

ŚĀSTRADĪPIKĀ
(TARKAPĀDA)

OF

Pārthasārathi Misra.

Translated into English

BY

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
P R E F A C E

This translation of the *Sāstradīpikā* (Tarkapāda) into English was undertaken by me on the recommendation of Mr. Hiriyanṇa, formerly Professor of Sanskrit in the Mysore University. I received unfailing help from him in the preparation of my work and many an emendation that he suggested, I acknowledge with thanks, has materially improved the translation. I find it hard to estimate the extent of my obligations to him. I am deeply grateful to Mahāmahopādhyāya Vaidyanātha Śāstri, Mīmāṃsā Pandit of the Śaṅkara Mutt, Bangalore, under whom I studied the *Sāstradīpikā*. He is one of the few authorities in India, to-day, on this somewhat neglected system. It was indeed a privilege that I had the inestimable advantage of his tuition. The other Pandit of repute to whom I am indebted is Vidvān Venkateśa Śāstri, Vedānta Professor in the same Institution. I am also obliged to Mr. Narasimha Śāstri Devudu M. A., my former pupil, who has assisted in the compilation of the appendix and the Index.

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To facilitate verification of the translation with the Original the Sanskrit text has been divided into paragraphs corresponding with those of the translation (vide appendix). The insertion of explanatory foot-notes may be justified on the ground that a translation even if it is not very close will leave the reader in doubt both as to the logical sequence of arguments and the import of words and expressions which are technical in character.

D. V.



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ABBREVIATIONS

- A. Tarka Samgraha by Y. V. Athalye (Bombay Sanskrit Series No. LV).
- Bh. G. Bhagavadgītā.
- BRH. UP. Brhadāranyakopaniṣad.
- CH. UP. Chāndogyopaniṣad.
- G. O. S. Gaekwad's Oriental Series Vol. LXVI.
- I. L. E. Indian Logic in early School by Randle.
- J. Sut. Jaimini Sūtra.
- K. K. M. Keith's Karma Mīmāṃsā.
- N. M. Nyāyamanjarī by Jayanta Bhatta. (Chowkambha Sanskrit Series)
- N. S. Nirṇayasāgara Edition.
- O. I. P. Outlines of Indian Philosophy by Prof. Hiriyanna.
- P. I. L. Primer of Indian Logic by Prof. Kuppaswāmi Sastri.
- P. P. Prakaraṇapañcikā.
- S. BH. Śābara Bhāṣya.
- S. D. S. Sarvadarśanasamgraha by Mādhava.
- S. L. S. Siddhanta Leśa Samgraha by Appayya Dīkṣita.
- Sud. Śāstradīpikā annotated by Sudarśanācārya. (Vidyāvilas Press, Benares).
- S. V. Śloka Vārtika of Kumārila Bhatta.
- Svet. Up. Śvetāśvataropaniṣad.
- Tait. Up. Taittareyopaniṣad.
- V. S. Vedānta Sūtra (Śāṃkara Bhāṣya), Nirṇayasāgara Edition.

INTRODUCTION

I

In the development of Indian thought through the ages the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā occupies an important and honored place. It may not soar to the heights of the Uttaramīmāṃsā or Vedānta in its speculations nor does one find therein that "metaphysical anguish" which the ancient sage seems to have felt but as Thibaut has pointed out its subject-matter is of a positive character, its logic is based on sound commonsense and barring its implicit submission to the authoritarian character of the Veda its appeal to reason is not different from that of rational philosophy. Even in the region of the scriptures the exposition of the text follows most scrupulously certain well-recognised canons of interpretation whose validity has been unquestioned by the later Indian jurists. Further the system is not occupied entirely with laying down injunctions as to the right performance of sacrifices. No doubt this branch of the Śāstra occupies the major portion of Jaimini's aphorisms as well as of the many commentaries on them. But it does not stop there. It penetrates into the deeper problems of life and death, the nature of the world of perception, the psychology of the thinking process, theory of knowledge, ethics, and finally the nature of the self and freedom. Every one of these problems is dealt with at some length in the Śāstra Dipikā setting forth not only the view-point of the Bhātta School but of other schools as well, more particularly that of Prabhākara who though a Mīmāṃsaka often comes into conflict with Kumārila the founder of the rival school of Mīmāṃsā.

II

Jaimini (c. 300 B. C.) the author of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā aphorisms is known as the Sūtrakāra as Bādarāyaṇa is of the Vedānta Sūtras. The Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtras are grouped into adhikaraṇas-topics which again are divided into twelve adhyāyas-Chapters. An adhyāya contains four pādas, with the exception of the third, sixth and tenth each of which has eight making a total of sixty pādas. The chapter contents are given in I. 1. 7-note 15. These twelve adhyāyas alone are generally regarded as constituting the entire Mīmāṃsā Śāstra (Dvādaśalakṣaṇī). Four additional chapters known as Samkarsakāṇḍa are by some taken to be a genuine sequel of the Śāstra composed by Jaimini himself.¹ The first great commentator

(1) Vide Introduction-pp. 12 and 13, to "Tattvabindu" of Vācaspatiśiṣ'ra edited by Mr. V. A. Ramaswami Sastri of the Annamalai University. I am indebted to the same source for the dates assigned to the authors in this section.

on the Sūtras was Śābarasvāmin (c. A. D. 200)¹ though others like Upavaṣa and Bhavadāsa had preceded him. That Śābara held Upavaṣa known as Vṛttikāra in great estimation is shown by the fact that he embodies in his Bhāṣya, Upavaṣa's alternative exposition of I. i. 3, 4, and 5. Śābara's is acknowledged as the standard commentary on the Sūtras and founded upon that commentary are two rival schools of Mīmāṃsā. Perhaps the older school is that of Prabhākara (c. A. D. 650) and the other is headed by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (c. A. D. -700)². Prabhākara has the honorific title of Guru- The great teacher, and his Bhāṣya is known as Brhāti. Śālikanātha who is supposed to have been his pupil has written a commentary on the Brhāti under the name Rjuvimalā and another treatise, Prakaraṇapañcīkā which is an independent work dealing with the essential doctrines of Gurumata. Dr. Ganganatha Jha is of the view that Prabhākara is more faithful to the Śābara-Bhāṣya than Kumārila and Professor Hiriyanna (O. I. P.) also thinks that the original teaching of the Mīmāṃsā Śāstra is better preserved in the writings of Prabhākara than in those of the other. Still it is curious that this school of Mīmāṃsā has long been neglected and the story is current among the Pandits that Prabhākara is under a curse.³ It is only recently that a few works of this school are being unearthed and made available to students of philosophy. In contrast, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa known as the Vārtikakāra has enjoyed uninterrupted popularity in the learned world as the outstanding interpreter of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā system. His is known as the Bhāṭṭa school and is generally followed by the orthodox section in their exegetical writings. His chief works are, (i) Śloka-Vārtika being an exposition in verse of pāda I of adhyāya I of Śābara-Bhāṣya, (ii) Tantravārtika which expounds the remaining three pādas of adhyāya I and adhyāyas II and III in their entirety, (iii) Tūptīkā which consists of brief notes on the other nine adhyāyas.

From a philosophical point of view the Śloka-vārtika is a most important work as it deals with questions relating to the theory of knowledge and the metaphysics of the Mīmāṃsā system. Pārthasārathi Miśra (c. A. D. 1050-1120) a reputed Mīmāṃsaka of the Bhāṭṭa persuasion, wrote Nyāyaratnākara and Tantraratna, commentaries respectively on Kumārila's Śloka-vārtika and Tūptīkā. Nyāyaratnamālā is another work of his as also Śāstradīpikā which latter is an independent commentary on the twelve chapters of Jaimini-Sūtras. The Tarkapāda, the first part of Śāstradīpikā is an elaboration of the doctrines contained in the first eight adhikaraṇas of Jaimini-Sūtras. It forms the philosophy

(1) "He is beleived by the Pandits to have lived about 57 B. C. being described as the father of King Vikramāditya"—"The Prabhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā" by Dr. Ganganatha Jha. This, Professor Keith regards as an idle fiction.

(2) Some hold the view that Prabhākara was "a younger contemporary of Kumārila".

(3) "Prabhākara's philosophy had to pay a heavy price for its innovating spirit; it never gained a solid footing; and until the publication of Śālikanātha's Prakaraṇapañcīkā in the "Pandit", the philosophy was known only under the misrepresentations of its opponents" - Dr. Jha,

par excellence of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā school and closely follows the Slokavārtika of Kumārila as may be evidenced from the prefatory verse. Though in the main it is an exposition of the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā it is polemical in character as it criticises the doctrines of other schools such as of Prabhākara, Advaita, Nyāyavaiśeṣika, and Bauddha. A helpful commentary on Śāstradīpikā is Yuktisnehaprapūraṇi Siddhānta-ṇḍrikā of Rāmakṛṣṇabhadda (c.A.D. 1700) referred to in the translation as ṇḍrikā.

An intelligent grasp of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā as expounded so succinctly and yet so lucidly in Śāstradīpikā will not only give the student a fair working knowledge of the Indian systems but will set him rightly on a critical and comparative study of philosophy. He will find that most of the problems dealt with here have their counterpart in the writings of European and American thinkers and that though the methods of investigation may be different the solutions in many cases are surprisingly identical. For the modern student of general philosophy, therefore the Śāstradīpikā (Tarkapāda) will be a valuable guide. Since the work is a compendium of the philosophy (darśana) of the Mīmāṃsakas it reviews questions of epistemology, ontology, as well as man's destiny. We will note here in brief how it sets about solving these problems.

III

The problem of knowledge was most vital to the Mīmāṃsakas. They had to defend the authority of the Veda as against heterodox teaching and it became imperative that a right criterion of validity (pramāṇya) that would establish beyond cavil its authoritarian character had to be found. Such a quest naturally led them to examine the nature of pramāṇa in general. What is the essential feature of a pramāṇa? What is it that constitutes the valid means of knowledge? The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas maintain that for a means of knowledge to be ranked as a pramāṇa it should satisfy two conditions: it should reveal something not known before i. e. the knowledge it gives should have the stamp of newness (anadhigata) and that knowledge should not be sublated later (abādhitā). For Prabhākara on the other hand all anubhava or the first apprehension is pramā so that neither of the two tests laid down by the Bhāṭṭas is required. Both however reject that remembrance-smṛti, is valid in as much as it is dependent on a prior cognition. It may be noted that this difference in the conception of pramāṇa materially affects the doctrine of error as held by these schools. Recognition-Pratyabhijñā however is free from the defect that pertains to memory-recall as it includes the perceptive element in addition to what is remembered and as such its validity is admitted.

In the Bhāṭṭa Scheme six pramāṇas or means of valid knowledge are accepted while the followers of Guru restrict them to five, the Naiyāyikas to four, the Sāṃkhyas to three, the Bauddhas to two and the Cārvāka materialists to one as specified below:—

Bhāṭṭas (together with the Advaitins)—perception, inference, verbal testimony, analogy, presumption, non-perception,

Prābhākara--	The first five.
Naiyāyikas--	The first four.
Sāṃkhya--	The first three.
Vaiśeṣika	} The first two.
&	
Bauddhas	} The first.
Carvāka Materialists--	

The view taken of perception varies with the different schools. The Bhāttas define it as knowledge derived from the contact of any one of the five senses with the objects presented to it. Mind also is admitted as the internal sense-organ. While it gives us the immediate cognition of pleasure and pain it is an indispensable aid to every kind of sense-activity. The realist that the Mīmāṃsaka is, he advances a powerful plea for the substantiality of the world and rejects the subjectivistic view of perception, held by a section of the Buddhists, as well as the Advaitic claim that the nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa or indeterminate perception has the absolute existence which is the attributeless Brahman as its object. It is interesting to note that the Mīmāṃsaka discards the intuitive perception, *yogaja-pratyakṣa* as held by the Naiyāyikas, and traditional hearsay (*aitihya*) thus showing that except in the domain of rituals he is not a mere dogmatizer.

A general feature of all cognition-perceptive or otherwise, is that it is self-evident (*svataḥpramāṇya*) and needs no other test to vouch for its validity—a contrast to the Nyāyavaiśeṣika doctrine that knowledge is valid only when it stands a pragmatic test. The cognition "This is water" is ascertained to be valid only when it leads to the quenching of thirst. This is known as *parataḥpramāṇya*. The Naiyāyikas extend this principle to knowledge derived from other means of cognition also such as inference, comparison etc.¹ For Mīmāṃsakas cognition is intrinsically valid both in its origin-Utpattau and in its ascertainment-jñaptau.²

(1) Kārikāvali - Stanzas 132-133-134.

(2) We have to find out how validity of cognition is produced (Utpatti) and how it is ascertained (Jñapti). According to the Mīmāṃsakas through whatever causes cognition arises through those same causes is its validity produced and through whatever causes cognition is cognised through the same causes is the Validity ascertained. This is what is understood by "the self-evidential nature of cognition". The cognition - "This is water" is produced by the perceptive sense &c., its Validity is produced by the same causes; and according to the Bhāttas it is inferentially ascertained by the mark Jñātātā (knownness). Its validity is known in that very process requiring no additional means. But according to the Prābhākaras since cognition is self-luminous its validity becomes manifest through that very luminosity. For the Naiyāyikas the validity of cognition is produced by the actual presence of some quality-guṇa, which varies according to the kind of pramāṇa. In the case of perception it is Viśeṣaṇa-vadvis'ēṣyasannikarṣa i. e. there must be something that is really qualified by that which is seen to qualify it. In "this is silver" the "this" is really qualified by "silverness" in case it is pramā and not so qualified in case it is bhramā. The ascertainment of validity is by means of a pragmatic test. It may be noted that for the Sāṃkhyas both validity and non-validity of a cognition are self-established, for Naiyāyikas both need an external test; for Bauddhas non-validity is self established and validity established ab extra and for Mīmāṃsakas it is just the reverse.

Now if validity is intrinsic to all knowledge how is it that sometimes our knowledge turns out to be false? We have seen that according to the Bhāttas one condition of truth is that it should not be sublated later (abādhitā). There should be exact correspondence between the cognition and the object of cognition if this condition should be fulfilled. Erroneous knowledge fails in this respect. When a piece of shell is mistaken for silver and the person tries to get it he is disappointed. Now the question is why should error arise at all? Confining ourselves to judgments of perception we find that different theories are held by different schools. The Bhāṭṭa view is known as anyathākhyāti as also that of the Naiyāyikas. Literally it means misapprehension; in other words, we have error when one thing appears as another. Like all other realists the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka must concede reality to both the subject and the predicate elements composing the erroneous cognition. The piece of shell and silver are realities independent of the mind but the relation of identity appearing in the erroneous cognition is false. This mistaken identity is due to some defect (doṣa) in the sense-organ or other attendant circumstances. When truth dawns on the disappearance of the doṣa what is sublated is only the relation, with the result that the existence of the subject viz. shell—"This", in "This is silver" is re-affirmed while that of the predicate, viz. "silver" is negated though "silver" has its being elsewhere. It is therefore seen that the relation alone is false, the ontological status of both the subject and the predicate remaining unaltered. So far there is agreement between the Bhāttas and the Naiyāyikas. But the latter interpose a variety of what they term alaukikasannikarṣa or super-normal relation (jñānalakṣṇapratyāsatti) between the eye and the object (viz. "The silver in the shop"—āpanastha rajata) constituted by smṛti,¹ for without some kind of contact between the sense-organ and the object no perception can arise. The relation and the relation are all given. But the Bhāttas accepting the relation as given consider the relation as non-existent. The anyathākhyāti as held by the Bhāttas is also known as Viparītakhyāti.

The Prābhākaras have their own theory of error known as akhyāti. In this view there is no such thing as error since all experience-anubhava, is valid. They contend that if anyathākhyāti is admitted the Bhāttas will have to abandon their doctrine of the self-evidential character of cognition. The so-called error, they maintain, arises when we miss the distinction between two cognitions. It is one of omission, not of commission. In the perception of shell-silver neither the cognition of shell nor that of silver is erroneous² and there exists no actual

(1) Cf. N. M. p. 162, Vol. I where the term "Viparītakhyāti" is used in place of anyathākhyāti.

Cf. also Gaudabrahmānandī (Laghuṇḍrikā), N. S. Edn. p. 647, where it is mentioned that the Naiyāyikas of the older school posit alaukikasannikarṣa to account for the knowledge of "silver" in the erroneous cognition "This is silver" but that the later Naiyāyikas account for it as due to doṣa only, thus agreeing with the Bhāttas in entirety.

(2) 'not erroneous' in the case of cognition of silver is not equivalent to prama, for it is smṛti.

relation between the two but we forget for the time being to note the *absence* of the relation. There is no synthesised unit-knowledge here. The objects denoted by the cognition are distinct but this fact is lost sight of owing to the obscuration of memory-Smṛtipramoṣa. The "this" in "this is silver" is perceptive, and "silver" is recollective and we fail to comprehend these, their distinctive features, Truth and error as commonly understood have to be determined by the test of practical efficiency. Every cognition prompts one to activity, say, of trying to possess the object given in that cognition. If that activity proves fruitful then the cognition is valid, if otherwise it is erroneous. When error is dispelled the volitional effort to get the thing alone ceases but the cognitions are not in any way affected. There is no sublation of an earlier cognition by a later one as in the Viparīṭakhyāti. What is sublated by the apprehension of the distinction is the desire and the activity consequent thereon.¹

There are other cases of error which are not quite on a par with "shell-silver". When owing to the juxtaposition of japākusuma (China rose) a crystal is seen as red both objects are within the perceptive range unlike "shell-silver" where of the two objective contents one is perceptive and the other recollective. No doubt here also we have imperfect knowledge. We see the crystal minus its white colour and the red colour of the flower. We miss that they are two. Erroneous cognitions like the perception of double-moon and those occurring in dreams are explained in the text. (V. 12).

The theory of akhyāti has this advantage over the Bhāṭṭa Viparīṭakhyāti in that it is true to the realism of the Mīmāṃsakas. While the Bhāṭṭas have to account for error by positing a relation (samsarga) which is non est and as such is subjective and so prove disloyal to their realistic postulate, the Prābhākaras by cancelling error altogether and ascribing validity to all experience can maintain their adherence to realism unimpaired. But the chief criticism against the akhyāti doctrine is that it goes counter to experience. Unless there is synthesised knowledge in an error-situation there could be no prompting to activity. If there be two cognitions they must appear as such since according to the Prābhākaras they are self-revealing in their character. But they do not. Hence we must conclude that somehow we get a unitary cognition which alone can account for such conative activity as may arise. A certain degree of monistic interpretation seems hardly to be avoided.

(1) Vide N. M. p. 165, part I - न हेतवेन, रजतनिषेधो विधीयते किं तु प्राग्गृहीतो विवेकः प्रख्यायते; न इदं रजतं-यदेवेदं तदेव रजतमित्येतन्न; इदमिदं, रजतं रजतम्; एतदुक्तं भवति-इदं अन्यत् रजतमन्यत्-.

The sublating cognition does not sublimate "silver" but the distinction not apprehended before will be apprehended. The meaning of "This is not silver" is that this very object of previous apprehension is not the silver that we supposed it was; "this is this" (referring to silver) and "silver is silver". In fine it comes to this - "this" is one distinct and "silver" is another.

The other doctrines of error are the ātmakhyāti of the Yogācāra idealists, the asatkhyāti of the Mādhyamika Nihilists, and anirvaṇāniya-khyāti of the Advaita Vedānta. The Yogācāra maintains that erroneous knowledge arises from the superimposition of cognitional forms on non-existent objects (alīka). For him even in the case of valid knowledge there is no objective counterpart. It is only the cognition (vijñāna) that externalises itself and presents the world of variety. But in the case of error the externalisation points not even to momentary objects, the reason for such externalisation being explained as due to the revival of beginningless vāsanās or mental impressions.¹ Now this view is criticised on various grounds. If silver in the illusory cognition, "this is silver" is only a thought-form (jñānākāra) though imposed on a fictitious object the question arises whether it is cognised by the same jñāna. If so then the subject and the object would be identical—a view upheld by none else. It cannot be said that this thought-form is the viśaya (object) of some other jñāna because of its momentariness and because one jñānākāra is like another (samatvāt)—one light is not manifested by another (vide Iṣṭasiddhi p. 113). A more serious objection is that the Buddhist view of the self-revealing nature of jñāna has to be abandoned in case one jñāna needs another for its manifestation. Further infinite regress is inevitable since no cognition as such can be established. Even if the self-revelatory character of jñāna and through it the jñānākāra of silver be admitted it should be asked whether the thought-form, "the silver which is my (thought) form manifests itself as if existing outside", is apprehended at the very time such cognition arises or at some other time. If at the very time, then "bhramā" itself will not arise because Vijñāna cannot at the same moment apprehend the silver as its own form and, also as existing outside.² If at other, the former objection holds good, viz, being momentary this thought-form will have disappeared. When jñānākāratva upon which the ātmakhyāti is based stands discredited neither pramā nor bhramā can be rationally explained.³ The Nihilistic view of error scarcely deserves any consideration. Since all is void-sūnya there is no criterion by which to distinguish truth from error. It may be said that error is only a variety of universal illusion due to vāsanās but then the question is how any vāsanā could arise without having reference to some previous positive experience and as Nyāyamanjari (P. 164 part I;

(1) Cf. Bhāmati on S'āṅkarabhāṣya text— तं केचित् अन्यत्र अन्यवर्मायास इति वदन्ति. This is what Bhāmati says—

विज्ञानवादिनामपि न बाह्यवस्तुसुत; तथापि अनाद्यविद्यावासनारोपितमलीके बाह्यम् । तत्र ज्ञानाकारस्य आरोपः , V. S. N. Edn. P. 26—For Vijñānavādins no doubt external objects as reals do not exist; still in an error-situation what takes place is that the thought-forms are superimposed on objects which though not existing appear as existing owing to timeless vāsanās. Hence with the corrective knowledge "nedam rajatam" what is sublated is the "This" aspect — idamtva of silver, the ātmākāra of silver is left in tact but its externality is negatived.

(2) Cf. सैव चेत् बुद्धिः सदाकारो बहिर्वद्भातीति तदैव जानीयात्, भ्रान्तिर्न स्यात्—Iṣṭasiddhi, p. 113.

(3) Vide Iṣṭasiddhi pp. 113-115 G.O.S.

p. 110 part II) pertinently puts it—why should a *vāsana* point to silver and not to sky-lotus?¹

The illusionism of the world is explained by the Advaitins on the analogy of erroneous cognition. The silver which appears in nacre is not the one which exists somewhere and recollected, as advocated by the Naiyāyikas and the Bhāttas; nor is it a thought-form as viewed by the Vijnānavādins, nor finally is it void-*sūnya*. It is a positive something which cannot be described either as existing, or non-existing, nor as both existing and non-existing-sat, asat, and sadasat. It is *anirvaṇaṇiya*, i. e. something bearing the character of neither sat nor asat-sadasadvilakṣaṇa. It is not sat; if it were so it could not be sublated; it is not asat; for if it were so it would not be present to the perceptive sense-organs. It has therefore a unique existence. The cause of such appearance is due to ignorance or *avidyā*. Since it shows the object as out there, the silver in our example is not subjective but at the same time it is private, for error is error only to the man whose *avidyā* has caused it and not to others. *Avidyā* being the source of wrong knowledge as well as of wrong object both can be discredited by right knowledge for the contradiction, it is reasonable to suppose, exists between *jñāna* and *ajñāna* for they are opposed to each other like light and darkness and not between one *jñāna* and other. Now the world also is *anirvaṇaṇiya* for it is presented in knowledge and yet like the silver in the erroneous cognition or *bhṛāntijñāna* it disappears with the rise of true knowledge. Whether the *jīva* is the ground (*āśrya*) of this cosmic nescience or Brahman and what discipline-moral and spiritual, one has to undergo to overcome it are questions that pertain to a different sphere of investigation. The doctrine of illusoriness of the world and the way of salvation through *jñāna* are fundamentally opposed to the realism of the *Mīmāṃsā* and come in for a sharp criticism at the hands of Pārthasārathi (v 142).

We may now deal briefly with the other means of valid knowledge. Inference is thus defined by Śaṅkara.—“that of two things found in constant association the presence of the one causes the apprehension of the other that is absent and that apprehension is Inference.” This definition is criticised on the ground that no new knowledge is brought to light. The Bhāṭṭa meets the objection by maintaining that what is given in *Vyāpti* is universal and that therefore there is no warrant for the supposition that in particular cases of Inference we are only apprehending a past cognition. The cognition of the relation between the *hetu* and *pakṣa* is the new element even though the probandum is implied in the knowledge of the invariable concomitance. The *Vyāpti* gives us the knowledge that wherever there is smoke there is fire but we are not aware that the particular hill we are seeing is fiery, and this apprehension constitutes inference, which is therefore a distinct addition to knowledge.

The Prābhīkara account of Inferential cognition is different. The invariable concomitance, a knowledge of which is indispensable for

(1) cf. Śāṅkara Bhāṣya on V. S. II ii 30 and 31. Śāṅkara refutes the *sūnya* vāda of the Mādhyamikas on the ground that no *vāsanā* can arise without a positive ultimate and that even *ālayavijñāna* (“repository consciousness”) which may be presumed to serve as a support (*adhiharaṇa*) for *vāsanā*s will fail because like everything else it is momentary.

anumiti is the unconditioned relation-*anaupādhikasambandha*¹. Now the invariable connection with fire is perceived in the case of smoke but not vice versa. The fire of red-hot iron ball is smokeless but it is only when wet-wood is kindled that the connection of fire with smoke is observed. Hence the relation free from any upādhi alone leads to valid inference. The objection that since no new knowledge is given in anumiti it ceases to be a *pramāṇa* is warded off by Prabhākara on the ground that direct apprehension-*anubhūti* and not the cognition of the uncognised (*agrhita-grāhitva*.) constitutes valid knowledge-*pramā*. The Bhāṭṭa agreeing with the Naiyāyika considers that the essential condition of *vyāpti* is the absence of *hetu* when there is no *sādhya*².

Inference may be classed as *svārtha*-for oneself, and *parārtha*, for another. For the first the *Mīmāṃsakas* consider that the recollection of the invariable concomitance of the probans and probandum (*vyāpti*) together with the knowledge that the probans (*hetu*) is present in the *pakṣa* (subject) is sufficient to produce inferential cognition. The Naiyāyikas would require in addition *liṅgaparāmarśa*-“subsumptive reflection” i. e. cognition in the *pakṣa* of that *hetu* which is known to be in invariable concomitance with the *sādhya* (fire). The later Naiyāyikas regard *liṅgaparāmarśa* alone as sufficient for *svārthānumāna*. For the second a more elaborate process is necessary, since the knowledge has to be conveyed through the medium of language. According to the Naiyāyikas a syllogism ought to have the following five members:—

- (i) *Pratijñā*-the thesis or proposition.
- (ii) *Hetu*-the probans or reason.
- (iii) *Udāharana*-exemplification
- (iv) *Upanaya*-subsumptive correlation
- (v) *Nigamana*-Conclusion

The *Mīmāṃsakas* would have only i, ii and iii and the Buddhists iii and iv for a complete syllogism.

As in the case of perception inference also under certain circumstances gives rise to error instead of truth. The Naiyāyikas bring in all kinds of fallacious arguments under five heads and use the general term *hetvābhāsa* to indicate that it is the defective *hetu* or mark that vitiates inferential knowledge. These fallacies are *Savyabhiçāra* or *anaiçāntika*, *Viruddha*, *satpratipakṣa*, *asiddha* and *bādhita*. Kumārila accepts not only the fallacies of the *hetu* but also those of the thesis (*pakṣa*) and the example (*udāharana*). As regards *hetvābhāsa* there is no material difference between the two schools of *Mīmāṃsā*. In the terminology of Prabhākara the fallacies are: i *bādhaka*, f. i. “the world is eternal because it is a product;” we have to note that what is a product is by its very nature not eternal; ii *sādhāraṇa*, f. i. “the world is eternal because

(1) यः कश्चिदेन यस्येह सम्बन्धो निश्चायिकः ।

प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमासिद्धः सतस्य गमको सतः ॥ P. P. *Pramāṇapārāyaṇam* p. 71.

(2) व्याप्तिस्वाच्यवदन्यस्मि-

न्न सम्बन्ध उदाहृतः

} *Bhāṣāpariçcheda*—*Kārikā*. 68.

of its cognizability;" cognizability may be predicated of both eternal and non-eternal objects; this reasoning engenders doubt; iii *anekadeśa-bhūta*; f. i. "the sky is perceptive because it is associated with colour" the sky is never the substratum of colour; iv *ekadeśānekadeśa bhūta*, f. i. "the Veda is the work of man because it is of the nature of episodes;" episodes are found in some parts and not in all parts of the Veda; v *svārūpāsiddha*, f. i. "Buddha has perception of Dharma and adharma because he is omniscient"; the omniscience of Buddha is not substantiated by any *pramāṇa*; vi *bādhita*, f. i. "fire is not-hot because it is an object"; perception dispels the notion of the fire being cold. It may be noted that i, iii, iv, v and vi are respectively termed *Viruddha*, *svārūpāsiddha*, *bhāgāsiddha*, *sādhanaṣiddha* and *bādhita* by the *Naiyāyikas*.

Kumārila's exposition of the fallacies is contained in V. 52 ff.

Upamāna or analogy and *arthāpatti* or presumption call for no notice here since they receive a fairly adequate treatment in the text (V. 65-76). *Arthāpatti* however is rejected as a *pramāṇa* by the logicians and is subsumed under inference. *Anupalabdhi* or non-apprehension is elevated to the rank of a *pramāṇa* by the *Bhāttas* but the *Prābhākaras* decline to concede *pramāṇatva* to it. In "there is no jar on the ground" the positive knowledge of *bhūta* (ground) they say, is of two kinds—(a) ground associated with some object; (b) bare ground; (b) is again of two kinds—(i) knowledge of the ground when there is the notion of the *pratiyogin*, say, jar; (ii) when no such notion exists. Where the *pratiyogin* is thought of but the knowledge of *bhūta* alone arises, that is *abhāva*. The knowledge of the *dharmin*, viz. *bhūta* when the *pratiyogin* is under consideration—*prasakta*, has to be admitted by all as generating the *abhāva*-cognition. Hence *Prābhākara* contends that the cognition of the *dharmin* alone is *abhāva*; it is also the knowledge of *abhāva* because all *Jñāna* is self-revealing and finally the ground of the usage—"here is no jar", there being thus no need to postulate another *pramāṇa* viz. *anupalabdhi* (vide p.p. *Pramāṇapārāyaṇa*, pp. 118 ff.). *Pārthasārathi* maintains *anupalabdhi* as a distinct means of proof by arguing that the absence of an object, say a jar, on the ground cannot be apprehended by any of the aforesaid *pramāṇas*—perception, inference, analogy or verbal testimony. The very incapacity of these *pramāṇas* to serve as a means of apprehending *abhāva* or absence points to a different *pramāṇa* to enable one to cognise it and this *pramāṇa* is *anupalabdhi* (V. 77-84).

None of the above *pramāṇas* is competent to serve as a means of ascertaining Dharma which is supersensuous. As the second *sūtra* has declared, it is the Veda alone that is the *pramāṇa* for establishing Dharma. The Veda is an assemblage of words just like the composition of any author and the question arises how it could be infallible seeing that human utterances are often erroneous. The *Mīmāṃsakas* therefore maintain the eternity of the word as such. For them the word, its meaning, and the relation between them are all eternal, not depending upon any human convention. The *Naiyāyikas* also admit

Verbal testimony as a valid instrument of knowledge but do not uphold the view that the word is eternal. With them the relation between the word and its meaning is of divine origin, God having settled that a particular word should denote a particular thing. Controversy rages on the question of the significance or śakti of the word. The Nyāya view is that the word denotes the individual as associated with the universal-jātivīśiṣṭavyakti. The word "cow" means the individual animal as associated with the jāti-cowhood. The Mīmāṃsakas on the other hand maintain that jāti alone is connoted by the word while the notion of vyakti is conveyed by implication or lakṣaṇa. The primary significance of the word according to the Bauddhas is *aṣṭha*, i. e. what a word means is something as differentiated from other objects. The word "cow" signifies something that is different from a horse, an elephant etc.

Another point to be noticed here is that words cannot always be taken in their primary sense-śakya or abhidheya. Where the primary sense is inappropriate we have to resort to the secondary sense-lakṣyārtha, though the latter must be based on the primary. When we say the town has risen in rebellion, we mean its inhabitants or in the stock example, "gangāyām ghoṣaḥ," the sentence literally means the village (ghoṣa)-in-the-stream. This being unsuited we take "gangā" to mean its bank and the import of the sentence is, the village situated on the bank. We need not go into the consideration of the varieties of lakṣaṇa-jahallakṣaṇa, ajahallakṣaṇa and jahajahallakṣaṇa which last is premised by the Advaita Vedāntins and not by other darsanakāras. The Mīmāṃsakas admit another vṛtti or import of words, viz. gaṇi as in the example 'he is a lion' where certain qualities of the lion are attributed to the person compared. The rhetoricians (āṅkārīkas) include a fourth vṛtti known as vyanjanā-suggestion.

Having discarded samketa or the conventional element in language by admitting the eternality of words (Varṇa) and their meanings the Mīmāṃsakas postulate the vibhūta or omnipresence of words. It is the dhvani or tone that reveals the varṇa (syllable) that is ever present. The significative potency (śakti) of words is understood in the early stages of learning the language by observing the context in which the words are used by the elders. Now the question is how the import of sentences is apprehended. There is a sharp distinction between the two schools of Mīmāṃsā. Prabhākara thinks that no word is significant in isolation. It is only in association with a verbal idea that it becomes significant. Even when single words are used as say 'door' some word as 'open' expressing an act is implied. Words are all 'sentence-words'. He goes further and maintains that words in general become significant only in injunctive sentences. This view is known as the anvitābhidhāna vāda meaning thereby that in syntactical combination only (anvita) the words reveal their sense. Kumāṛila on the other hand admits that words can denote meanings independently without the necessity of their being found in

company with words denoting injunction. He maintains that the meanings of words, even after the words have disappeared express the import of propositions. This is known as the *abhihitānvaya vāda* which means that the combination is of meanings (*abhihita*) and not of words when construing a sentence. In the view of *Prabhākara* we have a truly valid verbal cognition in the case of the *Veda* alone and hence this *pramāṇa* he calls *sāstra*. As regards *laukika* or non-scriptural statements their validity is not ascertained directly but through inference. They are therefore mere re-statements—*anuvāda*. In fact he holds the extreme view that the utterances of men give us no true knowledge and if asked how men carry on their business his answer is that even on probabilities secular transactions take place—*arthasamśaya* *loke vyavahāraḥ itivādamaḥ* (PP. *Pramāṇapārāyaṇa* p. 95). For *Kumārila* also *Veda-vākyas* are all denotative of action, the statements which denote existing things (*siddha*) serving only as subsidiaries to injunctive propositions (*Vidhivākyas*). But he maintains that even *laukikavākyas* are credible provided they satisfy the criterion of validity, viz. that the source from which they emanate is trustworthy and that what they signify is not later sublated. As regards *Vedavākyas* there being no agency since *śabda* is eternal they are immaculate. And he also maintains unlike the other that in the parlance of men statements can relate to *siddhavastu*—an existing something, also and not solely to something to be done (*sādhya*). There is again a divergence of view between these two thinkers regarding the manner in which Vedic Propositions, injunctive as well as prohibitory have to be construed, but the question is out of our purview. ¹

Before passing on to the next topic we may just refer to the controversy in regard to what are known as *pramāṇasamplava* and *pramāṇavyavasthā*. The *Bauddhas* maintain that the operation of each *pramāṇa* is restricted to a particular sphere, no single cognitive fact being the *viśaya* of more than one valid means of knowledge. According to them perception gives us only the bare particulars—things without any kind of determination such as name, *jāti* etc., and in the cognition of these isolated, colourless, *svalakṣaṇas* (particulars) perception is the only right means and none other. Inference on the other hand is the exclusive *pramāṇa* as regards all determinations like *jāti* &c. Except perception and inference no other *pramāṇa* is recognised by them and their scope is thus demarcated. The instrumentality of both or more than one *pramāṇa* as regards the knowledge of one and the same object (*pramāṇasamplava*) they discard.

The *Naiyāyikas* admit both *pramāṇasamplava* and *pramāṇavyavasthā*, which latter excludes the possibility of more than one *pramāṇa* functioning in relation to the cognition of a single object. In arriving at the existence of *ātman*, for example, we may depend upon the testimony of a trustworthy person (*śabda*) and also resort to inference when the probans (*hetu*) is furnished by the attributes of the

(1) The reader who is interested in this topic may consult *Nyāyaprakāśa* (Āpadevi) and *Arthasamgraha* for the *Bhāṭṭa* interpretation and PP. *Vākyaarthamāṭṛkā prakaraṇa* for the *Prābhākara* interpretation.

self, viz., desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain and knowledge. On the other hand the Veda (Śabda) is the sole pramāṇa in regard to the efficacy of sacrificial rites like Agnihotra, so that there is room, according to this school both for pramāṇasamplava and pramāṇavyavasthā.

The Mīmāṃsakas agreeing with the Naiyāyikas uphold the concurrent as well as the single testimony of the pramāṇas. The unique probative value of revelation (Śabda) is accepted in matters pertaining to the transcendental realm (cf. Īśānaśāstrī artho Dharmah-2nd Sūtra). So again (according to the Bhāttas) there is pramāṇavyavasthā as regards the cognition of abhāva for it is given only by anupalabdhi. But as regards the knowledge, say, of fire on the hill, it may be had either by perception, when one actually goes to the spot or by inference on seeing the smoke or by verbal testimony, thus making way for pramāṇasamplava.¹

IV

In dealing with the Mīmāṃsā epistemology it has been shown that both schools uphold realism. While Kumārila accommodates idealism to some extent in accounting for erroneous knowledge, Prabhākara holds the extreme realistic view banishing error altogether from the domain of knowledge. The nihilism of the Mādhyaṃikas and the idealism of the Vijnānavādins are both refuted and the objective world is regarded as a positive entity existing in its own right independently of the senses and the mind which comprehend it. The world in the Mīmāṃsā view is an ultimate real and not error-begotten as advocated by the Advaita Vedānta.

Now this world of reality is brought under certain categories. According to the Bhāttas they are five:—substance-dravya, quality-guṇa, action or motion-karma, generality-sāmānya, and negation-abhāva. Rejecting abhāva Prabhākara adds inherence (samavāya), potency-(śakti),² similarity-(sādrśya), and number-(Samkhyā). Both reject the viśeṣa of the Vaiśeṣikas who recognise seven categories discarding the three special categories of the Prabhākaras viz., śakti, sādrśya, and samkhyā. The Sāmkhyas recognise only two ultimate categories Prakṛti and Puruṣa, though the classifications of Padārthas number twenty five including the evolutes; the Advaitins only one viz., Brahman-the cit, the aṇi being only its illusory manifestation.

Substance is that in which the quality-size subsists by tādātmyasambandha (vide Manameyodaya, p. 149.) and it comprises nine according to Prabhākara, viz., earth, water, air, fire, ether, self (ātman), mind, time and space. These subdivisions are very nearly like those of the Vaiśeṣikas. Kumārila has in addition darkness and sound. According to Prabhākara darkness is not a separate substance but only a subs-

(1) For a further treatment of this subject Vide N. M. pp. 28-33, Pramāṇa Prakaraṇa; also Vātsyayana Bhāṣya on Gotama sūtra I i-3.

(2) The Bhāttas are not reluctant to admit śakti as a distinct category though disagreeing with the Prabhākaras that it is to be inferred - Manameyodaya p. - 261.

tratum devoid of light ¹. The Naiyāyikas hold that it is the absence of light. Earth, water and fire are perceptive since they possess both colour and a certain degree of magnitude (mahatva) but air has touch but does not possess colour. The other substances can only be inferred.

Twenty-four qualities on the basis of the Vaiśeṣika classification are admitted by the Mīmāṃsakas and these are :

(i) The specific qualities (Viśeṣaḡuṇas) viz. intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, colour, taste, odour, touch, viscosity, natural fluidity, fate (dharma and adharma), mental impression and sound.

(ii) The general qualities (Sāmānyagūṇas) viz. number, quantity, severality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, (derived fluidity), gravity and velocity. Kumāṛila omits dharma, adharma and śabda from the category of quality but adds śakti, prākṛatya and dhvani while Prabhākara refuses to admit number and discards prākṛatya altogether. The first six of the Viśeṣagūṇas are the qualities of the self and they are non-eternal.

Karma or action is perceptible as held by Kumāṛila and the Naiyāyikas but inferable according to the Prabhākaras.

Sāmānya or jāti (generality) is accepted as a separate category by most schools of Indian thought except that of the Bauddhas in which it is regarded as merely a mental idea (kalpana). Prabhākara agreeing with the Naiyāyikas considers jāti as real, eternal, and distinct from the individuals which serve as its substrate, and perceptible. Kumāṛila's view is somewhat at variance with Prabhākara's in as much as it is thought that jāti does not exist apart from the individuals, the relation between the two being bhedābheda. The cognition of certain common features among individuals differing in other respects is the sole basis of the cognition of jāti. In the absence of such common characteristics there arises no idea of generality. Prabhākara accordingly does not admit jāti where there is not a certain configuration (samsthāna) common to several individuals of a particular class. Hence he, unlike Kumāṛila, does not recognise such universals as Brāhmanatva, Kṣatriyatva, Sattā etc. As regards the relation of the individual and the jāti it is *inherence* (samavāya) in the case of Prabhākara and the Logicians and *īdātmya* (bhedābheda, identity-cum-difference) in the case of Kumāṛila. When a new individual comes into being, say a pot, it comes associated with potness (ghatatva). The ghatatva is eternal and is already present but what is brought about is the relation (inherence) of the individual 'pot' with its class-character. Such a view would be repugnant to the Naiyāyikas who hold inherence to be eternal. With the Bhāttas also the same explanation holds good, i. e. *īdātmya* arises anew in the origination of pot. The Naiyāyikas divide sāmānya into the more comprehensive and the less comprehensive (param and aparam), ghatatva for example is less inclusive than dravyatva (Substantiality). A distinction has to be made between jāti and upādhi. A feature which belongs to several individuals need not

(1) A section of the Prabhākaras regard darkness as the absence of the knowledge of light—आलोकज्ञानाभाव इति प्रमाकरैकदेशिनः S. D. S. p. 88.

necessarily constitute a *jāti*. If a hundred people should all be teetotalars, teetotalism does not constitute an independent class. It is only *upādhi*. Under certain conditions only can a common characteristic be regarded as universal (*jāti*).

The fifth category in the world-scheme of Kumārila is *abhāva* or non-existence. This has a fourfold classification: antecedent non-existence-*prāgabhāva*, annihilative non-existence-*pradhvamsābhāva*, absolute non-existence-*atyantābhāva*, and mutual non-existence-anyonyābhāva. Before its origination we have the *prāgabhāva* of *ghata* (pot), after its destruction we have *pradhvamsābhāva*, in 'pot is not on the ground' we have *atyantābhāva*, and there may be any number of such *abhāvas*; in 'pot is not cloth' we have *anyonyābhāva*. With the origination of the pot its *prāgabhāva* ceases. Like the *Naiyāyikas* the *Bhāttas* recognise *abhāva* as a distinct category and it is the object of a special *pramāṇa*, viz., *anupalabdhi*. For *Naiyāyikas* there is no such instrument of knowledge as *anupalabdhi* and hence *abhāva* for them is an object of direct perception where the *pratyogin* is perceptible, being related to its *adhikaraṇa*, say floor, by *viśeṣanāṭā*, i. e. *ghatābhāva* is an attribute of *bhūtala* (floor). *Prabhākara* as we have seen refutes the theory that *abhāva* is a distinct category and that *anupalabdhi* is a separate means of valid knowledge. For him the cognition of the simple substratum—the bare ground is the basis of the negative proposition.

V

There is divergence of views regarding the nature of Liberation-Mokṣa, and the discipline essential for its attainment. In three different ways is Mokṣa conceived:— (i) it is averred that eternal happiness and eternal consciousness arise in *ātman* in the state of Mokṣa and that such manifestation without the compresence of the objects of sense is itself Mokṣa (*Vedāntakalpalatīkā Govt. Sans. Lib. Benares, p. 4*); this view, however, is not supported by *Pārthasārathi* as the one held by Kumārila; (ii) the second view is that Mokṣa is the revelation of bliss by the mind since it is supposed that mind is eternal and endures in liberation (cf. *Mānameyodaya—Theosophical Publishing House, Madras P. 212*); (iii) others again hold that Mokṣa consists in the realisation of the self rid of all pain. The last view is the one advocated by our author. As interpreted by him Kumārila seems to maintain that the attainment by the self of its own true nature is Mokṣa. In the state of liberation the self is self's all, i. e. *ātman* is related to *ātman* only having no contact with the outside world. What constitutes liberation is the final riddance of the receptacle of experience, i. e. of the body which is the seat of joys and sorrows, of the instruments of experience such as the senses and the mind and of the relation with the objects of experience. There is no transcendental happiness which the enduring mind enables the liberated soul to experience. It is evident therefore that the concept of Mokṣa is negative in character there being no positive experience of bliss in the

state of release as held by the Vedāntins¹. The liberated soul is accompanied neither by knowledge nor by bliss. It is insentient though it has the cognitive potency in a latent condition.

Now the question is by what means is this state of negation brought about? Before answering this question we should understand the cause which has ushered this life of ours into existence. Like other Indian philosophies, the Mīmāṃsā also admits that samsāra which is bondage is the result of one's past karma and that unless this bondage is disrupted Mokṣa is unattainable and hence it is urged that the only effectual means by which one can obtain final release is by ceasing to perform karma altogether. Karma is of three kinds: (1) kāmya or interested; (2) niṣiddha or prohibited; (3) nitya and naimittika or obligatory. The Mīmāṃsā discipline prerequisite for the attainment of the goal is, abstention from the performance of both interested and prohibited karmas and the assiduous pursuit of nitya karma. It is the first and second varieties of karma that bring on good and bad births respectively. Dharma or merit accrues from the performance of interested karma such as jyotiṣṭoma and the result is a desirable life; adharma or sin accrues from the performance of prohibited work like śyenayāga and results in an evil birth. If one therefore is anxious to put an end to the recurring cycle of birth and death one should desist from the performance of both these karmas. Nitya however like sandhyā vandana—morning and evening prayers, sacrifices on new-moon and full-moon days and on the advent of spring etc. is a lifelong duty and its neglect produces sin thus paving the way for rebirth. Hence under no circumstance should nitya karma be left undone. It will be seen that kāmya from its hedonistic character and niṣiddha because of its sinful nature are both interdicted in the discipline of one who has set his heart on reaching Mokṣa—the bourne from which there is no return. This is the highest human end—puruṣārtha towards which all endeavour is to be directed. But then what about samcita, the accumulated past karma? A part of it which has begun to function, no doubt, will be exhausted by experiencing its fruit in one's present life but this is only an infinitesimal fragment of the accumulations of bygone births and until they are fully worked out there is no possibility of the wheel of samsāra coming to a stand-still. To escape from this dilemma it is maintained that nityakarma if performed to the exclusion of kāmya and pratiṣiddha has the potency to destroy the entire mass of residual samcita. An alternative explanation is that samcita in its entirety and not piecemeal is the cause of the present life and its total extinction is brought about if only one carries out the scriptural injunctions laid down for the attainment of Mokṣa, so that the question of samcita apart from

(1) Parthasārathi no doubt denies the existence of ānanda in the state of Mokṣa and maintains that this negative conception is in consonance with Kumārila's view (V-143). But Anantadeva in his commentary-Bhāttāṅkara on Mīmāṃsā Nyāya-prakāśa states that the ānanda doctrine is the one held by Kumārila and quotes in support the authority of Nyāyasudhā—a commentary on Kumārila's Tantravārtika. There is apparently some discrepancy between S'loka Vārtika and Tantravārtika in regard to the nature of Mokṣa.

prārabdha does not arise at all.¹ This is known as the aikabhavika doctrine and is postulated to meet the contention that samṛpa cannot be eradicated in a single birth. Some appear to hold that this doctrine which subordinates, if it does not altogether exclude jñāna and makes karma (nitya) the principle means of liberation, is the one advocated by the Bhāttas.

Another point for consideration is whether in the Mīmāṃsā doctrine the performance of nitya-naimittika alone having abstained from kāmya and niṣiddha is conducive to Mokṣa or whether the knowledge of the self (ātmanjñāna) also is essential. Pārthasārathi makes it clear (vide V para 149) that for Mokṣa the co-ordination of both jñāna and karma is indispensable. This theory which recognises the value of jñāna as an effective aid to Mokṣa is known by the name of jñāna-karma samuṇṇaya.² Such knowledge is admitted as indispensable both for karma and for Mokṣa – kratvartha and puruṣārtha. It is not, however, the knowledge of the identity of the individual soul with the supreme soul (Brahmātmaikya) as in the Advaita view. But it is the knowledge of the fact that the self survives the body and is eternal. How Atmanjñāna subserves karma as well as Mokṣa is detailed in V. 149.

Prabhākara more or less falls in line with Kumārila in his conception of Mokṣa. He considers that Mokṣa is the final riddance of future births brought on by the extinction of both dharma and adharma. If questioned as to how every trace of dharma and adharma could be eliminated seeing that they have been accumulated to an extent beyond

(1) प्रायेणअनभिव्यक्तानि सर्वाण्येव कर्माणि संभूत एकं शरीरमारभन्ते; तत्र सर्वैवामुपगोचरेण क्षपितत्वात् संचितं कर्मैवनास्ति—Anandagiri S'amkara Bhāṣya, Tait. Up. p. 4, Anandās'rama Edn.

Aikabhavika is stated as pūrvapakṣa by S'amkara in his Bhāṣya on V. S. IV. iii-14, beginning with "यत्तु कैश्चित् जल्प्यते". Anandagiri when commenting on S'amkara Bhāṣya on Bh. G. chap. XVIII, st. 66 explicitly mentions aikabhavika as the explanation given (evidently by one section of the Mīmāṃsakas) to account for the annulment of samṛpa.

(2) Does Kumārila countenance Samuṇṇaya Vāda? This question has to be answered in the affirmative. S'lokavārtika-Sambandhakṣepaparihāra, stanzas 102-107, is taken up with the refutation of the Sāṃkhya view that the knowledge discriminating puruṣa from prakṛti is the means of liberation, as also discrediting its conception of Mokṣa as a state of positive happiness. By the way it may be noted that Mokṣa of the nature of ānanda is not upheld in the classical Sāṃkhya. Since the fetters of saṃsāra are caused by karma they can be broken only by removing the cause – karma and with the disappearance of the latter what remains is mere abhāva i. e. bandhabhāva which in fact is the nature of Mokṣa. No positive predication like that of happiness can be made of Mokṣa for then it will cease to be eternal because it will be karmasādhya. This negation or the destruction of karma is brought about as more than once pointed out by the avoidance of kāmya and pratisiddha karmas (S. V. 108-111). Hence argues Kumārila that the knowledge which the Sāṃkhya system enjoins is of no value to the attainment of Mokṣa, even on the assumption that Mokṣa is of the nature of bliss, for such discriminating knowledge subserves only kratu. How then is Mokṣa attained? This question is answered in the Tantrvārtika in Vyākaraṇādhikaraṇa where meditation on the self (cf. "ātmanamupāsta") is laid down as being indispensable for one who longs for eternal freedom—Jai-Sut. iii 1-27 Anandās'rama Edn.


measure in previous births (*saṃçita*) his answer is that a man who dreads the miseries of *samsāra* abandons all hankering after the attractions of this world or for any guerdon in the other world and so gives up *kāmya* and *pratiṣiddha*, wears out *prārabdha* i. e. karma which has begun to yield fruit in this life, by actual enjoyment, and acquires *ātmajñāna* or knowledge of the self having cultivated such personal virtues as equanimity of mind, continence etc., as enjoined in the Scriptures. It is, he says, by such *ātmajñāna* that accumulated karma of previous births is destroyed and he never swerves from *Nitya* karma lest he should incur sin. It is evident therefore that he also upholds the *samuççaya*vāda insisting as he does on the performance of *Nitya* Karma in association with *ātma-jñāna* (pp 186-87).

By so concluding, we may note, that the *Mīmāṃsakas* of both denominations deny the existence of God altogether. For them karma alone is of supreme importance. God as the arbiter of man's destinies finds no place in their scheme. They have not even the belief that the deities to whom offerings are made are competent to confer rewards on men. They are mere hypothetical beings intended so to speak, to make up the sacrificial structure. The sacrifices generate the unknown potency—the transcendental result, viz., *apūrva* which of its own accord yields good or bad results without any interposition of the deities. Such being the position of the *Mīmāṃsakas* it becomes rather inexplicable how it could be maintained that if performed in the spirit of an offering to God without thoughts of reward, the *kāmya* ceases to be *kāmya* and partakes of the nature of *nitya*, thus helping forward the aspirant to *Mokṣa*¹. *Sāstra*dīpikā, however, makes no mention of Divine Grace by which to attain the highest end of human endeavour—*parama-puruṣārtha*. The abandonment of the *svarga* ideal and its replacement by *apavarga-mokṣa*, should be regarded as perhaps a later phase in the history of the *Mīmāṃsā* philosophy.

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- (1) (i) श्रीमोक्षदार्पणबुद्ध्याक्रियमाणस्तु,
निःश्रेयसहेतुः—*Mīmāṃsānyāyāprakāś'a*,
(ii) ईश्वरार्पणबुद्ध्याक्रियमाणस्तु
निःश्रेयसहेतुः—*Arthasamgraha*,

सकलदेवतानां धर्मस्य परब्रह्मतत्त्वस्य च प्रतिपादकं वेदमनुचार्यं परनिदानकलहहेतुं लौकिकीं वातां ,
सर्वत्रोच्चारयतः सृष्ट एव वाचि भाष्याभावः—*Sâyāṇa's Foreward to R̥gvedabhāṣya.*

The man who does not repeat the Veda which reveals the nature of all the Gods, of Dharma and of the Supreme Brahman, but who is ever continually indulging in worldly talk, the progenitor of revilement, falsehood and strife, such a man, it is evident, will miss the wealth of speech.



ŚĀSTRADĪPIKĀ OF PĀRTHASĀRATHIMISRA.

(T A R K A P Ā D A)

I

I lovingly adore Mukunda whose chest Goddess Lakshmi and
Kaustabha gem adorn

Who is the enemy of the demon Mura

Who wields the conch, the sword and club

Whose eyes are red like the lotus petal

Who is clad in yellow garments

Who bends the bow-Sārṅga

Who is cloudy-blue

Who has four ample arms lavish in their gifts


Who is other than Pradhāna (Prakṛti)

Who has the mark Śrīvatsa

Who is the friend of the forlorn, the Eternal.

II

Following the doctrine of Kumāṛila I shall compose Śāstradīpikā
which reveals the true teaching of the Śāstra enveloped as it is by the
darkness of spurious logic.



ŚĀSTRADĪPIKA

Tarka pāda

TOPIC—INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF DHARMA

Sūtra 1:— Then, therefore, the inquiry into Dharma (is to be instituted).

1. To secure attention on the part of the pupils (lit. hearers) this Sūtra (aphorism) sets forth the knowledge of Dharma as the aim of the Śāstra which (the Sūtrakāra) intends to begin. When it is seen that the Śāstra is begun with the declaration that the nature of Dharma has to be inquired into it is indeed evident that the study of this Śāstra has the knowledge of Dharma as its reward.

2. Well, what benefit accrues (from Dharmajijnāsā) is clear. (Now) the relation (i. e., that which occasions the inquiry) also which is presupposed in this inquiry has to be stated. Just as in other Śāstras it is the pupil's query that is followed by the teaching so that this sequence constitutes the relation, here also, of the several motives that occasion the undertaking of this Śāstra, that one which has a special application to it has to be set forth. One must be able to say—'because of this relation (Sambandha) has this inquiry arisen'. Otherwise the whole treatise will certainly be an irrelevant discussion.

3. Yes, it is true (that a relation should be pointed out). Here the relation between the Śāstra and the purpose it serves is one of sādhya-sādhana (i. e., of end and means) and that itself serves as the motive for commencing the Śāstra and none other. For one, desirous of attaining the end, the Sādhanatva¹ —capacity of serving as the means (which the Śāstra possesses)—alone, becomes the motive (hetu) for action. And such relation is implied by the declaration of the aim (as may be understood from the Sūtra—Then therefore is the inquiry into Dharma). For this reason it has not been specifically mentioned by the Sūtrakāra (the author of the aphorisms). There is therefore no fault.

4. The question next considered is this—'Is the pupil to prolong his residence in the house of his preceptor after acquiring mastery in the recital of the Veda for the purpose of understanding its import or quit it by performing Samāvartana?'² If the scripture enjoining the

(1) Sādhya-sādhanatvasambandhaḥ (साध्यसाधनत्वसंबन्धः); it seems preferable to read sādhanatvajñāna (साधनत्वज्ञान) since it is represented here as the motive for action—pravṛtti-hetuḥ (प्रवृत्तिहेतुः). Note the implication here is that the Śāstra is only a means and not the end. Dharmajñāna itself subserves the acquisition of Dharma which is the puruṣārtha—the highest human end. It is Dharma that is the real aim of the Śāstra as Mokṣa is of the Vedānta.

(2) Samāvartana is a ceremony performed by the pupil to mark the conclusion of his studies. He may thereafter quit the preceptor's house and enter on the duties of a house-holder (गृहस्थ).

study of one's own Śākha is understood as meant for the acquisition of Dharma (merit)³ only by which to attain Svarga then Samāvartana should follow immediately after Vedādhayana (learning to chant the Veda). The Smṛti, "Having learnt to recite, one ought to 'bathe'", i.e., perform Samāvartana also would be a support to such a procedure.

5. This may not however be the case (atha). If the injunction regarding adhyayana is laid down in order that the meaning which gradually unfolds itself from the memorised texts may be acquired, then, since such understanding is not possible without inquiry it must be understood that the adhyayanavidhi itself prescribes, by implication, the inquiry; as such the pupil must continue to reside in the teacher's house and investigate into the nature of Dharma.

6. "Even without the injunction as one is aware that one could get the meaning of the text we must conclude that the injunction has no reference to the acquisition of the knowledge (of the Veda); but on the strength of the Vidhi (injunction) we presume that Svarga is to be the fruit as in the case of Viśvajītyāga.⁴ (To explain) - learning how to recite the Veda with the teacher's aid (adhyayana) is itself sufficient to promote the understanding of the texts without the necessity of a Vidhi or mandate and this is evident as vouched for by other means of knowledge (i.e., perception, inference, etc.,⁵.) So the Vidhi⁶ (Apūrva vidhi)

(3) Dharmamātrārtham (धर्ममात्रार्थम्). Here Dharma stands for adṛṣṭaphala-unseen reward which according to some is the purpose for which Vedic study is prescribed and which has Svarga as its end.

(4) Viś'vājī is the name of a sacrifice where no phala is declared but a phala is necessary to serve as a stimulus for its performance. Hence Svarga is taken as the phala. This principle is extended to all Vedic injunctions which do not specify a phala and is known as Viś'vajinnyāya. (Vide Jai. Sut. IV, iii, 15-16.)

(5) Svādhyāyasamskāra (स्वाध्यायसंस्कार). In the mandatory statement, "Svādhyāyodhyetavyaḥ", the principle element is svādhyāya and the subordinate (guṇa), adhyayana. The samskāra that is effected by adhyayana is the acquisition of the ability to chant correctly that section (ś'ākhā) of the Veda to which the pupil belongs. Then with the help of grammar, dictionary, etc., he can understand the meaning independently of the teacher's help.

(6) The vidhi or vedic mandate is of three kinds :- apūrva, niyama, and pariśamkhyā. We have apūrva when the object for which an act is done is unknown through other pramāṇas, e.g., the adṛṣṭa that is generated in rice by sprinkling water over it is known only from the text - "vrihin prokṣati". When the object is likely to be obstructed by an alternative the vidhi removes such obstruction - that vidhi is niyama vidhi, e.g., when the object is to obtain rice from paddy for yāga it may be had either by pounding or unhusking with nails. The vidhi, "Vrihinavahanti" removes its non-occurrence, i.e., by implication wards off nakhaivalana or unhusking with nails. The third vidhi, viz., pariśamkhyā enjoins the rejection of one of the two alternatives, e.g., the injunction "pañcapaṇca nakhā bhakṣyāḥ" is with the object of obviating the eating of all five-fingered animals except the specified five-fingered ones; cf. Vidhiratyantamaprāpte niyamāḥ pakṣiḥ sati

Tatratanyatraṇa prāpte pariśamkhyeti kīrtyate.

(Vide Tantravārtika, p. 182; also S. L. S. 1st pariçcheda.)

has no place in relation to it (i. e., in so far as the acquisition of the meaning is concerned). Nor could it be maintained that it is of the nature of Niyama vidhi which for example is applicable to the method of obtaining rice (for the preparation of the sacrificial cake); for 'the pounding of rice' is enjoined as is well known, in connection with the new-moon and full-moon sacrifices in order that Apūrva may result. It is only when rice is obtained by pounding that Apūrva comes into being and not merely by obtaining it as such, for if it were so it would offend other pramāṇas (since rice could be got even by unhusking paddy with the nails). In like manner here also since the knowledge (of the Vedārtha) could evidently be had even apart from the injunction relating to adhyayana it is irrelevant to presume a Niyama-vidhi for the sake of that knowledge as such. It follows therefore that the injunction (Niyama) has to be presumed only in regard to the Apūrvas of sacrifices and (the injunction would take this form) – the acts enjoined by the Scriptures would bear fruit when performed only by those who have studied the Veda (with viçāra under a preceptor). But such a view does not hold good. The injunction to study the Veda is not a 'Kratvartha' (i. e., it is not auxiliary to a sacrifice), because it does not occur in a 'Kratu' context (i. e., it is not mentioned as the means for the right performance of a sacrifice)⁷, nor can it be said to find a place in a sacrificial context by any one of the marks such as Śruti etc., (which may also indicate what is a Kratvartha).⁸ Hence (concludes the pūrvapakṣin) the only aim of Vedic Study is to attain something beyond human ken through adṛṣṭa and the pupil has therefore to quit the preceptor's abode by performing Samāvartana, seeing that adhyayana by itself is enough to fulfil the demand of the Svādhyāyādhyana vidhi.

7. The contention is thus met:—When an empirical reward exists, to suppose adṛṣṭa (which yields svarga) as reward is not right; further since the injunction is one of Niyama it is not rendered purposeless. Now we will examine the contention that the injunction is neither for the comprehension of the Vedārtha (the meaning of the text) in itself nor for the sake of the Apūrva to be generated for a (main) kratu. We maintain neither. What then?, (you may ask). The object of the adhyayanavidhi (regarded as Niyamavidhi) is to restrict the performance of sacrifices to certain classes of people, namely, the first three castes only who are permitted to recite the Veda and can perform sacrifices like Agnihotra, and to exclude

(7) Anārabhyādhītatvāt (अनारभ्याधीतत्वात्). The injunction regarding adhyayana does not find a place in a sacrificial context. The vidhis 'Vithinavahanti', 'Vithin prokṣati', for instance, are Kratvartha because the Śruti mentions them having begun to describe the principle sacrifice. But not so the vidhi "Svādhyāyodhye-tavyah".

(8) The means of ascertaining what is subsidiary to the principal karma or archetypal, e. g., Agnihotra, are:—

Śruti-direct declaration, Līnga-indirect implication, Vākya-syntactical connection, Prakāraṇa-context, Krama or Sthāna-order or position, Samākhyā-name, e. g., Jyotiṣṭoma, Adhvaryu, etc.

the Śūdras to whom Vedic recital is prohibited. To explain-supposing the adhyayanavidhi did not exist, then the mandates bearing on Agnihotra etc., not being specifically applicable to a competent person would be regarded as addressed to him only who is incompetent (i. e., one not conversant with the ritual); but because the observance of the ritual is impossible without a knowledge of the meaning of the texts they would by implication require that knowledge and owing to their general nature, they would authorise all the four castes as fit for Karma (there being no room for discrimination). If however we admit the injunctive character in Adhyayanavidhi, the right to inquiry will belong only to those among the first three castes who are conversant with the theory and practice of the ritual and not to those of the fourth caste. To quote a text in point—"Initiate the Brahman in spring (i. e., perform Upanayana ceremony), the Kṣatriya in summer, and the Vaiśya in autumn." Because of the use of the accusative case here (i. e., of the words Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya and Vaiśya) it is clear that those belonging to the three castes after the purificatory ceremony will have a longing to do something (lit. will ask themselves the question 'What is it that is to be done by us now that we have received the initiation?').⁹ In close proximity to this (Upanayana injunction) there is the Adhyayanavidhi in which no agent is mentioned and which consequently desiderates a kartā—the subject of the injunction. This then is to be understood—because all the three conditions essential for construing a proposition are here, viz. syntactical need (apekṣā, otherwise known as akāñkṣa), proximity (Sannidhi), and compatibility (Yogyatva), that it is only the members of the first three castes who have been invested with the sacred thread that are competent to master the meaning of the Veda through the successive stages of adhyayana (which consist in learning the words—Svādhinocāraṇa, desire to understand—jijnāsā, inquiry—viçāra, and right understanding of propositions—Vākyaarthajñāna.) Hence the initiation ceremony (Upanayana) is subsidiary (aṅga) to adhyayana—Vedic study, because it is a samskāra (purificatory ceremony) relating to the neophyte (mānavaka) who is the kartā of the study which is fruitful (as it enables him to understand the meaning of the section which he learns); the purpose of the study is the comprehension of the meaning—a result which is apparent and because such comprehension is helpful to the performance of karma it evidently brings on the reward, so that all these (Upanayana, adhyayana and arthajñāna) become significant. The net result is that injunctions relating to agnihotra and other sacrifices, because competent men of the first three castes thus become available, exclude men of the fourth caste from acquiring the knowledge of the

(9) Dvitiyānirdesāt (द्वितीयानिर्देशात्).—The use of the accusative case is to restrict the investiture of the sacred thread to only the three castes so specified. And when the pupils belonging to these three castes undergo the upanayana ceremony they naturally will feel inclined to know why they have received this initiation and what they have to do. In close proximity to the text bearing on the upanayana we have the adhyayana text where the adhikārin (i. e. one fit to recite etc.) is left unmentioned. Now reading the two texts together we come to the conclusion that those initiated among the three castes alone are fit to learn the scriptures.

scriptures (lit. there is no presumption in favour of their studying the Vedas) and authorise only those among the Traivarnikas who have acquired competency. This restriction of *adhikāra* (authorisation) will be shown in *Apasūdrādhikaraṇa* (Jai. Sūt. VI. i-7) to have been sanctioned by *adhyayanavidhi* itself, (i. e., deriving authority from the *Śruti*); as such the *vidhi* (*Niyamavidhi*) is certainly purposeful. Hence the *adhyayanavidhi* enjoins the pursuit of the vedic study till the meaning is comprehended and since such comprehension cannot result without inquiry the *vidhi* itself demands inquiry and cancels the permission granted by the *Smṛti* to finish the study by *Snātakarma* immediately after learning to recite the bare text. The conclusion is that after memorising one's *śakha* one ought to undertake the inquiry into the meaning of *Dharma*.

8. Some however holding the view that *adhyayana* is undertaken as the result of the injunction pertinent to the attainment of preceptorship (*ācāryatva*) discuss whether *adhyayana* subserves only the purpose of securing preceptorship or of acquiring a knowledge of the meaning of the *Veda* and come to the conclusion that the latter is the aim of *adhyayana* since it is more immediate (whereas the conferment of preceptorship is remote). If questioned as to the reason for the supposition that *adhyayana* subserves preceptorship (they answer), that because no mention is made of the *adhikārin* and because *adhyayana* becomes a *vidhi* through another, viz., that relating to preceptorship, it is improper to think of any (unmentioned) *phala* as in the case of *Viśvajit*. Which then is the injunction relating to preceptorship and how does it imply *adhyayana*? (Here is the answer by the *Prābhākaras*):—"That twice-born man (*dvija*) who having initiated the pupil teaches him the *Veda* along with its exegesis (*kalpasūtra*) and its hidden import is called *ācārya* (preceptor). From this *Smṛti* a corresponding mandatory *Śruti* relating to preceptorship may be inferred, viz.,—"Having initiated, secure preceptorship by teaching. Here *adhyāyana* (teaching the *Veda*) is the means by which preceptorship is attained and *Upanayana* because of the participle termination (*Kṛva* in *upaniya*) is auxiliary to it (*adhyāpana*) only." If (again) it be asked how initiation subserves *adhyāpana* (the reply is) that the very proximity of the pupil (*upanaya*) to the teacher serving as the *liṅga* is to be accepted as the means (of such subservience).¹⁰ Since the boy who is initiated (*mānavaka*) cannot serve as an *aṅga* if he remains idle there is need to think of an activity in connection with him. And we conclude that *adhyayana* which is prescribed *after* the mention of *Upanayana* and which can be a help to *adhyāpana* is the activity (appropriate) to him (i. e., in order that *aṅgatva* may be established the boy must be started on Vedic study). Thus the injunction relating to

(10) *Lingāt* (लिङ्गात्) - *sāmartyāt*, potency or *śakti* is *liṅga*. It is of two kinds:—*arthagata* and *śābāgata*. The former points to some action that a thing is capable of accomplishing and the latter points to the meaning a word is capable of expressing. Here it is *arthagata*: बटो; गुरु समीर प्राप्य युक्तुं सामर्थ्यं उपनयननिष्ठम्. The initiation has the potency to bring the initiated boy to the preceptor.

(adhyāpana) insisting on upanayana which is auxiliary to it demands adhyayana as an essential corollary.

9. This cannot stand scrutiny. To explain:—it cannot be main-

The Bhāṭṭa view.

tained on the authority of the scriptures that either preceptorship or the knowledge of the meaning follows as a consequence from adhyayana which is productive of niyoga¹¹ because a single vidhi cannot serve two sādhyas (purposes), (viz., niyoga and ācāryatva or niyoga and arthajñāna). If it be urged that the vedic injunction is only for niyoga and that the knowledge of the sense follows incidentally (ānuśāngika) even then a dual judgment is inevitable. Moreover the optative termination when uttered only once will have to subserve two dissimilar functions—expressing an injunction (niyoga) and permitting the sense to be understood. What follows then is that doubt (as to the exact significance of the vidhi as premised by you) will not arise (the Prābhākaras consider the possibility of the vidhi establishing either ācāryatva or arthajñānatva; hence no necessity arises for inquiry). Likewise the conclusion also becomes untenable that adhyayana is for the comprehension of the sense is a matter known through pramānas other than (Scriptures) and as such it cannot be a proper subject for vidhi to deal with. It follows therefore that the view accepted by us, viz., the selective force (niyama) implied in the injunction (Svādhyāyodhyetavyaḥ) which you have condemned with enormous effort has, much to your chagrin, to be sought after as your only refuge seeing there is no escape for you. If niyamavidhi is not accepted your pūrvapakṣin's contention (that preceptorship and not comprehension of the sense is the phala) alone would be preferable. Because preceptorship is something beyond the perceptive range, it is fit to be the object of vedic injunction (i. e., the ācāryatva being not within human apprehension can only be regarded as the sādhyā of an apūrvavidhi). Further, vedic study so far as the acquisition of knowledge (arthajñāna) is concerned becomes an auxiliary means (Samskāra-karma), while so far as the unseen result (niyoga or dharma) is concerned it becomes pradhānakarma (chief means)—this is against the right interpretation of a sentence.¹² If it be argued that the comprehension of the sense as the resultant of study is incidental and not directly

(11) Niyogarthasya (नियोगार्थस्य) — The phala of adhyayana is the injunction of adhyāpana and not the attainment of preceptorship. The direct result of adhyayana is adhyāpana—niyoga. When thus adhyayana fulfils its function neither pūrvapakṣa nor siddhānta becomes pertinent.

The adhyāpana—niyoga, it may be pointed out, is the result of initiation (उपनयन) through adhyayana and upanayana implies the mānavaka's approach to the preceptor.

(12) Arthajñānatve (अर्थज्ञानत्वे)—when a kriyā is intended to generate some potency (अतिशय) mediately through something else like a substance viz., vṛthi, when it is sprinkled with water, it is guṇa karma, but when it is intended to generate the potency immediately it is pradhānakarma as yāga. Here the adhyayanakarma enjoined with reference to svādhyaya when arthajñāna is the phala is guṇakarma and when it is enjoined with reference to (i. e., as resulting in) niyoga it is pradhāna. To require the same adhyayana to yield two results as Prābhākara does is to violate the rules of sentence-interpretation. Cf. Jai. Sū. 11, 1-3 for this division of karma.

pointed out by the Scripture, even so preceptorship (we may say) is not signified by the Śruti since that also is incidental.¹³ And because inquiry (viçāra, would then be not enjoined by Sāstra (according to Prabhākara) there need be no postponing of 'snāna' discarding the Smṛti.¹⁴

10. Moreover, "An agent (Niyojya) has to be assumed here lest the significance of the mandate (viz., "one should study that section of the Veda to which one belongs") should be lost. Nor can it be said that upanayana serves as an auxiliary to adhyāpana. On the strength of the explicit accusative (Brāhmanam upanayīta etc.,) that vidhi is for the discipline of the vaṭu (the boy who has just entered on the first order). Hence upanayana is meant to subserve adhyāyana because it is closely connected with it." It is futile to argue that because there is no agent the adhyāyanavidhi becomes purposeless. It is not that there is no agent. For even though the agent is not specifically mentioned one has to be assumed as in viśvajit yāga (the agent there is he who desires svarga). The kārya or Niyoga is what the imperative termination means and the kārya is a correlative term; so it is clear that it is something to be done by some one in particular, not all kārya is for all people. Hence the question pertaining to the correlate, viz., "Whose is this kārya"? And this ākāṅkṣā (expectancy) has to be satisfied by some such phrase as "this is his kārya" being understood (otherwise the injunction remains incomplete). He whose kārya it is, himself is the niyojya (the person for whom the niyoga is intended).

11. No doubt adhyāyana by being explained as necessitated by another (viz., adhyāpanavidhi) might acquire its being (ātmalābha), yet it does not by that alone become a kārya. Surely achievability (kṛtisādhyatva) does not by itself constitute kāryatva. What then? That which is achievable and predominant in relation to will, (kṛti), is kārya. The direction of the will towards a thing having that as its main aim—that is prādhānya. Therefore the adhyāyana niyoga if it is to become a kārya (kṛtisādhyā) should necessarily have for its main aim the activity of a person (mānavaka).¹⁵ In the absence of the niyojya

(13) Açāryatvamapi... (अचार्यत्वमपि प्रयोजनं न स्यात्) preceptorship also will not be the outcome of adhyāyana text (sāstra) but it results from adhyāpana by implication. (अर्थात्)

(14) Snānotkarṣa (स्नानोत्कर्ष—स्नानस्य पश्चादनुष्ठानम्), it has been said that 'bathing' is to be performed after the acquisition of the meaning of the memorised text. But this need not be so since inquiry (according to Prabhākara) is not enjoined by Sāstra as it is in the Bhāṭṭa explanation where the cognition of the meaning is the phala of adhyāyana. The smṛti (अधीत्यस्यात्) need not be modified. But it has to be pointed out that for Prabhākaras also the understanding of the sense of the text is essential before leaving the preceptor's house.

(15) In the mandate pertaining to vedic study (viz., स्वाध्यायोच्चेतव्यः) the study (अध्ययन) is the viṣaya and kārya (अर्थ) is the phala. Now adhyāyana might result from the mandate pertaining to adhyāpana but not kārya which is the main aim of kṛti or effort. Hence an independent status should be assigned to adhyāyana vidhi and when that is admitted a niyojya is quite essential.

no one will exert with a view to securing it (kārya). The *vaṭu* who engages in activity on the authority of *adhyāpana vidhi* (that relating to the teaching of the *veda*) somehow is made to take to *vedic study* only (for without such study *adhyāpana vidhi* will be futile) but will have no thought of *apūrva* for lack of authority (*pramāṇa*).¹⁶ The *apūrva* resulting from *prayāja*, etc., subverts the *apūrva* of *Darṣapūrnāmāsa* and so the person authorised to perform the latter has to perform the former in order that he may secure the *apūrva* (of *Darṣapūrnāmāsa*) even though a *niyojya* has not been specifically mentioned (for *prayāja*). This is quite proper. The *niyoga* of *vedic study* (*adhyayana*) on the contrary does not subserve another and as such its accomplishment could not be regarded as necessary for that other's sake as otherwise it would have been. Since the knowledge of the meaning results from the *vedic study* *niyoga* need not be required (for it).¹⁷ Hence for the fulfilment of the *vidhi* (i. e., *kāryatva*) a *niyojya* has to be presumed.

12. Now the view that you have expressed viz., that the *adhyāpana vidhi* (injunction relating to preceptor) acquires its significance because it implies *adhyayana* through the initiation ceremony (i. e., that it involves *adhyayana* through *upanayana*) is untenable. *Upanayana* does not follow from the *adhyāpanavidhi*. It is even more untenable, therefore, that *adhyāpana* should involve *adhyayana* through *Upanayana*. (*Upanayana* is only for the purification of the *māṇavaka*) and is not necessitated by *adhyāpana*.

13. The 'Kṭva' termination (in *upaniṣa* of the *Smṛti* text quoted above) really indicates only a single subject (both for the verbal idea in the participle, and the principal verb) and as such a single agent has to be presumed. The relation of principal and auxiliary however has to be established on the strength of the identical agency (i. e., it is too unwarranted a conclusion).¹⁸ From the accusative termination (viz., initiate the *Brāhmin* (*Brāhmaṇam*, in *Spring* etc.), the auxiliary nature (of the initiation intended for the purification of the *vaṭu*) is directly stated. Hence just as the threefold encircling of the sacrificial pole is for effecting a *samskāra* in the pole and not for leading the goat near the pole, so the *upanayana* also is for the purification of the *Vaṭu* and not for the teaching of the *Veda*.¹⁹ The termination 'Kṭva' (on which the

(16) There is no independent *vedic* authority to show that *apūrva* is the object to be attained by *adhyayana*.

(17) नियमफलत्वेन-विषयफलत्वेन which is the alternative reading given in the Benares Edition seems preferable.

नियोगापेक्षत्वात् should be changed to नियोगानपेक्षत्वात् *Adhyayana* is the object (*viṣaya*) of *adhyayana vidhi* and the knowledge of the meaning (*arthajñāna*) results from mere *vedic study* (*adhyayana*) without the necessity of any injunction.

(18) What is meant is that the same person can perform *upanayana* and *adhyāpana*, i. e., he can initiate the pupil and teach him the *Veda* but it does not follow that *adhyāpana* is auxiliary to *adhyāpana*.

(19) त्रिवृत्ता यूपं परिशीय पशुमुपाकरोति—This is the full sentence. Note that *उपाकरण* and *परिव्याण* are एककर्तृक and yet *परिव्याण* is not taken as *उपाकरण*; so *उपनयन* is not to be taken as *अन्धाध्यापन*. Construe एव with *साक्षात्* and change *अंगित्व* to *अंगत्व*.

Prābhakara interpretation is based) is found in a Smṛti sentence; the accusative case (on which the present interpretation is based) is explicitly stated in a Śruti text viz., 'the Brāhmaṇa should be initiated in Spring'. This again implies that upanayana subserves the Vaṭu and not adhyāpana.

14. Let it (upanayana) be for the purification of the vaṭu; even then it might through that channel (i. e. of vaṭu) subserve adhyāpana and not adhyayana.

15. It cannot be. It is appropriate that initiation should subserve adhyayana only on the ground of proximate relationship. Adhyayana and adhyāpana are associated each with a reward, and on the question arising which of these two the vaṭu-initiation should subserve it seems just to conclude that that initiation is for subserving the adhyayana only, since it relates to the vaṭu and not to adhyāpana which relates to a different person and with whom therefore it is remotely connected.³ Just as you discard the preceptorship as the fruit of Vedic study and also set aside the Smṛti which enjoins the 'bath' in the text 'Let him bathe after learning to recite the Veda', and accept the knowledge of the sense (of the memorised Veda) alone (as the aim of Vedic study), even so the initiation has to be understood as subserving Vedic study.⁴ The 'Kṭva' ending in 'Upaniya tu yaḥ Śiṣyam' may somehow be justified even in the absence of the relation of the main and the auxiliary on the analogy of the Vedic text 'having performed Darsa and Pūrṇamāsa'.⁵

16. Even from the Paṇinīyasmṛti (Paṇini's Grammar) it is clear that the initiation has to be admitted as being auxiliary to Vedic study. Bearing in mind that the initiation is auxiliary to Vedic study Paṇini has laid down the rule in the 'Açāryakarana' that the root 'ni' takes the

(3) अध्ययन is फलवद्, so also is अध्यापन; उपनयन is not associated with any फल and being found in the same context should be regarded as subsidiary to one of them. Proximity now determines to which it should be related. Hence its relation to Vedic study and not to Vedic teaching. अन्तरंगत्वनिष्ठ is माणवकनिष्ठ and not अध्यापननिष्ठ which is अन्यानुष्ठानम्.

(4) This is a parallel instance admitted by Prabhākara. Vedic study may have as its fruit either conferment of preceptorship or the acquisition of the meaning of the Veda. Prabhākara selects out of these the acquisition of the meaning and in doing so he discards a Smṛti text which seems to teach that the acquisition of meaning is no part of Vedic learning. The same is what is proposed here in that the initiation is made the auxiliary of Vedic study on the strength of the proximity rather than of teaching the Veda.

(5) (i) The 'Kṭva' termination points only to succession in time and not to any angāṅbhāva as in the injunction 'दशपूर्णमासाभ्यामिष्ट्वा सोमेन यजेत' where there is no relation of primary and subsidiary between Dars'apūrṇamāsa and Somayāga, but what is intended is that one who wishes to perform Soma should first perform Dars'apūrṇamāsa. The parallelism is that one who longs for preceptorship should first initiate the pupil.

(ii) The sentence beginning with "उपनीय" and closing with "कृत्यते" should be transposed so as to come immediately after "वेदितव्या" above. Vide Candrika P.9.

ātmanepada termination. If it were to serve as subsidiary to adhyāpana (teaching the Veda) then, because the result of action (denoted by the verb) has reference to the subject, the ātmanepada termination could have been inferred from the Sūtra, "Svarita nītaḥ kartrabhiprāye kriyāphale." So that the laying down of the rule again (1-1-36), (that the root takes) the ātmanepada would be wholly useless. Therefore the upanayana does subserve adhyāyana.⁶

17. It is not purposeless (i. e. the Sūtra 1-3-36 regarding the use of ātmanepada). The sacramental change effected by it (upanayana) is in intimate relation with the Vāṭu.⁷

18. It is true; even though it (the fruit of initiation) is in intimate relation with the Vāṭu it is not intended for him. The fruit is for the sake of the agent (Yajamāna i. e. the preceptor) and it denotes the agent's wish but has no intimate relation to him. Otherwise the use of ātmanepada in "prepare the sacrificial fire (agninādhāṭa)" could not be justified. Because the āhavanīyatva which is the phala (result) of ādhāna (the initial ignition of sacrificial fire) is in intimate relation to agni it cannot get into relation with the agent.⁸ Again "Having initiated the pupil etc.," is only a Smṛti text; more authoritative than this is the second Śruti (viz., 'in the spring initiate a Brahman etc.'). Hence initiation is not auxiliary of Vedic teaching (adhyāpana); nor is Vedic teaching brought about through the instrumentality of upanayana.⁹

(6) स्मरणादपि.....if the fruit of initiation were intended for the preceptor who is the officiator, उपनयते is the normal form according to 'स्वरितेत्यादि' of Pāṇini-1-3-72. If Pāṇini thought that the fruit of initiation went to the preceptor, he would not have thought of framing a special Sūtra to justify the usage (प्रयोग) "माणवकं उपनयते" 1-3-36 where उपनयते means enrolling a boy as a pupil; but he has done so. Hence we must understand that उपनयते exhibits ātmanepada ending even though the उपनयनफल does not point to the preceptor.

(7) What Prabhākara means to say is that there is justification for the second Sūtra since the action points to one different from the Kartā उपनेतुमिच्छत संस्कारः, तस्मात् पुनर्विधानम्. The upanayanaphala is संस्कार or sacramental purification effected in the pupil. The परस्मिपद which we should naturally expect is obviated by the second Sūtra, though the fact of Upanayana being auxiliary to adhyāpana is not altered.

(8) "अग्नीनादधीत"—Here the āhavanīyatva is an unseen dharma which is generated in āhavanīyagni by the ādhānakarma and it is found related to an agni. If this āhavanīyatva is to be regarded as the fruit of ādhānakriyā the ātmanepada use in 'ādhāṭa would be incorrect, because the phala points to agni which is other than the ādhānakartā, viz., the yajamāna. Hence we cannot stop at āhavanīyatva but proceed to Yajamāna. Similarly, we must get beyond Māpavaka-samskāra to discover the upanayana phala. It comes to this therefore that the second Pāṇinean Sūtra is useless since the general rule स्वरितेत्यादि is sufficient justification for the use of the ātmanepada.

(9) अध्ययनस्य for अध्यापनस्य seems better reading. The meaning then will be that initiation is not primarily intended for Vedic study. This explanation is in consonance with the view of Kumārila that अध्ययनविधि is intended to restrict Vedic study to the first three castes,

19. Again it argues want of thought to say that adhyayana enjoined in the upanayana context is meant to afford activity to the pupil since a necessity for such activity perforce arises when he is initiated. For if one should say so it means that one's explanation is that adhyayana is auxiliary (anga) to Vedic teaching. When the need for activity arises on the part of the pupil who has been initiated in order that he may come under Vedic teaching the injunction regarding adhyayana meant to inculcate such activity is thus laid down 'Those of the three castes who are initiated and who need such activity as will bring about Vedic teaching should engage in adhyayana.' Then it is clear that adhyayana is the hand-maiden of adhyāpāna so that the acquisition of the knowledge of the meaning as the object of Vedic study is abandoned altogether. Ah! your exposition is splendid! ¹⁰

20. Well, the adhyayana injunction enjoins Vedic study for the sake of arthajñāna (knowledge of the meaning) and not for the sake of adhyāpāna.

21. Then say by which pramāṇa is it to be understood that adhyayana is the auxiliary (anga) of adhyāpāna (tadaupayikatvam)? Here perception etc., do not function. As for proximity which it may be said is the means, it is to be pointed out that proximity does not by itself constitute a valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa). For Sabda, when revealing its sense, proximity, desire, (a feeling of incompleteness) and compatibility are (effective) aids just as keeping the eye open, is, in perception (i. e. in perceptual cognition).¹¹ If it be said that Sabda (pramāṇa) might be regarded as declaring that the adhyayana vidhi is auxiliary to adhyāpāna then its function to serve the purpose of arthajñāna would fail and if the vidhi is intended for arthajñāna it ceases to serve as the auxiliary of adhyāpāna.¹² Hence of the adhyayana injunction—

(10) दूरनिस्तम्—The idea of the acquisition of the knowledge of the meaning is banished altogether. If adhyayana becomes auxiliary to adhyāpāna it cannot have its own phala. But knowledge of the meaning is intended by Prabhākara to be such a phala. Hence the knowledge of the meaning is wholly excluded.

मुनिरूपितो वाक्यार्थः—This is ironical: yours is a remarkable exposition!

(11) तदा हि—When you deny that adhyayana is an anga, how can you relate the two (adhyayana and adhyāpāna) in the manner in which you want to do? तदाह्य— is a better reading than तदाहि—Sabda is a logical pramāṇa which to function rightly demands certain conditions viz., contiguity or proximity (सन्नधि), desire (आकाङ्क्षा), compatibility (योग्यता), the knowledge of the speaker's motive (तत्पयज्ञान), among the constituent words of a sentence, very like sight which requires that the eye should be kept open. The point is that proximity like unmilana (keeping the eye open) is not a pramāṇa though accessory.

(12) शब्दव्यतिथि—If the required relation is attempted to be established through the "tavya" termination in 'Svādhyāyodhyetavyaḥ' arthajñāna will be outside the vidhi which is unwelcome to Prabhākara.

It cannot be argued that adhyayana vidhi is intended both for arthajñāna and adhyāpanaupayikatva according to the well-known maxim—अनेकाद्वैत्यत्वे एकस्य विधेः न संभवति.

Svādhyāyodhyetavyah, occurring in the upanayana context (Vasante Brāhmaṇam upanayita etc.) no relation could be established with the adhyāpanavidhi through the channel of upanayana (initiation into Vedic study). If again it be argued that since adhyāpana is impossible without adhyayana, adhyayana is implied for its (adhyāpana) sake, then because it (adhyāpana) results from adhyayana undertaken by one who does not conform to Śāstraic discipline, (but who has adequate cultural equipment for adhyayana), the adhyayana that has sacerdotal sanction ceases to result from (adhyāpana niyoga). Nor can it be said that sanctioned adhyayana alone should be accepted for the sake of brevity as there will be no need then for a separate vidhi (for adhyayana) for even when adhyayana is regarded as the anga there will be no brevity.¹³

For according to your doctrine (referring to Prabhākara) adhyayana even though enjoined results only form the injunction relating to adhyāpana and not from that (laid down) in its own behalf. Hence the adhyāpana vidhi would impel (i. e. necessitate) the adhyayana of the initiated, only when it has no sacerdotal sanction.¹⁴

The Vedic study prescribed (independently) by the S'āstra, because of the absence of its subervience to another (adhyāpana) would necessarily lead to the supposition of a suitable agent. (lit. agency).¹⁵

22. Moreover if the initiation (upanayana) is subsidiary to the teaching (adhyāpana) then the injunction as regards Vedic study having for its object the inculcation of the meaning would denote (get related to) the three castes because of the necessity of its subserving the teaching (adhyāpanārthatayā). Those who are initiated viz., the first three castes, to subserve adhyāpana being in need of activities helpful to it (adhyāpana) would be engaged in the study for getting at the meaning-a procedure (in the construing of a sentence) which is most illogical.¹⁶

And therefore the adhyayana injunction disconnected (as it has become) with the initiated would be applicable equally to all the four

(13) If you say that Vedic study as enjoined in the S'āstras only should be regarded as subserving the injunction regarding the Vedic instruction on the ground that no separate injunction need be laid down for Vedic study, it has to be pointed out that even then brevity cannot be secured as the injunction relating to Vedic instruction has to bring about both instruction and study अध्ययन and अध्यपन.

(14) (i) प्रयुज्यते-अनुष्ठेयत्वेन बोधितो भवति, is known as what ought to be done.
(ii) The point is that when the S'āstraic injunction for adhyayana is absent it would naturally imply laukikādhyaṇa or secular study which has no Vedic sanction. अध्ययनविधि प्रयुक्तभावेन लोकिकमेव आक्षिपेत् Chandrika, P. 10.

(15) प्रकल्पयेत्-the desire to understand the meaning on the part of one who is the object of the injunction. Thus the implication is that the vaṭu is entitled to study and so the reference is to the controversy already noted.

(16) They who began the study for rendering adhyāpana feasible end by learning the meaning of the Veda-पराधीदेशेन प्रवर्तितानां स्वार्थेसाधने अभिनिवेशः

castes so that the Śūdras would become entitled (to Vedic study.)¹⁷ Hence (i. e. to obviate such a contingency) for the initiated who are desirous of securing something (for themselves) what is enjoined is the acquisition (bhāvanā) of the knowledge of the meaning through the instrumentality of adhyayana so that the initiation is the anga (subsidiary) of adhyayana only and adhyayana is brought about by its own vidhi (viz., Svādhyōdyodhyetavyaḥ).¹⁸

23. This view (of Prabhākara viz., adhyayana is for adhyāpana) has received a detailed refutation in Nyāyaratnamāla alone; as such it (the discussion) is closed.

24. The point to be settled¹⁹ therefore is as already stated, whether adhyayana is for the purpose of adṛṣṭa or for the knowledge of the meaning through the gradual unfoldment of the significance of the words (composing the Vedic passages).

(17) When the aim of adhyayana goes beyond the sphere of adhyāpana the restriction of adhikārin which is entirely due to the operation of the adhyāpana-vidhi disappears and there will be nothing to prevent Śūdras from pursuing Vedic study.

(18) In the vidhi 'Svādhyōdyodhyetavyaḥ' as also in other injunctions "bhāvanā Viśaya Śābdabodha" or constructive knowledge of the meaning of the sentence is generated in the form-bhāvayet (संरादयेत्)-is to be acquired. This bhāvanā gives rise to three different desires:—(i) 'किं', what I am to acquire? known as उद्देशाकांक्षा, desire relating to the object to be gained; the object is the meaning of the scriptures—अर्थज्ञान, or it may be Svarga in the injunction ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत; (ii) केन—by what means? known as करणाकांक्षा, desire relating to the means of accomplishment; the karaṇa is scriptural study—अध्ययन, or yāga in the vidhi स्वर्गकामो यजेत; (iii) कथं? How?—which is the method of performance?—This is इतिकर्तव्यताकांक्षा, desire relating to the method. In adhyayana vidhi the connected ceremonies such as serving the guru etc., would constitute the method, whereas in a yāga as for example Jyotiṣṭoma, the preliminaries and the sequel.

लिङ्ग, लोट्, and the तन्व्य suffix are used in the mandatory propositions.

The लिङ्ग (or it may be तन्व्य) has both the aspects of लिङ्गत्व which is व्याप्य or of limited application and आह्वयत्व which is व्यापक or of wider application. According to the Bhāttas what is ascertained from the लिङ्गत्व aspect is विधि or command or प्रवर्तन but according to the Prabhākaras it is the नियोग (for which the equivalents are अपूर्व, कार्य, अदृष्ट). In its आह्वयत्व aspect it means कृति or भावना or यत्न, i. e. effort or undertaking (for both schools).

(19) विचारः—the doubt (संदेह) according to Prabhākara is whether adhyayana is for preceptorship or acquisition of meaning, it being granted that Vedic study (अध्ययन) is अध्यापनप्रयुक्त that is, for the purpose of rendering preceptorship possible. The doubt according to Kumārila is whether अध्ययन is for अदृष्ट such as will secure Svarga or for the knowledge of the meaning, it being understood that अध्ययन is स्वप्रयुक्त and not अध्यापनप्रयुक्त.

Or (it may be said that) there is no problem here for solution for on the very analogy furnished in the ninth chapter (Jai. Sūt. 9-2-2) the purpose of acquiring the knowledge of the meaning is attained through successive stages beginning with the correct enunciation of the words (in one's section of the Veda). This is what is said in the ninth chapter—Since it is seen that the Sāma texts serve the purpose of laudation through the elucidation of the ṛks it is stated that they (ṛks also) are intended for laudation and not for securing any adṛṣṭa (unseen phala or apūrva). On that identical ground, since the purpose of attaining the knowledge of the meaning is secured for adhyayana it is evident that one ought to inquire into the meaning of Dharma immediately after learning the texts, and the aphorist's object is to point out this prayojana (viz., of understanding the meaning in the aphorism—athāto dharmajijnāsā).²⁰ (In corroboration of this view) the Vārtikakāra says; "That what is known as Dharma is the Viśaya (subject matter), to state which is the object of the Mīmāṃsā (Śāstra)". And it is not intended to discuss any Vedic statement here (i. e. the Sūtra athāto dharmajijnāsā does not presume any viśayavākya). This fact is also borne out in—"There is no Vedic text here to be commented upon for it will amount to making a superfluous statement"²¹. Hence it is concluded that the inquiry into the nature of Dharma has to be made after adhyayana.²² And that

(20) The S'āstra (of Jaimini) of course instructs us in Dharma and dharmajijnāsā is the prayojana of the S'āstra; when it is stated that Dharma is the subject-viśay of the S'āstra it should necessarily follow that the knowledge of its significance is the prayojana. All S'āstras impart jñāna about their Viśaya. The very statement that Dharma constitutes the subject-matter of the S'āstra is the statement of the object with which it has to be studied.

(21) It is not to be supposed that Jaimini's first aphorism is intended to inculcate that Vedic study is for the acquisition of the meaning of the Vedic texts. That such study in general is for the understanding of the sense has been established in 9-2-2, "Karma Vā Vidhilakṣaṇam" etc. The question raised there is whether Sāma in relation to ṛks is guṇakarma or pradhānakarma, the finding being that it is guṇakarma since the chanting is for elucidating the meaning of the ṛks which when so elucidated result in the laudation of the Deities. The elucidation is dṛṣṭa, i. e. something evident and the generally accepted rule is that where a visible phala is possible there is no room for an invisible phala. On the strength of this rule all the Vedic texts having a meaning must be understood to have arthajñāna as their immediate result. The doubt then arises why apart from 9-2-2—Jaimini should have framed the first Sūtra. The object is to render explicit the Viśaya and prayojana, of the Mīmāṃsā Śāstra in keeping with the practice of all darsanakāras who start with first enunciating what is known as anubandhaçatustaya—the four elements that constitute the structural unity of a S'āstra. In this S'āstra the Viśaya is Dharma and prayojana is the knowledge of dharmasvarūpa.

Hence what has been detailed so far is mere anuvāda or restatement, or 'supplementary reference'.

(22) "तस्मादर्थज्ञानार्थत्वादध्ययनस्य, अर्थज्ञानस्य च विचारसंतरेणासंभवात् अध्ययनानन्तरं धर्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्या"—Chandrika. Therefore the object of vedic instruction is to acquire the meaning and since the knowledge of the meaning cannot be had without inquiry it is the duty of one to make such inquiry after acquiring mastery in recitation.

(inquiry) relates to these four points:—the definition of Dharma, proof (of its existence), means (of acquiring it), and the phala (object to be gained).

25. (An objection):—The mandate relating to Vedic study (adhyayana vidhi) presumes only the inquiry into the meaning of the Vedic texts so that where (one might pertinently ask) is the occasion for investigation into the nature and proof of Dharma?

Answer:—The preliminary inquiry (necessary to establish that such and such is the meaning of the Vedic texts) is itself the occasion.²³

If it be that Dharma is what the Vedic texts mean and that the Veda (itself) is the pramāṇa (for ascertaining Dharma), then this inquiry becomes a necessity. Otherwise it will be as useless as busying oneself in knowing how many teeth a crow has. Hence the mandate regarding adhyayana itself desiderates inquiry as to the proof etc., (of Dharma). It must also be understood that the word Dharma is implicative since it includes also adharma whose nature has to be inquired into in order that it may be avoided. Or, the sūtra has to be commented upon in its bearing on adharma also if we understand that there is the euphonic coalition of "a" (between athāto and dharmajijnāsā.) Hence the inquiry is unexceptionable.²⁴

(23) चिंतां प्रकृतसिद्ध्यर्थो उपोद्घातं प्रचक्षते—Upodghāta is the name given to the inquiry made in order to establish what is undertaken to be proved. The thing to be established is what the particular Vedic texts mean. And that can be done only by ascertaining what the nature of Dharma is and by which proof it can be deduced.

(24) The literal sense of the Sūtra—अयातो धर्मजिज्ञासा, is that after (अथ) acquiring mastery in the recital of the texts, one has to endeavour to know their meaning because (अतः) such mastery itself becomes the hetu for the inquiry.

SECOND CHAPTER

DEFINITION OF DHARMA

Sūtra II. "Dharma is that which is enjoined in the Veda and is productive of good".

1. To begin with, this aphorism (Sūtra) sets out to answer by means of Śruti (the words as contained in the Sūtra) and artha or arthāpatti, (postulation or presumption) the two queries— What is Dharma? and on what authority is it based? What is understood as Dharma has ṣoḍanā (Veda) as its pramāṇa (lakṣaṇa) i.e. the Veda only is its pramāṇa and the Veda is indeed its (Dharma) pramāṇa. When thus the pramāṇa of Dharma is determined by postulation it becomes evident that what is known from the Veda alone, viz., agnihotra etc., is dharma and not the adoration of Caitya (Buddhist Temple) etc., (as it is) not supported by Vedic authority. Hence the nature (Svarūpa) of Dharma becomes manifest. If on the other hand the Sūtra is construed thus :—

Whatever has the Veda as its pramāṇa, that is Dharma (When thus the Svarūpa or the nature of Dharma is determined) then by postulation its pramāṇa will become manifest.¹

2. Some one says, by this Sūtra is taught that the meaning of the Veda is kārya (apūrva) and not something that is already known. The word ṣoḍanālakṣaṇa means kārya and Dharma means Vedic import (Vedārtha).
Prābhākara view & its refutation.

3. That is not so. As regards mandatory statements (Vidhi vākyaṃ) their validity arises from their being commands only and not from their reference to the nature or essence of an object (Svarūpa). Since this is clear there is no room for your contention. Even statements such as "(Vāyurvai kṣepiṣṭhā devatā)" acquire their validity by being considered as complementary to mandatory statements. No objection need be taken regarding mantras also since in the second pāda it will

(1) The Sūtra चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः can be construed in two ways :—(i) From the actual words of the Sūtra (Śruti) the pramāṇa of Dharma is ascertained to be the Veda only and that the authority of the Veda is unquestioned; then by postulation the nature of Dharma becomes evident: whatever is known by ṣoḍanā alone that is Dharma.

(ii) From the actual words of the Sūtra, first the nature of Dharma is ascertained and then by postulation its pramāṇa—चोदनालक्षणः स धर्मः that which has ṣoḍanā as its pramāṇa that is Dharma. When the nature of Dharma is established by means of the Veda alone, then the Veda must be its pramāṇa.

be shown that they are in their contexts understood as being auxiliaries to the main vidhis (Vidhiśeṣaṭā).² Which portion of the Veda then would you consider as specifying kārya by rejecting all reference to a previously known object? Well, you may rejoin by adducing Upaniṣadic texts like "Lo ! This ātman is indestructible". It (your contention) is untenable. If such statements should subserve a vidhi and so cohere in a mandatory statement, they have to be classed as arthavādas; in case they are not (syntactically related to mandatory statements) how can their import be kārya? If you maintain that since no vidhi is specifically stated and since coherence is impossible without a vidhi (being in their juxtaposition) apūrva or kārya cannot be fitly presumed and that words remain without any denotation when they refer to objects of previous knowledge, (then) it comes to this that they (the Upaniṣadic statements) not being supported by śabdapramāṇa are devoid of all validity. Is it your view then that the object of this Sūtra is to establish the invalidity of statements relating to ātman? A fine comment this, that the Sūtra-kāra (Jaimini) at the very commencement of his Work has set out to disprove the validity of Vedic statements (Upaniṣads are part of the Veda). And how do you maintain that a statement becomes valid only when it signifies some action.

4. *Prābhākara*. (Words) are significant only there (i.e. in prompt-ing activity). The meanings of words are apprehended upon the activity (being perceived when the vākya is uttered) and that activity is dependent upon the knowledge of the mandate. Hence the cognition of the meaning has reference only to Kārya.

5. *Bhātta*. The apprehension of the meaning is not necessarily dependent upon the action. In the sentence 'he cooks rice in the vessel, with faggots' where the present tense (paçati and not the optative) is used it is observed that men do understand the meaning of the word 'faggots' (for the first time) when it occurs in association with what is already known viz., the significance of the instrumental case (in kṣāṭhaiḥ) and what is not known viz., the bare stem (kṣāṭha).

6. *Prābhākara*. There is little doubt that the śabda must point to an action when used for the first time. For then (i.e. when the śabda is heard for the first time) śabdabodha (the significative knowledge of a word) cannot arise on the ground that it is found in association with other words (already understood) because of the absence of (the previous) comprehension of any word in that vākya.

7. *Bhātta*. Let it be as you say (in the case of one who is a beginner-avyutpanna). Still since words used subsequently relate mostly to existing things (siddhārtha) and since also in such sentences as "Who is this King? He is Pāṇḍala" involving a question and an answer as

(2) The constituent elements of the Veda are: Vidhi, arthavāda, mantra, nāma-dheya, niṣiddha. Vidhi is a direct mandatory statement, and the other four also, says Parthasarathi, cohere with the mandatory statements and so must be regarded as valid. Hence there is no room left to suppose that any portion of the Veda refers to what is already there-सिद्धम्. But Prābhākara thinks otherwise.

any reference to action is absent, it is patent (even to common intellects) that the significance is of the constant element only.³ Though for the first time observing the use of the word 'cow' with reference to some object one may conclude that the word is significant of that individual cow only, one (alters one's judgment) when the same word is subsequently used to indicate some other cow and not the first which has disappeared and concludes that the import of the word is the *sāmānya* or *jāti* (gotva-cowness) which is constant and never strays. Similarly though words when first used may relate to action they are subsequently seen to point to existing things having abandoned the inconstant element (their relatedness to action) and so it is right to conclude that verbal statements (in the initial stage of apprehension also) signify something that is already there.⁴ Moreover not all the words can have connection with action. Hence who can avoid attaching to words like 'faggots' which reveal their denotation in the later stages, a meaning which relates to things existing? And in the construing of words, there is no restriction in regard to the precedence of words.⁵ Hence all words whose meanings are understood later in life are ascertained by some (one or other) of the means of apprehending the denotation, such as dictionary, grammar etc., apart from usage to point to existing objects. In case all verbal statements are significant of action, words occurring in the language of men (i. e. secular statements as distinguished from those of the Veda) and expressing objects already given, have to be understood as possessing without exception only a secondary sense (*lakṣaṇika*) so that not a single word will be action-associated (*anvitābhīdhāyī*, because *lakṣaṇārtha* is based on *Sakṛyārtha* and no *lōkika śabda* is *Siddha-pāra sui generis*). How in these circumstances is it possible to know them as mutually related?⁶ And we refuse to admit that such relation (e.g. between isolated things) can be inferred from the fact that the speaker

(3) It is pointed out here that there is no invariable concomitance between the meaning of *śabda* and action. When found in a mandatory sentence the *śābdabodha* is associated with action but elsewhere as in 'the pot is blue' *śabda* denotes an existing something, *सिद्धवत्तु*. So that the meaning of the word alone is constant.

(4) The first stage is when a child is learning a language. Then all the words are understood as action-associated—*Kāryanvita*. But in the later stages language is learnt through other means such as dictionary, association of words etc. This has reference to the *Prābhākara* argument that all words when first learnt necessarily mean things as related to action, and those words when met with in later life cannot but recall things as associated with *Kārya*. The *Bhāṭṭa* concedes this for the sake of argument, yet shows how there is scope for cognition of sense (*vyutpatti*) with reference to things already there (*Siddhārtha*) in regard to other *śābdas* learnt in later life.

(5) It is not incumbent that first the words should become significant by pointing to some action and then to something that is *siddha* and not *sādhya*. Such priority of the one over the other does not hold good always. Further priority and posteriority cannot obviously affect the way in which the words denote their meanings.

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Knowledge of those words as mutually related. When the meanings of several words are ascertained in an isolated form through *lakṣaṇa* how is the connected sense which should be the import of the *Vākya* as a whole to be secured?

must have had a related meaning in his mind. (The Prābhākara argument is that whenever a speaker makes a statement he intends some action though the statement itself refers to merely existing objects). The speaker's intention should be inferred only from the subject (it may be action or an existing thing) to which his statement relates. And there is no actual statement pointing to the relation; then how can the inference of the intention of relatedness be made? If it be argued that words import action since their function is to bring to mind their meanings which in their turn are associated with some action, then denotativeness as associated with action (Kāryātānvitābhidhāna) will fail since statements directly importing action will remain unexplained. Again even when statements are made for the first time we see that their import is not action (lit. we can perceive the straying away of Kāryānvita). For instance when the news is conveyed to the father in the words 'a son is born to you' the bystander observes the man's (father's) face beaming with smiles; he then concludes that something causing joy was communicated by these words and that as such the verbal statement denotes an existing something which is the cause of joy. It is true that the stander-by does not know what particular occasion has brought on the beaming face since there are several causes that can occasion joy (in a person and not only the birth of a son); still he understands from the statement that it bears relation to some existent affair. That is enough to show that the import of words is not always action. And it is also possible for the stranger to readily infer even the particular event the news of which has rendered the man cheerful since he might have known that such words are used only on the occasion of a son's birth and not on others. Further a statement does not necessarily bring on action though its significance is dependent upon action. For instance, when a man addressing one who is utterly incapable of movement, old or ill makes this statement just for fun—'there are five fruit on the bank of the river' another who has been there by accident, wishing to get the fruit, having heard those words and having gone to the river-bank fetches the fruit. Witnessing all that has taken place a third party in trying to understand the meaning of the verbal statement learns that the words signify the existence (only) of the fruit. Hence there is no invariable rule that words should signify action.

8. What is the syntactical relation of the parts of the Sūtra (i. e. which is the subject and which is it that is predicated of it—*vaṇavyakti*)? If it be said that what is *kārya* (*ṇodanālakṣaṇa*) that indeed is *Vedārtha*, or in other words that *Vedārtha* is predicated of *kārya* then since both *uddeśya* (*kārya*) and *upādeya* (*Vedārtha*) should perforce be concomitant, all ordinary (*laukika*) commands like 'bring a cow' should be *Vedārthas* (i. e. amount to scriptural commands which is absurd).⁷ Again because there is no concomitance between

(7) The concomitance will take this form:—यत्र यत्र उद्देश्यतावच्छेदकधर्मैव तत्र विधेयसम्बन्धवत्त्वं, तथा च गवानयनादिस्तु लौकिकमर्थं पि कार्यत्वरूप उद्देश्यतावच्छेदक धर्मवत्त्वेन वेदावच्छेदक भव्यम्।

upādeya (Vedārtha) and uddeśya (kārya) just as there is no vyāpti between fire and smoke (we cannot say that fire is always accompanied by smoke though its reverse, viz., that smoke is pervaded by fire is true) it follows that even as regards what is other than kārya, the Vedic pramāṇa cannot become void.⁸ If (in the Sūtra the subject-predicate relation is altered and) the Sūtra is interpreted thus:—‘that which is Vedārtha (Dharma) is of the nature of kārya (ṣoḍanālākṣaṇa) then the vaṇavyakti (i. e. a clear statement of subject and predicate in a proposition) becomes—that which is dharma (uddeśya) is ṣoḍanālākṣaṇa (upādeya); now the question will be what word does artha (found in the Sūtra ṣoḍanālākṣaṇo artho Dharmah) which means auspicious (abhyudaya) qualify? If it should qualify upādeya viz., what is signified by ṣoḍanālākṣaṇa then the entire Vedārtha (Dharma) would be characterised by kāryatva and arthatva (apūrva and auspiciousness) with the result that even śyenayāga-niyoga would become a good (arthatva). If on the other hand it be said that (the word artha) qualifies Vedārtha which is the subject then the sense will be: Vedārtha which is auspicious (alone) is kārya-rūpa; then the kāryatā in relation to śyenayāga will not arise since the fruit accruing from such performance is forbidden and is inauspicious. You cannot assert that Niyoga (kārya) is not obligatory (in śyenayāga) because from the optative termination even in the case of yāgas like śyena the notion of kāryata does arise. In the absence of kāryatva as regards śyena-injunction it would be necessary to interpret it as relating to existent objects. Such (an interpretation) is not possible (according to you), the optative termination being there. Since verbal statements are devoid of significative force in regard to existent objects Vedic pronouncements in relation to śyena and the rest would become unauthoritative.

9. It is a mere display of one's wits to repeat from the first Sūtra the word Dharma interpreted as Vedārtha, and construct (two) statements first ‘ṣoḍanālākṣaṇa is Vedārtha’; and second ‘artha is Dharma’ (i. e. kārya is Vedārtha and artha is Dharma). Without securing any definite purpose a word has been wrested from its position and sentence unity has been violated. It is further absurd to define the term Dharma not set forth (in the first Sūtra, i. e. Dharma in the second sense—tending to good, is not premised in the first Sūtra). If it be argued that Dharma (in its second sense, viz., abhyudaya or puṇya) is predicated of Vedārtha as set forth there (first Sūtra) only for securing to it kāryatva, does it mean (we ask) that Vedārtha which is of the nature of Dharma is kārya only and that the significance of that alone has to be inquired into and none other? Then why not admit, without perverting the sūtraic phraseology, that Dharma (meaning the means to good—sreyassādhana) is the subject of inquiry and why repeat ‘Dharma’ from the first sūtra? Hence the thesis that the import of the

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must have had a related meaning in his mind. (The Prābhākara argument is that whenever a speaker makes a statement he intends some action though the statement itself refers to merely existing objects). The speaker's intention should be inferred only from the subject (it may be action or an existing thing) to which his statement relates. And there is no actual statement pointing to the relation; then how can the inference of the intention of relatedness be made? If it be argued that words import action since their function is to bring to mind their meanings which in their turn are associated with some action, then denotativeness as associated with action (Kāryātānvitābhidhāna) will fail since statements directly importing action will remain unexplained. Again even when statements are made for the first time we see that their import is not action (lit. we can perceive the straying away of Kāryānvita). For instance when the news is conveyed to the father in the words 'a son is born to you' the bystander observes the man's (father's) face beaming with smiles; he then concludes that something causing joy was communicated by these words and that as such the verbal statement denotes an existing something which is the cause of joy. It is true that the stander-by does not know what particular occasion has brought on the beaming face since there are several causes that can occasion joy (in a person and not only the birth of a son); still he understands from the statement that it bears relation to some existent affair. That is enough to show that the import of words is not always action. And it is also possible for the stranger to readily infer even the particular event the news of which has rendered the man cheerful since he might have known that such words are used only on the occasion of a son's birth and not on others. Further a statement does not necessarily bring on action though its significance is dependent upon action. For instance, when a man addressing one who is utterly incapable of movement, old or ill makes this statement just for fun—'there are five fruit on the bank of the river' another who has been there by accident, wishing to get the fruit, having heard those words and having gone to the river-bank fetches the fruit. Witnessing all that has taken place a third party in trying to understand the meaning of the verbal statement learns that the words signify the existence (only) of the fruit. Hence there is no invariable rule that words should signify action.

8. What is the syntactical relation of the parts of the Sūtra (i. e.

Refutation of the which is the subject and which is it that is predicated of it—vaṇavyakti)? If it be said Prābhākara interpretation of the Sūtra, that what is kārya (codanālakṣaṇa) that indeed is Vedārtha, or in other words that Vedārtha is predicated of kārya then since both uddesya (kārya) and upādeya (Vedārtha) should perforce be concomitant, all ordinary (laukika) commands like 'bring a cow' should be Vedārthas (i. e. amount to scriptural commands which is absurd).⁷ Again because there is no concomitance between

(7) The concomitance will take this form—यत्र यत्र उद्देश्यतावच्छेदकधर्मवत्त्वं तत्र विधेयसंबन्धवत्त्वं; तथा च गवानयन्तं दिशः लौकिकं दार्ढ्यं पि कायेत्वरुण उद्देश्यतावच्छेदक धर्मवत्त्वेन वेदापत्तेन साध्यम्।

upādeya (Vedārtha) and uddeśya (kārya) just as there is no vyāpti between fire and smoke (we cannot say that fire is always accompanied by smoke though its reverse, viz., that smoke is pervaded by fire is true) it follows that even as regards what is other than kārya, the Vedic pramāṇa cannot become void.⁸ If (in the Sūtra the subject-predicate relation is altered and) the Sūtra is interpreted thus:—‘that which is Vedārtha (Dharma) is of the nature of kārya (ṣoḍanālākṣaṇa) then the vaṇanavyakti (i. e. a clear statement of subject and predicate in a proposition) becomes—that which is dharma (uddeśya) is ṣoḍanālākṣaṇa (upādeya); now the question will be what word does artha (found in the Sūtra ṣoḍanālākṣaṇo artho Dharmah) which means auspicious (abhyudaya) qualify? If it should qualify upādeya viz., what is signified by ṣoḍanālākṣaṇa then the entire Vedārtha (Dharma) would be characterised by kāryatva and arthatva (apūrva and auspiciousness) with the result that even śyena-yāga-niyoga would become a good (arthatva). If on the other hand it be said that (the word artha) qualifies Vedārtha which is the subject then the sense will be: Vedārtha which is auspicious (alone) is kārya-rūpa; then the kāryatā in relation to śyena-yāga will not arise since the fruit accruing from such performance is forbidden and is inauspicious. You cannot assert that Niyoga (kārya) is not obligatory (in śyena-yāga) because from the optative termination even in the case of yāgas like śyena the notion of kāryatā does arise. In the absence of kāryatva as regards śyena-injunction it would be necessary to interpret it as relating to existent objects. Such (an interpretation) is not possible (according to you), the optative termination being there. Since verbal statements are devoid of significative force in regard to existent objects Vedic pronouncements in relation to śyena and the rest would become unauthorized.

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Veda (in general is kārya) becomes futile. (To avoid this dilemma) it may suit (the Prābhākara) to ignore the word artha and construe the Sūtra thus:-That which is Vedārtha, that is kārya; then the word artha becomes meaningless and indicating things in general, will be a mere restatement (anuvāda). But the Bhāṣyakāra (Sābarasvāmī) maintains that the object in using this word is to ban those (kāryas) which are of evil consequence. (cf. S. Bh.1-1-2 p.17). Hence it (ārtha) has certainly a qualitative force. If regarded as an attributive, kāryatva will pertain to auspicious Vedārtha, and as such inauspicious Vedārtha will not become kārya. Hence the rule (which you have laid down) will fail, viz., that all Vedic statements are authoritative because of their association with kārya. Hence also the Upaniṣadic texts like "Behold ! this ātman is eternal" which relate to the nature of ātman (and not to any kārya) cannot be ignored (i. e. cannot be put down as being of no primary importance). Now let the discussion end. It is evident therefore that this aphorism (second Sūtra) has for its aim the elucidation of the meaning of Dharma and the valid means (pramāṇa) of its apprehension.

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Is there no pramāṇa by which to establish
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conjointly ? (The alternatives are considered). Because Śabda derives its validity from some other pramāṇa which bestows validity on it and by itself cannot serve as pramāṇa (Śabda brings to mind what has been cognised by some other pramāṇa) and since perception etc., are incapable of bringing within their purview (Dharma which is supersensuous), Dharma is bereft of any pramāṇa—this is one view. That it is cognisable by perception etc., is the second view. That yogins can have direct perception while moderns (arvācīnaḥ) have to fall back upon the Veda is the third view. Because of the amazing variety observed in the world we are driven to conclude by implication something unseen (adr̥ṣṭa) and so we arrive at Dharma of a general nature. Then on the authority of the Veda we learn what its specific nature is, viz., agnihotra etc. Hence a different view is that conjointly they (arthāpatti and ṣoḍanā) establish Dharma. The final view or siddhānta is that ṣoḍanā (Veda) alone is the pramāṇa and that it alone is the valid means of the apprehension (of Dharma, i. e. its validity cannot be questioned). Therefore these two statements thus emphasised—Veda alone is the right means of knowing Dharma, and Veda is pramāṇa indubitably—constitute the thesis.

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(the necessity of investigation). Though from such inquiry undertaken later its nature as a science of investigation is understood, the sequel is here set forth in order to secure attentive hearing on the part of the learner.

12. In the Pratyakṣasūtra (Fourth Chapter) is pointed out that preception cannot serve as a means of ascertaining Dharma since its scope extends only to what is present and not to what is yet to be like Dharma and that others (other pramāṇas like inference etc.,) also which presuppose pratyakṣa are invalid here. It becomes evident therefore that *codanā* (Veda) alone is the proper instrument of ascertaining what constitutes Dharma and the alternatives proposed, viz., that some pramāṇa other than the Veda is needed, that either (*codanā* or pratyakṣa) may suffice or that both together testify to the nature of Dharma, are all ruled out.

13. In the Autpattika Sūtra (Fifth Chapter) having proved that knowledge is self-valid and that what renders it invalid is the apprehension of its incoherence with one's later experience (*arthānyathātva-jñāna*) as also of any defect in the means employed (*eye-disease* etc., *karāṇa doṣa*), it is established that since the Vedic texts enjoining *Agni-hotra* etc., give rise to indubitable knowledge they are self-valid. Here is no apparent apprehension of any invalidating experience (*bādhakajñāna*) nor awareness of any defect in the means (the *karāṇa* is *S'abda*) because all defects in *S'abda* as a means of knowledge are to be traced to human agency. Because the relation between a word and its meaning is natural (and not arbitrary) there is no room for the operation of human agency through this channel to invalidate the scriptures. The truth of this statement is (however) doubted by the *pūrvapakṣin* since in his view the relation between the word and its meaning is not eternal because the word itself is non-eternal. The *Sabdhādhikaraṇa* (Sixth Chapter) controverts this position and establishes the eternal nature of the relation because of the eternal nature of *Sabda*.

14. (Thus answered the *pūrvapakṣin* says):—"Let me admit that human agency has no place in so far as the relation between the word and its meaning is taken into account but regarding the relation between the sentence and its import it is not seen in common speech to be invariably fixed up. Hence there is no basis for the knowledge of the import of propositions relating to *Agni-hotra*. Such knowledge must therefore be either illusory or conventional. To conclude, the Veda is no authority (pramāṇa) in determining the import of propositions. As against such an objection the *Tadbhūtādhikaraṇa* (Seventh Chapter) states that the meanings of words themselves discarding all dependence either on relation (between the word and its sense) or on convention become the valid means of apprehending the import of propositions. (This is the *abhihitānvaya-vāda*.) The *pūrvapakṣin* raises another objection:—The Veda is an assemblage of sentences and we find also mention of such names as *Kāthaka* etc., it is therefore *pauruṣeya* (i. e. the work of an author) and as such is not infallible. This objection is untenable because what is eminently fit to be

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remembered (viz., author) is not remembered, that is, the *karlā* is excluded by *anupalabddhipramāṇa*. Thus as the author cannot be inferred, it is only to indicate the instructors that the names (of *Kāthaka* etc.) are mentioned (cf. *Sut.* 30). The conclusion is that there is no author and the *Veda* is self-existent-(*apauruṣeya*). Now (in the *Second Sūtra*) a part of the *Veda* (viz., *vidhi* relating to *agnihotra* etc.,) is proved to be self-valid and it must be understood that the entire first *pāda* is intended solely to substantiate the propositional statements made in the *ṣoḍanā Sūtra* (viz., the *Veda* certainly is an independent source of knowledge—*pramāṇameva*, and the *Veda* alone is *pramāṇa* and none other; cf. *S. Bh.* I-1-8 p. 104). The gist of each *adhikaraṇa* (Section) has here been given in the order adopted by the commentator (viz. *Sabarasvāmin*). Later we will expound the doctrine of the *Vṛttikāra* (viz., *Upavarṣa*).

15. Now to the topic on hand: what has been set forth is that the *Veda* alone is *pramāṇa* (in determining *Dharma*) and that it is indubitably a *pramāṇa*. Such a statement is questioned on the ground that perception etc., possess validity without calling in the aid of other *pramāṇas* so that in regard to *Dharma* perception only is the valid means. Verbal testimony however having to rely always upon the indubitable knowledge vouched for by some other *pramāṇa* cannot become a *pramāṇa* independently of that other. In answer to this, it may be said that the perceptive process since it takes place only where there is sense-contact, relates to present cognition and not to *Dharma* which is yet to be (and so not within the sense-ambit). In the *Sreyaskarabhāṣya* however, *apūrva* etc., are not characterised by the term *Dharma*, but substances (*dravya*) like the jar in which water is carried to wash the cow's udder, action such as *yāga* (*kriyā*), and quality like 'being lower' (*niṣaistva*) are so characterised because every one of these is regarded as a means for achieving a result (*phala*).⁹ Still (it should not be forgotten that) only as instruments for acquiring the desired end (*palasādhana*) they become *Dharma* and that the desired end (*phala*) eventuates in some future birth so that as being the very essence of *Dharma* they cannot be said to fall within the range of perception. And because inference etc., are based upon perception they too cannot become *pramāṇas*. If it is asserted that the potency of yogic perception generated by the success-

(9) (a) गोदोहनेनपशुकामस्यप्रणयेत्—This is a *kāmya karma* whose performance yields a *phala*. *Dharma* is that means which is revealed in the *Veda* for the attainment of a desired end—वेदबोधित इष्टसाधनताकम्

Hence the milk-jar (गोदोहन) is *dharma*.

(b) यदि वृष्टिः पर्जन्यः स्यात् नीचैः सदो मिनुर्यात्—

If it is desired that the clouds should pour rain, the middle floor of the sacrificial pavilion should be made lower than the other two. The pavilion is divided into three sections:—(i) *Prāgams'am*, the western portion; (ii) *Sadonāmakaḥ*, the middle one, (iii) *Havirdhānanāmakaḥ*, the eastern one. The quality (गुण) of 'being lower' (नीचैस्त्व) is a means for getting rains—वृष्टिरूपकसाधनम्. All the three are within the range of perception. Cf. *यपवधेयस्करः सपवधमशब्देन लुप्यते* (*S. Bh. PP.* 17-18).

ful practice of yoga enables one to discern the future Dharma we say it is purely imaginary. The potency acquired by Yogic contemplation (bhāvanā) is associated invariably with an object of which one has had some experience and it could only generate a (vivid and) true recollection of that very object. But that cannot be pramāṇa in relation to Dharma the reason being that it is recollection, (smṛti or recollection not bringing to light any new knowledge is not regarded as a pramāṇa). Much less could it be perception, not being generated by any sense-organ.

16. It may be argued that sense-emanation is not what constitutes perception; but mere knowledge without any determinations.¹⁰ (The answer is that) under no circumstances does Dharma come within the perview of perception since perception stripped of all determinations (nirvikalpaka) cannot have that as its object which is the means of bringing about the wished-for reward.¹¹ Hence perception is not to be regarded as pramāṇa in relation to Dharma. Being based upon it, inference and the rest also (forfeit their claim to pramāṇa here).

17. The kāśyāpiyas (the followers of Kaṇāda the founder of the Vaiśeṣika System) assert that the intuitive power (pratibhā) of the Rsis can grasp Dharma (without scriptural revelation); but that intuition resting on plausible reason is not a pramāṇa even. How can it be such in the case of Dharma? Of Śabda (Veda) however since it gives rise to knowledge, it is but proper to admit its validity (as pramāṇa) so long as that knowledge remains uncontradicted. But it may be questioned whether it is right to ascribe validity merely because it (Śabda) produces knowledge since no exclusion is made regarding statements which engender false knowledge. True, (your contention is right). But there (in human utterances) owing to some defect in the channel of information and their incompatibility with later experience it is reasonable to regard them as invalid. In the Veda on the contrary these two invalidating elements being absent the self-evident nature of pramāṇa is not vitiated.¹²

(10) कल्पनापोद्धत्वम् --The Buddhist view of perception is that it is mere apprehension divested of all determinations. Perception gives only the bare 'that' (śvalakṣaṇa) and all the qualifications such as name, class, quality, act, substance, are mere figments of the brain (kalpana); cf. I. L. E., P. 108, N. 2.

(11) सुतरां धर्मस्य अश्रयक्षत्वम्-फलसाधनत्वेन रूपेण धर्मत्वात्; न च तेन रूपेण निर्विकल्पकेन ग्रहणं समवति, नस्वरूपमात्रावगाहित्वात् तस्य-(Candrika-P. 19)

The object of Nirvikalpakapratyakṣa or perception free from thought-determinations is mere being and as such what acquires Dharmatva through its being an aid to a result cannot be given in Nirvikalpaka. That the milk-jar etc., are a means to a result shows that they are the object of savikalpaka and not of an unqualified perception. 'Being a means' is a quality-kalpana.

(12) Even when no sensible meaning is conveyed by a statement there is no badha but that does not invest it with validity. The two conditions required for pramāṇya are—the source of information must be free from defect and the knowledge that the statement produces should not be sublated.

remembered (viz., author) is not remembered, that is, the karṣā is excluded by anupalabdhīpramāṇa. Thus as the author cannot be inferred, it is only to indicate the instructors that the names (of Kāthaka etc.) are mentioned (cf. Sut. 30). The conclusion is that there is no author and the Veda is self-existent-(apauruṣeya). Now (in the Second Sūtra) a part of the Veda (viz., vidhi relating to agnihotra etc.,) is proved to be self-valid and it must be understood that the entire first pāda is intended solely to substantiate the propositional statements made in the ṣoḍaśā Sūtra (viz., the Veda certainly is an independent source of knowledge—pramāṇameva, and the Veda alone is pramāṇa and none other; cf. S. Bh. I-1-8 p. 104). The gist of each adhikaraṇa (Section) has here been given in the order adopted by the commentator (viz. Sabarasvāmin). Later we will expound the doctrine of the Vṛttikāra (viz., Upavaśa).

15. Now to the topic on hand: what has been set forth is that the Veda alone is pramāṇa (in determining Dharma) and that it is indubitably a pramāṇa. Such a statement is questioned on the ground that perception etc., possess validity without calling in the aid of other pramāṇas so that in regard to Dharma perception only is the valid means. Verbal testimony however having to rely always upon the indubitable knowledge vouched for by some other pramāṇa cannot become a pramāṇa independently of that other. In answer to this, it may be said that the perceptive process since it takes place only where there is sense-contact, relates to present cognition and not to Dharma which is yet to be (and so not within the sense-ambit). In the Śreyaskarabhāṣya however, apūrva etc., are not characterised by the term Dharma, but substances (dravya) like the jar in which water is carried to wash the cow's udder, action such as yāga (kriyā), and quality like 'being lower' (niçaiṣṭrā) are so characterised because every one of these is regarded as a means for achieving a result (phala).⁹ Still (it should not be forgotten that) only as instruments for acquiring the desired end (palasāadhanatā) they become Dharma and that the desired end (phala) eventuates in some future birth so that as being the very essence of Dharma they cannot be said to fall within the range of perception. And because inference etc., are based upon perception they too cannot become pramāṇas. If it is asserted that the potency of yogic perception generated by the success-

(9) (a) गोदोहनेनपशुकामस्यप्रणयेत्—This is a kāmya karma whose performance yields a phala. Dharma is that means which is revealed in the Veda for the attainment of a desired end—वेदबोधित इष्टसाधनताकम्

Hence the milk-jar (गोदोहन) is dharma.

(b) यदि वृष्टिः पञ्चन्यः स्यात् नीचः सदा मिनुयात्—

If it is desired that the clouds should pour rain, the middle floor of the sacrificial pavilion should be made lower than the other two. The pavilion is divided into three sections:—(i) Prāgvaṃś'am, the western portion; (ii) Sadonāmakah, the middle one, (iii) Havirdhānanāmakah, the eastern one. The quality (गुण) of 'being lower' (नीचैस्त्वन) is a means for getting rains—वृष्टिरूपफलसाधनम्. All the three are within the range of perception. Cf. अण्वध्वजस्तरः सण्वध्वजैस्त्वन्नेन उच्यते (S. Bh. PP. 17-18).

ful practice of yoga enables one to discern the future Dharma we say it is purely imaginary. The potency acquired by Yogic contemplation (bhāvana) is associated invariably with an object of which one has had some experience and it could only generate a (vivid and) true recollection of that very object. But that cannot be pramāṇa in relation to Dharma the reason being that it is recollection, (smṛti or recollection not bringing to light any new knowledge is not regarded as a pramāṇa). Much less could it be perception, not being generated by any sense-organ.

16. It may be argued that sense-emanation is not what constitutes perception; but mere knowledge without any determinations.¹⁰ (The answer is that) under no circumstances does Dharma come within the purview of perception since perception stripped of all determinations (nirvikalpaka) cannot have that as its object which is the means of bringing about the wished-for reward.¹¹ Hence perception is not to be regarded as pramāṇa in relation to Dharma. Being based upon it, inference and the rest also (forfeit their claim to pramāṇa here).

17. The kāśyapiyas (the followers of Kaṇāda the founder of the Vaiśeṣika System) assert that the intuitive power (pratibhā) of the Rsis can grasp Dharma (without scriptural revelation); but that intuition resting on plausible reason is not a pramāṇa even. How can it be such in the case of Dharma? Of Sabda (Veda) however since it gives rise to knowledge, it is but proper to admit its validity (as pramāṇa) so long as that knowledge remains uncontradicted. But it may be questioned whether it is right to ascribe validity merely because it (Sabda) produces knowledge since no exclusion is made regarding statements which engender false knowledge. True, (your contention is right). But there (in human utterances) owing to some defect in the channel of information and their incompatibility with later experience it is reasonable to regard them as invalid. In the Veda on the contrary these two invalidating elements being absent the self-evident nature of pramāṇa is not vitiated.¹²

(10) कल्पनापोढत्वम् ---The Buddhist view of perception is that it is mere apprehension divested of all determinations. Perception gives only the bare 'that' (svalakṣaṇa) and all the qualifications such as name, class, quality, act, substance, are mere figments of the brain (kalpanā); cf. I. L. E., P. 108, N. 2.

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The object of Nirvikalpakapratyakṣa or perception free from thought-determinations is mere being and as such what acquires Dharmatva through its being an aid to a result cannot be given in Nirvikalpaka. That the milk-jar etc., are a means to a result shows that they are the object of savikalpaka and not of an unqualified perception. 'Being a means' is a quality-kalpana.

(12) Even when no sensible meaning is conveyed by a statement there is no bādha but that does not invest it with validity. The two conditions required for pramāṇya are—the source of information must be free from defect and the knowledge that the statement produces should not be sublated.

18. How then is *prāmānya* self-evident? It is for the ascertainment of that (which constitutes Vedic credibility) that the inquiry regarding the validity of knowledge in general is undertaken. These questions may be raised:—Is it that both validity and invalidity become self-evident? Or the nature of either being unrevealed is it determined (as valid) in case the instrument by which it is apprehended (*karāṇa*) is sound or (as invalid) if the instrument is defective? Or is it that invalidity is self-established, validity however (being established) either by the knowledge of the soundness of the instrument (or source) or by its coherence with other experience, or by the awareness that it serves some purpose, or validity being self-established, is it vitiated either by the knowledge of its incompatibility with subsequent experience or by the defect in the instrument?

19. Some (*Sāmkhyas*) hold that an effect-producing potency resides naturally in all causes (*Kāraṇa*) on account of which both (validity and invalidity) of knowledge are self-apprehended. This view is wrong. An individual knowledge cannot at the identical moment reveal its validity as well as invalidity because of mutual contradiction. It is wrong also to suppose that a certain *jñāna* of itself reveals its validity and another its invalidity.¹³ If knowledge that is not supported by another is itself the cause of its certitude there is no means to discriminate in which particular piece of knowledge there is validity and in which there is invalidity. Hence both being incapable of being determined from knowledge as such (*svasvabhāvena*) they can be adjudged either way (say the *Naiyāyikas*) by ascertaining the soundness and defect of the instrument (by which that knowledge is generated). Even that (argue the *Bauddhas*) is absurd. It is clear from the above statement that prior to the ascertainment of the soundness or otherwise of the means employed, knowledge, owing to its incapacity to point to something valid or invalid is void (*Nissvabhāvam*—neither the one nor the other, i. e. it is invalid). Hence knowledge in itself is invalid and its validity however depends on corroborative evidence etc. This alone (the *Bauddhas* maintain) is the right view.

20. To explain:—Merely because knowledge has originated it cannot be concluded that what it imports is indubitable, for it strays (as in the illusory cognition of silver in nacre) and is dubious. Hence it is invalid at the time of its origin but subsequently either by the cognition that the instrument (of *jñāna*) is of the right kind or by the cognition of corroborative evidence or by the actual experience of its serving some end, its validity is cognized and invalidity negated. As regards the *Veda* (*Sabda*) (we must look for) a trustworthy person who has composed it since that (viz.,

(13) It cannot be urged that a certain *jñāna* reveals validity as in अयं वदतः and another invalidity as in इदं जतम्. Since *jñāna* as such engenders both validity and invalidity confusion may arise in fixing which is which.

trustworthy source) constitutes the right kind of instrument. But that is absent in the Veda since it is admitted (by you) that the Veda is *apauruṣeya*. (Not only does this defect militate against its validity but it contains such patently absurd statements as):—"The trees performed the *satrayāga*; "Listen, O Stones" and so forth—statements which resemble the prattle of an inebriate person. Being the composition (as it is evident) of a most untrustworthy author the Vedas are undoubtedly valueless as *pramāṇa*.

21. Now begins the answer :—"Validity if it should depend upon Established doctrine, external corroboration can never establish itself; whoever will substantiate a view that cuts at the very root (of *prāmānya*)?"—(Kumārila's *Sloka Vārtikā*). If all knowledge should desiderate other knowledge, being itself unable to establish its self-validity then the knowledge of the soundness of the means, of corroboration, and of possessing some utility, would require some other evidence for the proof of its own validity, that other again something, so on and so forth, with the result that the nature of no object could be determined even in a thousand births and validity itself would be at an end (i. e. there would be no criterion by which to credit knowledge of any kind with validity). It may be argued that the knowledge of 'causal efficacy' (and of the soundness of the means and corroboration) is self-valid (*arthakriyājñānam svataḥ prāmānyam*). But one may ask, what difference does it make? If it is answered that such knowledge can always stand the test of fruitful activity (*avyabhiçāra*) we say, no. In a state of dream, there is the awareness of efficacy but no fetching of water.¹⁴ It may be said again that consciousness of pleasure alone constitutes causal efficacy and that it does not stray for there cannot be the consciousness of pleasure if there were not pleasure somewhere. Yes, this is true but even then it is not the determinant of the validity of the first knowledge (i. e. knowledge on its first appearance) as witness the feeling of pleasure when in dream, there is the (false) meeting of a person with his beloved. Hence it must necessarily be admitted that knowledge being by its very nature self-valid loses that validity either from the evidence of later incompatible experience or from the defect in the instrument of knowledge. It is therefore clear that the validity of *Sabda* is vitiated because of its contact with a person on whose veracity no reliance can be placed but such a contingency being absent in the Veda and further there being no apparent invalidating experience its validity is not negatived. The human speech on the other hand depending as it does on one's will may be either illusory or purposely intended to deceive and so being corrupt at the very source is defective as a valid means of testimony. This then is the difference (between the Veda and the human speech).

(14) The dreaming man is conscious of bringing water in a vessel but actually no water is brought. Hence *वर्थाकारिज्ञान* has failed to substantiate the validity of *jñāna*.

22. Some aver :—In the empirical sphere also (loke) invalidity

Contention that S'ab-
da may be included in
anumāna.

cannot be attributed to Sabda because it is not recognised as an instrument of knowledge. (The question of validity or otherwise arises only, when Sabda is recognised as an independent pramāṇa).

In the world of men Sabda is not a pramāṇa because the words used by a person serve as a (līṅga) to infer the idea of the speaker. Hence any incoherence (vyabhiçāra) that may come to light is due to anumāna (inference) and not to Sabda. (We may go a step further and say) that (vyabhiçāra) does not belong to inference even, since the listener cannot make out whether the words used by the speaker are in reality indicative of what he (the speaker) means and so he may regard as līṅga what is not really such. But if it be urged that incoherence is due to Sabda only then invalidity must be regarded as sui generis (not to be traced to any extraneous cause as puruṣa) because Sabda is not contaminated by the speaker's faults seeing that the function of the speaker is merely to give expression to words as they really are.

23. The view advanced is jejune. If in the empirical sphere Śabda

Bhātta view.

is not accepted as a pramāṇa, how can validity be attributed to the Veda (which is also an assemblage of words)? That "Śabda which ceases to function after serving as a līṅga (indicating what the speaker has in mind) cannot by any pramāṇa be shown to possess its denotative potency," is mentioned in Nyāyaratnamāla (a work by the present author). The statement has been made that if incoherence is admitted (in Śabda) invalidity would belong naturally to Sabda only since the faults of the person cannot by any means affect it. This would be so if the person was merely concerned in giving utterance to (i. e. merely revealing) a sentence which is regarded as his. But the sentence however is his own (conscious) construction (and so he cannot be said to be a mere passive utterer of the words which are in a particular order)—the letters are (no doubt) eternal; alike the words; but the sentences have a human origin because they are constructed by men: (the syntactical arrangement which should yield a particular sense is the deliberate work of man). If they (loutika sentences) merely manifested existent Śabdas they too would like the Veda attain apouruṣeyatva.¹⁵ And then (if the loutika sentences are apouruṣeya) they cannot be said to serve as a mark enabling one to infer the speaker's desire. Just as the Vedic sentences chanted by the learners do not indicate what the learners intend, so the sentences fashioned by men also would not indicate their intention. If it be maintained that in the empirical sphere Sabda cannot be credited with validity because of the possibility of its swerving from truth (when it proceeds from an untrustworthy source) then, even when it serves as a mark to indicate the speaker's mind the same invalidity attaches to it because it is seen that thought and speech are often at variance with each other (i. e. the expression does not often correspond to the

(15) If human statements merely revealed existent S'abdas as the Veda does, then, such statements also would rank as apauruṣeya—a conclusion which would find favour with none.

thought behind it). Further Śabda like sight etc., possesses a power of its own which reveals knowledge and though the knowledge may swerve from truth the power to reveal knowledge is not thereby destroyed. But in the case of inference, only that which does not stray (i. e. *saddhetu*) can be the true inferential mark and consequently that which strays loses its *liṅga* (i. e. its character to serve as a *hetu*).¹⁶ If it be said that inference will be accepted only after taking care to remove any doubt regarding the trustworthiness of the speaker then let Śabda itself be a valid means of knowledge there being no trace here of any invalidating circumstance (on your own admission the words used in the world-loukika, are all free from defect). In a person who wishes to understand by inference the idea of the speaker, necessarily the meanings of the words first arise; then compatibility and fitness to express some sense are to be thought of by him; while in this thought-process those (compatibility etc.) would immediately bring home the meaning of the sentence (*vākya*rtha) and do not wait for inference. (Hence there is no room for *anumāna*).

24. Again your doctrine is that, to start with, the speaker's idea is inferred and then the sentence which merely restates (*anuvāda*) what has gone before yields its meaning (*vākya*rtha). Now when one believes that a person is trustworthy though (as a matter of fact) he is untrustworthy one should admit that the knowledge arising from this person's statement is indeed false; as such the invalidity of the *pramāṇa* (Śabda) is the result of some defect (*doṣa*), but since it is not admitted (by the *Prābhākara*) that the speaker's faults contaminate the words it comes to this that the words are by nature error-contaminated and ipso facto the Veda (consisting of words) becomes invalid. So let us proceed no further (enough of this topic). To conclude – because in the empirical domain statements proceed from untrustworthy sources all invalidity is to be traced to the speaker only but the Veda not having any human source must be regarded as a self-valid means of knowledge. Therefore, in substance, that only is Dharma which has the Veda as its *pramāṇa* and helps one towards the attainment of a beneficent end. That which is the means to a beneficent object (*śreyas-sādhana*), namely *yāga*, *homa* etc., that alone is Dharma: a view accepted by the elders (*loke*) and not *apūrva* (*vihitakarma janyo Dharmah*, according to the *Naiyāyikas* and *Prābhākaras*), or modal change of *antaḥkaraṇa*, (the *Sāmkhyas* regard as Dharma a change in the internal sense); for such interpretations of Dharma are not commonly held in the world.

25. Is not *apūrva* itself the path to the beneficent end? No; because (*apūrva*) is only an intermediate cause (*vyāpāra*).¹⁷ Hence *yāga* and the rest alone constitute Dharma as they lead to the wished-for goal. And because

(16) The validity of Śabda is discarded on the ground of *vyabhicāra* and Śabda is made to assume the character of *linga* to indicate the speaker's intention (*अनुमानविषया*) but even here says the *Bhāṭṭa*, *vyabhicāra* cannot be avoided.

(17) *Vyāpāra-tarjanantevēvati tarjanatkarṇam* *apūrva* is the immediate cause of *Svarga* and is itself the effect of *yāga*.

it will not be the means to the attainment of good if performed by a Sūdra, yāga will not be Dharma to him. The word artha (in "ṣodanā lakṣaṇo artho Dharmah") is put in specifically, to obviate the possibility of regarding as Dharma all (injunctions) that have the authority of the Veda.¹⁸ By the use of the word ṣodanā are meant statements which enjoin certain actions and also those which prohibit others (i. e. obligatory and proscribed). Now statements of a prohibitory character such as "No harm should be done to any creature" indicate, that certain injunctions if followed will cause harm and as such produce deleterious effects; but (included as they are in the ṣodanā) they too will acquire the character of Dharma. To exclude such a possibility the qualifying word 'artha' is used making it clear that what is prescribed for adoption because it is beneficent (artha) in its result is alone Dharma. (This interpretation finds corroboration in Śābara Bhāṣya). (Śābarasvāmin) in his commentary dwelling on the word 'śyena' explains that it refers to the injury that its performance causes (to the enemy whose ruin is sought). In a subsequent passage (subsequent to the comment on "śyena abhiçaran yajeta") he says, "That (śyena) indeed is harm; that is interdicted".¹⁹

26. Some hold the view that the śyena yāga itself (taking Śyena in the literal sense) is excluded by the word 'artha' since they wish to avoid taking the word 'śyena' in the secondary sense (viz., injury done to the enemy). (Because the Bhāṣya) states that śyena and other yāgas of like nature are to be understood as not fit for performance they conclude that these yāgas come under the category of prohibitory mandates. How do you assert that there is no mandatory force—vidheyatva? To this question they reply "That (karma) whose performance is essential in order that the vidhi in respect of it may acquire its mandatory character and which is not brought about otherwise (say by one's desire) is spoken of as vidheya (i. e. something to be done as the outcome of an injunction). As regards kām्यakarmas (duties conditional on subjective desire) or interested duties, the will to do (pravṛtti) results from the promptings of the desire itself and the vidhi-tva (mandatory character) is secured from that only (in other words the performance of the duty enjoined, results indirectly and not from the mandate). (Having secured vidhitva through the channel of one's

(18) षोडना लक्षणमात्रस्य etc., ṣodanā or vidhi is either: (i) that which is the opposite of a mere restatement - अनुवादप्रतियोगित्वं रूपम् - or (ii) that which is the opposite of a negative statement - निषेधप्रतियोगित्वं रूपम्. It is the first kind that is meant here since it is intended to comprise both positive and negative mandates; for then only would the inclusion of artha in the definition of Dharma be appropriate. The negative vākya also come under vidhi but Dharmatva has to be excluded from them because of the evil resulting from the performance of prohibited deeds.

(19) Śābara says that the use of the word 'artha' is to exclude śyena yāga which results in sin. If it is objected that the injunction regarding śyena is not on a par with prohibitory injunctions like 'do not eat flesh' etc., the answer is that the Bhāṣyakāra means by 'śyena' the injury caused to the enemy. And there is the command - Do not injure any creature.

desire to perform *śyena*yāga with the object of bringing about the enemy's destruction) the *śyena*-injunction does not directly prompt the will to perform the yāga as there is no absence of some other means to bring about the result (i. e. the performance).

27. An objection may be raised against this view—Pravartana (the activity prompted by the *liñ*) is no other than the knowledge regarding the observance of a duty and since in the Veda the optative suffix (*liñ*) itself enjoins that the yāga should be performed how can it be maintained that there is no prescription of duty (*avidheyatva*)? (The *Prābhākaras* answer):—Yes, it is true (i. e. that duty is obligatory is what the *liñ* denotes). But the duty of performing the yāga is not enjoined by the modal suffix. The mood (*liñ*) explains its own meaning (i. e. *apūrva*) as a moral duty (*kartavyatva*)²⁰ (but not yāga). And yāga stands in the relation of *viśaya* to *apūrva* and it is also *janaka* (*kāraṇa*) of *apūrva*.²¹ *Niyoga* which is the meaning (of *liñ*) and which is of the essence of something to be achieved (*kārya*) not being otherwise possible (*ākṣepa-pramāṇa*) indicates that what is to be done relates to its own *viśaya* (i.e. yāga) and as such is regarded as inducing the performance of yāga. As regards *śyena* and the rest since the will to perform is prompted by desire, *niyoga* does not enjoin their performance and so they cannot be said to come under the pervue of *vidheyatva*. The *vidheyatva* (being the object of a mandate) being absent they fall under prohibited duties and so the word 'artha' is used to prevent the possibility of incurring sin by their performance.

28. These points have to be considered. In what particular are they (*śyena* etc.) to be excluded (from the pervue of *liñ*)? If you say, as regards Dharma, it cannot be, because the nature of Dharma has not yet been defined. This *sūtra* is intended (according to you) to reveal the *kāryatva* of the meaning of the Veda and not the *Dharmatva* (i. e. not to define Dharma which has the Veda as its authority). If it were otherwise (i. e. if it had referred to Dharma) then you could say that the word 'artha' is used to remove the possibility of regarding *śyena* as Dharma. You may (if you so desire) say that here *kāryatva* is interdicted but such a view has been refuted before. (If *śyena* is not *kārya* it becomes *siddha* and so loses its validity; cf. *Čandrikā* p. 33). Again let it be conceded that this *sūtra* (*çodanālakṣaṇa* etc.,) also gives a definition of Dharma though such concession would

(20) The *apūrva* being a correlative term demands its correlate which is here yāga. Like *Jñāna* and *içcha* *apūrva* demands something of which it is the *apūrva*.

(21) By implication (*arthāt*) the *liñ* should be understood to prescribe yāga.

involve a break in sentence-unity. Even then your view is that by the employment of the phrase *çodanālakṣaṇa apūrva* which is of the nature of *kārya* is intended and that (*apūrva*) is *Dharma*.⁸ Then (i. e. if it is accepted that *Dharmatva* pertains only to *apūrva* or *kārya*) where is the propriety in making any reference to *śyena yāga* which not being a *kārya* has no connection with *Dharma* and as such it could not be said that *artha* is used to prevent *Dharmatva* being attributed to *śyena yāga*? As *apūrva* (alone) is admitted to be *Dharma* even *Jyotiṣṭoma* ceases to be associated with *Dharmatva*.⁹ If you (changing your attitude) say that the word *artha* is used to obviate the attribution of *Dharmatva* to *apūrva* of *s'yena* (i. e. *apūrva* resulting from the performance of *s'yena*) then you will be interpreting the word *s'yena* which is used as the name of a sacrifice (*karma*) in the *Bhāṣya* in its secondary sense of *apūrva* which is the outcome (*sādhya*) of *s'yena*—a procedure not different from the one you are contending against.¹⁰ And if it is urged that *apūrva* alone is to be excluded from the category of *Dharma* (and not *himsā*) the *Bhāṣya* text — “That is injury indeed and that is forbidden” (referring to *śyena*) would become inappropriate. It is the *s'yena* sacrifice (because it is a means) or its result (*phala*) that is *himsā* and never *apūrva*. According to this explanation (of yours) viz., that *apūrva* is negated by ‘*artha*’, the *Bhāṣya* texts (S. Bh. P. 19) “Why does the *S'ruti* enjoin the performance of a deleterious act (viz., *s'yena*)?”—this is the question; “It is not understood that *s'yena* and other sacrifices of like nature are to be undertaken”—this is the answer, would refer to *apūrva*. And the obligation to perform it (i. e., securing the *s'yena apūrva*) cannot be put aside since it is of the nature of *Kārya* (*Prābhākara* conception). It all comes to this that having admitted that this *Bhāṣya* is intended to inhibit the performance of the sacrifice you answer (when confronted with the query why it should not be performed) that what is to be undertaken is in reality *Niyoga* (or *apūrva*) and not that (i. e. *yāga*)—an interpretation which is absurd. Even in relation to interested works (*kāmya*) the propulsion comes from the *vidhi* (the scriptural mandate) and not from the satisfaction of an end because its (*phala*) origination depending upon the *vidhi* does not need *yāga*.¹¹ As far *vidhi*, its justification

(8) *Apūrva* is a supersensuous quality generated in the *ātman*, and that it should be secured is the meaning of the optative mood in scriptural commands.

(9) The point is that in *kāmyakarmas* the prompting to undertake the sacrifice comes from one's desire to secure an end while as regards *nityakarmas* such a desire being absent the prompting must come from the scriptural command. This is the *Prābhākara* view. When it is thus insisted that *apūrva* alone is *Dharma* even *jyotiṣṭoma* since it is a *yāga* ceases to be *dharma*—a view not accepted by any school of *Mīmāṃsa*.

(10) According to the *Bhāṭṭas* *s'yena* in its secondary sense is the harm resulting from its performance and according to the *Prābhākaras* it is *apūrva* which is again a secondary sense of *s'yena*.

(11) According to the *Prābhākaras* the relation is between *yāga* and *apūrva* and from *apūrva* results *phala*; *phala* is therefore the *preraka*—propeller of *vidhi* and *vidhi* is the *preraka* of *yāga* so that the contention that the *phala* is the *pravartaka* of *yāga* is void.

is dependent upon yāga (i. e. it could become vidhi only when the yāga is undertaken) and therefore the will to perform yāga comes from vidhi (and not from phala.)

29. If in interested works, scriptural injunction is understood as possessing no operative force then it ceases to function as such even in the case of the auxiliary portion because its performance also is prompted by the end in view (phala) and (it is known) that this end could be secured only by the performance of the principal karma together with its auxiliary. In confirmation of this it is stated as follows:—"The pradhāna or the principal karma, only when conjoined with the auxiliary, is related to the declared end—so that the desire to perform both the primary and the auxiliary is proper". (Jai. 3-7-9). Hence the agniṣomiya sacrifice also leading as it does to injury (himsā) and deprived therefore of the support of vidhi comes under acts which are banned (i. e. the general injunction "Do not harm, any creature"—Nahimsyāt Sarvābhūtāni), with the result that jyotiṣtoma also, because of its association with the auxiliary agniṣomiya would end in disaster. Then the Bhāṣya text - "Which is artha? That which conduces to one's good, viz., Jyotiṣtoma etc.," becomes invalid.¹²

30. Well, the prohibitory passage "Do not injure"—not occurring

in any sacrificial context should be regarded as referring to the prohibition of a particular course of man's conduct (puruṣārtha). Because it is so only those harmful acts are to be prohibited which are perpetrated for the gratification of the individual.¹³ If indeed it is regarded as kratvarthanaiṣedha then that also (the prohibition—"Do not injure") will relate to yāga. Being thus undifferentiated the same prohibitory vidhi by its application to kratvartha and puruṣārtha will have to bear two entirely unrelated senses (vairūpya which amounts to vākyabheda or break in sentence-unity). Hence only

(12) (i) Itikartavyatā is the name of subsidiary actions.

(ii) अग्निषोमीये षष्ठ्याहनेत् "sacrifice the agniṣomiya animal". In the performance of jyotiṣtoma which is the principal yāga agniṣomiya which involves the immolation of goats is an auxiliary karma essential for the fruition of the primary yāga.

(iii) Jyotiṣtoma—Stoma or stotra refers to the number of laudatory ṛks which are to be chanted and a definite number chanted on the occasion of the sacrifice is known by the name of jyotis.

(13) Nigedha or prohibition is of two kinds:—

(i) Puruṣārthanaiṣedha:—पुरुषनिष्ठ प्रत्यवायापादकक्रिया विषयकत्वम्
This prohibition refers to the sin a man would incur in case he acted contrary to the injunction.

(ii) Kratvarthanaiṣedha:—ऋतुगतवैपुल्यापादक क्रिया विषयकत्वम्
This prohibition relates to the loss of efficacy in a yāga if what is prohibited is done; eg., the sacrificer is enjoined not to utter falsehood. If he violates this injunction the yāga will not be fruitful (वैपुल्यं-ऋतुजननासामर्थ्यम्)

In the first case the man that violates the rule such as नक्तलङ्घनं मत्स्येत् (do not eat flesh), commits sin; in the second if the prohibitory injunction is violated the expected reward from the performance of yāga will not come.

such harmful deeds as are perpetrated for self-gratification fall under the category of prohibited deeds and not those of kratvartha (i. e. those enjoined for the fulfilment of a yāga).

31. What has been said can only delude the ignorant (lit. all this may gratify children's fancy). The injunction regarding the prohibition of himsā even if undemarked does not convey a plurality of contradictory notions. If the prohibitory injunction had made specific reference to both kratvartha and puruṣārtha then it would be (open to the blemish of) conveying contradictory notions, for the same predicate would have two objects to govern viz., the kratvartha and puruṣārtha which are animadverted against by the mandate. But when injury in general is prohibited how could vairūpya be attributed to it? To secure meat for the sake of food injury is caused, as also to put an end to the life of one's enemy whereby there results direct personal gratification; though both these cases come under the prohibitory injunction without any differentiation there is no vairūpya. So here also.¹⁴ Otherwise (i. e. if vairūpya is attributed to the vidhi because it makes no distinction between kratvartha and puruṣārtha) vairūpya has to be attributed to the vidhi prohibiting injury associated with food as well as that relating to direct personal gratification. Therefore injury of any kind with whatsoever motive caused without exception stands condemned. And it is evident that the prohibitory injunction (nahimsyāt sarvābhūtāni) is puruṣārtha only as not having found a place in the kratu context. Therefore if the injury inflicted in agniṣomiya had not the sanction of a vidhi (i. e. if it is not the object of the mandate-vidheyatva) it would come under the pervue of the general rule governing himsā. But being as it is an act enjoined (agniṣomiyam paṣumālabheta) it comes under exception and as such the general rule being opposed to this exception is operative in those cases of injury which are not covered by the special rule.¹⁵

(14) The same injunction regarding 'injury' applies to the killing of animals which ministers to one's wants indirectly and to the killing of an enemy which mode of inflicting injury ministers directly to one's wish; and yet no one regards that the vidhi is vitiated by its application to two different acts. So also the same vidhi which relates to both kratvartha and puruṣārtha is not vitiated.

(15) The Prābhākaras assert that in interested works (kāmya) it is the desire for reward that prompts one to action and not the scriptural mandate (vidhi). But for the Bhāttas both in kāmya and nitya the prompting comes from the mandate. If, according to the former, the Vedic mandate is not operative in kāmya the prohibitory injunction which is universal in its application will surely operate in agniṣomiya. This is unacceptable to both schools of Mīmāṃsa.

पुत्रप्राप्ये etc.-even though prohibition regarding the infliction of harm (nahimsyāt etc.) is not found in the kratu context it will apply to the person sacrificing, i. e. he will incur sin for having killed the sacrificial animal. This again is unwelcome.

विरोधात्-contradiction comes in when regarding the same act (here, the sacrifice of the agniṣomiya pasu) there is vidhi as well as pratishedha. But in this case the exception विशेषविधि enjoins the sacrificial injury and as it is opposed to the general injury the latter applies to cases not falling under the Vedic mandate,

32. Objection :—Even admitting the mandatory character of paśuhimsā (the killing of animals in yāga) we find no contradiction in the operation of both mandate and prohibition, for the first applies to yāga and the second to the person, there being thus difference in the objects referred to (viśayabheda). This prohibition does not apply to the sacrifice (for the infliction of injury is necessary for its fruition) but as regards the person the prohibition (does apply).

Refuting the Sām-
khyā doctrine of
himsā.

Yes, it is true (in a sense). There will be no inconsistency (even when both vidhi and pratiśedha operate) when the mandate relating to the auxiliary sacrifice alone is concerned.¹⁶ Since however the mandate regarding jyotiṣṭoma enjoins on one the performance of the primary (pradhāna) conjointly with the auxiliary (aṅga) sacrifice it inhibits the operation of the prohibitory mandate relating to injury caused for the gratification of the person¹⁷ which would otherwise become applicable to the injury inflicted in agniṣomiya (aṅga). And the performance of Jyotiṣṭoma is impossible for one who avoids the infliction of harm essential in agniṣomiya. Hence because of the contradiction (if both kinds of vidhis operate) the exception (viśeṣa vidhi) rules out the general rule (nahimsyāt etc.). If the vidhi (sanctioning himsā) has no room, even the himsā pertaining to agniṣomiya would be prohibited.

33. (Reverting to the Prābhākara view)—On what grounds is śyena yāga excluded from the operation of the Vedic mandate? If it be said that it is for bringing it under the operation of the prohibitory mandate (we ask) which is the prohibitory mandate? (You will answer), "Do not injure any creature"—. (But we have to point out that) the prohibition does not apply to śyena because it (the prohibitory injunction) relates to the causing of injury. And it is the consequence (phala) of śyena that constitutes injury and not the śyena sacrifice. To this effect it is said, "To one who wishes to cause injury this is the means (śyena is only the means and not 'injury' by itself)—such indeed is the object in prescribing śyena and the rest". (S. Bh. I. 1-2. P. 19).

34. Some one says:—If Śyena comes under the Vedic imperative perforce its consequence which is of the nature of injury falls under the same category and cannot be prohibited (the general prohibitory rule cannot apply because the phala viz., himsā is also an obligatory act). Hence to check the scope of the imperative extending to the phala or consequence the imperative regarding Śyena is unavoidably baulked.

(16) अङ्गविधिमात्रलोचनया If we ignore the fact that agniṣomiya is indispensable for the fruition of Jyotiṣṭoma.

(17) The Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice is an interested ritual—पुरुषार्थ i. e. the means by which a desired end is achieved, (पुरुषार्थमिष्टवित्तकलसावनम्). As forming part of this main sacrifice the aṅga viz., agniṣomiya also becomes a kāmya karma. Hence when there is puruṣārtha vidhi as in sāṅgajyotiṣṭoma, there cannot be puruṣārtha-pratiśedha

35. What is said is not pertinent. Even though the apūrva

Answer.

connected with Syena yāga is admitted (by the Prābhākaras also) to be an imperative duty, the end that is achieved by it is not a matter of injunction; similarly though the yāga (Syena) is a legitimate duty, its end (viz., suffering caused to the enemy) as sought by one's desire does not come within the purview of the imperative. Hence it is meaningless to deny the imperative character to Syena. Hence also it (must be granted that it) is the injury that does not fall under the definition (of Dharma). That section of thinkers (ekadeśinah) have to be asked this another question, viz., "What do you understand by the term artha"? If it be answered that it connotes the means to one's good (Sreyas sādhana) the unconditional duties (nityakarma) will forfeit their claim to Dharma (duty enjoined by scriptures).¹⁸ If on the other hand it be said that the term artha means that which does not yield a prohibited end then the apūrva of a negative injunction (indicated by the potential termination liṅ) will become a matter of duty,¹⁹ because it is enjoined by the scriptures (Çodanālakṣanatva) and is unassociated with any prohibited consequence. If it be said 'Let it be so' (i. e. if it be answered that there is no harm in regarding the apūrva of a negative injunction as constituting Dharma) it must be rebutted on the ground that it is opposed to common experience. He who has set about doing an act of injury when turned away from it by a prohibitory mandate is not described as a person who has done a meritorious deed (lit. a duty enjoined by scriptures) but only as one who has desisted from an evil deed, as witness the statement.—"The definition given by the Logicians must be in conformity with common usage and not be conventional like the definition of vṛddhi." (The definition of vṛddhi-coalescence, viz., 'vṛddhirādaic' is purely conventional). Let there be no further discussion of this topic.

Thus ends çodanā aphorism.

(18) The reason why on this view dharmatva is denied to nitya is that according to the Prābhākaras there being no phala for it S'reyassādhanā is out of the question.

(19) In the mandate "do not eat flesh" (न कृच्छ्रं भक्षयेत्) The potential mood indicates apūrva and with the negative particle it means cessation from eating flesh. Here there is no prohibited end or phala. Hence it acquires the character of duty (धर्मत्वापत्तिः).

SECTION III

TOPIC:—INQUIRY INTO THE PRAMĀṆA OF DHARMA

Sūtra 3.—Examination of the (validity of the) means of apprehending that (viz., Dharma).

By this aphorism is indicated for easy understanding what this Pāda (the first chapter) is going to detail, viz., the investigation into the nature of the pramāṇa known as *codanā* (Veda) on the analogy of the aphorisms: "Then therefore the Section on *Śeṣa*" (Jai. Sut. III-I. I). "Then the Section *Viśeṣa*". 1. (Jai. Sut. VIII. I-I).

(1) The first six books of Jaimini - Pūrvaṣatka, deal with Upades'a-Vākyas, i.e. statements enjoining that particular yāgas should be performed in a particular manner-इत्थं कर्तव्यम्, the second six - Uttaraṣatka, deal with atides'a or transfer, i.e. sections which are to be understood when performing ectype yāgas where all subsidiaries are not directly mentioned.

The second section laid down two positions:—

- (i) The Veda is the valid means of apprehending Dharma:
- (ii) The Veda alone is the valid means (pramāṇa) of Dharma.

Now these propositions are undertaken to be proved in the Sections 4 to 8. The fourth establishes the second proposition (pratijñā) by showing that pramāṇas like perception are incompetent to reveal the nature of Dharma; the fifth and the following establish the validity of the Veda (S'abda) as a pramāṇa.

तस्य-धर्मविषयतत्त्वज्ञानस्य, of knowledge regarding what constitutes Dharma.

निमित्तं - कारणम्; तस्य परिधिः-परीक्षा-युक्ति पूर्वकसाधकतर्कलपैः विचारः-

a reasoned inquiry into the validity of what gives that knowledge.

SECTION IV

TOPIC:—WHAT CONSTITUTES DUTY (DHARMA) CANNOT BE
ESTABLISHED BY PERCEPTION ETC.

In order to prove that the Veda alone is the *pramāṇa* in regard to Dharma (Sūtra II) it is said that validity is denied to perception etc.

Sutra IV. Perceptive knowledge arises on the contact of a man's senses with objects and this perception is no *pramāṇa* (in the case of Dharma) because it is the knowledge of the existents.

1. Perception (perceptive knowledge) since it arises when there is contact between the sense and the object apprehends what is existent (at the time when such knowledge arises) and is (therefore) invalid as a means of knowing Dharma which is yet to be. The Naiyāyikas find fault with this position since even in erroneous knowledge there is a similar contact of the sense-organs with existent objects and as such they assert that this is no definition (i. e. that it is a case of *ativyāpti*). But there is indeed no fault as what is stated is not a definition (of perception). This is not meant to be the definition of perception but only a statement of the fact that it cannot be the means of ascertaining (Dharma). The reason for this is that perception is of the present objects, which fact again is based on the ground that perceptive knowledge results only where there is contact between the sense and the object. And there is no possibility of this knowledge (as results from the contact of sense and object) arising with reference to absent objects. We refute the objection that contact between the sense-organ and the object is not the cause, because of its non-pervasiveness (*avyāpti*) in the apprehension of happiness etc. For their origination also is due to the contact of a sense-organ named mind. And the apprehension of happiness etc., is itself the authority for the existence of the mind. Perceptive knowledge is dependent upon sense-organs, as witness the *vyāpti* in the perception of colour; (the *vyāpti* or concomitance may be stated thus:—Wherever there is perceptive knowledge that is invariably dependent upon sense-organs.) Hence the apprehension of happiness etc., being perceptive knowledge (*pratyakṣa-jñāna*) leads to the inference of a sense. As this (apprehension of pleasure, pain etc.,) is outside the province of the sense of sight etc., we have to presume some other sense.

2. Some one argues thus: as pleasure etc., are special qualities inherent in an eternal substance (viz., *ātman*) they arise when there is contact with some other substance just as we perceive the appearance of colour inherent in

earth-atoms when they come into contact with fire. That which is this other substance is the mind. (On this analogy it is argued that pleasure etc., originate when the ātman comes into contact with the mind.)

3. This cannot stand the test of reason. In fact it is the body that is the seat of enjoyment. What else is the meaning of the statement that the body is the seat of

Bhātta.

enjoyment except that pleasure etc., arise in ātman only when there is contact between the ātman and the body? And because the body is the receptacle of food and drink, pleasure etc., cannot arise outside the body. Hence as bodily contact alone suffices for the origination of pleasure etc., the inference of another substance (here it is mind) is untenable. Moreover the need for contact with some other substance is seen only in the case of qualities inherent in the earth-element and not in relation to qualities of substances in general. The contact with tejas (fire-element) alone is seen as the cause (in the appearance of colour in earth-atoms) and not contact with substance as such (all substances irrespectively). Hence mind is not established in this manner. The immediate perception of pleasure etc., alone is the hetu in the inference of mind.

4. Now which then is the definition of sense, covering sight etc., and also mind? This is it:—That is spoken of as

Definition of sense.

indriya (sense) which generates a clear and specific knowledge of the object with which it comes into contact and it is of two kinds, external and internal. The external is fivefold:—smell, taste, sight, touch and hearing. The internal is one-mind. That the first four of these are respectively constituted by earth, water, light (tejas), and air (substance) is admitted as in the system of Akṣapāda (another name of Gautama); the sense of hearing is admitted by them (the followers of that system) to be made up of ether, but we declare on the authority of the Scriptural text 'The quarters are the hearing' (cf. *Puruṣasūkta*) that dis as delimited by the orifice of the ear constitutes the sense of hearing. The mind is constituted by one of the (enumerated elements viz.,) earth-substance etc., or it is something different from them; constituted anyhow, the mind exists and it establishes its contact only with the ātman and the ātman's qualities independently (without the aid of sight etc.,) but not with objects outside as colour etc. Hence it is spoken of as the internal (sense-organ). Even in the apprehension of colour etc., it functions with the aid of the eye etc.; likewise in inferential knowledge with the aid of liṅga-probans. (That the instrumentality of mind is necessary is proved by the fact) that in one whose mind is not concentrated, though there is contact (between the eye and the object), no apprehension of colour etc., arises. In recollection also it functions, being dependent upon mental impressions (samskāra) and not independently.

5. As inference etc., have their origin in mind and as they function even in regard to (objects existing in) the past and the future the statement that what has origin

Objection.

in a sense-organ has reference to objects existing in the present is inconclusive (anaikāntika).

There is no straying away of reason (anaikāntika). The being originated in a sense-organ is not the cause but the contact of the sense-organ is; and (for instance)

Answer.

in the inference of past or future rain there is no contact between the inferring mind (and the rain). Hence there is no Vyabhiçāra. ¹ It is therefore patent that perception is not the means of cognising (Dharma) and as a corollary, inference and the rest (like upamāna, arthāpatti) as they have to presuppose perception. When perception fails to function in establishing Dharma anumāna also fails since there can be no contact with it (Dharma) of any liṅga or hetu as in the concomitance between smoke and fire). ² The upamāna (as a means of cognition) fails here (lit. recedes to a distance) because it is based on similarity. ³ Presumption or postulation (arthāpatti) also is helpless here because there is nothing that can be regarded as inexplicable in the absence of Dharma (i. e. if Dharma is not postulated, as in the stock example 'stout Devadatta does not eat during the day, where his eating during night has to be presumed to obviate the incongruity between his stoutness and starving by day).

6. Are we not to postulate (Dharma) since otherwise the variegated world-spectacle remains inexplicable ?
Objection.

7. No. The world-variety can be explained on the basis of necessity. ⁴ Though no doubt owing to its

Answer.

(world) inexplicability, some supersensuous cause (adr̥ṣṭa) might be presumed, yet arthāpatti cannot help in discriminating which is Dharma or which is adharma either. Hence our refuge must be in the Veda. When this is admitted there can be no more ado about presumptive evidence nor is there room for the inferential process (known as) Sāmānyatodr̥ṣṭa. ⁵

(1) In the process of inference there is no contact between the mind and the sādhyā, viz., vidyamānopālabhanatva (apprehension of an object that is present) but the contact is between the mind and the hetu (paksadharmatājñāna). If this altered hetu is substituted, there is neither sādhyā (viz., apprehension of the present object) nor hetu-contact of sense organ. Hence no vyabhiçāra. The objection was raised on the ground that there was the hetu, (the being caused by the sense-organ) but no sādhyā (vidyamānopālabhanatva-apprehension of a thing that is present).

(2) When inferring fire from the perception of smoke in the mountain, we have the perceptive corroboration of the example viz., the fire-place.

(3) Cf. 'The forest-cow is similar to the cow in the shed' from which arises the upamiti, 'the cow in the shed is like the forest-cow'. But nothing similar to Dharma is within the range of observation.

(4) The Svabhāvavadins consider everything as self-determined requiring no precedent cause. For a fuller description of this doctrine—Vide O. I. P., pp. 104 ff.

(5) Inference is of two kinds: dr̥ṣṭa and sāmānyatodr̥ṣṭa. Here the sāmānyatodr̥ṣṭa takes this form:—the world-variety must have a cause, because it is a Kārya like pot. Every Kārya is concomitant with a kāraṇa, cf. I. L. E. pp. 158-159; also Pārthasarathi's comment on S. V. p. 392.

8. Is not the apprehension of concomitance (Sambandhagrahaṇa) dependent upon determinate (Savikalpaka) knowledge? How can that (i. e. vyāptijñāna in the process of inference) presuppose perception (as stated in para 5 *ibid*).

Objection.

Because determinate perception also arises in a person from the never ceasing activity of his senses, it reveals what is immediate so that it is pratyakṣa only. Hence there is no blemish.⁶

Answer.

9. It is indeed surprising that perception should be (understood as) revealing savikalpaka (determined or related objects). Svalakṣaṇa or apprehension of a bare 'that' is termed pratyakṣa and perceptive knowledge gives us only that (bare something). Determinations however being fit to be expressed in association with words cannot grasp svalakṣaṇa and words cannot approach svalakṣaṇa (i. e. a judgment which involves the use of words can only relate to savikalpaka which according to the Bauddhas is not perception). If verbal specification did really relate to svalakṣaṇa (apprehension of the real) then even without sense-activity perceptive knowledge would arise; but such is not the case. (In elucidation of this point) it is said - "The man burnt by contact with fire experiences the burning sensation in one way and the import of śabda 'burning' means differently to one who merely hears the word 'burning'." Hence as for names they cannot reveal the true nature of the object, (i. e. pratyakṣajñāna cannot arise from words). The savikalpakajñāna (apprehension of what is characterised) is on the same footing (as abhilāpa and so fails to give us reality). That clear apprehension which one with eyes wide open has in the savikalpaka - "This is a cow" arises at the very time that the nirvikalpaka reveals the true nature of the object and with which it (the savikalpaka) is in conjunction. Because of its (nirvikalpaka) absence, śābdabodha, (the determinate knowledge derived from mere words) and anumiti (inferential knowledge) give us but an indistinct apprehension of objects (i. e. the savikalpaka is blurred as given by śabda and anumāna). Hence nirvikalpaka alone is pratyakṣa. In that indeed there arises a clear apprehension of 'the unique particular' (or the bare 'that').

10. It is not so. Even savikalpaka as in the apprehension 'this is a cow' of one who keeps his eyes wide open is admitted as being perception only and this is not generated by association with something else (viz., nirvikalpaka) because of the absence of any proof. The class-conception (jāti) though fit to arise

Refutation of the
Buddhist doctrine
of perception.

(6) The Bauddhas find fault with the statement that inference presupposes perception since according to them it is the bare particular that is given in perception but that inference is based on the savikalpaka which they deny to be perceptive knowledge.

(7). "The percept is that which is not designated by a name nor determined by class and other predicables; it has a shape corresponding to the unique character of the object and is self-cognised". I. L. E. P. 122.

from verbal expression gives us vague notions, when conveyed by śabda, inference etc., and clear apprehension when conveyed by the senses. The distinction between immediate (pratyakṣa) and mediate (parokṣa) knowledge is not due to the object. If that were so sāmānya (class or jāti) would always be remote (parokṣa) and svalakṣaṇa (unique particular) would always be immediate perception. As a matter of fact it is not so. (Whether a thing reveals itself with clarity or not depends upon the means of apprehension). Apprehension of the class (universal) also is seen to be either parokṣa or aparokṣa. To explain:—A person observes from a distance a patch of bare white colour (svalakṣaṇa) and is doubtful about the class (jāti), —cowhood or horsehood, to which it belongs; when hearing the sound of neighing he infers horsehood in the same bare particular; but yet knows it (the apprehension) to be parokṣa. In fact this is what he says:—“Though this is a horse it is not revealed to the eye as such (i. e. in the manner it would be seen were there sense-contact)”; approaching the object however he says, “Now I see with my eyes its jāti also, viz., horsehood, but did not before”. Svalakṣaṇa however was a matter of clear apprehension even before (i. e. when seen from a distance) and the difference between parokṣa and aparokṣa pertains only to the universal (and not to the individual) and this (universal) becomes parokṣa or aparokṣa according as the object is far or near. Hence this distinction (between mediate and immediate perception) is the result of the cause (occasioning the apprehension).⁸ Who will demur to the statement that even as regards one and the same object the knowledge arising from sense-contact invests it (knowledge) with immediacy but not when arising from inferential marks etc? It is within the experience of all that what is known as aparokṣya is a distinct result produced in the object by (perceptive) knowledge.⁹ It is only on the basis (linga) of its (āparokṣya) existence or non-existence that for those only, who keep their eyes open the apprehension takes (respectively) the form.—“I see with my eyes; I do not see with my eyes”. Therefore even savikalpaka is perception (in its own right) since it reveals the object clearly.

11. Some thinkers hold the view that all knowledge (apprehension) is qualified (savikalpaka) only and that there surely is no such thing as non-qualified perception (nirvikalpaka). This is against all experience. We certainly have, after the sense comes into contact with the object a vague perception of the mere object as the result of

Refutation of the view that perceptive knowledge is of necessity Savikalpaka.

sense-contact, where no differentiation is made between generals

(8) Immediacy and mediacy both relate to the universal as illustrated above and not to the object. It is on the clarity or otherwise of the apprehension that the distinction is based.

(9) According to the Bhāṭṭa School jñāna is a matter of inference. The object of perception is illumined or made known—prākṛtya or jātātā and this new property that has arisen in the object (jñānājanya) serves as the mark for inferring jñāna. We conclude from prākṛtya which is perceptive that jñāna must have originated in us.

and particulars. In the absence of unqualified perception qualified perception itself does not arise. A person who is perceiving an object has to call to mind his past experience of the particular class (jāti) ¹⁰ to which it belongs and the particular name (samjñā) which it has and then acquire the savikalpakajñāna (qualified perception) of the thing that is before him. ¹¹ To one who has not had the perception of the jāti (artha) i. e. of the nature of jāti, samjñā etc. no recollection of it is possible and if it should arise, it would be (purely) accidental. Hence we must admit the existence of unqualified perception.

12. Some are of opinion that 'unqualified perception' has absolute existence alone (Sanmātra, i. e. pure consciousness - the Brahman) for its object. The bheda (the 'other') is apprehended by the qualified perception and as such when this bheda is not apprehended (in nirvikalpaka) the particulars cease to be apprehended. Further bheda is reciprocal negation (or differentiative non-existence) and this (non-existence) is not possible of being apprehended by pratyakṣa (but only by the pramāṇa known as anupalabdhi) and not by any means through unqualified perception (which is a variety of pratyakṣa). Hence as there is no opposition between (the śruti) - 'There is no plurality here' and pratyakṣa (because pratyakṣa has been shown to be incapable of grasping bheda), the secondless Brahman is proven on the strength of the texts like 'Brahman is one only and Secondless'. ¹²

13. This is a most ill-considered view. Is it that in your judgment no difference exists between blue and yellow, bitter and sweet, cold and heat, pleasure and pain? Refutation of the Advaita view. If that be so then no answer need be given (such a position being against all experience is beneath notice). ¹³ It cannot be argued that in the pure existence (undifferentiated Brahman) the particulars are cognised by the qualified perception (i. e. having Brahman as the ground, variety is cognised by savikalpaka pratyakṣa) because the qualified perception also cannot give rise to particularities, like the unqualified perception (the reason being that qualified perception is dependent upon the unqualified and so cannot have for its object something different from that of the unqualified).

(10) Jāti, name etc., must have been experienced in nirvikalpaka perception though unparticularised, आलोचनामात्र-Nirvikalpaka (Vide I. L. E. p. 116 Note 1.)

(11) From his previous knowledge of jāti and samjñā, he can now say—"This is associated with cowhood, and this is called a cow." अयं गोत्वविशिष्टः; अयं गे पदवाच्यः. This is what is meant by having a qualified perception. No categorised perception is possible without nirvikalpakajñāna.

(12) Even savikalpaka gives knowledge of variety but not of reciprocal negation. The author of Tatvasuddhi maintains the extreme view that pure existence alone is what is given in all pratyakṣa; not merely bheda but even individual objects like pot, cloth etc., are regarded as illusorily given: (Vide S. L. S. p. 245). When the latter view is accepted the Advaitin can well maintain that there is no opposition between the Śrutis denying nānātva and pratyakṣa.

(13) In criticising the Advaitic view the Mīmāṃsaka supposes that according to the opponent, the individual objects like pot etc., are given in savikalpaka though not bheda.

If it be said (by the Advaitin) that necessarily in the notion – this is different from that – the difference is known only by the qualified perception and not by the unqualified, the answer (of the Mīmāṃsakas) is, 'We do not refer to the cognition of bheda (differentiative non-existence) but to objects (dharmaṇaḥ) that differ? And even in their case the cognition is with reference not to their mutual negation but with reference to their own nature. That which is different from the other – blue from yellow or the reverse, that is cognised – So we say. Neither blue nor yellow is bheda, but their characteristics (nilabheda is prādharmya and vice-versa) constitute bheda. Even when it (dharma) is not cognised, the cognition of the things qualified (dharmaṇaḥ) is not infeasible.¹⁴ If perception (i. e. nirvikalpaka) can apprehend only the pure existence (according to the advaitic view) and not things like blue and yellow how can even by qualified perception the bheda as noticed in "This is different from that" be apprehended? It cannot happen that one (pure) existence is different from another (pure existence, for existence is integral). Hence since evidently perception gives us qualities like blue, and substances like earth, to will away the world is certainly opposed to pratyakṣa. If you say that you do not deny the world etc., but only the bheda which is its property (here bheda means differentiative negation, e. g. ghataḥ pato na) even that is not possible because the differentiative non-existence of blue and yellow is cognised by pratyakṣa (according to the Prābhākaras) and anupalabdhi (according to the Bhāttas). Absence of perception (pratyakṣābhāva which is anupalabdhi) like perception itself is of greater validity than other means of knowledge (such as anumāna and Sruti). Else one might (foolishly) infer the possession of horns by rabbits because of their four-footedness.¹⁵ Hence bheda cannot be denied (i. e. that non-existence becomes the object of perception or anupalabdhi cannot be refuted.)

14. It may be urged that differentiative non-existence is untenable because of the defect of mutual dependence (anyonyāśraya) and that in consequence it (bheda) is due to avidyā only (ignorance)¹⁶. Yes, it would be liable to this charge of mutual dependence in case the correlate and counter correlate (pratyogin and anyogin) are first considered as mutually excluding and then the differentiative non-existence premised; but where is there any occasion for mutual dependence when being perfectly unmindful of the differentiating non-existence of blue and yellow we first cognise blue and yellow in their own nature (as blue and yellow only) and then premise their mutual non-existence?

(14) Blue is not the differentiation of yellow and yellow is not the differentiation of blue as the Bauddhas aver, but the yellow differentiation, that is in blue is the dharma and without apprehending this dharma it is quite feasible to apprehend the blue etc.

(15) Hornlessness is what anupalabdhi gives but if the potency of that pramāṇa is rejected one may be misled by the following inferential knowledge:—The rabbit is a horned animal, because it is four-footed, like the cow.

(16) The Vedāntin argues thus: if bheda is to be known we must first have knowledge of pratyogin and anyogin and only if bheda is known do we know pratyogin and anyogin. Hence the defect of 'mutual dependence'.

If it again be said (to show that no contradiction exists between the Śruti viz., 'Nehaṇānasti kiñcana' and pratyakṣa) that what is denied is only dvitva (the notion of duality) and not earth etc., and their mutual difference, even that contradicts perception because numbers can be cognised by perception.

Though opposed to perception, it may be argued, the Śruti proceeding to supersede it reveals non-duality by altogether negating (the authority of) perception.

This cannot be. The Śruti (if it should contradict perception) will cease to be significant (pravṛtṭyasambhava i. e. will not serve as a means of knowledge). It is perception indeed that arises instantaneously without the co-operation (of external aids) and as such it balks the operation of the contradictory knowledge arising from Śruti which is slow in functioning because it is dependent on such aids as word, word-meaning, proximity, desire, compatibility, and application of the rules of interpretation (as given in Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsā). Further the knowledge that the world is nought cannot be inferred from the Śruti. If that were possible the Śruti itself would be understood to be illusory since it is of the world. How could the falsity of Śruti be known from the Śruti itself? And the Śruti will cease to be an instrument of truth (pramāṇa) when its testimony is impugned; if however its instrumentality as a pramāṇa is admitted the Śruti whose validity is recognised cannot (be said to) vouch untruth. It is not possible to comprehend, of one and the same thing that it is both true and false, by combining these two characteristics at the identical moment. It is only when the one is contradicted, the other gains credibility. So that if the validity of the Śruti is conceded the negation of the world would not be possible, the reason being (as already pointed out) that the Śruti also is of the world. If the Śruti is relegated to oblivion (i. e. if its testimony is impugned) then owing to the mere absence of any pramāṇa the world cannot be negated.

15. But (says the Advaitin) since Brahman is self-luminous what need is there for another pramāṇa to reveal the Brahman? ¹⁷

16. Let Brahman be self-luminous what (support) do you get for proving the negation of the world? That (prapañcābhāva) certainly demands a pramāṇa. How again do you account for the manifestation of a world that is not? If it be said that it is due to ignorance (avidyā), whose then (we ask) is that avidyā? ¹⁸. If (you answer) that it belongs to the Jīvas, (we say) no, for they do not exist (according to you). If (you say) they do exist then you will have to admit duality. And avidyā has no room in Brahman who is pure sentence. You may say

(17) When it is pointed out that the Śruti itself would cease to be a valid instrument of knowledge in case substantiality is denied to the world the Advaitin rejoins by saying that he need not call in the evidence of Śruti to prove the existence of Brahman because Brahman is self-luminous and so self-established.

(18) कस्यपुनरियमविद्या ?-who is the subject of this illusion? The identical question is mooted and answered by Saṅkara in his Bhāṣya on XIII-(ii) Bh. G.

that pure consciousness as Brahman is, he is apprehended through illusion as if contaminated by avidyā. The question (again) is to whom does this illusion belong? If you say that it belongs to none, your reply is indeed admirable! Say that is of the Jīvas, it cannot be as they do not exist; say that is of Brahman, (you should know) that Brahman can never be subject to illusion. Supposing that avidyā can subsist in Brahman who is of the nature of vidyā (pure consciousness or knowledge), by what can it (avidyā) be destroyed? If by meditation (dhyāna) etc; we say, no, because they are also illusory (according to you who posit nothing other than Brahman). If they do exist then duality will step in. Avidyā co-existing with Brahman and therefore not hostile to him cannot be dislodged by it (meditation). What results then is, non-liberation (anirmokṣa). The conclusion therefore is that in order to extol Brahman the Upaniṣadic texts and, taking their lead, the Itihāsas (History) and purāṇas because of the impermanency of the world negate its very existence by way of figure (i. e. the negation should be regarded as no more than a figure of speech, say hyperbole) and the advaita doctrine is but a prattle of the deluded who cannot comprehend the central idea of the texts and whose powers of reasoning are void, and as such it should be ignored altogether. (To come back to the starting point) that the avikalpapratyakṣa (non-determinate perception) can cognise individual objects of a determinate character is therefore proved beyond doubt.

17. Others have a partiality for the view that the non-determinate perception (nirvikalpa) has for its object something devoid of all particulars (viśeṣaṇas).

Refutation of the
Buddhist view of
non-determinate per-
ception.

This view also contradicts experience. What indeed is vouched in experience is that an object at the very instant (it comes into contact with a

sense-organ) is a mere continuum (sammugdhākāra) and later appears differentiated through the qualified perception (savikalpa) in five ways with the attributes of genus (jāti), substance (dravya), quality (guṇa), action (kriyā), and name (nāma), as in (the respective examples), this is cow, he-with-the-staff, this is white, he goes, he is Dītha. Here (it should be understood) that what is given in the unqualified perception though a mere continuum is multiple in character (and not devoid of character as understood by the Bauddhas)¹⁹. The qualified perception on the other hand gives the object with each of its explicated particulars such as genus etc., (viz., the individual, the relation between jāti and vijakti and so on).

18. Is there not a sixth savikalpaka jñāna as in the cognition, 'this is that only?' Then how can it be said

Recognition.

'having differentiated into five ways? (The opponent points out that recognition which is also savikalpaka cannot be brought under the Mīmāṃsaka's fivefold enumeration). This is not

(19) The argument of the Mīmāṃsaka is that though at the first instant nirvikalpaka gives only the vague inclusive whole it should also possess the rudiments of savikalpaka to account for their manifestation when the object is closely perceived.

the qualified perception of genus as it is recognition of the particular; nor is it the qualified perception of name for recognition arises even when the knowledge of the name is absent. Even animals on the very day of their birth first becoming aware of their mother, the next moment have the cognition 'This is that' and so without the necessity of any word-relation are capable of recognition. Hence this is the sixth kalpana (Savikalpaka perception) and as such the fivefold division is wrong.

19. The contention is met as follows:—This (i. e. recognition which you say is sixth Vikalpa) is what we mean by the qualified perception of name; in the cognition 'this is Dittha' the object (present) is differentiated by the Dittha-tādātmya (i. e. identical with the Dittha of recollection) just as in 'this is a cow' the object is differentiated by 'cow' (where however it is the genus that is taken as the differentia) and not the relational aspect as in 'the man-with-the-staff' because of the absence of a particle like 'matup' (which connotes possession). The word Dittha (in 'this is Dittha') is not like jāti which is related to the object by tādātmya because of the absolute difference (between the name and the object named) which otherwise would have become manifest by it; (the word Dittha). The cognition in 'this is Dittha' is to be understood thus:—The individual connoted by the word Dittha and previously known, being now brought to mind by the word Dittha differentiates the vyakti (individual) which is the object of present perception (tādātmya-smṛtivyāyaya vyaktyātmana)²⁰. Well, what is it that has been said? It is this:—He who is our Dittha the same is he who is standing before us and not any other. That very recognition of this individual (vyakti known before) is (identical with) the fifth savikalpaka (i. e. it falls under the name pratyakṣa). And this recognition of the vyakti because it is associated with names only, by those who understand language (unlike the quadrupeds) is spoken of as the perception-of-name. By this very argument is refuted their (Bauddha) contention that savikalpaka is no instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa) because of the fact that an object which is not of the nature of word (śabdākāraśya, i. e. which is unrelated to śabda) is designated by the word Dittha. Here the object is not understood as possessing the nature of śabda but the function of śabda terminates with the revival of the notion of the object of previous experience. The savikalpaka perception of the object before us arises with the awareness of the identity (of the present object) with the remembered object. It is said "In the recollection of any object that is known at any time even before the use of the word (to indicate it), the word (now used) serves as the cause of the recollection of the object and is the right pramāṇa". Hence even in the savikalpaka of names as in class-perception, there is no such thing as (cognising what is not there)²¹. (The question again is put)

(20) The object (individual present) is not related to the word 'Dittha' as in Dandin where there is the possessive relation. Nor is the relation one of class and individual as in 'ayam gauḥ'.

(21) The word as in the recognition Ditthoyam recalls that very object (i. e. of previous experience) and it is not that the name (śabda) is superimposed on the object as held by the Bauddhas.

"which is it that is delimited by class (jāti) etc. (i. e. which is the locus of jāti ?) (Answer)—Substance. Again; ' What does substance mean ? (Answer)—earth, water, light, and air.

20. Is it not that we are unaware of what is called substance—an entity distinct from colour etc.? And there is no pramāṇa which gives us the knowledge of substance; because the five senses such as the sight etc., cease with revealing only colour etc. The collocation of smell, colour, sapidity and touch constitutes earth; the collocation of sapidity, colour and touch constitutes water; the collocation of colour and touch constitutes light (tejas); the collocation of sound and touch constitutes air; thus it is from a difference in the collocation of colour etc., there arises the division of earth etc., and there is no such thing as substance—so say the Saugatas.

21. That is an untenable view. That which coheres in colours etc., which are of a fleeting nature, and from which recognition (pratyabhijñā) arises, that is substance (i. e. the object of pratyabhijñā is substance). This substance is grasped by sight and touch. Pratyabhijñā is (constant) just as the jujube, (badaraphala, is constant) both in its dark (when unripe) and red (when ripe) condition or just as the earth—substance in its states of pot, lump, and potsherds. The recognition of substance does not fail even though change is perceptible in the lump—state and in the colours dark and red (and this is how the recognition is expressed)—this earth—substance having discarded the lump—state gave rise to the pot—state and having abandoned the colour dark, assumed, after being burnt, the colour red. Subsequently the potsherds arose with the abandoning of the pot—state. Similarly it is to be understood in the states of thread and cloth etc.

22. Is it not admitted that a distinct substance is originated (in the shape of) cloth made of threads etc.? (What the Naiyāyikas mean is that cloth woven of threads is altogether a different substance from the threads). Otherwise it would amount to the negation of the whole composite.²²

23. We do not negate the whole, but we discard the view that a different substance takes its origin, because such is not corroborated by experience. The threads themselves by the peculiarity of their co-relation transform themselves into a single substance, become a whole made up of constituent parts, and manifesting in this manner, the genus, cloth (paṭajāti), and grossness (Sthaulya—thickness), are understood as one piece of cloth having tangible (dimensions)—this is how experience arises in the world. Hence at no time is substance subject to inconsistency (i. e. it does not appear and disappear), occurrence and non-occurrence being characteristics only of pot, cloth, cow, horse, white, red, and such other states. The Vārtika also says:—"What (the element

(22) The Naiyāyikas maintain that the whole is something different from the parts of which it is composed, the reason being that otherwise perception itself would be impossible since the component parts, viz., the atoms are imperceptible,

that) persists in things that appear and disappear (i. e. fleeting in their nature) that is dharmin (the whole constituted of parts), the knowledge of which arises before the properties (constituting it) are grasped." Likewise, "What we have agreed to regard as substance, of that indeed in general, the quality alone stands out apart, but not its essence". Substance is (to be understood as having been) thus (in the manner we have explained) established. And that is differentiated in five ways associated with the properties of genus etc. Hence all cases of savikalpaka come under perception, and inference etc., pre-suppose it (i. e. they are based upon perception). None of these pramāṇas (it is to be concluded) is valid as regards Dharma.

Here ends the Sūtra on perception.

CHAPTER V

VEDIC TESTIMONY IN THE DETERMINATION OF DHARMA

Sūtra V.—The relation between the word and its sense however is eternal. Vedic Mandates are *pramāṇa* in the matter of that (i. e. Dharma). As their subject-matter transcends human experience it is not contradicted. Therefore Vedic Mandates are *pramāṇa* as acknowledged by Bādarāyaṇa (V. S. I. 3-28) on the ground that they are not dependent upon any (agency such as an author).

1. It has been stated that in relation to Dharma the testimony of perception is not valid (i. e. that Dharma is beyond the scope of perception). Therefore it is that validity has to be denied to human speech also since it pre-supposes it (perception).¹ If so the validity of *śabda* requires invariably for its corroboration the evidence of some other *pramāṇa* and that in its absence (*pramāṇāntara*) *S'abda* ceases to be a *pramāṇa*, with the result that Dharma will be cognizable only by non-perception (*anupalabdhi*).² To remove such an objection validity is asserted of *codanā* (Veda).

2. Well, it is true. In the ordinary intercourse of men (*loke*) verbal utterances are perceived to be valid when confirmed by other *pramāṇas* and not valid when not so confirmed; but even then what confers validity upon the *pramāṇa* is not something external but validity is self-established. The falsity of an utterance by an untrustworthy person arises not because there is no external corroborative evidence (*mūlavirahābhāvāt*) but because its intrinsic self-validity is balked owing to the vitiated nature of *śabda* proceeding from a vitiated source.³

3. The Veda owning no authorship (*apauruṣeya*), it is true, is not the work of a trustworthy person; still since no defect arising from the contact of an untrustworthy person is observable, its validity is not vitiated⁴. Human contact with *śabda* in general is perceived to

(1) Cf. अर्थबुद्धाशब्दरचना—Speech is framed after perceiving or knowing the object.

(2) अभावगम्यत्वम्—अनुपलब्धिरूपशभावारव्यप्रमाणम्—Anupalabdhi is itself non-existent. Hence Dharma which is to be cognized by it will be non-existent.

(3) Invalidity is adventitious. "The Mīmāṃsakas and Advaitins emphasise the fact that truth is intrinsic to knowledge and falsehood is externally conditioned".

(4) The Naiyāyikas, for example, hold the view that the trustworthiness of Vedic testimony is due to the fact that *īśvara* is its author. The Mīmāṃsakas on the other hand deny authorship—human or divine, to the Veda and regard its validity as self-evident.

exist in these three ways:—1. through the relation between the word and the thing it signifies (i. e. human interference may conceivably be determining that certain words should signify certain things); 2. through the relation between the sentence and its significance; 3. or through authorship of a (whole) work as in the case of the Mahābhārata which is written by a person. Here none of these three exists. The word 'autpattika' (in the Sūtra) has made it clear that the relation between the word and the thing it signifies is eternal; the significance of a sentence is dependent upon that of the words,⁵ and the non-human origin of the Veda will be explained further on.

4. The word 'avyatireka' (Vth Sūtra) purports to mean that there is no direct contradiction (i. e. that what is given in s'abda is not empirically contradicted by another jñāna as when the knowledge of silver is contradicted by that of the shell). By the phrase 'arthe anupalabdhe' (when the Vedārtha is not cognized by another pramāṇa) it is made evident that the ascription of non-validity resulting from a mere re-statement (anuvāda) is out of place because Vedic truths are not given by other pramāṇas. Since the Sūtrakāra (Jaimini) has employed the three attributes it is manifest that the constituents of a pramāṇa are: absence of defects in the source (kāraṇa), absence of contradictory knowledge, and the apprehension of that which was not previously apprehended. Thus is indicated the definition of Pramāṇa.⁶

5. The point is raised that in a continuous stream of knowledge⁷ (referring to the same object) the jñānas that are subsequent to that which is the first member of the series are merely a repetition and as such they (the later ones) would cease to be valid and so (it is argued that) 'anubhūti is pramāṇa' and that constitutes the definition of pramāṇa.⁸ Anubhūti connotes all experience except memory and the term Smṛti (memory) is applied to knowledge derived from the recall of past impressions only (but not from the senses).⁹ The insertion of the term 'mātra' in the description of memory (Samskāramātrajam) is with the object of warding off non-

(5) The import of a proposition depends upon the relation between one padārtha, and another but not as in the case of pada and artha upon s'akti or lakṣaṇa.

(6) The three essential elements in a valid piece of knowledge are: (i) औपत्तिकत्व, (ii) अबाधितार्थकत्व, (iii) अनधिगतार्थकत्व.

(7) In धारावाहिकज्ञाने we have, fixing our attention on the object, different intellections of the same object, e. g. अथेष्टः, अयेष्टः; and so on, where each apprehension is valid though it would be not, according to the Bhāṭṭa definition of pramāṇa.

(8) Anubhūti or anubhava is 'primary experience' or 'direct apprehension' I. L. E. P. 68.

(9) Memory, स्मृति is not regarded as pramāṇa since it only repeats a past experience. It is the original experience that is an independent instrument of knowledge.

validity from recognition (pratyabhijñā) which arising from the combined operation of recalled impressions and senses might be regarded as falling under memory.¹⁰

6. It then comes to this that knowledge which arises from causes other than the past impressions is pramāṇa (pramā). This (definition of pramāṇa) is however not applicable to the dream-experience. Though arising from mere mental impressions, the dream-cognition is admitted by you to be pramāṇa (as giving valid knowledge), in relation to its essence (as jñāna) and the cognizer (kartā—the dreamer, because he remembers after waking what he dreamt. The object seen—viṣaya, is no doubt illusory but apprehension as such and the karta are not.)¹¹

7. In so far as objects perceived (in dreams) are due to the revival of (waking) impressions the jñāna comes under memory but the dream-experience in so far as it concerns svarūpa and karta (jñānāśraya) is anubhūti only. Hence our definition of pramāṇa holds good (even in relation to dream-experience).

8. If so, the insertion of the term 'mātra' (in the definition of Bhāṭṭa objection. smṛti) serves no purpose; even in the case of recognition, that part of it which is past experience only, is recollection and so its invalidity must be accepted, but where it is pramāṇa it is anubhūti only.¹² Again restatements like "he who knowing thus performs the sacrifice — Paurṇamāsī" (Jaimini Sūt. II-ii-3) would be (elevated to the rank of) pramāṇa because they are not merely the outcome of previous impressions.¹³ You cannot say, 'let them be pramāṇa'. Because it is opposed to the general view. Similarly an empirical statement (laukika or non-scriptural) because it helps one to infer the speaker's intention (i. e. the speaker's idea which has relation to some previous experience of his) is a restatement but yet it would acquire the character of pramāṇa (since it is not memory-revival). This is not what you would wish; for (witness the text) 'the use of the term' assannikṛṣṭa

(10) Recognition since it involves sensory activity and not merely the recall of past experience is excluded from memory and classed as pramāṇa—there are two elements in recognition: the memory-image and sense-perception.

(11) तदिदं स्वप्नप्रदर्शने &c.:—In all jñānas, whatever their status, the cognizing element and the element of cognition are according to the Prābhākaras necessarily 'known' and validly known. So in dreams these two elements are correctly known and so far, dreams are valid since they are not Samskāratiriktakāraṇajanya; but as regards Viṣaya, Samskāramātrajanya—begotten of mental impressions.

(12) What the Bhāṭṭas mean is that on the analogy of dreams, recognition also may be explained as consisting of two elements: one relating to the recollected aspect and the other, the object of present perception e. g. 'Saḥ āyam'—he is this person.

(13) The statement 'He performs the sacrifice on the full-moon day' is anuvāda and is sense-generated. That it is anuvāda has to be learnt by hearing the scriptural text. Hence it would become pramāṇa in the way the Prābhākaras take it. The text quoted is accepted by all as a mere restatement. The doṣa here is ativyāpti.

(the same as anadhiḡata-not known before) is to exclude restatements (anuvāda) from s'abda-pramāṇa (verbal testimony).¹⁴

9. That is pramāṇa which for its own validity stands in no need of other pramāṇas. Restatements however, presupposing as they do previous statements cannot partake of the nature of pramāṇa.

A fresh definition of pramāṇa.

10. If so even an empirical statement which (it is supposed) points to an object already known through inference, becomes valid testimony because the sole purpose of inference there is to remove doubts regarding the truth of the sense conveyed and not for determining the import of that statement.¹⁵ Likewise inference would cease to be a pramāṇa for it depends upon a knowledge of concomitance of hetu and sādhya – the person who infers should have perceived such co-existence as (e. g. of smoke and fire in the hearth).¹⁶ And your doctrine forbids the addition of even a particle to what is apprehended in the vyāpti (grhitam artham-vyāptijnānena grhitam artham).¹⁷ Again the perception of "yellow conch" (due to eye defect and so regarded as illusory knowledge) would become valid because it is anubhūti (and not depending upon the revival of past impressions) and if you wish its inclusion (i. e. of the perception of yellow conch) under pramāṇa common sense will not support you. Hence it should be maintained that what constitutes pramāṇa is the knowledge of that which is not contradicted by a subsequent experience and which relates to something not previously apprehended. Even in regard to a continuous succession of intellections (dhārāvāhikajñāna) since each successive intellection is delimited by a different time-moment, and uncognised before its validity stands to reason.

11. It may be urged that though there is difference in time (in the apprehension of identical series) moments being so subtle are not perceptible. Ah? you, obstinate man, how astute you are! One who has remained long experiencing a

(14) असन्निकृष्टग्रहणम्-S'abarasvāmin's text runs as follows:—"शास्त्रं शब्दविज्ञानात् असन्निकृष्टे अर्थे विज्ञानम्"; here शास्त्र means शब्द; असन्निकृष्टे means प्रमाणान्तरेण अज्ञाते. Hence अनुवाद is excluded from the category of s'abda-pramāṇa; S. Bh. I, 1-5 P. 37.

(15) अनुवादकतया- because the artha which has been inferred by the hearer through Vaktrjñānalakṣaṇalinga previously, is again understood by him as the import of the statement, it becomes anuvāda and so should cease to be pramāṇa. This is the Prābhākara view. But the empirical vākya not depending for its veracity on anumāna would acquire validity.

(16) नियमग्रहणम्- the knowledge of the invariable concomitance of probans and probandum. Since inference presupposes perceptive knowledge it ought to lose its claim to validity according to the Prābhākara definition of pramāṇa. But as inference is admitted to be an independent pramāṇa the definition is liable to the defect - avyāpti.

(17) There is no new element in infential knowledge as there is the time-element in the case of a succession of apprehensions धारावाहिकज्ञान.

continuous succession of intellections of an identical object and then ceased to do so, recollects the object (which had continued to occupy his attention) as having been apprehended by him in the immediate precedent moment. And when asked by one if the pot (the object of his attention) was there he answers: "just at this moment it was seen by me; nay, from morning till now I have been seeing it!" Without cognising the difference in time (i. e. different moments succeeding one another) how could he say so? There does exist therefore the perception of time-succession, and because of its addition (the new moment being the delimiting factor and hence anadhigatārthaviṣayaka) the pramāṇa of the subsequent apprehensions in a series is established.¹⁸

12. If the test of a right instrument of knowledge is that it should convey a meaning that cannot be contradicted (yathārtha), then the apprehension of 'hot-water'

Objection. becomes invalid.

Answer: It is admitted (that hot-water sensation is illusory, since water by its very nature is cold.)

Query: Does it not contradict common experience?

Yes, it would offend common-sense in case men of understanding regarded what is illusory (apprehension of hot-water) as pramāṇa (valid testimony). But it is only

Answer. those who take it to be right knowledge (i. e. those who are ignorant of the nature of hot-water) that regard this apprehension to be valid testimony and not illusory; while those who take it to be wrong knowledge do not consider it to be valid but only as illusory. Hence there is no going counter (to common experience).¹⁹

In the apprehension 'this is yellow conch' people forget that it is anubhava because of their delusion that the colour

Prābhākara. 'yellow' is a recollected notion and so regard that apprehension as invalid. Hence our doctrine (of anubhava) is not vitiated.²⁰

(18) The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold that time cannot be an object of perception since an object to be perceived must have mahatva (non-infinitesimal) dimension and udbhūtatava (manifest form). Time like atoms cannot be perceived. The Mīmāṃsakas hold that the time-quality is directly perceived as otherwise the presentness-
ब्रह्मज्ञानं in 'I see a pot now' cannot be explained; cf. नसोस्तिप्रत्ययो लोके यत्र कालेन विद्यते.

(19) In hot-water the heat pertains to tejas (light) atoms and the viscous character etc., to water; so there are two perceptions which are not however felt as two at the time of experiencing the sensation. This is the Prābhākara explanation. According to Kumārila also the explanation is based on the same analysis but he views that the heat of the tejas atoms is by mistake taken to qualify water thus introducing a subjective element in the samsarga aspect of the knowledge-situation.

(20) For the Prābhākaras error arises from non-discrimination between the presented object, say nacre, and the recollected object, silver. The two are distinct reals but not apprehended as such. Similarly both yellow and conch are reals though by mistake invalidity is ascribed to the cognitive 'yellow conch' cf. P. P. 43.

What you say does not stand to reason. People have no idea of recollection even in the apprehension of 'shell-silver' and there is absolutely no room for recollection in the apprehension of yellow-conch. Hence the correctness of the definition of Pramāṇa as given by the author of the aphorisms (Jaimini) in the words, arthenupalabdhe'.²¹

Thus (ends the 'autpattikasūtra').

(Now begins the interpretation of the foregoing three aphorisms- 3, 4, 5 as given by Vṛttikāra (identified with Upaśara). This interpretation though differing from that of Śābarasvāmin is accepted by him and included in his Bhāṣya).

13. "The Vṛttikāra on the other hand has interpreted this in a different way" (S. Bh. P. 25) with these words the Bhāṣyakāra (Śābara) sets out to explain Upaśara's version of the three aphorisms commencing from 'Tasya nimittapariṣṭiḥ' (Sūtra III). Now the third aphorism 'nimitta sūtra' (was explained by Śābara) as indicating a resolve (pratijñā) to investigate into the nature of Veda (codanā) as a pramāṇa. Upaśara (on the other hand), because the word 'parikṣa' is found (on the plca-apadeśa) says that the pramāṇa of prāmāṇya (in general) is self-evident, and as such need not be examined, (a negative particle being understood:- parikṣānakartvya).²² Perception etc., are invariably accepted as pramāṇas and the Veda (śabda) is included in these. Therefore it is also a pramāṇa. It is needless to examine the validity of a generally accepted pramāṇa since it possesses in its own right the potency to reveal the object falling within its sphere. If its validity is tested by another agency, the latter by which it is tested has to be tested by another, again this last by another and so on resulting in infinite regress. Hence pramāṇa in general being a means of valid knowledge, the Veda also (should be regarded) as such a means.

14. Merely on the ground that a particular cognition has arisen it is not possible to be sure of its validity. Though Objection. more generally accepted as valid (than other pramāṇas) perception is seen to present objects as other than what they are. For example, the cognition of silver in nacre is not true knowledge.

15. No, the cognition of silver in nacre is not perception; it is an apparent perception; (hence is obviated the Answer. vyabhiçaradoṣa).

(21) The three indispensable requisites of Pramāṇa are:—

- (i) Freedom from defect in the source - this, the Veda has because it is eternal;
- (ii) Absence of contradictory knowledge;
- (iii) Apprehension of something new.

(22) While Śābara thinks it necessary to inquire into the validity of verbal testimony Upaśara would desire no such inquiry since in his view all means of apprehension are self-evident—स्वतःप्राप्तमय.

16. What then is the definition of perception which excludes illusory perception? That is explained (in Sūtra IV):—"On the contact of a man's senses with that

Perception.

(i. e. with the particular object) right sensory knowledge arises". Suppose the knowledge is of a particular object; when there is the contact of the senses with that object, the knowledge arising therefrom is right perception.²³ By the transposition of the terms 'tat' and 'sat' (cf. the wording of Sūtra IV) the possibility of the definition applying to apparent perception is avoided. (In the definition) 'tat' is in indeclinable particle construed as the third case meaning 'with that'.

17. Even without the reversal of position (of sat and tat) the definition will not embrace (illusory perception).

Objection.

The cognition arising from sense-contact is perception—this alone should suffice (as the definition of perception). The cognition of silver in the nacre is not generated by sense-contact. Then how else? The piece of nacre on coming into contact with the sense-organ is cognised as possessing some bright form which it happens to have in common with silver but the feature unique to it, namely nacreness (S'uktikātva) is lost sight of owing to some defect in the eye. And after that, owing to the revival of mental impressions silver is remembered and then the nacre piece is, as a result of some defect (in the eye or elsewhere) apprehended as of the nature of silver. Therefore the cognition of silver is not the outcome of sense-contact; thus is refuted the charge of atiprasaṅga (i. e. the definition extending beyond its sphere, ativyāpti). If it is argued that the reversal of order (of tat and sat) is to exclude the cognition of silver in nacre which arises from sense-contact through the intervening steps (i. e. indirectly) we say, no (i. e. that there is no justification even then). For here the definition of perception is not meant to apply to cognition arising from sense-contact in whatsoever manner, but to cognition arising directly from sense-contact. If perception is the result of sense-contact in whatsoever manner then even with the change effected (viz., the exchange of words) the definition will be defective being over-extensive in its application (ativyāpti). The cognition of heat by one who sees fire from a distance would, instead of being inferential knowledge become perceptive because it arises from mediate sense-contact (i. e. serially, first the perception of fire and then of heat characterising fire) and also because there is the contact of sense-organ with the object. There certainly exists the relation of Samyuktasamavāya (inherence-in-the-conjunct, I. L. E. Note I, P. 110) between the visual organ and the object, viz., heat.²⁴ Therefore the definition of perception as cognition arising

(23) In the case of nacre-silver apprehension the sense-organ instead of being in contact with silver is in contact with nacre. Hence it is illusory apprehension.

(24) The cognition of heat in the distant fire can only be inferential and if 'sākṣāt' is not inserted in the definition of perception this cognition would become perceptive because of the indirect sense-contact. The inherence-in-the-conjunct or inherence in a thing which has come into contact—Samyuktasamavāya, e. g. colour in a jar, is one of the six kinds of sense-relation as accepted by the Naiyāyikas.

from direct sense-contact with the object has to be accepted. Now since there is no vyabhiçāra even in the case of shell-silver the inversion of tat and sat effected (in the definition) is to no purpose.

18. True, the definition (suggested by you), viz., perception is cognition resulting from direct sense-contact is

Answer according
to Upa-varṣa.

right and it is also true that the defect of over-pervasiveness does not arise in the apprehension of shell-silver. But ativyāpti cannot be avoided in the apprehension of 'yellow conch' and of 'double moon' because these two jñānas arise from direct sense-contact (and are yet bhramā)²⁵. Moreover when the remembered silver is seen in the shell-piece which is within the range of one's sight and is taken to be identical with it, it is to be noticed that the knowledge of that identity—the visual organ being ceaselessly active and the apprehension itself being immediate—cannot but be regarded as arising from direct sense-contact²⁶. Hence (Upa-varṣa's) inversion of sat and tat to exclude the illusory cognition stands to reason. In the Bhāṣya (of S'abara) however to point out (the defect in the definition) only one example, viz., apprehension of shell-silver is given and that is immaculate.

19. How are the two to be distinguished: that which results from sense-contact with 'that', and that which results from sense-contact with 'non-that'?

Question.

It is thus:—From the very nature of jñāna (jñānasvarasādeva) the reality of its object is vouched²⁷. The falsity of the object is indicated either by the awareness of some defect in the sense-organ or the (later) knowledge that shows the object to be other than what the first jñāna revealed it to be. Hence that is pramāṇa where even though searched with effort neither the defect (doṣa) of the organ nor contradictory knowledge is brought to light. The rest is apramāṇa (invalid cognition). As for cognition (of object) arising from scriptural testimony (śodanārthajñāna) its validity is unquestioned there being neither of these two (invalidating elements).²⁸

(25) There is direct contact between the visual organ and the object when a person owing to some defect in his sight seems to observe 'yellow conch' or 'double moon'. Hence the definition loses its correctness being over-pervasive in its application.

(26) अनुपरतेन्द्रिय &c.—Here what is pointed out is that though 'silver' may be recollected it is, at a later stage of the same visual process, identified with 'shell-piece' which is admitted to be in direct sense-contact and that identity-knowledge also is immediate. It is under these circumstances that the direct sense-contact of tādātmya is adduced. Hence the justification for revoking the admission made regarding 'shell-silver' previously.

(27) ज्ञानप्राप्त्यर्थं नाम अवाधितार्थं विषयकत्वम्—Knowledge is said to be valid when it reveals an object which suffers no negation by a subsequent knowledge.

(28) The sense-defect invalidates the knowledge and bādhakajñāna reveals the invalidity.

20. "Is it not that the whole of knowledge is supportless?" (S.Bh.P.

Bauddha contention. 28; i. e. jñāna in general is without a viṣaya). Such is the contention of the Sūnyavādin,²⁹ who criticises the mithyātva (in the narrow sense accepted by the Bhāttas) as conditional under the two circumstances set forth above.³⁰ To explain:—Your classification of perception into wrong perception where there arises awareness of either defect in the source or of a contradictory knowledge and right perception otherwise, is untenable since invalidity is the mark of all knowledge. Indeed cognition in general ends in itself (i. e. does not travel beyond itself—has no object outside it) and owing to the beginningless 'psychical dispositions' (vāsanās) appears itself as something external and that externality is illusory only (i. e. objectless). It may be asked how it is known that the idea stops with itself. (The answer is) that it is through inference and also because of the fact that it is incapable of functioning outside itself. How such incapacity arises will be explained later. Now the inferential process will be stated:—Our (waking) notions of 'pillar' etc., which appear, themselves (i. e. vijñānas only) as external objects are illusions, because they are notions, like the dream-presentation and also like the presentation of silver in nacre. In the dream-cognitions there is the absence of external objects as presented in them;³¹ there is no possibility of the presentation here and now (near region and present time) of things which are in other regions and at other times; and again in dreams events are presented which are impossible (of occurrence) at any time or place like (the witnessing of) one's own decapitation. Hence it must be admitted that these dream-cognitions apprehend themselves as if outside (i. e. as if they have external objects). Therefore on that analogy (tatsāmyāt) waking cognitions also are illusory having no scope beyond themselves³².

21. Such is the argument. (Now follows the refutation). This is to be said,—it is wrong to say that dream and other cognitions have no objects beyond them (i. e. that what they apprehend is themselves). We shall point out that they too present external objects but only as other than what they actually are (i. e. the dream distorts the real nature of objects which however are there, external and independent of the idea or vijñāna — this is the anyathakhyātivāda of the Bhāttas). Well,

(29) The term Sūnyavādin should be understood here as referring to the follower of the Buddhist School of idealism viz., Vijñānavāda and not of nihilism—Sūnyavāda proper. The idealistic doctrine denies independent existence to external objects and regards them as but ideas only. This is the Nirālambanavāda as propounded by the Yogācāra teachers, Asanga and Vasubandhu. Sūnyavādin therefore means the bāhyārthasūnyavādin.

(30) The two grounds on which the invalidity of perception is based are:—

(1) Defect in the perceiving subject. (2) Subsequent awareness of another pramāṇa which annuls the object of previous perception.

(31) Objects, only appear to exist externally, but none in reality do exist. The objects of cognition are non-entities.

(32) In the waking-state also there is the absence of pramāta in the sense of a permanent subject nor is there an object apart from the cognition; the only reality is vijñāna which proceeds in a stream no two members of which have anything in common.

we might even admit *ātmakhyāti* (i. e. that the objects of cognition are subjective, are ideas only) in dreams. (This admission is a temporary concession to the opponent; cf. 'tuṣyatu durjanaḥ') But from this alone the notions of blue etc., do not deserve to be treated like that (dream-apprehension). In our waking consciousness what we cognise, viz., the blue etc., which are external and which take the form of 'this' as in 'this is blue' (lit. blue out there), 'this is yellow', 'this is pillar', 'this is pot' and so on—, all these which are given in perception cannot be negated by inference. If cognition (alone) were cognized (in everything that is perceived) the cognition would take the form 'I am blue etc.'³³ Therefore perception bringing within the range of cognition objects external to one's self acts as an effective check to the rise of an inferential cognition which proceeds to subvert it (i. e. perception). In dreams however objects perceived are found to be false by other cognitions (i. e. of the waking-state) and their external existence being thus negated, there, *ātmakhyāti* might hold good. But here (in the waking-state) there is nothing to annul (the existence of reals) beyond what you have adduced as inference. It has already been declared that inference is impotent to negative perceptive knowledge. We close the topic here since in a thousand ways³⁴ this inference is animadverted upon in the *vārtika* (of Kumārila).

22. When thus inference is set aside (by the Bhāttas) since it conflicts with perception the same Śūnyavādin criticising what was said before again confronts (the Siddhāntin. i. e. the Bhāṭṭa) with the observation that "perception (perceptual knowledge) is incapable of getting beyond itself"; (and this criticism begins in the Bhāṣya of Śābara) with 'Śūnyastu' (i. e. the absence of anything else to serve as its object)³⁵. Now this has to be inquired into: What manifests itself as 'this is blue', 'this is yellow' etc.,— is that *viñāna* itself, manifesting as such or is it some external object that so appears? For an inquiry thereof this again has to be ascertained:—Is *viñāna* an object of perception or of inference? If regarded as an object of perception, seeing that no perceptive cognition of a formless thing is possible and that only one form is cognized (by *jñāna*) it comes to this that the perceived form is *jñāna* only. Hence the object not being given in perception will be non-existent only (i. e. the object perceived is illusory). If on the other hand *viñāna* is an object of inference (as in the Bhāṭṭa School), seeing

(33) What is suggested by 'idam' is that the object is presented and that externally, 'I am' should be contrasted with 'abam'. It means that the objectivity of perceived things is a fact of direct experience. Note that the Yōgācāra acknowledges no *ātman* apart from *Viñānaśāntati*. Each cognition therefore stands for the self so far as that moment is concerned. cf. अत्रैव गोविन्दुद्धारमा वपरां सत दशैः
प्राद्य प्रहृ सं वल मेद्वन्निव लक्ष्यते—S. D. S. P. 13.

Though one and impartible, *viñāna* appears to the deluded as owning the distinctions of subject, object and knowledge.

(34) Cf. Section on *Nirālambavāda*. pp. 217 - 267 S. V.

(35) S. Bh. I, 5, P. 31. Where the point under discussion begins with the word 'Śūnyastu'.

that inference is impossible without an external object being posited (i.e. a *liṅga*) the reality of the existence of external objects is proved (beyond doubt).

23. There (*tatra-itisandehe*, when doubt arises whether ideas are per-

Counter argument
Yogācāra.

ceptive or inferential, the *Vijñānavādin* answers):—
“*Vijñāna* itself appears thus (as forms of blue etc.)

Why? (it may be asked); because if *vijñāna* does not reveal itself its cognition by another instrument of knowledge is out of the question (*gatiḥ-avagatiḥ*, knowledge). And because blue etc., are cognized they are but forms of *jñāna* (or *vijñāna*). If objects were different from *jñāna* they could never be known”³⁶. If a person should wish to hold that *vijñāna* does not reveal itself, for him it would be impossible to postulate knowledge itself, for it defies all other means of knowledge (i.e. cannot be proved by any other *pramāṇa*). If inference is supposed to prove it, we say no, since there is no *liṅga* (middle term). It cannot be said that the object is the ground (for proving the existence of *jñāna*). For without the existence of *jñāna* it is admitted (by the *Mīmāṃsaka*) that objects do exist in deep sleep (if not for the sleeper, for others). (It may be said that not the object only but) activity in connection with the object (*arthavyavahāra*), is the ground and that activity pre-supposes some adventitious cause (*viz.*, *jñāna*) which has occasioned it. If so there would not arise the consciousness of cognition till activity arises. Now even without putting it to any use a person on seeing a pot says:—“I understand there is a pot” — thus arises the apprehension and this is vouched for by experience. We again deny that the ground (*liṅga*) is a property (*dharma*) of the object generated by apprehension (as when we become aware of a pot, say, ‘*ayam ghataḥ*’). Because there is no *pramāṇa* to justify its (*arthadharma*) existence; and the special property cannot be said to inhere in objects of either past or future experience (because of the absence of ground-*āśrābhivāt*) with the result that *jñāna* would be uninferred in objects apprehended in the past etc. The conclusion therefore is that *vijñāna* should be admitted as revealing itself (*pratyakṣam*), and that as a consequence it is clear that all objects are but forms of *vijñāna* and objects as such cannot be proved to exist by any *pramāṇa* (i. e. the existence of objects apart from being mere thought-forms cannot be substantiated by any *pramāṇa*).

24. Moreover, from the fact of their being cognized, blue etc., (should be regarded) as but forms of *jñāna*. Just as yellow is not perceived because it is not transformation of *jñāna*, blue also if it were not *jñāna*

(36) अर्थान्तरस्येति—यदि चार्थं ग्राह्यः नीलादिः विज्ञानस्याकारः स्यात् तदा तदात्म्यलक्षणसंबन्धेन ग्राह्यग्राहक भाव उपपद्यते, भेदे तु संबन्धभावेन ग्राह्यग्राहकभावानुपपत्तिः—*Candrikā*.

It is only when external objects like blue etc., are regarded as but the forms of *jñāna* that by the relation of identity (*तादात्म्य*) the terms *grāhya* and *grāhaka*, i.e. perceived and perceiver would be appropriate. Otherwise owing to absolute difference between the two and the consequent relationlessness the notion of perceiver and perceived would be untenable.

(anātma) would remain uncognized.³⁷ If blue is a distinct object then how do you define its cognizability? (i.e. what does knowing—its vedyatva, mean?). If objectness (arthatva, being an object) is its definition (distinctive mark) then everything would become cognizable to every jñāna there being no differentia (to demarcate one object from the other). If hetutva (i. e. being the cause e. g. in the apprehension 'this is blue' the object blue is the hetu of the blue—notion) is urged as the criterion (as note):—whichever object occasions vijñāna that itself is the thing to be cognized and not any other, even this position (we say) in untenable. Cognizability would then apply also to one's eyes etc., (because the eye also is the hetu in the apprehension — 'this is blue' and not merely 'blue'). Similarity and hetutva both may be urged as constituting viśayatva (vedyatva or cognizability):—there is resemblance between the object blue and the cognition blue and not between the eye and jñāna. Even then samanantarapratyaya would acquire cognizability since it is the cause of the succeeding idea and being itself vijñāna resembles the succeeding jñāna; (the absurdity here pointed out is that a preceding idea will become an object of apprehension to a succeeding idea)³⁸. It may again be urged that the mark of cognizability consists in a similarity of a distinctive kind being perceived in the form of an object (i. e. similarity in respect of that alone which appears as cognizable). Now jñānatva or knowingness is a common feature of all kinds of jñāna but the idea of blue (nilākāra) belongs distinctively to a few (objects so called) and cognizability means resemblance with that aspect. Even then (says the Vijñānavādin) the preceding idea becomes the object of the succeeding idea in an identical object-series (i. e. stream of similar notions like this is blue, this is blue etc.,) because both are of the nature of blue and there is hetutva also (in the preceding notion).

25. The true doctrine is this:—³⁹ It is not similarity that confers cognizability upon an object. That is viśaya (what is cognized) which is the cause of investing jñāna with the form of blue etc., (What the Sautrāntika means is that for knowledge to appear, say, as blue, there should be some object external to it). In the case of Samanantarapratyaya however it is clear that it does not confer the form of blue etc. (upon the object). If it did, when once the idea of blue arises it must go on perpetually generating the same idea of blue. Again in a single series variegated forms of blue, yellow, etc. would not emerge; this is

(37) In the perception of blue why is yellow not cognized? Because jñāna has not assumed that form and it follows therefore that if blue when perceived is not ideal transformation it could not be apprehended—this is the logic of it.

(38) समनन्तर प्रत्ययः—The four causes of vijñāna are:—(i) Ālambanapratyaya; (ii) Samanantarapratyaya; (iii) Sahakāripatyaya; (iv) Adhipatipratyaya. According to the Sautrāntikas ālambana represents the viśayakāra side in the series, samanantara, the cognitive side, sahakāri, accessories like light etc., and adhipati, the senses. The doctrine is that these fourfold causes (pratyayas) give rise to all the phenomena of our mental and emotional life: (Vide V. S. II. 11-21 Saṃkarabhāṣya; Vidyāraṇya's Bauddha-darsana in S. D. S.)

(39) The Sautrāntika who admits the existence of external objects though of a momentary character now confronts the vijñānavādin who denies their existence altogether.

because of the fact that when there is no variety in the cause there will be none in the effect either. The rise of a surprising variety of ideas is due to the contact (of senses) with an equally surprising variety of objects—blue, yellow etc. Hence cognizability is with reference to objects only (and not to vijñāna).

26. Does not the object which constitutes the cause in the generation of jñāna which is the effect, being momentary, disappear at the time jñāna originates? Then how can it be apprehended by perception?

That a thing is an object of perception means only this, that it has the capacity to serve as the means of endowing jñāna with a specific form. As witness:—"To the objection how perception of the object could arise at a time when it is not there, i.e. at a time different from that at which it exists they (the Sautrāntikas) say that they rightly understand the term grāhyatā to mean being able to endow jñāna with its form".

If that be so whose form is it that we perceive in an object that manifests itself at the present moment? If it be of jñāna only, then what is the ground for ascertaining the (very) existence of the object that is not given in perception and of its being the cause of jñāna?

The very fact of jñāna manifesting itself in a variety of ways; and this cannot be accounted for by samanantara-pratyaya (the precedent idea) only as already stated (vide para 25).

If so, the (existence of) object is inferred and how can it be said that it is apprehended by perception?

The perceptibility of an object means only this much, that by directly conferring its form on jñāna it becomes the cause of transferring its shape to it, while if it should acquire its hetutva by conferring its form on jñāna mediately, it is said to be apprehended by inference. For example—The svalakṣaṇa of fire (in the stock instance) is said to be inferred because it generates apprehension of fire (not directly but) through dhūmasvalakṣaṇa (the bare smoke-particular) apprehension, then its perception, and (finally) the concomitant nature (vikalpa). Hence because of the difference between jñāna and artha (knowledge and object) there are only two instruments of valid knowledge: perception and inference.⁴⁰ Since (jñāna and object) are not identical (as in the vijñanavāda) we infer the existence of the object from the jñāna on the basis of causal rela-

(40) Note that all arthas (objects) are inferential in the Sautrāntika view. Hence under inference a distinction is made between perception conventionally so termed, and inference in the narrow sense. If there were no difference between jñāna and artha, the postulation of inference would be to no purpose, for jñāna externalises itself and is self-revealing.

tion (tadutpattinibandhana).⁴¹ Here when knowledge arises directly we have perception; when however it arises by stages it is (regarded as) inference. Thus there are only two ways by which knowledge of the object can arise. Hence the resemblance alone with the object constitutes the validity of knowledge (prāmānyam), as dependent upon that resemblance is the recognition of distinction among objects. It is not merely from its nature as jñāna that the knowledge of blue arises for it is common to yellow also.⁴² It is from blue however that the apprehension of blue results (i. e. there should be some object that is blue to generate the cognition of blue); thus say they; "The apprehension of an object cannot be said to result merely because there exists jñāna; seeing that its (jñāna) scope is unrestricted it would end in confusion (if jñāna alone were the determining factor in perception or inference); but the object having bestowed its own form on it makes jñāna assume its form". Hence the existence of the object is proved because of the bestowal of its form on jñāna and (it is) also (proved) that apart from vijñāna there exists the object of perception:—this is the view of the Sautrāntikas.

27. Here we (have this to) say:—The definition of an object (grāhya) would be as you have stated provided there was proof that the object had the characteristic of either endowing jñāna with some form or of itself being the cause of jñāna. But proof for this does not exist. The origin (apprehension) of the variegated objects is due to the variety in the samanantarapratyaya (just the previous idea in the series-avyavahitapūrvā vr̥tti). To explain:—you also have to admit that the world-spectacle is grounded on precedent notions in the series on the analogy of the dream-state where even in the absence of objects in the vicinity ideas arise in infinite variety. If that be so, in the waking state also let the same cause account for the cognizance of ideas. What is the purpose served by positing external objects? Hence "being the cause of jñāna (hetutvam) cannot constitute the definition of object (because external objects themselves are non-existent).

Then it will be replied that what constitutes viśaya is activity in relation to the object, such as getting it etc., presupposing the corresponding cognition (jñāna-nibandhana).

(41) तदुत्पत्ति निबन्धन—The Sautrāntika who admits difference between jñāna and its object cannot obviously base his inference on that variety of inference known as tadātmya or identity of nature but he can only rely upon the other variety - tadutpatti-nibandhana, the necessary causal relation, - e. g. from the cognition of blue to the pot which is the cause of that cognition (Vide O. I. P. P. 200 for an explanation of the two kinds of inference recognized by the Bauddhas.)

(42) The Yogācāra does not recognise the reality of the objective world. He reduces the perception of all objects to the forms of ideas. The Sautrāntika argues that if the idea (jñāna) alone is the basis of perception it may cognize indifferently any object, not blue in particular for jñāna as such is common to the apprehension of blue, yellow, red etc.

If it be so, the viṣaya of nīlajnāna (the object of the cognition blue) would include (not merely the patch of blue but) also its constituent atoms, concomitant taste etc., since they are fit to be brought (along with the object in which they inhere).⁴³

No; activity such as bringing etc., is only in relation to substance and not in relation to qualities like taste.

Sautrāntika.

If so, colour cannot come under the category of object, (the implication is that if colour as such is non-perceptive, the substance which is the substratum of colour-rūpin, would also cease to be perceptive). Further all activity is directed towards the attainment of some pleasure and after that is experienced there is nothing left for activity in respect of that pleasure (the cause of, say, good news is not anything out there to be fetched) nor is such activity ever possible. This might have been possible if any activity associated with that pleasure had arisen from the rise of such apprehension. Similarly as regards fragrance experienced by the sense of smell no activity of any kind such as the taking hold of the thing that occasioned fragrance exists (for fragrance is a quality and its being fetched is inconceivable). Then how can objectivity (viṣayatva) belong to it (activity)?

Yogācāra.

It is not that the fetching by itself constitutes activity; linguistic expression also constitutes such activity. Hence objectivity is conferred on blue since it is the viṣaya of the verbal expression occasioned by the knowledge of blue.⁴⁴ Likewise as regards pleasure etc., (verbal expression is feasible even with reference to experienced joys).

Sautrāntika.

Even then fetching also should be accepted by you as coming under vyavahāra and as such the act of fetching cannot but relate to the constituent atoms; (i. e. the atoms would be the object of blue-cognition). Therefore the defect noticed already is not removed. Moreover it is not possible to determine (nirūpaṇa) the viṣaya of a jñāna on the basis that vyavahāra signifies śabda-prayoga since it (the process) is the reverse (of what actually takes place). The determinant of vyavahāra (linguistic expression) is in reality the use of a word that is related to an object and not the mere verbal expression. The relation between the word and object is, as is well-known, one of vācya and vācaka (that which is denoted and that which denotes).⁴⁵ Hence when from a verbal expression there arises the apprehension of a particular object that

Yogācāra.

(43) This is evidently absurd since atoms and taste cannot by their very nature become objects of perception. Sight cannot grasp taste.

(44) व्यवहारः हानोपादानादि, शब्दप्रयोगो वा—Occasioning physical activity or discourse or expression in the shape of language.

(45) प्रत्याख्ये-प्रत्येतुं (ज्ञातुं) योग्यं, ज्ञेय वस्तु = अर्थे—The object to be known, and it must exist before its apprehension arises. प्रत्याख्यक-शब्द word or expression.

object is the one denoted (vācya) by that expression. Hence the determination of the meaning (viśaya) of a word presupposes the determination of the content (viśaya) of the corresponding jñāna. If the latter (i. e. apprehension of the object) is made to depend upon verbal expression (as you have said) it will be open to the irrefutable charge of 'mutual dependence', anyonyāśraya. Objectivity, it may be argued, is secured by the special property (atiśaya-additament) which the object acquires as the result of its apprehension; but this special property is not known to exist and it has already been shown that with reference to past or future cognition no such attribution is possible (*Vide para 23*). That constitutes the viśaya of jñāna, it may be held, the sense -contact with which gives rise to that particular knowledge (as pot in the perception of pot) or that is viśaya (if it is inference) which pervades the mark (līṅga) by which the particular knowledge arises (as the knowledge of fire generated by the mark-smoke). Then we may answer, 'Let touch also become the object of the cognition of blue generated by the eye; because as in the case of colour so in the case of touch there exists the relation of inherence-in-the-conjunct with the eye (inherence in a thing, say a jar, which has come into contact with the eye; in the cognition of blue touch-sensation should become the object, which is absurd). Similarly let colour also become the object of the inference of taste (rasa) based on the hetu viz., smell; because like the concomitance of the taste and smell there exists the concomitance between colour and smell. (As these difficulties cannot be solved the Yogācāra drives home) the conclusion that blue etc., regarded as objects are nothing but thought-forms. Hence the identity between the two, thought and object, is established. Further the simultaneous cognition of both idea and object by negating distinctness which is not invariably concomitant (with its sadhya), because of the reason that this cognition is subversive of the probandum (vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi) does not support the bheda (distinctness) between the idea and the object.⁴⁶ In the case of distincts like pot and cloth simultaneous cognition is not invariable (bheda is not invariably pervaded by simultaneous cognition). The charge of asiddhi based on the supposition that at the time the object is apprehended the cognition of that apprehension does not arise cannot be maintained since in after-recollection it is our experience that that object is apprehended

(46) Where there is भेद there is सहोपलम्भनियमाभाव. Hence where there is सहोपलम्भनियमाभाव i. e. where सहोपलम्भ exists, there is no भेद.

According to the Buddhist doctrine, non-existence (अभाव) can be inferred by one of the eleven varieties of non-perception (अनुपलब्धि) serving as hetu. These eleven hetus are classed under Svabhāva hetu or tādātmya variety of inference as distinguished from tadutpatti. Here, that which establishes identity between knowledge and object i. e. non-existence of difference (भेदाभाव) is known as Vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi. Now the vyāpaka of bheda or probandum is Sahopalambhāniyama and its opposite (viruddha) is Sahopalambhāniyama whose knowledge consequently cancels bheda (which is pervaded by āniyama) and establishes abheda or identity - (i. e. between jñāna and artha) *vide* N. M. P. 53 for a full account of this topic.

along with jñāna as in 'the pot was known';⁴⁷ and there can be no recollection of things not previously experienced. Hence it must be admitted that at the very time a cognition arises its self-manifestation also arises.⁴⁸ It is impossible that the formless could be known. Hence it is evident that blue etc., are but forms of jñāna (i.e. the ideas signify nothing but themselves). The conclusion is irresistible that since dream-cognitions, cognitions like 'the son of a barren woman is going', 'on the tip of the finger (there are) a hundred herds of elephants', (all these and more) are from their very nature utterly impossible, externals (external objects) should be regarded as nothing but forms of jñāna. Let the same reasoning serve elsewhere also (i.e. as regards normal cognition). Therefore it is proved that externals do not exist. When such an argument is advanced (it is met as follows):—

28. By which jñāna is it ascertained that the knowledge of blue etc., cognizes its own self (and not any object external to it)? Not by itself (since nīla-jñāna

ends in itself it can reveal neither svātmāmśatva nor its externalization) and not by any other jñāna since that other also exhausts itself by self-revelation.

Knowledge of non-cognition, of what is enduring, of that which is many-featured, of externality—how can such as these which are other than jñāna, (leaving alone the question) whether they actually exist or not exist, be cognized by vijñāna (i.e. assume thought-forms)? The vijñānavādin asserts that the idea in all cases points to itself only and to nothing else; by itself it is cognized and not by another since the operation of this other also is confined to self-manifestation, (in other words every idea exhausts itself by signifying itself and therefore one idea cannot reveal another); (as witness) what is stated (by the Yogācāra) :—Nothing other than itself there exists for jñāna to apprehend; there is no separate cognition of this cognition and since the existence of the cognised and cogniser is denied it (is evident that it) manifests itself, (jñāna is both cognizer-grāhaka, and cognised-grāhya).

29. Now the disputant has to answer this query—by what jñāna are these cognized—the knowledge of blue ending in itself and the thought-form of blue? It cannot be said that these are known by itself (vijñāna). In the idea 'this is blue' there is no manifestation of the idea ending in self-cognition (svaprakāśa) and of the blue being but a form of the idea because the manifestation of blue alone is evident (in that idea). It may however be urged that because of cognisability (samvedyatva), because of the impossibility of defining grāhya (i. e. object) and because of the reason that the idea and the object are cognized simultaneously, inference leads to this comprehension (the

(47) असिद्धि - The unestablished reason, a case of fallacious inference where the hetu is absent in the pakṣa, say, of smoke in the pool.

(48) The Yogācāra maintains that vijñāna is svasamvedya-known by itself; the Naiyāyika also admits that jñāna is knowable but by another jñāna. The advaitin denies that jñāna can be known whether by itself or by another. According to him the existence of jñāna means its revelation and when he describes it as svaprakāśa all that he means is that it is not paraprakāśa—not revealed by any extraneous jñāna.

two referred to above—self-manifestation and thought-forms of blue etc.). Even then inference (itself a jñāna) if it should terminate in self-cognition will be incapable of signifying the self-manifestation of jñāna different from itself.⁴⁹ But it may be argued that inference is not self-cognizant (but points to something outside itself). Then what peccancy (do you find) in the cognition of blue etc., to warrant the supposition that the ideas which relate to external objects in the immediate presence (of the perceiver and pointed to as 'this' and 'this') and which manifest them as blue etc., are exhausted in themselves?⁵⁰ (If inference is credited with the potency to cognize something external) then it cannot be argued that cognisability (samvedana), possibility of being an object of knowledge, and simultaneous apprehension are impossible in the case of that which is other than itself (viz., the idea).⁵¹ Of all of them (viz., samvedana, grāhyalakṣaṇa and sahopalambhaniyama) there is the straying away of reason in your argument. Indeed you have to admit that your inference has to go beyond itself and point out the self-cognizance of the knowledge blue etc., (i.e. it has become cognizable though it is distinct from anumiti. Hence your lakṣaṇa miscarries.) If inference also is confined to itself (as it has to, seeing that it is a jñāna) then the self-cognizance of the knowledge of the blue cannot be established by means of inference. So it has been said (vide Kumārila's *Slokavārtika* on *Nirālambanavāda* Slokas 65 and 66), "If by the knowledge awakened through the *Sīdhana* (hetu as characterised by invariable simultaneous consciousness) the *nirālambanā* which is the property of notions like 'he is *Çaitra* etc., (as postulated by you) is not grasped, then the two (*anumiti* and *Çaitra*-notion) having distinct objects the *sālabhanatva* which is the natural characteristic of *çaitra-jñāna* is not negated by its counter-correlate (*nirālambanatva*), and this (*sālabhanaprāpti*), who could avert?⁵² Again (referring to the second verse noted above para 28) the

(49) The *Yogācāra* definition of object viz., संबन्धत्व and ग्राह्यलक्षण which pertain to jñāna only, is made the basis of refutation. The contention of the *Bhāṭṭa* is that if inference is premised it cannot, being itself a jñāna, prove the two already mentioned, self-manifestation and modality.

(50) Since perception and inference are alike jñāna their functions cannot be different. If inference can point to something beyond itself so can perception. Hence inference cannot cognize the self-manifestation of another jñāna nor can it show that an object is only a form of an idea. इदंकारादपि पुरो वृत्ति विषय—Something external that can be pointed to as 'this' 'here and now'.

(51) नानात्मनः—न अनात्मनः, स्वव्यतिरेकत्व, of that which is other than itself. If inference can cognise an external something it cannot be maintained that perception is self-cognizant only and incapable of grasping an object out there because both inference and perception fall under the category of jñāna and as such there can be no difference in their functions.

(52) विषयनानाद—The two jñānas contrasted here are *anumiti* and *pratyakṣa*, say, "this is *Çaitra*". The common-sense view of the latter is that it is *sālabhana*: that it not only points to *Çaitra* but also implies that *Çaitra* is external to the jñāna. It is this *sālabhanatva* pertaining to the jñāna "he is *Çaitra*" that is claimed to be disproved by the *anumiti* in question. But on the consideration noted above that that *anumiti* also being a jñāna cannot go beyond itself, this *sālabhanatva* which belongs to another jñāna can never be its (*anumiti*) *viṣaya*. And no jñāna can cancel another, unless both have one and the same *viṣaya* as in 'idam rajatam', 'nedam rajatam'. Cf S. V. *Nirālambana vāda*, 65th Stanza.

cognition of non-cognition has absence of cognition (jnānābhāva) as its object and absence of cognition cannot be of the nature of jñāna because of the utter contradiction (between the two). Similarly in the cognition "this is that only" we find the same object to endure from the past to the present time (ie. temporal continuity is evident as regards the object of recognition) but it is impossible for cognition which is momentary to acquire the character of permanency. Again in the cognition of an aggregate (Citrabuddhau-Samūhālambanajñāne in the simultaneous cognition of a group of objects such as pot, cloth, wall etc.) there is the manifestation of different forms but a unit-cognition cannot assume different forms.

30. (Even granting the existence of external objects the Yogācāra contends that) the permanency of the object and the assumption of different forms (such as jāti, guṇa etc.) by a single object (say, pot) are untenable (for according to him not only jñāna but even objects are momentary). Whether tenable or not it is futile to assume (says: the Bhāṭṭa) that the object can ever be identical with jñāna. When no such possibility exists permanency and many-featuredness should either be attributed to the object (i. e. respectively to recognition and aggregate cognition) or they may be regarded as being totally non-existent. In either case since cognition apprehends what are other than cognition (viz., sthāyitva and citratva) the position which we espouse stands well established. Likewise when you are negating an external (object) that object should (prior to negation) have been conceived by the intellect.⁵³ And that external object is out and beyond jñāna and could not acquire a thought-form.⁵⁴ Hence for the justification of the existence of such as these (viz., continuance and variety of external objects) you have perforce to admit that jñāna points to something other than itself and such admission is essential also for the sake of your inference.⁵⁵ When it is established on the strength of experience that the knowledge is external it cannot be negated by reason of cognizability etc., (cognizability etc., have been advanced as reasons for proving the non-existence of externals, vide para 24). Then cognizability of externals has to be admitted on the strength of direct experience. On the contrary it is the cognizability of (jñāna) itself that stands refuted.⁵⁶ As regards notions of blue etc., cognitions assume such forms

(53) Negation is only with reference to something that has already been engaging one's thought—प्रसक्तस्यप्रतिषेधः

(54) तस्य-बाह्यवस्तुनः अनुवादसमर्थेज्ञानाकारता न संभवति—When a restatement is made the external object does not assume a thought-form; if it did the Yogācāra would be negating jñānākāra itself.

(55) Inference being a cognition its scope cannot extend beyond itself in the scheme of Yogācāra. The non-existence of externals cannot therefore be proved by inferential process.

(56) प्रत्युत-विचार्यमाणे—On careful consideration, it is seen that in any particular jñāna it is the viśaya that is revealed and never the jñāna itself. Note the manner in which the existence of outer reality is exhibited here as more primary than the consciousness of jñāna. Kumārila goes further than Śaṅkara in this respect.

as 'this is blue' 'this is yellow' etc., having a distinct reference to things other than themselves and not manifesting themselves.⁵⁷

31. Let the 'I' notion, then (it may be said) have itself for its object.⁵⁸ We shall point out in the ātmavāda section (Vide para 131) that even that (viz., the ego-consciousness) has for its object the karta (subject or the knower) and not knowledge (ahampratyaya). Hence we must so define objectivity (viśayatva) as it may appropriately refer to some external object only (contrast the yogācāra definition of the term; vide ante para 24). Otherwise the inference you adduce to prove that the cognitions of blue etc., are self-regarding (svāmsāparyavasāitva) will not have for its viśaya the self-regarding nature inferent in the cognition of blue etc., (for it has already been shown that inference being itself jñāna cannot point to anything beyond itself.) Also permanency (Sthāyitva) etc., cannot be the object of those cognitions.⁵⁹

32. Since its definition (i. e. of the object) as enunciated by others (viz., Sautrāntikas) has been pronounced to be defective (by yogācāra and we also agree with him) it must be admitted that it (object) is to be defined as something in which the phala resulting from jñāna abides. The knowledge-activity has reference to an object (sakarmikā) and it generates a phala in the object which is the karma, as does cooking.⁶⁰ And the phala when begotten of the sense-apprehension is āparokṣya (immediacy), while what is derived from the knowledge of the liṅga or probans is said to be pāroṣya (mediacy). As is well known, there is the distinction between those objects which fall within one's ken (viśaya) and those which do not (aviśaya); among the viśayas again the division of parokṣa and aparokṣa (mediate and immediate). And without the phala such a division is not possible. Hence its acceptance. And this very phala being of the nature of effect leads to the inference of vijñāna as its cause (hetu or probans) and thus the exis-

(57) What is meant is that the very form of the jñāna shows that it is devoid of any reference to itself, its content being absolutely confined to the corresponding object.

(58) अहंप्रत्यय or ego-consciousness' it is clear, does not arise with reference to an external object but is self-embracing; here is an exception - so yogācāra thinks. Note that according to the yogācāra view there is no ego or self apart from the momentary ātman.

(59) It has been shown that recognition cannot be explained unless objects are regarded as enduring in time so that in all cases of recognition (प्रत्यभिज्ञा) the स्थायित्व of the viśaya is apparent or in other words this jñāna is with reference to some enduring object. The words विषयानस्तु: should be understood after तदुद्दीनान्.

(60) In 'he cooks rice' the object is rice and in it the act of cooking produces a certain result, viz., the moistening and breaking up of the particles.

tence of jñāna is proved though it is not an object of direct perception.⁶¹ Or what constitutes the mutual relation between that which is of the nature of the knower (katrbhūta) and that which is of the nature of the known (karmabhūta-object) depending as it does upon thought-activity (jñānakriyā) and termed Vyāptṛvyāpyata (knower-known,) relation and apprehended by the inner sense-perception leads to (kalpayati) the inferential cognition of vijñāna. (It is evident,) that without the occasional cause (āgantuka) there cannot arise the knower-known relation between the ātman and the object.⁶² And that kāraṇa is commonly known by the term jñāna. Even those who aver that jñāna is self-revealing have necessarily to admit this mentally perceived relation. Otherwise (i.e. if such a relation is not conceded) it would be impossible to speak of a relation either between the apprehension and the object apprehended or between the apprehender and the apprehended as we actually do when using an expression like 'the pot is apprehended by me'. Verbal usage is limited to that only which is apprehended and to nothing else.⁶³ Here a pprehension (samvit) is wholly self-manifested and the object also depends upon the samvit for its manifestation and if it be asked by what is the relation of jñāna (with the object) rendered manifest, that also it might be answered (by Prabhākara) is by the same samvit. No, this view is wrong because the relation has not arisen at the time jñāna arises. The relation of jñāna with the object means only its capacity to reveal it and no other. Hence it is only after the apprehension has arisen and after the object is rendered manifest that the relation comes into existence and as such that apprehension cannot grasp it (relation).⁶⁴ For jñāna cannot function after an interval of cessation.⁶⁵ It is incapable of first revealing the object and then the relation, because of its momentary existence. If it be argued that the relation also is self-illuminating it is refuted on the ground that no proof can be adduced to warrant such a view. Therefore (it must be admitted) that the relation between the self and the object known through the inner perception leads to the inference of jñāna, a view that is most satisfactory. There certainly exists some relation of

(61) The apprehension in 'this is pot' grasps 'pot' but not itself and it should be known by inference as indicated above; the apprehension of every jñāna is inferential according to the Bhāṭas. उपक्रमण्यदि-causes it to be inferred. विज्ञानम्-this is the apprehension of apprehension.

(62) अथवा the inferential character of jñāna can be established in another way-मानसप्रत्यक्षः; the relation is mental like the perception of pleasure, pain etc. आगन्तुक, कादाचित्क whenever there is an accidental kārya there must be an accidental kāraṇa and that is jñāna.

(63) If jñāna alone is manifest in one's apprehension, that itself should be accepted as being fit for vyavahāra-verbal utterance. But this is evidently impossible. Hence we must admit the relation referred to in the text.

(64) 'तथा संविदा-पूर्वक्षणे उत्पन्नया संविदा' etc. The jñāna arising in the preceding moment cannot denote the relation that is to arise thereafter.

(65) Jñāna when it manifests itself manifests also the object that is present but not the relation because it comes into existence subsequently. Hence the statement in the text - विरम्य व्यापाराभावात् - jñāna cannot function again after a pause.

the self with the object which is cognized by mental perception and which is admitted by all and this relation makes the inference of jñāna feasible. Or the distinct additament-*atiśaya*⁶⁵ generated in the object by jñāna leads to the inference of jñāna and the *atiśaya* has necessarily to be admitted even by those who hold that all the three are revealed (together).⁶⁷ He who avers that the three become manifest has perforce to admit the thing that is designated by the term *prakāśana* (*bhāśana*, *atśaya* or *prākātya*) a feature common to the triad of cognition-cognizer-cognized. Now *jñānatva*-cognizing, however is not a common accompaniment for it is found in cognition only and not in cognizer and cognized; *jneyatva*-cognizedness, in *jneya* (object) only and not in cognizer and cognition; *jñātṛtva*-being the cognizer, in cognizer only and not in cognition and cognized. If it be said that serviceableness (*hānopādāna*) is the needed common feature we say no; for in regard to *saṃvit* (cognition which is one of the three) there can be no serviceableness (*vyavahāra*) since jñāna has disappeared at the time of *vyavahāra*. The use of words it may be argued is itself *vyavahāra*. It is not so owing to the defects already pointed out (*vide* para 27). Hence it is evident that this special property designated by the synonymous terms *prakāśana*, *bhāśana*, etc., (manifestedness) inheres in all the three (cognition, cognizer, cognized) as cowhood (*gotva*) is in individual cows. And that property (*dharma*) originates both in the cognizer and the cognized as effected by jñāna. Of jñāna itself it is there by its very nature as heat is of fire. For this reason jñāna is self-illuminating (*svaprakāśa*). The two others (cognizer and cognized) have to be admitted as being illuminated by something other than themselves. And the objectivity of an object is effectuated by this (i.e. objectivity is conferred upon an object because of this special property arising in that object-*paraprakāśyanimittam viṣayasya viṣayatvam*). The definition of an object (*viṣaya*) as something serving a practical utility etc., has been already criticised. (*Vide* para 27).

33. If the view of one school (of *Mīmāṃsakas*-the *Prābhākaras*) is accepted, namely, that the *viṣayatva* is determined by its (object) serviceableness then the nacre will become the object of the knowledge of silver (in the illusory cognition of silver-in-nacre) but such is not their view (they do not desire that nacre should be the object of silver-cognition for it is the imagined silver that one goes to take and not the nacre).⁶⁸ Hence the distinct additament or *atiśaya* is proved beyond dispute to arise in the object and from this (*atiśaya*) only is drawn the inference of jñāna (the awareness of cognition as in 'ghatam, aham jñāmi') or such inference arises from the mentally perceived relation

(66) अतिशयः—some special property धर्मविशेष is generated in the object by jñāna and this *atiśaya* is a directly experienced fact enabling us to infer jñāna.

(67) ' त्रितयप्रतिभासवादिनः । '—The *Prābhākaras* advocate that cognition illuminates all the three elements viz., ज्ञातु cognizer, ज्ञान cognition, and ज्ञेय the cognized, as is evident, they say, in the statement चतसर्हजानामि.

(68) ज्ञेन ज्ञानेन यो व्यवहारो जायते तस्य व्यवहारस्य यो विषयः स एव तस्य ज्ञानस्यापि विषयः, this is so when *viṣayatva* is defined in terms of *vyavahāra*. The steps are रजतं ज्ञानम् तज्जन्यः कश्चिद्व्यापारः तस्य व्यापारस्य कुक्षिविषयः.

referred to before. Just as we comprehend the numerical quality *daśatva* (lit. tenness) etc., relating to the days that have elapsed (as when we say ten days, that have passed) we do admit that the *prakāśa-nadharmā* (*atiśāya*) arises in objects that either existed in the past or will exist in the future though not existing at present and this admission is based on the evidence of common experience (*vyavahāra rūpa pramāṇabalā*).⁶⁹ Therefore (this is the final conclusion) *jñāna* cannot be admitted to be the object of perception.⁷⁰

34. It cannot be argued that on the strength of experience we have to regard *jñāna* as an object of perception (i. e., directly known). At the time the object is cognized there is no manifestation of *jñāna* at all and by no means does the question of immediacy arise. It comes to this that because of the negation of simultaneous apprehension of cognition and its content what was urged by the *Yogaçāra* is wholly untenable and his dictum—that in consequence of the invariable association of thought and its object—*sahopalambhaniyama*, the blue and the blue-cognition are non-distinct—is controverted. And the contention that because there is such a thing as later recollection *jñāna* also must have been experienced formerly (i. e. when perceiving the object) is untenable. It is only the object that is then (at the time of recollection) remembered. And as each object is remembered the subject-object relation is then and there cognized through mental perception and founded on this relation is the inference of the cognition of the apprehension of the object.⁷¹ Owing to the absence of sense-contact

(69) This statement is made to meet the contention that *atiśāya* can arise only in objects of present knowledge and not in those relating to the past or the future. In the analogy the *dharma* is the days passed, *अतिक्रान्तदिवसाः*; the *dharma*, the *daśatva*.

(70) The *Bhāttas* being realists have advanced several arguments to prove the separate and independent existence of objects and so conclude by saying that the *yogaçāra* doctrine of *jñāna* itself appearing as object is wrong. The awareness of cognition according to the *Bhāttas* is through inference and not through perception as the *Bauddhas* of this school hold.

(71) *अर्थव्याप्ति* Etc.,—*आत्मनः चैत्रादेः अर्थव्याप्तिः विषयेण साकम्*, the comprehending of the relation between the subject say, *Chaitra* and the object. This relation is one of the *vyāpti-vyāpyabhāva* and is mentally perceived at the time the object is recollected.

अयं न तावत्—अर्थविषयकज्ञानं अनुमिनोति—It is by inference that the previous *jñāna* is recollected through the channel of the relation (*Sambandha*) which is the *liṅga*.

The opponent's point is that when we make the statement "the pot was cognised by me" even *jñāna* is the content of recollection and that as such *jñāna* is the object in the apprehension "this is pot". But the answer is that such cognition (of cognition) is only inferred.

The views of the two schools may thus be summarised:—

The *yogaçāra* holds that when an object is recollected its *jñāna* also is included in the content of that recollection. Since both the elements are recollected both equally refer back to a former *anubhava*; in other words just as a recollected object points to the same object as having been *pratyakṣa* so the recollected *jñāna* points to the *jñāna* as having been *pratyakṣa* once before. This leads to the *Yogaçār* doctrine that *jñāna* is *pratyakṣa*.

According to the *Bhāttas* in all recollection it is the object alone that is given and that means—as proved by mental perception, that the *ātman* has come into a particular relation with the object. This relation being an effect points to the fact that the corresponding *jñāna* should have risen.

and other means (of direct perception) jñāna is not directly apprehended and so we should conclude that it is result of recollection and that the earlier jñāna on which the recollection is based is inferred at that very moment (i. e. at the time of recollection). Hence it (jñāna) is not (to be regarded) as recollected knowledge.

And this also. We cannot admit that blue etc., are but "presentational forms" of jñāna. In acts of inference the object-forms are mediate (parokṣa) but jñāna is admitted (by you) as being everywhere immediate (pratyakṣa), and it can never be that mediacy and immediacy are identical. Similarly it is not possible to hold that fixity (enduring in time) etc., which are regarded by you as totally unreal, to be forms of jñāna which (alone) is of the nature of reality.⁷² Again in the inference of a past event (e. g., we infer by observing, say, the swollen condition of river that it should have rained before) the pastness (bhūtatva) is manifested but jñāna of the present time cannot assume the form of bhūtatva (which it should, as according to Yogācāra all objects are but presentational forms of jñāna).

Even if it be admitted that the cognized is different from the cognizer (it may be urged) that a subsequent jñāna has a past jñāna for its viśaya and not an object. But such a view is untenable for lack of proof (vide S. V. p. 313 S'ūnyavāda). Here (in this context) the Vārtikakāra having considered the past (idea) under three alternatives has refuted each of them in the passage beginning with "atītam yaççaviññānam etc.," and having also considered the subsequent (idea) under three alternatives has refuted each of them in the passage beginning with "dvyākārakalpanāyāmaṇa etc.,". Thus it (the vārtika passage) has to be differentiated. Hence the doctrine of the Vaibhāṣika also stands condemned. It follows therefore that blue etc. are forms external objects only and not of jñāna.

35. How about dreams? Even there external objects only which were perceived at a remote place and time having been recalled by the revival through adṛṣṭa, of memory-impressions are cognized as if proximate in time and place owing to the illusion caused by the sleep-perturbed mind (nidrādūṣita). It is a notorious fact that what was experienced the previous day is in dreams experienced as if it were a present experience and it is but right therefore to admit a similar occurrence in the other cases of dreams also. Even the decapitation (mentioned before) seen elsewhere is cognized through the defect (of sleep) as relating to one's self. In all cases (of error) it is only the relation (between the subject and the predicate elements) which though unreal appears to exist; the relata however are real. And this is the

(72) In recognition (प्रत्यभिज्ञा) we notice that a particular object endures in time but this fact is not accepted by Yogācāra. To him it is of the nature of unreality (असद्रूप) but then it must be regarded as jñānākāra which alone is real; hence the absurdity—असद्रूपज्ञान is सद्रूपज्ञानाकार; स्थायित्व is unreal according to Yogācāra for he upholds the doctrine of universal momentariness. Now this jñāna that all sthāyitva is unreal has for its content sthāyitva and as such it must be jñāna which is sadrūpa.

viparītakhyāti as stated by the Mīmāṃsakas. The upholders of asatkhyāti discard even the relata. Herein lies the difference (between viparītakhyāti and asatkhyāti). In the erroneous apprehension of silver-in-nacre the universal silverness which is real not being of the essence the piece of nacre which latter again is real is cognized as identical with it.⁷³ Similarly in 'barren woman's son' the meaning of the really existent 'son' gets related to barren woman and owing to the defect of the proximity of that word the erroneous notion arises.⁷⁴

36. The doctrine of those who discarding the view that in all such cases of error one object appears as another, consider that error consists in the non-apprehension of the fact that the reals are unrelated is to be ignored altogether seeing that it is against all experience.⁷⁵ Who when his finger is pressing against his eye could possibly deny the appearance of the double moon (diplopia)? Moreover even he who has a clear conviction of the existence of only one moon at the time and not two has the illusory sight of the double moon. How could in this case error arise from a non-apprehension of the difference (between the reals)⁶⁷? One who is aware of the different quarters is (often) subjected to the confusion of orientation (digbhrama) and that cannot be due to non-discrimination.

37. How then is the double image (of the moon) to be accounted for? It cannot be recollection because of the lack of memory-causing experience (i. e. there is no previous perception of the double moon); it cannot be perception (grahana) for the eye cannot grasp that which is not in contact with it.

38. It is explained thus:—Two regions are perceived as also the moon; their (deśadvaya and candra) relation is perceived through the defect (caused by the twist given to the eye though such relation is not real) and having observed the moon in the two regions (the observer)

(73) Both the relata as noted above are real existents, viz., shell and silver; the former as indicated by "this" इदं is a present experience and the latter रजतं a former experience and though no actual relation exists between them it is imagined to exist, संसर्गग्रह and this is the cause of the mistaken notion-s ukti-rajata.

(74) The meaning of the word 'suta'-an existent thing appears related to 'barren woman' wrongly, through the juxtaposition of the two words in question.

(75) संविद्विरोधात्-Contradicts our experience. It is the Prabhākara doctrine of error that is criticised here. That doctrine does not recognise error in the usual acceptance of the term for according to Prabhākara "Knowledge can never play false to its logical nature"; what really constitutes the so-called error is the non-apprehension of the fact that the two factors, the presentative and the representative stand unrelated. This is the akhyātivāda; cf. यथार्थसद्वैतवद् विज्ञानमिति सिद्धये । प्रासादर-गुरोर्भावः समीचानः प्रकाशयते P. P. p. 32

(76) Errors are of two kinds - one in which the form seen in bhramā persists even when bhramā is dispelled, the other in which it does not. In the apprehension of the double moon we have the first kind, विवेकग्रहऽपि भ्रमोदृष्टः and illusion arises in spite of the fact that the perceiver is conscious that the moon is different from objects characterised by dvitva.

superimposes the doubleness—a character belonging to the region, on the moon by reason of (the same) defect.)⁷⁷ So also the eye perceiving the yellowness of the bile and the bare conch (i. e. without grasping its pure whiteness) establishes through the operation of the defect an erroneous relation (between the conch and yellowness).⁷⁸ This is how it has to be understood. Again if (as argued by the Prābhākaras) in the cognition of the real silver the relation of identity (between silverness and the “this” that is before the observer’s eye) is manifested and not in the cognition of shell-silver then owing to the difference in the objects manifested,⁷⁹ it is possible to apprehend the difference in that which manifests (viz., jñāna) even before the remedial cognition arises. And as a result of such (differential) knowledge no activity (directed towards the object) would arise (but as a matter of fact the observer goes towards the “silver” with a view to possess it).⁸⁰ Furthermore if a person coveting silver should fetch the shell thinking he ought to do so, then the fetching of the shell which is not his desired act appears as if it were deliberately done. This amounts to (the Bhāṭṭa) viparītakhyāti. If he does not think so (i. e. that he ought to fetch it-kāryataya) he should not act; for activity depends on the knowledge that it has to be done.⁸¹ It might be argued that though there is no consciousness of it (fetching the perceived object) as something to be done activity ensues because of the resemblance with the kāryatvajñāna. Then it is equally plausible argument that because

(77) “The vision of two moons is due to a lack of co-ordination of the rays of light which issue from the eyes and bring back the images—Keith’s Karma Mimāṃsa p. 20.

Parthasārathi’s explanation amounts to this:—There is a double error in the apprehension of the double moon, (i) the single moon being related to two regions; here the erroneous element is the relation between the two regions and the moon; (ii) the perceiver not stopping at seeing the moon in two places but going further and asserting that the moon is double, i. e. he transfers the doubleness from where it is, viz., the regions, to where it is not, viz. the moon. This is anyathākhyāti in that the dvitva which is existent and the moon which is existent are falsely related.

(78) Note how Prābhākara explains the same phenomenon. It is the non-apprehension of the fact that the two jñānas (i. e. of yellowness and of conch) are distinct and unrelated that is the cause of the so called error; while according to Kumārila there is the subjective element in that the mind superimposes the one over the other, thereby establishing a relation that is not there. The visual rays are supposed to stream out to the spot where the conch is. Now the yellowness belongs to the rays and is therefore not actually in relation with the conch; yet it seems so related. cf. N. M. pp. 135 ff.

(79) अन्वयः—that which is manifested consists of (i) पुरोवर्तिव्यक्ति, रजतत्व, रजत-तादात्म्य and (ii) absence of संबन्ध in the case of the apprehension of real silver and shell-silver respectively.

(80) It is therefore imperative, says Kumārila, that samsarga-bhāna or vis’istajñāna, i. e. shell-silver as unitary cognition should be accepted—रजतत्वविशिष्ट पुरोवर्तिविषयकज्ञानं अंगीकृतव्यम्.

(81) तत्कार्याविगमनाधीनत्वात्प्रवृत्तेः—It is only after the rise of jñāna i. e. consciousness that he should act, that action takes place. The volition takes the form शुचयुगदनं कर्तव्यम्. Notice that on either supposition the opponent cannot escape from the dilemma.

there is no consciousness of it as a duty, resemblance of it to the consciousness of it as a non-duty, may also arise with the result that there will be no activity, the resemblance in the one case being the same as in the other (when two things are similar they possess by implication dis-similar features). And it is patent that in the absence of the cause what is similar to it cannot bring about the required effect. The nacre though it resembles silver cannot bring into existence an ornament which is to be fashioned out of silver.

39. Is it not a fact that the *nīvara* (wild rice) brings about *apūrva* which (*kārya*) rightly belongs to *vrihi* (cultivated rice)?

Not so. There in the *nīvara* are the *vrihi* particles which alone bring about the result (i. e. produce *apūrva*). Though lacking in fulness (*vikalaḥ*—forming a fractional part) they are considered, when one is otherwise helpless, as being the effective means of bringing about *apūrva* as laid down in the injunction relating to the performance of a ritual with such means as one could possibly procure (*yathāśakti-prayogavidhāna*). Thus the *kārya* does not result here from (as you maintain) any thing that is not a *kāraṇa* but is only similar to it.

Well (says the opponent), the absence of knowledge that a thing is not to be done will serve as a cause for *pravṛtti*-activity. Then even those outside (the pale of the Scriptures, viz., the Buddhists) might engage in Vedic duties as they have no knowledge that such duties are not to be performed.

Well, what if they (the Buddhists) have understood it (Vedic Karma) to be *akārya* (something not to be done)?

Then because *kārya* (the *Prābhākara*s admit Vedic Karma as *Kārya* and explain the *akāryatāvāgama*-belief that it is to be discarded-of the Buddhists as a *brahmā*) is regarded as *akārya* it tantamounts to *Viparītakhyāti*.⁸² Enough of this topic.

Hence even in dreams etc., since only external objects which are existent somewhere are experienced as if existent other-where (i. e. in one's vicinity and at the present time) the conclusion is that *jñāna* in all cases is grounded in external reality.

40. The inference (vide para 20, *ibid*) is untenable that purports to establish that cognitions like 'pillar-cognitions' are illusions on the

(82) First is considered the alternative that *kāryatāvagati* prompts activity; next *kāryatānavagati*; thirdly *kāryatāvagatisādṛṣyāvagati*. The *Prābhākara* view has been refuted under all these three heads. A fourth alternative *akāryatānavagati* is also considered and dismissed as it leads to *Viparītakhyāti*. The *Prābhākara* view is that all activity, secular as well as religious, is prompted by *kāryatājñāna*, the consciousness that one should act. This is the reason why that expression is used here. Now in the case of *brahmā* (illusion) there is activity which however leads to the attainment of nacre (in the nacre-shell apprehension.) The question is whether the activity could have been prompted by *kāryatājñāna*. The *Prābhākara* can give only two answers:—(i) Presence of *kāryatājñāna*; this means that the *suktyupādāna* is a *kārya* which in reality is an *akārya* for one seeking silver; in other words what is really an *akārya* has been conceived as *kārya*; this is *viparītakhyāti*; (ii) absence of *kāryatājñāna*; if so activity which is a fact cannot be explained.

ground that they are cognitions like 'dream cognitions'. If it were so, this—your inference itself would be invalid, the *hetu* (*pratyaya*) being the same in either case.⁸³ Or there is the defect of *vyabhiçāra* (straying away of reason) in your reasoning (if you should hold that this particular inferential knowledge is not an illusion) since the *hetu* exists but not the *sādhya* (i. e. your *hetu* is *amithyā*—valid, but it leads to a *sādhya* which is *mithyā*—invalid). Hence the correctness of the statement in *Sābarabhāṣya*: "That piece of knowledge alone is vitiated which is given by a defective sense or which is proved invalid by something subversive of it—*bādhaka-jñāna*, and none other" (S. Bh. P. 23). Therefore there being no defect of *vyabhiçāra* in *pratyakṣa* its validity need not be inquired into. Here ends the *Sūnyavāda*.⁸⁴

41. Having established the validity of perception by defining it as knowledge derived from the contact of senses with existent objects—a definition the correctness of which is vouched by all, the *Vṛttikāra* now gives the definition of inference which is equally warranted by the general opinion, in order to establish its (inference) validity. (This is the definition)—"Inference is knowledge arising in a person who is cognizant of the concomitant relation (between probans and probandum) and who perceives one of these (*viz.*, *hetu*) that is in relation to the other (*sādhya*) which is not in immediate contact (with the senses)",⁸⁵ (S. Bh. P. 36). When a person after perceiving, as unfailing, in that which serves as an example the association of a particular something (*hetu*, say smoke)

(83) The constituent members of the *yogācāra* syllogism are :—

Probandum	(साध्य) — अन्यथा भूतत्वं, अथार्थवत्
Probans	(हेतु) — प्रत्ययवत्
Example	(दृष्टान्त) — स्वप्नप्रत्ययवत्
Subject	(पक्ष) — जाग्रत्कालीनस्त्वमादिज्ञानम्

The Bhāṭṭa rejoinder is that the probans in the above inference is just the same as in the waking perception and as such the *yogācāra* inference is vitiated.

(84) Strictly speaking *Sūnyavāda* is the doctrine of Nihilism maintained by the *Mādhyaṃika* School of Buddhists, but that is not the subject matter of discussion here. It is the *yogācāra* doctrine or idealism that is refuted in this section. Hence the word *sūnya* should be understood as meaning the negation of existence independent of *jñāna*.

(85) This passage is construed in two ways, (i) ज्ञातः संबन्धो व्याप्तिरूपो व्याप्य व्यापकयोः दृष्टान्तधर्मिणि येन प्रमाणा स ज्ञातसंबन्धः, तस्य एकदेशस्य व्याप्यस्य धृमादेर्दशनात् एक देशान्तरे व्यापकवन्धादौ चक्षुःपथवन्निष्ठे उर्ध्वे वा बुद्धिः तदनुमानम्—The *jñāna*, which a person having the knowledge of the relation of pervader and pervaded (*vyāpya* and *vyāpaka*) as observed in the example (दृष्टान्त धर्मिणि) has after seeing the *hetu*, of the other *viz.*, fire (व्यापक the pervader) which is beyond the pale of sight, is inferential cognition. (ii) ज्ञातः संबन्धः यस्य एक देशाभ्यां धूमवन्निह रूपभ्यां सह, स ज्ञातसंबन्धः महानसादि धमा एक देशी, तस्य यो धूमाख्य एक देशः तस्य पर्वतादौ दर्शनात् एक देशान्तरे वनखादौ बुद्धिः This also yields the same sense but the grammatical construction is different. of the preception of the probans (धूम रूप एकदेश दर्शनात्) on the hill the knowledge fire arises (एक देशान्तरे वन्धादौ बुद्धिः)

with another particular something (sādhya, say fire) this association being either direct or indirect and any one of the following varieties—samyoga, samavāya, ekārthasamavāya, kāryakāraṇa or other, should perceive that particular something (hetu) in that which holds the sādhya (viz., the minor term—hill) there arises in him the cognition of the other (viz., fire) which is one of the two objects related in the manner aforesaid, presuming however that it is not already known through a stronger pramāṇa (viz., perception or word) to be such or the reverse, that cognition is inference.⁸⁶ The instance in point is the inference of fire in the hill after seeing smoke there, made by one who has invariably observed in the hearth the association of the constantly rising smoke, with fire.

42. *Objection*:—When it is admitted that inference is dependent upon the ascertainment of an invariable concomitant relation how can it be maintained that inference is applicable only where the thing is not known to be in its true nature (tadrūpyena aparicchinna). Is not the rule (i. e. vyāpti niścaya) thus—Wherever there is smoke there is fire; whatever has taste has colour? It being so in every case of smoke the existence of fire is perforce a known fact. Hence that which is unapprehended will not constitute the probandum.⁸⁷ It is for this reason that some (thinkers viz., the Prābhākara) baffled at this question aver, agreeing with the view that inference gives only that which is known, that the use of asannikṛta (being non-proximate) in the Bhāṣya is to obviate the possibility of holding inference as recollected knowledge. Even then (though apprehending the apprehended) inference cannot (they say) be denied the right to be regarded as pramāṇa. The mark of pramāṇa is not that it should give what is not already known (anadhigata). It is anubhūti which is its mark.⁸⁸ And inference though what is given in it is a previously apprehended bit of knowledge, is rightly held to be valid since it is anubhava only derived

(86) The relations between the probans and probandum may be one of the following kinds:—Conjunction—Samyoga; inherence—samavaya, inherence in a common substrate—ekārthasamavāya, e. g. inferring sweetness from red colour which are both inherent in the same locus viz., fruit; cause and effect—Kāryakāraṇatva, others such as tādātmya, viruddha etc. Conjunction and inherence are direct relations, whereas ekārthasamavāya and kāryakāraṇatva etc., are indirect relations. The Śāstra Dipikā purports to maintain that the knowledge of any one of these relations is alone sufficient to warrant an inference and there is no reference to the relation of concomitance which is admitted by all to be essential in any inferential process. This point is adverted to in the Candrikā. There it is stated that one of these relations may exist along with concomitance. Pārthasārathi however in commenting on the 4th Sloka (S. V. P. 348) takes the relation—Jñātasambandha, found in the definition of anumāna as given by S'abara, to mean vyāpti or concomitance.

(87) The doubt raised here points to the fact that the Sādhya is known in vyāptijnāna (apprehension of the concomitant relation) only and as such the inference proves nothing that was not already known.

(88) Anubhava includes all experience except memory which recalls only a previous experience grounded in perception. The only condition necessary for a pramāṇa is that it should not arise from samskāra—latent impressions, as in the case of memory.

from the inferential mark (liṅga) presented at the moment⁸⁹ that jñāna arises and (because it is) not (derived) solely from revived impressions.

43. Then why not admit the obscuration of memory?⁹⁰

No, because at the moment of inference there arises the apprehension of the mark (liṅga). No doubt in the Prābhākara. apprehension—this is silver—because there exists no cause other than the past impressions, the knowledge of silver though of the nature of anubhava (i. e. valid knowledge) has unavoidably to be regarded as memory which, it should be admitted, is obscured.⁹¹ But in the case of inference there exists the apprehension of the mark leading up to anubhava and it is not proper to reject what every one cognises as anubhava and admit memory-obscuration.

44. This fear of theirs is baseless (cf. ṣoḍyāt bibhyataḥ). To explain—

Bhāṭṭa.

If it be that in all cases where the pervader exists, the existence of the pervader is also known, then the doubt might justly arise that inference gives what is already known. But the fact is not so. It is only in the kitchen etc., serving as examples that the co-existence of smoke with fire is perceived before the rise of inferential knowledge but not everywhere (say, on the hill where co-existence is not perceived) because of the absence of pramāṇa (which is here perception). How such a pramāṇa is lacking has been amplified in Nyāyaratnamāla, (G. O. S. Vol. 75; P. 333). To one who has often perceived the co-existence of (smoke and) fire only in the familiar case (i. e. in that which serves as example, kitchen-fire) and who in spite of deliberate search has not discovered smoke anywhere which is devoid of fire (to such a one) there arises the knowledge of the existence of fire in the substrates (sādhya-dharmin is the pakṣa or the minor term). The Vārtika (P. 460 St. 42 Sec. Arthāpatti) has the following:—'the fact of the knowledge of the concomitance of fire and smoke being indubitable in the few cases examined, as well as of the non-apprehension of vyatireka (i. e. the non-observance of smoke in the absence of fire) leads to the inference of fire.⁹² Again, "As for me

(89) प्रत्युत्पन्नम्—तदानीमेवउत्पन्नम्—The liṅga-jñāna arises at that very moment and it is not a past jñāna. This is the new element in inference (according to the Prābhākara) distinguishing it from perception.

(90) अयस्मृतिप्रमोहः &c. This explanation that in inference obscuration of memory—say, of fire that was once perceived along with smoke, is what makes the inferential knowledge look like anubhava. (This is the counter-charge).

(91) That silver is recollected knowledge is lost sight of by the doṣa and the non-existence of the relation between 'idam' i. e. the presented nacre and silver is forgotten. This, we have seen is the Prābhākara explanation of error. Prābhākara explains 'knowledge of silver' as "memory obscuration" since he can neither maintain it to be anubhava as it seems to be, nor as pure recollection. Anumiti comes under anubhava as there is an objective stimulus, viz., the smoke giving rise to the knowledge of 'fire' which is the anumitavisaya. There is no room here for memory or memory-obscuration.

(92) The one is positive evidence or reason—अन्वय e. g. where there is smoke there is fire; the other is negative reason—व्यतिरेक, e. g. where is no fire there is no smoke'.

the absence of the sight (of the negative instance-vipakṣa), serves as the basis (gamaka) of the associated object", (S. V. P. 460 St. 40). Hence it is not to be supposed that one who desires to infer, has actually apprehended that all regions of smoke are regions of fire nor has he the knowledge of the absence of smoke in all places where there is the absence of fire. All that one, who wishes to draw an inference, should require is the association in as many cases as possible (of smoke and fire) and non-observance of contradictoin (vyabhiçāra i. e. he should not in any case under his observation perceive smoke where there is no fire) and nothing else in addition. That this jñāna- 'wherever there is smoke there is fire' is inference only is explained there only (viz. Nyāyaratnamāla G. O. S. Vol. 75; P. 334).

45. Even then is it not admitted from this inference of a general character that all places having smoke should have fire?⁹³ And if again from the perception of smoke in particular places like hill etc., fire is inferred, in that inference (as already pointed out) the apprehension of the apprehended remains as it stood.

46. It is not as you think because of the difference between the knowledge of the universal in the one case and of the particular in the other case.⁹⁴ It is indeed by the universal that the knowledge arises viz., that whatever has smoke has fire; but in the case of the hill which is a particular region its very existence (svarūpa, the thing itself) is unknown before (i. e. at the time of apprehending the universal vyāpti and prior to the inferential knowledge that the hill is fiery). Hence much less is its being fiery comprehended. But if some one should think that it is known for a certainty (i. e. that the knowledge of the hill being fiery is included in the knowledge of the invariable connection) then by which pramāṇa could he say that those beyond whose vision the hill lies have apprehended it when even the very features of the hill are unknown? Not by perception nor by any other means of apprehension. It is impossible to definitely predicate fire of a hill which is itself unknown. If the existence of fire on the hill-a fact to be known now (i. e. when perceiving smoke on the hill) had been known before (i. e. at the time the cognition of the inseparable connection between probans and probandum arose) then one wishing to get fire would mount the hill for it without perceiving smoke thereon. For indeed there is no object served by perceiving the smoke to one who wants to get fire but who already knows that it is

(93) सामान्यानुमानेन देशसामान्यकालसामान्य संबन्धितत्वेन-inference in general; not limited to a particular place or time and based on the cognition of invariable concomitance between probans and probandum.

(94) The Bhāṭṭa contention is that a knowledge of the invariable concomitance of probans and probandum does not warrant the conclusion that in particular cases of inference the previously apprehended alone is known. In the familiar example "the hill is fiery" we infer the presence of the existence of fire at a particular place and time and this knowledge is much more than the comprehension of the universal connection of smoke and fire, hence the text सामान्य विशेषभेदात्.

there. Moreover one who avers that in a particular tract like the hill having the property of smoke the knowledge of its association with fire is a past cognition, should also aver that the association of smoke with the hill is alike a past cognition. Because for one who is ignorant of the relation between the *hetu* (middle term) and the *pakṣa* (subject) (i. e. for one who is unaware of *pakṣadharmatā*) there cannot arise the conviction of fire-on-hill (*agnimattājñāna*.) If it be argued that this attribute (having smoke) is with reference to regions in general and not to particular regions (like the hill) then the possession of fire also is as extensive and not limited to specific places. Hence there being in this respect no difference between *liṅga* and *liṅgin* (*hetu* and *sādhya*-probans and probandum) to say that "*liṅga* alone can transcend (the limits of) space and time and not *liṅgin*," is a vain cry. Again (in the *vyāpti*): "Where there is contact between fire and (wet) fuel, there is smoke" the apprehension of smoke also belongs to the category of past cognition; there thus remains nothing to be known by the apprehension of smoke⁹⁵—(as we are landed in these absurdities) enough of such childish prattle!

If inferential cognition presents only a past experience inference would then be no other than recollection but only obscured.⁹⁶ You may demur by saying that because inference arises through an actual presentation of the *hetu* (*pakṣadharmatājñāna*) it is no recollection. But that is untenable; it is indeed the perception of one of the two *relata* (*sambandhināu*) that helps in the revival of past impressions just as in the case of similarity (e. g. the sight of *gavaya* brings to mind the cow which it resembles). That the perception of one of the related objects is the occasion for the revival of impressions is an indubitable experience and that the revived impressions occasion memory-revival, is also undisputed. And obscuration of recollection (i. e. that it is a recollected bit of knowledge) is an admitted fact in the apprehensions of shell-silver etc. Thus seeing that the cognition of fire arises from (the perception of) smoke in accordance with the conditions already postulated who dare imagine that the *liṅga* (smoke) is the direct cause of the apprehension of the *liṅgin*—(at best) a dubious conclusion.⁹⁷ If however it is conceived that the apprehension of *liṅga*

(95) In the cognition of the *Vyāpti* — where there is smoke there is fire (according to the opponent) the probandum is a past cognition; again in the *vyāpti* where there is contact between fire and fuel there is smoke, the smoke which is here the probandum must also be a past cognition. So both smoke and fire being already known there is no new knowledge to be gained by the awareness of the fact that the hill has the property of smoke. This is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the opponent's contention.

(96) तद्भावे — स्मरण भावम् &c.—the fact of its being recollected knowledge is forgotten for the time being and the name inference is given by way of courtesy, as if it were, to memory which is obscured.

(97) The opponent thinks that the perception of smoke brings on immediately the cognition of fire ignoring the other psychical processes that are involved therein. The *Bhāṭa Siddhāntin* tries to force the conviction that inference is the result of *pakṣadharmatājñāna* coupled with *vyāptismarana*.

directly occasions *liṅgi-jñāna* (then it follows that) the apprehension of silver in the shell also partakes of the nature of *anubhava* and we have to suppose that the eye-defect (*doṣa*) only, is the cause of the origination of *anubhava* (or what looks like *anubhava* when really it is blurred *smṛti*). If it is not so conceived (if *anubhava* is not supposed to have arisen from *doṣa*) then even here (in inferential cognition) inference ceases to be a *pramāṇa* as it is only hidden *Smṛti* (*Smṛti* is not ranked as valid knowledge being only a revival of past *anubhava*). Hence it must be admitted that inference is cognition of something not cognised before.

47. Since the particular fire whose association (with the pakṣa-

Objection.

hill) was not ascertained before, cannot now be the object of inference, (we have to admit) that what we infer is universal only and as this universal is a past cognition, how could it be construed as the cognition of the unknown?⁹⁸ What say they (referring to the *Cārvākas*)?—"If the particular is to be inferred then there is the absence of invariable concomitance; if of the universal, it is setting out to prove what is already known. In this mire of vanquished inference are floundering the disputant elephants".⁹⁹

48. There is no defect (i. e. the dilemma as pointed out does not exist)- Though the universal is known, since the

Answer.

probandum relating to a particular place and a particular time is not previously cognised but is now cognised it must be regarded as right knowledge (lit. *prameyatva*, the character of *prameya*, object of valid knowledge). Further this has to be answered by the critic (the opponent in turn is questioned; *ekadeśin*, a casual critic). By which *pramāṇa* is the sight of smoke understood as the cause of fire-cognition? If it is said that it is by posteriority (i. e. the knowledge of fire immediately following the sight or smoke; it amounts to *arthāpatti*) we say no, because such cognition may arise from the revival of past impressions also. Then it may be urged that it loses its character as *anubhava*. (We say) no; even as regards memory it should be understood that one forgets at the time that it is so and imagines that it is *anubhava*. As a matter of fact that it is *anubhava* cannot be established for want of proof. There is neither perception nor any other *pramāṇa* to prove that knowledge of fire partakes of the nature of *anubhava*. But there is *pramāṇa* in the case of memory-obscurance. Well, if it be a case of memory-obscurance, the objector might say, it should admit of being negated by the right

(98) The point of the objection is that when arriving at the knowledge of universal concomitance fire in general is cognized as the probandum but not any particular fire say the one on the hill. It is this general fire only that could be known on the hill so that there is no new cognition. Hence the defect of गृहीत ग्राह्यत्व-*cognition of the cognized persists*.

(99) विशेष-वर्ततीय बह्वेकमेकत्वे—If the inference is of the particular viz., hill-fire: अनुगमाभावः—व्याप्तिनिश्चया भावः the awareness of the concomitant relation is absent because this relation refers to the universal; सामान्ये—तामान्य सैव अनुमेयत्वे if the universal only is to be inferred; सिद्धसाधनता inference will be but past cognition.

knowledge (just as the apprehension of silver is negated by the knowledge of the nacre); and there is no such nullifying knowledge as regards the cognition of fire. No, (it is not so, as you argue). Even when memory is obscured there may be no later sublation.¹⁰⁰ For instance it is a case of memory-obscuration when one has the apprehension of a gem on seeing its lustre (and not the gem itself) for otherwise (if *bādhakajñāna* is accepted) it would be an instance of *viparītakhyāti*.¹ But since when one proceeds to the spot whence the lustre comes one obtains the gem there is no *bādhaka-jñāna*. Hence it would come to this that memory itself is inference with the consequence that it (inference) ceases to be valid knowledge.

How again (could it be proved that) inferential knowledge is cognition of the cognised? (The existence of) fire is inferred in a place absolutely unknown and at a time totally different (from that at which the knowledge of the invariable concomitance was acquired;) and we ask by which *pramāṇa* was that arrived at before, i.e. the knowledge of the particular fire on the particular hill?² It is not by perception for perceptive knowledge arises only when the object is present (and is in contact with the eye) nor is it by any other *pramāṇa*. Moreover all that you aver is that the mutual relation between fire and smoke which is not conditioned by space and time is apprehended by perception; but this by itself does not warrant the cognition of fire related to a particular time or place. Hence inference is in reality the cognition of the uncognised.

49. Which is the unknown element here (the opponent might query). It is evident that the fire in general is the cognised element only (cognised when arriving at the knowledge of the invariable concomitance). The hill also is perceptive apprehension. But (we say that) the hill associated by fire has not been apprehended by any one

(100) What is meant is that in all cases where memory is obscured there is no necessity to presume *bādhakajñāna* or sublating knowledge.

(1) If a precious stone is partially hidden and the lustre alone is perceived a person may see the lustre as lustre and conclude that there must be a precious stone in the neighbourhood and he runs to possess it. This is not the case that is relevant to the point under consideration. Here the objective situation is the same. But we have to think of a person who sees the lustre and mistakes it for the gem. It will then be a case of *bhramā* and it admits of two explanations. Kumārila explains it as lustre taken wrongly in a positive sense for the gem. There is sublation later when the person runs to the place and finds no gem at the spot where the lustre is and his feeling then is that he mistook the lustre for the gem (though he may find it in the neighbourhood). Prabhākara explains it differently. He takes the gem-cognition as memory aroused by the perception of lustre in association with the forgetfulness, however for the moment, of its being so. The attainment of the gem stands in the way of introducing any *bādha* element for *bādha* is found only where there is failure to attain the object as in nacre-silver. Now if Prabhākara should find scope for introducing *bādha* he should adopt the *viparītakhyāti* which militates against his doctrine. If he adheres to his doctrine no *bādha* is involved and his above statement stands discredited.

(2) *Pakṣadharmatājñāna* or knowledge that the probans exists in the *pakṣa* or subject is necessary for inference but this is absent in the mere *vyāptijñāna* or knowledge of the universal connection between the probans and probandum.

and thus it becomes inferential knowledge.³ And there (in an inference) when discriminating between what is known (prāpta) and what is not (aprāpta) we find that the relation alone is the residual element constituting prameya (it is only the relation-*visiṣṭya* between the hill and the fire that constitutes new knowledge which is the *viṣaya* of anumāna. For example, the scriptural command "Let him sacrifice (offer the oblation) with curds", though it enjoins qualified homa (oblation-with-curds), the injunction relates to *viśeṣana* only⁴; just so here. The inference relating as it does to *visiṣṭaviṣaya* (pakṣa-sādhyā relation) because of the previous knowledge of both *viśeṣana* (fire) and *viśeṣya* (hill) refers only to the relation (between hill and fire) as in the injunction, "Let the consecrated chariot be given to the *adhvaryu*."⁵

50. The form of the proof should be set down by one who desires

The Members of a syllogism. to bring home to another by inferential process the conclusion one has arrived at (for oneself).

That statement is termed *Sādhana* (instrument of proof) by which the knowledge of (the mode of) inference arises in a person (other than the one making it).⁶ "And that (*Sādhana*) is declared by some to contain five (members), two by others, but three by us either terminating in the example (*udāharaṇa*) or commencing from *Udāharaṇa*."⁷ The *akṣapādīyas* (the followers of Gautama, the founder of the Nyāya School), are however of opinion that the syllogistic statement consists of five members, *pratijnā*, *hetu*, *udāharaṇa*, *upanaya* and *niḡamana*, (as exemplified below):—

(i) Sound is transitory — this is *Pratijnā*.

(ii) Because it is produced (*kṛtakatvāt*) — this is *hetu*.

(3) *Pakṣadharmatājñāna* is the essential element in inference. Mere *pakṣa* is perceptive and the mere *sādhyā* is implied in *vyāpti* but the knowledge of the two related as the *vis'eṣana* and *vis'eṣya* is new and deserves the status of a *pramā*.

(4) "दध्नाकु ह्येति"—In the text, "Let the oblation be with curds", though the import of the sentence is that the homa in which curds constitute the substance-*dravya*, should be performed the injunction does not refer either to curds (*vis'eṣana*) or to oblation (*vis'eṣya*) but its incidence is only on the relation between the attribute (*vis'eṣana*) and the attributed (*vis'eṣya*) because that alone is previously unapprehended.

(5) Vide *Āpastamba Kalpasūtra* and *Mādhaviya Nyāyamāla*-ch. X-111-20. The text occurs in *Vajapeyaprakarana*.

(6) In many contexts *artha* can be rendered "conclusion", cf. *स्वनिश्चितार्थं अनुमानम्*—"an inference in which the conclusion is inferred by oneself" I. L. E. P. 162, N. 3.

Having dealt with "inference for oneself" *स्वार्थानुमान* the work now explains "inference for others"—*परार्थानुमान*

(7) The five members of a syllogism are:—(i) *Pratijnā*-thesis set down, e.g. the hill is fiery, (ii) *hetu*-reason, because of smoke; (iii) *Udāharaṇa*-exemplification, whichever has smoke has fire as a hearth; (iv) *Upanaya*-subsumptive correlation, so is this, (*बहिःश्लाघ्यमूयमानस्य पत्रैः*) (v) *Niḡamana*-conclusion, therefore it is such (*तस्मात् तथा*). The *Mīmāṃsakas* would have either (i), (ii) and (iii) or (iii), (iv) and (v); the Buddhists, only two—(iii) and (iv).

- (iii) Whatever is produced is seen to be transitory as pot etc., - this is Udāharaṇa.
- (iv) And sound is a product - (the subsumptive correlation; when fully stated it would be anityatvavyāpya kṛtakatvān śabdaḥ)-this is upanaya.
- (v) Therefore transitory (impermanent) - this is Nigamana, conclusion.

The Saugatas (Bauddhas) consider this (five-membered syllogism) to be too lengthy involving a repetition and so they admit only two members-exemplification and subsumptive correlation. (For they assert) that in the case of a person who perceives in the pakṣa the liṅga (mark or hetu) which by recollection he is aware is invariably concomitant with the probandum, the cognition of the sādhyā (liṅgi-buddhi) arises of its own accord.⁸ That sound is impermanent, will be inferred by him on his (listner) being reminded of the invariable concomitance between impermanence and artificiality based on the observation that what is artificial is impermanent and on postulating the subsumptive correlation only (upanaya). Hence the other members of the syllogistic statement are (found) superfluous.

51. If so (i. e. admitting only two members as adequate), the statement would create an acute feeling of incompleteness (ākāṅkṣā) and its import would have to be understood with much difficulty and as such it is but right to admit three members (as being adequate for syllogistic reasoning) as exemplified below :—

- (i) Impermanent is sound.
- (ii) Because it is a product.
- (iii) Whatever is a product that is impermanent as pot etc.

The Vārtikakāra (Kumārila) in all cases employs the syllogistic members up to the end of udāharaṇa; or (the statement may take this form) :—

- (i) Whatever is a product that is impermanent as pot etc.
- (ii) And a product is sound.
- (iii) Therefore (sound) is impermanent.

Thus the steps of the syllogistic reasoning should include Udāharaṇa and those following. It will therefore be seen that the proof (as stated by the Mimāṃsakas) is neither inadequate nor overmuch. The Bhāṣyakāra (Śabarasvāmin) in all cases states the syllogism thus :—

- (i) Whatever is karma, that yields phala - (example)
- (ii) And Homa also is karma-(subsumptive correlation).
- (iii) Hence it (homa) should yield phala (conclusion).

(8) स्मरणविषयीभूतव्याप्ति विशिष्टलिङ्गम्—The recollection of the inseparable connection between the probans and probandum arises and the liṅga associated with this Vyāpti serves as the mark. साध्यवर्तिनि, - pakṣa in which the sādhyā resides. लिङ्गबुद्धिः - the knowledge of the sādhyā which is jñāpya; dhūma is jñāpaka - the smoke serves as hetu by bringing to mind fire which therefore is jñāpya.

52. Fallacies relating to the thesis as when they run counter to perception as well as cases of unproved (aprasiddha) Viśeṣaṇa (sādhya) etc., are described in full in the Vārtika (Śloka-vārtika of Kumāṛila. P. 365; 59-70).⁹

The unestablished reason (asiddha), the reason that strays (anaikāntika), the contradicted or stultified reason (bādha) — these three are the fallacies or defects relating to the hetu (probans). Now asiddhi is five-fold:—

i. Buddha is cognizant of dharma and adharma.

Because he is omniscient — this is Svarūpāsiddhi (with reference to itself), for omniscience is found nowhere.

ii. Fire does not burn.

Because of coldness (of being cold) — this is Sambandhāsiddhi (with reference to the relation); because of the absence of relation between coldness and fire.

Objection:— If so the moon-rise will not be the hetu of the flowing tide of the sea, because of the absence of relation between the moon-rise and the sea.

Answer:— There is no defect because the relation is secured by the simultaneity of the moon-rise and the rise of tide. (i. e. the occurrence of both at the same time — ekakāla vṛttitvam, is itself the relation).

Objection:— Then how can we account for the inference of the flowing tide which is arrived at, fifteen ghatikas after the moon-rise on seeing the moon occupying the zenith i. e. when simultaneity is absent?

Answer:— Even there, because of indirect relation between the two (moon's position overhead and the rising tide in the evening); there is no defect. (Moreover) direct relation is not indispensable in all cases; whichever hetu is concomitant by whatsoever relation with a sādhya direct or indirect, that (hetu so concomitant — vyāptiviśiṣṭa) becomes the means of inferring that particular sādhya in that very manner (i. e. directly or indirectly) — this has been pointed out already. Hence if the kind of relation which the speaker points out as existing between the hetu (and the sādhya) is not proved to exist then only it is a fallacy (defective probans-Sambandhāsiddhi), not otherwise.

(9) Three kinds of fallacious reasoning are mentioned:—

i. Fallacy of the thesis, ii. fallacy of the example, iii. fallacy the hetu (middle term). As the first two are elaborated in S. V. P. 365 ff., they receive here but scant notice. The fallacy of the proposition or thesis:—(a) involving contradiction from perception and from the other five pramāṇas; (b) where the conclusion is non-existent (aprasiddhavisēṣatva); (c) where the subject (pakṣa) is non-existent (aprasiddhavisēṣatva); (d) where both the conclusion and the subject are non-existent (vide S. V. P. 365 ff.).

ii. Fallacious exemplification:—(for a detailed account (vide I. L. E. P. 221 ff.)

These two classes of fallacies are generally included under fallacious reasoning (fallacy of the middle term — hetvābhāsa (Vide N. M. Part II P. 133).

iii. The word 'cow' denotes (an animal) having dewlap etc., because it is characterised by the term 'cow'-goṣabdatva (hetu). This is Vyatirekāśiddhi, for apart from dharmin (pakṣa or the minor term)-there is nothing like goṣabdatva.¹⁰

iv. Space is eternal, because it is a substance without parts.

This is an example of āśrayāśiddhi (in respect of abode) when addressed to Sautrāntikas who deny the category of space, (i. e. it becomes a fallacy from the Sautrāntika point of view).

v. Air and also space are non-eternal.

Because they are tangible (mūrtatva). This is an example of vyāptyasiddhi, because tangibility is not associated with space.¹¹

53. Anaikāntikatva (having the nature of straying) is of two kinds:-Savyabhiçāra and Sapratīśādhana.

i. Sound is eternal, because it is intangible—here, intangibility strays (vyabhiçārāt, i. e. is of wider application) because even in Karma etc., which are non-eternal there is intangibility.

ii. Air is imperceptible, because of its being a dravya (substance) minus colour; (again) air is perceptible, because it possesses mahatva (finite magnitude) and is tangible (i. e. possessing the quality of touch.¹² On account of this equally cogent counter-inference (sapratīśādhana or sapratīpakṣa) it is difficult to determine which of the two constitutes the real hetu so (that we) are landed in doubt; the fact is, it has not been ascertained which of these two hetus is potent.

54 Some one says:—Two contradictory hetus, (i. e. proving mutually opposed conclusions) of equal potency cannot exist in one and the same locus (pakṣa).

Objection.

Otherwise, (if they did so) doubt as to the precise character of the thing (viz., locus-hetvāśraya, whether it is perceptive or not) would be constant. (The hetu) — being a substance without possessing colour—because it is not adverse to the manifestation of that which is aparokṣa is unable to establish apratyakṣatva (imperceptibility) and so loses its potency. The inference based on touch however (i. e. the second hetu, viz., mahatvesati Sparsāvatvāt — possessing finite magnitude and touch) is aviruddha (i. e. more cogent than the other in the pratyakṣatva-

(10) गोशब्दत्व इति गोशब्द शक्ततावच्छेदक इति i. e. it determines the denotativeness of the word 'cow'; the hetu should be different from pakṣatāvagghedaka, i. e. from what characterises the minor term, but here the word cow (pakṣa) is both the minor term and probans.

(11) This is known as bhāgasiddhi or pakṣaikadesa hetvasiddhi, for tangibility is in vāyu but not in ākāśa.

(12) It is only substance having colour that is perceptible and not substance without colour. महत्त्व in the counter inference is used to exclude atoms which are not perceptible though possessing sparsāvatva. Sparsāvatva is used to exclude ākāśa which is not perceptible though possessing mahatva. Here is a real antinomy where the arguments on either side are equally strong though the conclusion of the one contradicts that of the other.

inference i. e. of perceptibility) and so it has potency (which the other has not). Hence it is wrong (to suppose) that the two hetus are of equal potency. It comes to this therefore that there is no hetu known as *Sapratīśādhana*.¹³

He should be questioned. Then, (if *sapratīśādhana* fallacy is not admitted), even *savyabhiçāra* should not constitute

Bhāṭṭa. a hetu occasioning doubt (regarding *sādhya*), owing to the same objection that doubt (as to the precise nature of objects) would remain constant; (because the hetu is found both where *sādhya* is and where it is not). It may be argued that though it be a fact that it (*savyabhiçāra*) is vitiated by a doubtful hetu, the charge of permanent doubt (*nityasamsāyāpatti*) cannot be brought against it since truth could be ascertained with the help of some other *pramāṇa*.¹⁴ If so here also (as regards *sapratīśādhana*) since truth could be ascertained by some other *pramāṇa* (we say that) it is free from defect (i. e. that it is a fallacy must be accepted).

In that case, when one (hetu) is found to be weak because of its inhibition by some other *pramāṇa*, and since the other is strong, it is a case of unequal potency (and not of equal potency as you have stated).

Prābhākara.

Well, whoever said that both were of equal potency? All that was

Bhāṭṭa.

said was merely that it was not discovered (at that stage) which was strong and which was weak. To explain:--A man (on seeing a branchless tree - *sthānu*) is undetermined as to its being a pollard or a person; to him the cause of doubt is its verticality. But after it is ascertained that one of the two forms is true the doubt vanishes. Even so, to one who is not decided as to the perceptibility of air, the apprehension of tactility as qualified by perceptibility (as exemplified) in earth etc., and again of colourlessness as qualified by imperceptibility (as exemplified) in air, does indeed produce doubt. And that doubt when resolved by some other *pramāṇa* vanishes¹⁵; hence no need to labour the point. The conclusion is that *pratiśādhana* also like *savyabhiçāra* is *samsāya*-hetu i. e. gives rise to doubt. The *Bhīṣyakūṭa* (Sabara) is in agreement with this view as witness: "That which is karma has a result, (i. e. reward is the result

(13) The *Prābhākara* points out that the hetu, "being a substance minus colour" advanced by the *Bhāṭṭa* to prove imperceptibility strays. *Ātman* is cognized by perception (cf: *jānāmi*), though possessing the characteristic of substance minus colour. This example, however is not found in the text. *Sapratīśādhana* hetu means a hetu which is confronted by another proving the very opposite probandum. (Vide P. P. page 77 *Pramāṇapārāyaṇam*).

(14) cf. "The mountain has smoke, because of fire". Here the middle term 'fire' is doubtful probans but the doubt vanishes by perception (*pramāṇāntareṇa*).

(15) Air is perceptible, because it is tangible, and air is imperceptible, because it has no colour--this is the antinomy. To resolve the doubt we must resort to a *pramāṇāntara* as pointed above in the *Ātmadṛṣṭānta*. *Ātman* is *mānasa-pratyakṣa* though *arūpa*. Hence *sparsāvatvāhetu* is the more effective.

of action); and homa is karma; from that also should the reward accrue"; (as opposed) to this hetu (he further says), "When the karma is over, it is perceived that as an effect (result) for the dravyas or for the conjunction thereof, some other dravya accrues as the reward, so that even dravya has a reward". Having thus mentioned the contradictory hetu he points out that sapratīśādhana¹⁶ comes under defective probans. Hence that also (sapratīśādhana hetu) is a source of doubt. The unique hetu (asādhāraṇa regarded by some as a variety of anikāntika fallacy), however, e. g. the property of smell found in the earth, does not lead the mind to the apprehension of odourness anywhere else, and as such it is not a case of doubtful probans. The sādharmaṇa (hetu) on the other hand, because it is found both where the probandum is and where it is not, thus leading the mind either way (for lack of the apprehension of a differentiating factor) is, it must be admitted, a doubtful probans.¹⁷ Similarly (i.e. as in the case of sādharmaṇa-anāikāntika hetu) a pair of hetus though concomitant with contradictory sādhyas being found in a common locus and suggesting (in consequence) the residence in the same pakṣa (dharminī) of the sādhyas (by which the two forming the pair are pervaded) causes doubt since it is not possible that two contradictory sādhyas can reside in a single pakṣa. And because such description cannot apply to asādhāraṇa it is not a case of doubt.¹⁸

55. Likewise there is the defective probans by name bādha which by the Naiyāyikas is termed - viruddha. Some regard this as of six kinds; (i) Dharmasvarūpabādha (sublation of the essence of sādhyā), (ii) Dharmisvarūpabādha (sublation of the essence of dharmin or pakṣa) (iii) The bādha of the essence of both (dharma and dharmin), (iv) Dharmaviśeṣabādha (sublation of a particular property of sādhyā), (v) Dharmiviśeṣabādha (sublation of a particular property of pakṣa), (vi) The bādha of a particular property of both. Some regard bādha as of four kinds because the bādha of both (taken together) viz. (iii) and (vi) is included in the bādha of dharma and dharmin (i.e. the remaining four). Others consider it as of one variety. The nature of bādha under all circumstances is to establish just the opposite of the desired

(16) The above quotation is from S'ārabhaṣya, II, ii-25. In the Agnihotra section the text "वृक्षा इदित्य कामस्य जुहुयात्" is found. Now the question is whether the reward, viz. vigour and lustre of the senses, results from the dravya-curd, or from homa which is Kārya. The Siddhanta is that it results from Dravya. The Sapratīśādhana¹⁶ is substantiated by the fact that what is not Karma yields a result. A direct example is given in the Candrikā: after the action of weaving is stopped the substance, threads and their conjunction yield another substance, cloth.

(17) Kumārila in his S'lokavārtika st. 84 ff. anumāna section, accepts the threefold classification of doubtful probans such as sādharmaṇa, asādhāraṇa and viruddhāvya¹⁷bbhiṣārīn. But Pārthasārathi explains that this classification is in accordance with the one adopted by the S'ākyas (Buddhas) and that Kumārila's own view is that asādhāraṇa is not a case of doubtful probans for it is pakṣavṛtti only and is found nowhere else, cf. I. L. E. 203-209.

(18) विरुद्धार्थे व्याप्तम् e. g. sparsavatva is hetu for perceptibility and arupatva for non-perceptibility. Both hetus are found in vāyu. This is regarded by some as a case of विरुद्धा व्यभिचारी, antimony where both arguments are equally cogent though leading to contradictory conclusions.

sādhya. This alone appears reasonable, the subsidiary divisions serving no purpose. If, however, it is necessary to mention the subsidiary divisions then two alone need be mentioned:—Sublation of the essence of sādhya and sublation of a particular property of sādhya. The Vārtikakāra himself says that from the mere sublation of the essence of pakṣa or of a particular property of it no defect in the probans will arise.¹⁹ Now the upholder of the fourfold division of bādha sets out the following syllogistic reasoning):—Samavāya-inherence relation, (the minor term) is other than substance (probandum); because it is the ground of the notion of a thing's being in another (ihapratyayahetutvāt-hetu); like conjunction (Samyogavat-example). Here (in the example-conjunction) "being the ground of the notion of a thing's being in another" (ihapratyayahetutva) is seen to be pervaded by non-inherence and variety (since conjunction is not single but many) so that the attribution to samavāya, of both asamavāya and bheda, sublates the inherence which is the pakṣa (dharmī) and its special property, viz. unity (ekatva). This is the illustration given (to prove the two special varieties of sublation—Dharmisvarūpabādha and Dharmivīṣṣabādha). This is untenable. The question is whether the hetu-ihapratyayahetutva (as when we say-ihaghataḥ) is seen in samavāya which is the pakṣa (minor term) or not. If unseen then being absent from the pakṣa a case of svarupāsiddha or unestablished reason, it (the hetu) is neither probative nor sublative (sādhaka or bādhaka) of anything. If on the other hand it is seen (in the pakṣa) then how can it, residing there only, sublata it (by establishing the opposite). It is only when it is opposed to it (pakṣa as e. g. fire and water) that it will be a case of sublation (bādha) but under no circumstance can there be mutual opposition between it (ihapratyayahetutva) and the other (samavāya-inherence which is the pakṣa) since it is perceived as its (pakṣa) property (dharma).

56. It may be argued that what is sublated is samavāyatva (and not samavāya). If indeed samavāyatva were different from the samavāya which is the pakṣa (dharmī) then even if that-(samavāyatva) is sublated what constitutes pakṣa would not be sublated. But if it is identical with the dharmī, it has been shown that sublation will not apply to it (i. e. that the dharmī cannot be stultified). Hence the defective hetu known as dharmisvarūpabādha (i. e. sublation of the pakṣa) is non est; in all cases where a hetu is not found it is as good as not existing (i. e. it is neither sādhaka nor bādhaka) and if found, it cannot stultify it.

It is patent that unity (ekatva) which is the property of the pakṣa (viz. samavāya) is stultified (on the analogy of samyoga) but on that score it does not become a defective probans (i. e. it does not inhibit the probandum "being distinct from substance"). If ihapratyayahetutva did actually contradict the unity of samavāya how would

(19) The quotation from the vārtika as given here—Dharmisvarūpabādheṇa etc., cannot be traced.

it act as a hindrance to one intent on proving that samavāya is other than substance? It is not that ekatva (is to be) established by means of dravyātirikṭatva (i. e. we are not trying to prove ekatva by first proving dravyāntaratva); if it had been so the hetu would have become defective. Hence there are only two varieties of sublation (bādha)-dharmasvarūpa and dharmaviśeṣa (sublation of the essence of the probandum and of its special property). Of these two (the first is thus illustrated):—"Sound is eternal because it is a product"; (here) since kṛtakatva (being a product) is pervaded by non-eternality, the essential character of the major, viz. eternality, is sublated (i.e. the very essence of the probandum is stultified). (Now the second, viz. the sublation of the special property of the sādhyā-Dharmaviśeṣa is illustrated):—He who holds the view that the meaning of a word is its own self (svarūpameva)²⁰ and not any object apart from it, and who wishes to establish that view argues thus (lit. adduces this *form of inference*-prayoga):—A word even in the state in which its relation (to its sense; śaktigraha) is unknown reveals a meaning which is itself, because of possessing a case-termination, like the (same) word when its relation is known. To him (i.e. to one so syllogising) the hetu serves as only the means of establishing that which is subversive of dharmaviśeṣa (the special property of the probandum.²¹ After the relation is grasped the word is seen to reveal something which is not its own self (asvarūpa). Similarly before (the relation between the word and its sense) is understood, a meaning other than its own self would follow from that very hetu (viz. 'possessing a case-termination'). Now when the meaning viz., its own self is proved to be stultified the arthapratipādakatva also which is the essence of the probandum is stultified. Before the relation is grasped (śaktigraha) it cannot be said that any knowledge of a meaning other than the word (arthāntarapratipatti) has arisen, because it (patently) contradicts experience. In all cases when a hetu is found concomitant in the example with a probandum which is characterised by a particular property, that hetu, circumstanced as it is, fails to establish the sādhyā characterised by that property in the pakṣa for it involves contradiction of experience and itself having by the force of vyāpti sublated

(20) In grammar words are words only; their meaning is of no account. The Baudha who denies external objects regards them as denoting nothing beyond themselves.

(21) अगृहीत संबन्धावस्य शब्दस्य अर्थ प्रतिपादकत्वम्—The potency to reveal a meaning pertaining to a word even when it stands isolated without denoting any relation to its sense outside itself.

The opposite, विपरीत of this is the negation of the meaning-revelation. Hence the hetu विभक्तिमत्त्वात् only becomes the means of establishing the very opposite of the probandum viz. अगृहीत संबन्धावस्य शब्दस्य अर्थ प्रतिपादकत्वम्.

अर्थ प्रतिपादकत्व is probandum in general but अगृहीत संबन्धावस्य शब्दस्य अर्थ प्रतिपादकत्व is धर्मविशेष and this is sublated by the hetu; for in the example, after the relation of the word and the sense is understood there is no self-revelation-स्वरूप प्रतिपादकत्व but only a revelation of something other than itself अर्थान्तर प्रतिपादन.

the contrary *sādhya* (viz. *agr̥hītasambandhāvastha s'abdaniṣṭha artha-pratipādakatvam*—revealing the meaning that resides in a word when its relation with the sense is unknown), and a qualityless probandum being impossible, (that *hetu*) leads to no conclusion whatsoever.

If on the analogy of the concomitance between the fact of origination and the agency of an embodied sentence as observed in the origination of pot etc., it is argued that a sentient agent has to be inferred in the case of the body, sprouts etc., the answer is that since it is impossible to prove the agency of an embodied sentence as it offends the *anupalabdhi pramāṇa* (Non-cognition), since a disembodied sentence is ruled out by that very *hetu*, as exemplified in the case of pot etc., and since a sentence devoid of either of these two ways in which it could be conceived is an impossibility;²² it (origination which is the *hetu*) fails to establish the sentient agency even, in regard to sprouts etc. Hence this negation of the particularised probandum baulks the *hetu* from leading to the conclusion itself, so that we have here an example of the defective probans (known as *dharmaviśeṣabādha*).²³ The contradicted *dharmaviśeṣa* (particularised *pakṣa*) however is not a case of fallacy since it does not adversely affect the probandum.²⁴

Further if some other doctrine of the *vādin* (one who maintains the thesis) is attempted to be proved to be defective (by this contradicted *dharmaviśeṣa*) it tantamounts to a confession of defeat on the part of the disputant (*Nigrahasthāna*). It is a discredit to the *pratīvādin* (disputant) and not to the *vādin*. He who argues that, though what is contrary to the *sādhya* as perceived in the example may result, the *hetu* establishes the *sādhya* only (minus its property) and that the *sādhya* eventuates taking some other attribute, will have to admit that, when he sees some change in a (plot of) grass caused by frost similar to the change which is invariably effected when it is in contact with fire-heat, there is fire but devoid of heat since the assertion of heat therein is contrary to the *pratyakṣa* of moisture. Hence the proving of the contrary to *dharmaviśeṣa*—the particularised subject—does not render the middle term fallacious.

57. "Examples are of two kinds—exemplification describable as *sādharmya* and that describable as *vaidharmya*. *Sādharmya* is the statement of *liṅga* (*hetu*) followed by the *liṅgin* (the pervader, viz., fire in the stock example). Whatever has smoke like the hearth etc., all

(22) विधादयः (i) शरीरिचेतनकर्तृकत्वम्, (ii) अशरीरिचेतनकर्तृकत्वम्—Origination implies that the originator must be either an embodied conscious being or a non-embodied conscious being. It is not the first as its postulation offends 'Non-cognition' nor is it the second as in the example its very opposite is in evidence.

(23) धर्मविशेषाद्यः धर्म-साध्यः धर्मविशेष-अशरीरिचेतनकर्तृकत्व and the opposite of it is शरीरिचेतनकर्तृकत्व which cannot be established in देहादिकृति because it is opposed to *anupalabdhi pramāṇa*.

(24) For instance, the inference of fire from the observation of smoke on the golden hill is valid though the *pakṣa*—golden hill, is contradicted,

that is known to have fire so that when this positive universal concomitance is perceived, vaidharmya the negative example, need not be stated since it is subsumed in the former. If however such (a negative example) has to be given the statement of the absence of the pervader should take precedence of that of the absence of the pervaded; e. g. where there is no fire, there, smoke is also absent as in water etc. Where a positive something is established by a positive something (i. e. where the conclusion is affirmative) there alone, a similar affirmation (sādharmya) and also a dissimilar affirmation (vaidharmya) which is its opposite could be made. Where, from the absence of cloud the absence of rain is proved, there, the parallel example (sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta) assumes a negative form, e. g. when in a particular place there is no formation of clouds then there is no rain; dissimilarity however assumes a positive form e. g. where there is rain there is the formation of clouds. Hence the Buddhistic assertion that vaidharmyodāharaṇa is always negative is to be ignored. The sādharmya example becomes fallacious when the sādhya is absent and the vaidharmya example when the absence of sadhya is absent (i. e. when the sadhya itself persists). This topic is to be further pursued in the vārtika only.

58. The statement made in the Sābarabhāṣya, viz. "that (anumāna, meaning anumiti) is of two kinds" is to oppose those who think that anumāna is based upon perceived svalakṣaṇa. ²⁵ The mention of two kinds is to show that there is also the anumāna relating to motion (kriyā) which is unperceived svalakṣaṇa (svarūpa). The kriyā-svalakṣaṇa is never an object of perception for it is only the conjunction and the disjunction (of a thing) with two points of space—one prior and the other subsequent, that are cognised through perception. The cause which is occasional (the cause if eternal would result in the eternality of conjunction and disjunction) and inferred from those which are occasional (viz. conjunction and disjunction) is termed kriyā.

59. Is not dravya-(substance) the cause (for conjunction and disjunction)?

No; because of its existence even before- (i.e. dravya cannot be an occasional cause which it must be to produce occasional conjunction and disjunction).

Is it not that at the very next moment there comes into existence a different dravya because of the momentary character of all impressions (Samskāra which here seems to be used for existence, vide Samkara Bhāṣya P. 533 N. Edn) As for recognition (we say it) is owing to similarity; (recognition is supposed by the Mimāṃsaka to establish stability). When in the

(25) दृष्टस्वलक्षणमेव अनुमानम्—It is "inference of an object whose peculiar property-svalakṣaṇa, which is also the common characteristic-sāmānya, of its class such as the बह्विध of बहिः is previously observed" T. S. by A. p. 255. But vide p.p.p. 78.

same place the precedent existents (give rise to) the succeeding ones then a thing is seen as stationary (tiṣṭhati). When however the precedent existents give rise to the succeeding ones, in a different place then a thing is seen as moving just like the apparent movement of light and of shadow which is caused by similar successive movements getting into relation with successive points of space. Hence let the talk of kriyā end. Moreover, a momentary object prior to its coming into being cannot initiate motion; and when it has come into being how can it initiate motion seeing that it is liable to (instantaneous) decay? ²⁶ So they say: "momentary are all padārthas; how could motion (originate) from the evanescent (moments)?"

This position of yours we will demolish in the section on 'Śabda.'

Prabhākara. From the reasons advanced therein, when the dravya (substance) is admitted as being stable, (conjunction and disjunction which take place occasionally) become inexplicable on the mere basis of substance. Hence it is reasonable to hold that Kriyā is inferable.

60. This is unsound. An effect (kārya) it is evident, requires only a

Bhāṭṭa, criticism of
prabhākara kriyānu-
māna.

cause, (but it need not be kriyā) and that, in the present case is indeed perceptive. There must first be a certain specific volition; then arising as a consequence, conjunction and disjunction of the body become manifest. That itself (viz. prayatnaviśeṣa-specific effort) is the efficient cause; the conjunction of the body with the self as imbued with volitional effort is asamavāyī (non-inherent or non-intimate cause) and the body is the samavāyī (cause of conjunction and disjunction). Where then is the necessity for inferring an unperceived cause (viz. kriyā)? ²⁷

61. Will you not admit that the conjunction (samyoga)

Prabhākara. which constitutes the non-inherent cause produces the effect either in its āśraya (i. e. its substratum or ground) or in that which is inherently related to its āśraya and not anywhere else? For instance, in the conjunction of threads the cloth (is the effect) in the threads which constitute its

(26) Kriyā should extend over more than one instant necessarily; this involves reference to at least two momentary things. Now the first of these can give rise to action (ārambhaka) only in the second instant. Then however, it is non-existent (vināśāgrasta). This is the first objection. Even supposing it gives rise to Kriyā where can it manifest itself (as'raya) since the second instant is not there at all then? This is the second objection.

(27) In the generation of an effect there are three kinds of causes:—Samavāyikāraṇa—inherent cause; Asamavāyikāraṇa—non-inherent cause; Nimitta kāraṇa—efficient cause. As regards the kārya under consideration, prayatna (volition) is the efficient cause; prayatnaviśiṣṭa-ātmasārīra-samyoga, (the conjunction of the self characterised by volition with the body) is asamavāyikāraṇa; and Sārīra is the samavāyikāraṇa. Action according to Prabhākara is not perceptible as held by Kanāda but is to be inferred. This (Prabhākara's view) is not in agreement with the Bhāṭṭa view either.

(conjunction) āśraya, or the conjunction of cloth with the shuttle (is the effect) in cloth (āśrayasamaveta).²⁸ Then how can the conjunction of the (body) with the volition-exercising self, initiate the conjunction (which is the product) in space which partakes of neither characteristic (i. e. which is not its abode-svāśrayatvābhāvavati), and which is not inherent therein (svāśraya samavetatvābhāvavati). Therefore it comes to is that a cause different (from the prayatnaviśiṣṭatmaśarira-samyoga) has to be presumed.

62. The conjunction of threads does not produce cloth in its
 Bhāṭṭa. āśraya (abode) only, because cloth inheres in
 several threads. Conjunction in general is to be
 found between every two threads only. Further from the conjunction
 of the arrow with the bow-string termed 'nodana', (i. e. propulsion as
 when the arrow is about to be discharged from the well-strung bow)
 innumerable motions are produced all at the same time in the arrow
 (i. e. that part of it which is in contact with the bow-string) and in all
 its parts both inside and outside. Here, even in those parts where the
 arrow-contact is absent, that is, in what is not inherently related to it,
 the bow-string contact produces motion. Hence (your) reasoning is
 discrepant. And they (those parts) are not in inherent contact with
 that part of the arrow which is the abode of the conjunction (with the
 bow-string); it is the arrow (avayavin) that is in inherent relation with
 them. Again after the conjunction of the self characterised by volition,
 (with the body) motion (karma) is produced simultaneously in the hand
 which is in conjunction with the volitional self, in the arm-let which is
 in conjunction with the hand, and in the ring and (finally) in the gem
 set therein; so that in these and the like, karma is produced neither by
 propulsion (nodana) nor by the conjunction of the volitional self, but
 it must be said to result from conjoined-conjunction (Samyukta-Samyoga).
 (In the example referred to), from the conjunction of that part
 (of the arrow) with the bow-string the conjunction with next part,
 (takes place); this latter with the next and so on. Even so (motion is
 produced) in the hand due to its conjunction with the volitional self,
 then in the armlet which is in conjunction with it and finally in the
 gem which is in conjunction with it. A similar explanation may be
 offered here also. From the conjunction of the body in contact with
 the volition-dominated self with the outside space, results the disjunc-
 tion between the body and the space; from its (body) contact, the con-
 junction with the next point of space. Thus when conjunction and
 disjunction can be established from perceived contact there is no need
 for holding that motion is an object of inference. Moreover this
 characteristic is not peculiar to conjunction only (and you have to
 admit) that all non-inherent causes initiate an effect either in their own
 abode (svāśraya) or in that which is inherently related to their abode
 and in none other. This then follows that Karma also which is to be
 inferred as the non-inherent cause (e.g. in the flight of a bird) would

(28) The sentence should be completed thus- सत्तुत्तुरीययोगस्य कार्यत्वात्त्रयसमवेते
 साधयेचपदेनतेते.

be inferred as subsisting both in space and bird. No effect will be produced in space from the motion of the bird. Hence the notion that it moves, would arise as regards space also. (This being irrational viz. the thought of space moving) Karma is not an object of inference.²⁹

Prābhākara: Does it follow then that there is no such category as Kriyā (Karma)?

Bhātta: No, it does exist because it is known by perception.

Prābhākara: Do you not admit that here is nothing except conjunction and disjunction?

It is well within our experience that when a serpent is moving though conjunction and disjunction between the earth and the serpent exist and are mutual the notion of movement (çalati) is with reference to the serpent only and not with reference to the earth. Therefore (it is evident) that a separate category— 'motion' (Kriyā) which is the object of this notion exists in the serpent. We have to admit the existence of the notion of movement and its non-existence in relation respectively to the serpent and the Earth from the existence of motion and its opposite (i. e. motion in the serpent and its absence in the Earth). And this (kriyā), it is not right to regard as an object of inferential knowledge. Therefore the Bhāṣya (text i. e. "Tattudvividham") is not intended to convey this meaning (as understood by the Prābhākara). But it is to elucidate the nature of the content of inference by classifying it into viśeṣaviṣayānumāna and sāmānya viṣayānumāna. The position of those (Cīrvikas) who say "If what is inferred is a particular there results the non-establishment of the pervasion; if it is generic, it means that what is already established is established", stands refuted by this very argument (we have urged).³⁰ It stands to reason that the content (of an inference) may be both viz. generic as well as particular. Where the pervasion is with reference to the particular only there the content of the inference is particular, where it is general the content also is general. And because inference embraces the cognition of something which is not previously understood as related to a

(29) Since all non-inherent causes produce their effects in their abode or in that which is inherently associated with their abode and nowhere else Kriyā which is regarded as the non-inherent cause by the Prābhākara must also follow suit. Now the effect we are concerned with here and of which we are seeking the non-inherent cause is the disjunction of the bird and space—आकाशविहंगमविभाग. This effect is found both in the bird and space since there is no reason to restrict it to one of them, viz. bird as the Prābhākara would like to.

(30) The Prābhākaras explain 'that is of two kinds' (त-सुद्विविधं of S. Bh.) as meaning that the viṣaya of inference is dr̥ṣṭasvalakṣaṇa and adr̥ṣṭasvalakṣaṇa. The example given for the first is fire etc., in the stock anumāna, and 'karma' for the second. But the Bhāṭtas maintain that the twofold division relates to viśeṣaviṣayam and Sāmānyaviṣayam. e. g. for the first, "Sandal-fire inferred from the sandal-scent smoke"; for the second, "the mountain is fiery because of smoke". Because both special and general anumiti are possible the çārvāka contention stands refuted.

particular place and particular time the charge that there is the establishment of what is established is futile. This has been explained already.

Here ends the section on Inference.

63. "Verbal testimony is the knowledge, arising from words comprehended (through the sense of hearing), of the meanings not given (by *pramāṇas* other than *Śābda*)." To explain - The comprehension of the sense of a *vākya* (proposition) through the recollection of the meanings of words which are apprehended by the sense of hearing, that is the *pramāṇa* known as verbal testimony.³¹ We need not inquire into its validity as it is universally accepted. And that is of two kinds—that which can be traced to a source which is human and that which is extra-human. The human (verbal testimony) is the statement of trustworthy persons, and the extra-human is the Vedic statement. Both are valid means of knowledge because they are exempt from the blemishes proceeding from an untrustworthy source and because the word by its nature is faultless. That (Vedic statement) again is of two kinds: that which is denotative of something that is existent and that which is denotative of a mandate. The mandatory *śābda* is also of two kinds: *upadeśaka* and *atideśaka*. "Thus has it to be done"—this is *upadeśa*. Just as in the world of men we say—Devadatta should be treated to a dinner consisting of curds, ghee, lentil soup, and fine rice etc. even so in the Veda (it is laid down that) one should achieve *svarga* by the performance of *Darśa* and *Pūrṇimāsa* by first performing the *prayāja* and by getting the rice by pounding (*avahanana*). "Like that, this has to be done"—this is *atideśa*. Just as in the world of men we say—like Devadatta, Yejnadatta should be treated to a dinner; even so in the Veda (it is laid down), "Perform the *Saurayāga* (for its fruit) just as you try to achieve the fruit by performing the *Agneya* sacrifice". The *upadeśa* *vidhi* (mandatory statements known as *updeśa*) is of various kinds as determined by *śābdāntara* etc.; *Śruti*, *liṅga*, etc.; *Śruti*, *artha*, etc.; and is indicative of difference (in rites), of the distinction between the main and accessory (sacrifices), and of the respective order (of the different acts in a sacrifice).³² The *atideśa* *vidhi*, it is to be supposed, by

(31) शास्त्रं—प्रवृत्तिर्निवृत्तिर्गतिरित्येनकृतकेनवापुंमयिनोपदिश्येतच्छास्त्रमभिधीयते—That is called *s'āstra* by which men understand what is to be undertaken and what is to be avoided, whether such injunction comes from the eternal Veda or from a human source. Here *S'āstra* is the name given to verbal testimony. Vide *S. Bh.* p. 37.

(32) (i) *S'ābdāntara* etc.—*s'ābdāntara*, *abhyāsa*, *samkhyā*, *saṁjñā*, *guṇa*, *prakaraṇāntara*. These six are *pramāṇas* to find out if one *karma* is different from another.

—Jai. sūt. II - 2.

(ii) *S'ruti* *liṅga* *dibhiḥ*—*s'ruti*, *liṅga*, *vākya*, *prakaraṇa*, *sthāna*, *saṁkhyā*. These six are helpful in determining which is *aṅga*, and which *aṅgin*.

—Jai. sūt. III

(iii) *S'rutyarthā* *dibhiḥ*—*S'ruti* (*kramabodhaka s'ruti*), *artha* (*prayojana*), *pāṭha*, *sthāna*, *mukhya*, *pravṛtti*. These six determine the order of performance of different acts in a sacrifice.

—Jai. sūt. V. - vide also V. S. Kalpataru (N. Edn. p. 64)

means of a statement, name or the sign of the injunctive word, enjoins that what is laid down in one context (viz., prakṛti)—it may be all the things without exception, or the texts referring thereto, otherwise styled vidhyanta—is to be transferred to another context (viz., Vikṛti sacrifice)—āṅga, without any change (sambandha) or with some change, or wholly changed. The inclusion of the phrase “asannikṛṣṭa” (in the above definition of Śabda-pramāṇa) is as before (i. e. as in the definition of inference) to exclude cases where knowledge generated by śabda is obtained by other means of knowledge, and (also) where what it connotes is contradicted by another pramāṇa (i. e. when another means of knowledge gives something quite opposed to that of verbal testimony). This inclusion of asannikṛṣṭa would become meaningless in the doctrine of a section (of the Mīmāṃsakas viz., the Prābhākaras). (For according to their doctrine) śabda (like any other jñāna) does not give us knowledge that fails to correspond with what is real (since) all jñāna is yathārtha jñāna). If however śabda is accepted as denoting something that is untrue, śabda then becomes intrinsically invalid, since the (Prābhākaras) do not admit that words are contaminated by human defects, with the result that the Veda would lose its claim to validity.³³ It may be argued that (the use of the said term) is to exclude anuvāda which refers to a matter already known to be as such; that also is untenable. Even that comes under śāstra and invalidity cannot be ascribed to it (re-statement-anuvāda) since: it leads to anubhava (i. e. all varieties of valid cognition except smṛti). And because its subsumption under perception etc. is not possible, it (anuvāda) must be regarded as śāstra. Let the discussion of this topic stop here.

64. (This verbal testimony is regarded as identical with inference by the Vaiśeṣikas). Their definition of inference (Vai. sūt. X. ii-1 is as follows):— “Of that this is the cause, (of that this is) the effect, (of that this is) the related, (of that this is) opposed. Thus (is inferential knowledge) derived from the probans-Liṅga”³⁴ Having thus stated the definition of inference, the Kāśyapiyas (Vaiśeṣikas) assert that verbal testimony has been explained by this very definition. They together with the Saṅgatas (Bauddhas) who also hold that (verbal testimony) is non-distinguishable from inference consider that perception and inference are the only two means of knowledge. Now as regards the contention (that śabda is an instance of anumāna), the knowledge of the object denoted by the word since it relates to a thing already known, (we say) cannot become a

(33) The invalidity of s'abda is sui generis because this invalidity is not the result of any occasional cause, viz. puruṣa-doṣa.

(34) अत्य-धूमस्य, इदं-बन्धिरूपं कारणं; अत्येदं कार्यं-बन्धेः धूमः कार्यः; अत्येदं संबन्धि-धूमः बन्धि संबन्धिः; अत्येदं एकार्थं समवायि-एकस्मिन्नात्र फले रूपं रसश्च एकार्थं समवायिनो; अत्येदं विरोधि-हृदः बन्धय सावधानं ज्ञात. After giving this definition of inference the Vaiśeṣika argues that s'abda is the liṅga of artha and so is included in anumiti.

pramāṇa at all; hence where is the need to enquire whether it is different from or identical (with inference)³⁵ What however is the knowledge of that which is denoted by a proposition (vākya) that having arisen from the collocation of word-meanings whose relation had not been previously understood, cannot admit of being thought of at all as coming under inference.³⁶ Besides there does not exist the knowledge of the relation of all the particulars that constitute the import of a proposition. Further the knowledge of the relation between an infinite number of propositional statements cannot occur. Even though a particular statement should be extremely strange (when heard) as in the news of a distant country, it is construed from the sense of the words (heard at the time).³⁷ This is common knowledge. That inferential knowledge which is held to be true because of its emanation from a trustworthy source, is conveyed to us only after we have ascertained the import of the proposition³⁸ and as such cannot bring it (the import of the proposition already known) under inference. It is only after a statement is heard, that the propositional import is conveyed without there being any necessity to determine whether that statement has a trustworthy or untrustworthy source. Even when a statement is made by an utter stranger, if its import is grasped then the doubt as regards its veracity or otherwise will be resolved by inferring that it is true because the speaker is trustworthy. The knowledge of the import of a proposition (however) which does not require the determination that the source of its origin is trustworthy, in no way implies (the operation of) inference.

Hence just as in the world of men śabda is a distinct pramāṇa, Vedic Śabda also must be held to be valid pramāṇa.³⁹

(35) Neither pada nor padārtha is pramāṇa but it is vākya-rtha-jñāna that constitutes a distinct instrument of knowledge.

(36) In inference the previous knowledge of vyāpti is essential, but here it is not so. The relation between the padārthas which in fact is vākya-rtha arises simultaneously with the import of the proposition. The first argument is to show that śabda is not a form of anumāna: the words of a sentence merely recall the respective things; the question of pramāṇa therefore does not arise in respect of them. As regards vākya-rtha, it is obtained through padārthas, so that padārthas might be regarded as hetu and vākya-rtha as probandum. But vyāpti-jñāna is absent.

(37) व्याप्ति ज्ञानं विना तादृशवाक्यार्थं ज्ञानं पदार्थैः जायते—even when we hear a statement of something strange we get the import though there cannot be any knowledge of concomitance.

(38) The Vaiśeṣika reasoning to prove that śabda is subsumed under anumāna takes this form—इदं ज्ञानं अपिसेवादि वातवाक्यत्वात्. The criticism here is that the inferential knowledge is Vākya-rthajñāna and not that the statement made, yields valid knowledge. वाक्यार्थविगमोत्तराख्यत्वात्—This is an instance of the fallacy where the hetu is absent in the pakṣa. When we are in doubt whether the speaker is trustworthy or not how could trustworthiness (hetu) be ascribed to the statement (pakṣa). It is only after the validity of the statement is proved that we can infer that the speaker is trustworthy.

(39) The Bhāttas proceed to show that śabda is not a form of anumāna thus: the words of a sentence merely recall the respective things so that the question of pramāṇa does not arise at all in respect of them. In regard to Vākyas the Vākya-rtha is obtained through the padārthas; so, if there is any līṅga it should be padārthas but there is no vyāpti between padārthas and vākya-rtha. Hence Śabda is a distinct pramāṇa.

As for a section (of the Mīmāṃsakas meaning the Prābhākaras) who accept the theory that the validity of human statements can only be inferred, we have shown how (on this theory) the authoritative character of the Veda cannot be proved.

Thus is concluded the discussion of verbal testimony.

65. The upamāna produces the apprehension of similarity, in an object which is not proximate. For example, the sight of (of similarity with cow found in) gavaya (Bos Gaveas, is the cause) of the recollection of (similarity with gavaya found in) the cow. The knowledge of the similarity between the presented object and the recollected object of past perception is upamāna (upamiti—knowledge from similarity). (The form that such knowledge takes is as follows):—

“That cow which was seen by us in the city is similar to the gavaya”. What then is similarity? The sādṛśya or similarity is the parallel relation of the several parts that go to make up (the exterior of) one object with those which compose another object. For instance: the related parts of the gavaya-class being similar to the related parts, such as the ear and the rest of the limbs, of cow-class—this is what constitutes the gavaya’s likeness to the cow; the related parts of the cow being similar to the related parts of the gavaya—this is what constitutes the cow’s likeness to the gavaya. And this resemblance which may be great or small depending upon the greater or less number of points of comparison, is (in some cases) great (susadṛśa) and (in others) slight (īṣat). As regards those (Prābhākaras) who hold that ‘similarity’ is a distinct category, apart from the possession of common (parts) we have to yet to discover what it is that occasions the difference of great and small (in the similarity of one object with another). Further there is no proof to establish that similarity is a separate category. We need not pursue the topic further.

This upamāna is not to be included under perception, because the city cow is not an object of direct sense-perception. Nor is it a case of inference because (the upamiti) arises even without the knowledge of the invariable concomitance (i. e. without the vyāptijāna).

Is it not thus that the inference is derived?—The cow is similar to the gavaya, because it is the pratiyogin (counter-correlate) of the similarity (observed) in the gavaya; whatever is the pratiyogin of sādṛśya found in another that is seen to be similar to that other just as of the twins one resembles the other (one of the two is the pratiyogin of the similarity existing in the other).

This is untenable. He who has no simultaneous perception of the two objects which are similar to each other, having perceived the one only, viz. the cow in the city sees (thereafter) the gavaya in the forest, and he also reasons from similarity that the cow has similar qualities as the gavaya. Hence it cannot be (classed under) inference.⁴⁰ That it is śabda is out of consideration altogether, (because words have no

(40) The point is that the man in whom the upamiti arises is not perceiving at the time the pakṣa, viz. cow, which is essential for inferential cognition.

place in the whole process of upamāna. Hence it is an independent pramāṇa and no inquiry (as to its validity) is needed owing to its general acceptance.

This is the doctrine of upamāna.

66. "Arthāpatti or presumption is the postulation of a fact when what is seen or heard is otherwise unaccountable. For instance when we see the absence from the house, of Devadatta who is alive we presume what we cannot see, viz. his presence outside the house" (S. Bh. p. 38). Perceiving that what is an indubitable fact (i. e. not merely perceived but logically known to be a fact) cannot be explained except by another fact we postulate something to account for it and that postulation is arthāpatti.

If arthāpatti is the presumption of something that will account for what is otherwise unaccountable, then it is no other than inference; even there as we cannot account for smoke (in the stock example) except by postulating (the presence of fire) fire is presumed from (the appearance of) smoke.

Yes, this would be so (i. e. a case of inference) if that which is unaccountable is the gamaka or logical means. Here however what is unaccountable, that itself is gamya or the logical end.⁴¹ (Devadatta's) stay elsewhere cannot be explained except indeed by his absence from the house. Is it then (it may be asked) the idea that the arthāpatti is the apprehension of the unaccountable something, resulting from the upapādaka (i. e. grhābhāva-absence from home)? What is wrong (if that is admitted)?

Indeed there is nothing wrong. But the fact is otherwise. It is not by perceiving the upapādaka that the apprehension of what was inexplicable arises. If it did the presumption of śimśapātva would arise on the perception of vrkṣatva, because śimśapātva cannot be established otherwise than by its possession of the characteristics of a tree (vrkṣatva). Hence what is unaccountable alone is gamaka and it is not upapādaka that is gamaka (as you would have it).

67. Well, this will be said (in answer).⁴² It is not stated that unaccountability is occasioned by avinābhāva (constant association) but it arises because of

(41) गम्य - Logical end or goal. In the present case it is the satisfactory accounting of dṛṣṭāpīnatva or perceived fatness in the example-pīnadevadattah; the gamaka or the logical means to it is the presumed night-dinner. In the case of inference the perceived smoke which corresponds to the perceived fatness here, is the logical means. The mental process in inference ends at vanhijnāna; in arthāpatti it starts from pīnatvaśāna and reaches to the presumption of night-dinner and without resting there it comes back to the accounting of fatness-प्रीतिवत्पत्ति.

(42) अथ उच्येत, is another reading for अथोच्यते meaning यदि. Then what follows should be regarded as the resume of Prābhākara's view by the Naiyāyika.

doubt. When we have generally come to associate residence in the house with a man's being alive, we begin to doubt whether that man is alive on perceiving his absence from the house and the doubt is resolved only by postulating his stay outside. Hence since uncertainty as to his being alive exists before his stay elsewhere is presumed, it cannot be the *liṅga*. What is uncertain cannot become a *hetu* (*liṅga*). The mere absence from the house unassociated with the fact of being alive leading as it may to the conclusion that the man is dead is a case of *anaikāntika* fallacy and as such is incapable of pointing to the conclusion "that he is out". Hence inference being out of the question this (*arthāpatti*) is a distinct means of valid apprehension. Whereas in inference the *gamaka* is a well ascertained fact, in *arthāpatti* the *gamaka* is uncertain—this fact has to be admitted on the strength of (our) experience. And here the reason for uncertainty is the discrepancy with what has hitherto been known (*viz.* Devadatta being alive and remaining in the house).

68. What you have said does not stand to reason. Merely on the ground of doubt whether (Devadatta) is alive, his stay outside cannot be presumed. How can one who is in doubt whether Devadatta is alive or dead, suppose that he is somewhere outside? The doubt regarding one's existence or otherwise (*jīvanabhāvābhāvah*) cannot be dispelled by the presumption of one's being out. Everywhere it is the removal of the principal cause (of doubt) that dispels it, or by the ratification of one of the two (alternatives that appear in the doubt). It is not merely by the supposition of (Devadatta's) stay outside that the cause (of doubt) is removed. On the supposition that one who is alive is generally found at home it has been explained here that one's absence from the house is the cause of doubt. But this doubt will not be dissipated by the postulation of his stay outside. On the other hand it (*bahirbhāvakalpana*) will only confirm the very opposite (*viz.* absence from home which is the cause of doubt). Nor is either of the alternatives characterising the doubt ratified (by the presumption of stay outside). The doubt indeed here is whether he is alive or dead. And the assumption that he is outside cannot determine either the one or the other (i. e. his being alive or his being dead). Being alive is one thing and being elsewhere is another thing (*lit.* his different spatial relation). The presumption based on his absence from the house is no adequate proof to establish the fact of (Devadatta's) being alive. It is not relevant to argue thus:—because Devadatta is not found in the house, therefore he is alive. On the contrary how could (it may be asked) the fact of his being alive which had been previously ascertained to be a fact but now rendered doubtful by his absence from the house be established from that (absence) only? The cause of doubt cannot be the cause of the resolution of that doubt (*lit.* cannot be the means of decision—*nirṇaya*). Hence when the fact of his being alive which is doubtful is first established by some other means, (*sar* śabda) then his stay elsewhere has to be presumed. Because Devadatta

is alive and is not found in the house, therefore certainly he is elsewhere (this is the right presumption). That presumption however is untenable when it is doubtful if he is alive. Because he is not in the house the doubt arises whether he is alive or not; therefore the presumption (according to Prabhākara) that he is away from the house is supply unreasonable. Hence having ascertained the fact that (Devadatta) is alive together with the fact that he is not in the house – such knowledge being pervaded by the apprehension that he is outside, his being outside (sādhya) is postulated; so that this is only anumāna and not a separate means of valid cognition.

69. Now the final answer is set forth:—The mere absence from the house is not the mark (i. e. *hetu* of the *sādhya* —his being out) for it may serve as such even in the case of one that is dead, nor the mere fact of being alive, for it is consonant with existence in the house. Hence the togetherness of the absence from the house and the fact of being alive must be declared to be the mark. After having first cognised the *liṅga* (probans) should one infer the *liṅgin* (i. e. the probandum) but the cognition of the probandum (does not occur) at the very time the probans is cognised. And here (in *arthāpatti*) without the knowledge of (Devadatta's) existence outside it is not possible to determine the togetherness of the absence from the house and the fact of being alive because of the (apparent) contradiction (between Devadatta's being alive and his not being in the house).⁴³ Indeed there is little doubt that if one is alive one must necessarily be either at home or outside. As such to one who proceeds to conceive the *liṅga* by bringing together the two notions – the fact of being alive and absence from the house, without implying (Devadatta's) existence elsewhere, his cognition will take this form:—Devadatta is not found in the house; he must be either in the house or outside. But this is impossible for the existence (indicated by *jivana*) and the non-existence (of one and the same person) cannot be simultaneously predicated with reference to the same locus.⁴⁴ Hence it is only by assuming different spatial relations that Devadatta's existence and non-existence have to be brought together. Since the knowledge of Devadatta's stay outside arises from that very joint notion of existence and non-existence, thereafter nothing is to be known afresh. The *vārtika* says:—“On account of this notion of Devadatta's being alive associated with his absence from the house his existence is expelled (as it were) from the house and remains outside only.”

(43) It may lead to doubt. It is only when we know that Devadatta is out we can combine these two-absence from home and being alive.

(44) The fact of his being alive leads to one of two alternatives-his being either at home or outside. When his existence outside only, remains unascertained—all that is known is that Devadatta is at home or failing which he is out of home. The first alternative, viz. the possibility of his being at home conflicts with the known fact that he is not at home.

70. Well, though it may be admitted that arthāpatti is a distinct pramāṇa, since neither jīvana by itself nor grābhāva by itself can be the means of presumption, both of them combined, must be admitted as being the means (gamaka). But from this very knowledge of the combination, the stay outside, has already been known and as such there remains nothing thereafter for one to cognise; hence both of us are in the same predicament (lit. the fault is common).

Here is the answer:— This knowledge of the conjunct (samsarga) itself is arthāpatti – knowing this let your Honour find satisfaction!

Bhāṭṭa.

Naiyāyika. Which then is the means of that (knowledge)?

We say it is the clash between the two – absence from the house and the fact being alive. For instance when a statement:—“There are fruits on the river-bank” is made

Bhāṭṭa.

by one and (again when a statement) “They are not there”, is made by another, the hearer failing to perceive which (statement) has greater claim (to conviction) and which not, understands them as mutually contradicting. And he is unable to choose or reject either the one or the other. But still he does not blend existence and non-existence (of fruit) because of the inconsistency. So here also the cognition that Devadatta is either in the house or outside acquired by some pramāṇa (say śabda) and the cognition that he is not in the house acquired by some other pramāṇa (say anupalabdhi)—these two when coupled together appear to be mutually exclusive. This opposition is not irreconcilable like the existence or otherwise of fruit. On the other hand it is possible of reconciliation by the presumption of ‘bahirbhāva’ (stay outside). This then is the distinction. Hence the incompatibility between two truths both of which have been attested by valid means when thought of as admitting reconciliation by the presumption of another fact, is the cause of (i. e. what establishes) arthāpatti. The arthāpatti (which is no other than) the presumption of another fact made for the purpose of reconciliation is a means of knowledge distinct from inference. The annulment of one ascertained fact by another pramāṇa that itself is termed arthānupapatti (i. e. incompatibility between two tested facts) ⁴⁵.

71. Well, let us admit arthāpatti to be a pramāṇa; anumāna then has to be included in arthāpatti only. To explain:—It is known that wherever there is smoke there is fire; it is also known that the hill is smoky. If on the hill there be no fire then either the hill being smoky would be false or the notion that all places having smoke contain fire would be false, and in order to show how both these are not untrue the possession of

(45) Both कल्प (viz. गृहेनास्ति, गृहेवा बहिर्वा अस्ति) and कल्प्य (viz. बहिर्भावं कल्पना) are styled arthāpatti like the use of the word प्रत्यक्ष which stands both for perception and the means of perception.

fire (by the hill) is presumed so that (it is clear that) this is (a case of) arthāpatti⁴⁶.

This would be so if by some means other than inference it could be understood that all places having smoke have fire; it is not so however⁴⁷. It is only in the dharmin (minor term) of the example (isolated instances like the hearth) that the association of smoke with fire has been perceived and not in all places, and it has been pointed out that (it is only the) inferential reasoning (that) leads to the cognition that all places having smoke have fire. The knowledge of the pervaded and the pervader (i. e. the intimate connection between smoke and fire) as has arisen from the example will not conflict with the perception of smoke on the hill even if the cognition that all places having smoke have fire does not arise, and it would have been a case of arthāpatti if there had been any clash (between these two cognitions) necessitating the postulation of fire. Hence because the viśaya may be different from that of arthāpatti, anumāna is a distinct pramāṇa and likewise arthāpatti. (Now) when the two pramāṇas are established, whoever has, by inference, the knowledge that all places having smoke have fire, to him the cognition of fire in the hill arises (by seeing the smoke there and that cognition may arise from both (the pramāṇas)—either inference resulting from the recollection of the concomitant relation perceived in the example, or postulation resulting from considerations of incompatibility; (but still the two are different).⁴⁸ Therefore (it is evident that) arthāpatti is a separate means of apprehension.

The notion of the absence of Devadatta in all other places, which arises on seeing his presence in some one place, that is also (a case of) arthāpatti. To explain:—That a material object cannot get into relation with several space-points at the same time and in its entirety is understood from the example of one's own body. When a person remains in some place he knows that his body is non-existent in all places except in the one (where he is), because it is unperceived though it is a fit object of perception (anupalabdhi); hence he infers that any other person like Devadatta cannot at one and the same time establish his contact with several places. Therefore having come to know by (actual) perception the existence of Devadatta in some place and making sure by means of inference his non-contact with several places simultaneously (as in the case of his own body) a person presumes his non-existence in all other places in order that both may be feasible.

(46) The anupapatti here is constituted by the presence of smoke on the hill and the Vyāpti—all places having smoke have fire; if there is no fire on the hill, by the postulation of fire these two will remain unfalsified.

(47) The Bhāṭṭa rejoinder consists in showing that the knowledge of the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire is itself inferential and is required prior to postulation which the Naiyāyika regards as necessary for its validity.

(48) In the case of anumāna the emphasis is on the knowledge of concomitance or to put it otherwise on the empirical basis which the concomitance has; in arthāpatti the emphasis is on the contradiction between concomitance as such without any thought of empirical basis and the knowledge of the probans in the minor (Pakṣa).

Can this not be classed under anumāna? (To state the logical form) Devadatta is not now found in any other place, because he is in the house, like myself.

It is true. This becomes inferential knowledge to him who is in the same place as Devadatta (i. e. in his immediate presence). But he who remains in some house and who learns by some means (say śabda) that Devadatta is to be found in the third house from his next after thesecond, by what liṅga could he apprehend the absence of Devadatta in the intermediate house which is other than the one he is occupying and also in all other places? ⁴⁹ It may be argued that perceiving Devadatta in some place and also knowing his absence in a place different from that place but yet near to it, one infers his (Devadatta's) absence from all places other than the one in which he is seen, because all these places are different from where he (Devadatta) is, like the place next to it (Devadatta's place). ⁵⁰ The Vārtika points out (S. V. arthāpatti section 45; p. 461) that even here there arises the fallacy (known as Viruddhāvyabhiçārin):—"As in that case (i. e. of Devadatta cited above) the fallacy Viruddhāvyabhiçārin is perceived, because of its being different from the near place like the place occupied by Caitra." ⁵¹

Hence this must come under arthāpatti only. The presumption of Sakti or potency to produce the sprout as existing in seeds etc. is from this very reasoning established. (vide s. v. p. 462).

72. Cannot this fact (the sprouting) be explained otherwise than by the presumption of sakti?

S'akti as a distinct category.

(No). When the seeds exist it is observed that the sprouting could be accounted for and when they are absent, not. Hence the cause of sprouts is found in the seeds. And even if the seeds are there they cease to be the cause of sprouting when the mice have sniffed at them. And this opposition between their (seeds) being the cause and not being the cause is satisfactorily explained by postulating sakti. Indeed there is a certain imperceptible characteristic (rūpam or sakti) which

(49) The point is that because the middle term which is essential to an inferential process is absent here, arthāpatti cannot come under the head of inference. Another reason assigned to show that arthāpatti is not a case of inference is that every example of arthāpatti, when reduced to the form of an inference will have for its major premise a vyatirekavyāpti which does not lead to an inference.

(50) In the opponent's argument, the hetu is तद्देशव्यतिरिक्तत्वं, the example is प्रत्यासन्नदेश where we have the hetu as well as the साध्य viz, देवदत्तश्चयत्न. Hence सर्वदेशोऽपि तद्देशव्यतिरिक्तत्वात् तच्छून्यः

(51) "सर्वदेशः चैत्रवन्तः, समीपदेशमिन्नत्वात्, चैत्राविष्टितदेशवत्." Here the hetu is समीपदेशमिन्नत्वं, the example चैत्राविष्टितदेश and the probandum चैत्रविशिष्टत्वं. Notice that this reasoning leads to an exactly opposite conclusion; (vide note above) because Caitra (or Devadatta) is in a place different from a near place, he must be in all places because they are different from the near place. This is the fallacy known as Viruddhāvyabhiçārin-antinomic reason (I. L. E. 353)

whenever present occasions sprouting but whenever destroyed as when the mice have smelt, occasions no sprouting, so that (we are forced) to postulate the rūpam or śakti.

(Then) the non-smelling also may be regarded as the cause of sprouting. When there is sniffing the sprouting fails only because of its absence (i.e. the absence of non-smelling) and as such enough of this postulation of śakti.⁵² This argument we say, is not right. The act of smelling is momentary and though it is absent the next moment (strictly speaking, the third moment) the sprouting does not take place.

The antecedent non-existence is the cause and not annihilative non-existence.⁵³ If so argued we say no; because as abhāva (non-existence) there is no distinction (between the two). Except as regards time which in the one case is anterior and in the other posterior there is no difference whatever in the innate nature of anterior and annihilative non-existences. And when the causes are not distinct there could be no distinction in the effect. But if it is asserted that a certain unique feature marks off the anterior from the annihilative non-existence, then it must be admitted that something has to be presumed; the question will be whether it should be presumed (to exist) in non-existence or in the very nature of the seed. And because the seed is the direct cause of the sprouting, presumption there alone seems right.⁵⁴ Likewise the presumption of a potency (śakti) in yāga, viz. apūrva which is instrumental in securing svarga has to be surmised.

How, when the yāga in which the potency has arisen is non est, could the potency (apūrva) remain without a support?

Naiyāyika.

It will not become supportless since it resides in the agent Bhātta.

How could the potency of one (thing-yāga) reside in something else?

Naiyāyika.

Because it is so perceived. (Moreover) it is not binding that the potency should reside in the place of its origin. Bhātta. Because we have to presume it from kārya, it must be presumed as residing in the place in which it produces the

(52) Śakti as a distinct category is not admitted by the Naiyāyikas. In the sprouting the seed itself is the cause and the absence of sniffing also is an aid. Hence there arises no sprouting from a seed that has been sniffed at by the mice. Therefore they say there is no necessity for postulating śakti.

(53) The opponent shifts the ground; it is not *प्रवृत्तमान* (annihilative non-existence) which is *नित्य* (eternal), but it is *प्रगभावनिश्चिन्न* that is the cause. *Prāgabhāva* is beginningless but is terminated with the coming into existence of its pratiyogin. Hence antecedent non-existence which does not fail as does *pradhvamsābhāva* which, being momentary may cause sprouting; hence no śakti need be presumed.

(54) If you presume a certain *Vailaksanya* in *prāgabhāva* why not presume such *vailaksanya* in the positive entity seed whose potency to produce the sprout both of us admit?

kārya (effect). And that potency bearing the name apūrva having (first) its residence in yāga does not fulfil its purpose of securing svarga (immediately) after the cessation of yāga (for svarga is attained only after death); hence the presumption is that its abode is the agent. So says the Vārtika, "Since potency is presumed on the basis of kārya it must be admitted as residing in that place wherein it produces the effect, whether that place is the abode of its origin or different".⁵⁵

How do you account for the usage-Yāgaśakti if it has its residence in the agent ?
Naiyāyika.

It is because we have to presume śakti in order to make clear that the instrument for bringing about the phala (svarga) is that (yāga) only. On that score only is its acceptance as yāgaśakti. And this (such usage) is recognised in the world of men. Even after the lapse of much time since drinking oil it is usual for people to say because of the good effects of taking oil "Strength and vitality have appeared in me to-day". Hence it (i. e. our doctrine that śakti resides in the agent) is faultless.

73. (In the definition of arthāpatti, para 66 ibid) by the use of the word dṛṣṭa alone, knowledge in general is included and (as such the other variety)-śrutarthāpatti is (as good as) established but still since it (śrutarthāpatti) relates to pramāṇa the use of the word śrūta is to point out the special feature which distinguishes it from dṛṣṭarthāpatti.⁵⁶

To explain-To be sure, in ordinary conversation when the words "door", "door," are heard some other word like "close" is postulated to form with the words heard a connected sentence in order that it may yield a full sense. So in the Veda also, (there is the declaration) "He should perform viśvajit sacrifice". Here the word, "Svargakāmah" or "Svargārtham", i. e. the word which in conjunction with the heard words forms a homogenous sentence and yields a full sense, is to be understood; when such a word is thought of and combined with those (already) heard the meaning of the sentence becomes known from the sentence thus completed. Likewise (we have the Vedic declaration) "He who desires divine glory-(spiritual eminence), should

(55) स्वाश्रया-यथाप्रोक्षणं नवाअपूर्वस्वशक्तिः, the potency which is generated in the rice after sanctification resides there only; आत्माश्रया-यथायागादिजन्याअपूर्वस्वशक्तिः, the potency which is generated from yāga seeks its abode in the agent since yāga perishes and it has to fulfil its object of securing heaven to the agent, which event can only happen after the agent's death.

(56) Dṛṣṭarthāpatti,- "implication or presumption from experienced facts"; Śrutarthāpatti-"implication or presumption from words" -I. L. E. 319-20.

We have d-arthāpatti when we negate silver from the shell; appearance and subsequent non-appearance can be accounted for only by taking silver to be false. We have śrutarthāpatti when to complete the sense we find it necessary to supply the word "door" after hearing the word "close", or when we posit apūrva from the Vedic declaration "Jyotiṣtoma yields svarga". This is pramāṇagrāhīni, i. e. the presumption of vākya-rūpa pramāṇa.

perform the yāga of which sūrya is the deity and çaru is the dravya".⁵⁷ In this mandate because of the absence of words denoting the mode of performing the yāga (itikartavyatā) and the consequent incompleteness (of the sense) there arises the need for supplying such words as signify it (i.e. itikartavyatā). (Now) of the three elements of the Agneya mandate which are brought before the mind by the "reciprocal similarities"⁵⁸ those parts (of the Vedic injunction) relating to sādhyā and sādhanā not being required are ignored, and the phrase which denotes the third element— the ithambhāvah which here is agnyanvādhāna &c.,⁵⁹ declared to be the itikartavyatā (vidhyantatvena) is "Agneyavat" and it is supplied (postulated) as complementary (to the sauryayāga vidhi). Or why should the word "Agneyādivat" which is not explicitly mentioned (either in the Agneya context or elsewhere) be postulated? On the other hand that which has been mentioned in connection with Agneya as denoting the details of procedure and which is brought to recollection by the elements of similarity (in sauryayāga) may, though separated (from the present context), be brought into syntactical unity by postulation (ekavākyaṭā) with the mandatory statement relating to the vikṛti.⁶⁰ This is not a case of anuṣaṅga for if it were so, words of remote context could not be

(57) सौर्व्यवर्धनिर्विपेत्त्वद्भनर्चसकामः—This is vikṛtiyāga or ectypal as contrasted with Agneya yāga which is prakṛti-archetypal. In the vikṛti all the required details of procedure will not have been stated and they have to be transferred (atides'a) from the prakṛti wherein will be stated all the three essentials of a yāga, viz. Sādhyā (the phala or the desired object), Sādhanā (the dravya to be offered) and itikartavyatā, known also as ithambhāvā or Vidhyanta (the details of procedure). Now in the mandate "Sauryam etc." there is no mention of itikartavyatā; hence its akāṅṣā or desire arises.

"Çaru"—the boiled rice for oblation. Its preparation is described thus :—
अनवज्ञातित् अन्तरूपमपक्वतन्डुलप्रकृतिकम्

(58) चोदनालिङ्गोपस्थापितस्य—the name çodanālīṅga is given to points of similarity in the mandatory statements. In sauryayāga the elements of similarity are—the eka-devatā (Sūrya), the augadhi dravya (rice) and the injunction (nirvāpet which is found, in both) and because the Agneya Vidhi resembles the mandate here, we are put in mind of Agneya when we hear the declaration regarding Saurayayāga by the upamiti pramāṇa.

(59) अग्न्यन्वाधान-प्रातरग्निहोत्र होमानन्तरं इष्टवर्धप्रणीते अग्नौ श्रयमिक शकलप्रक्षेपः—
The first kindling of the āhavantiyāgni with small splits of fire-wood, having previously performed the morning agnihotra and conveyed the fire from gārhapatya to the āhavantiya fire-place. This anvādhāna is the samskāra karma (purificatory act).

(60) आग्नेयविधन्तः—आग्नेयविधिसमपिपद्यमानः इति कर्तव्यता बोधकः वाक्यसमूहः—
What is stated here is that all the sentences denoting the details of sacrifice have to be transferred and read along with the vidhi prescribing the vikṛti. In fact it is the agneyabhāvāna that is suggested and of its three elements as noted above only that which is pertinent is to be made use of.

एकवक्यतासाधने न तु मूलतयाय किञ्चित् शब्दः कल्यते, no new word need be presumed but syntactical unity can be secured by bodily transferring the pertinent texts.

transferred. ⁶¹ But this being a case of atideśa (the itikartavyatā texts) though separated (from the vikṛti context) are brought to mind somehow (i. e. by sādrśya which is upasthāpaka) and (as such) their transference is justifiable. That this is so is vouched for (in VII, iv-10 of J. Sūt.):—"The vidhyanta (i. e. the text relating to the details of procedure) operates (lit. proceeds towards) in the vikṛti mandate (sauryam çarum nirvapet) just as it does in prakṛti". The commentator (Śabara-svāmin) explains "Vidhyanta" as denoting the whole group of itikartavyatā texts relating to this purodāśa yāga (viz. āgneya in which purodāśa cake is offered as oblation) except the vidhi relating to pradhāna (the sādhanā which is āgneyayāga and by implication the words relating to the phala, should also be excluded).

If the transference of the Vedic texts be admitted in this manner (referring to the second interpretation above) does it not conflict with the first adhikaraṇa of the first pāda of the tenth adhyāya (of J. Sūt.) and does it not also render inoperative both ūha and bādha? ⁶²

Yes, it would be so if the text "They pound the rice" as expressed

(i. e. mere verbal expression with no thought of the sense) were brought into connection with the

vikṛti vākya and construed as a unitary sentence with the vikṛti vidhi by appropriately altering the sense (to suit the context). If the transferred text is thus interpreted then because in relation to the golden grains (kṛṣṇala) which are used as oblation (in the vikṛti) the word "rice" (vrihi) in the sense of havis does not fit in and "pounding" has no visible effect (viz. removal of husk), the pounding which is the means of producing rice would be considered as having been enjoined for the production of adṛṣṭa. (What follows) then is that no bādha will result. ⁶³

(61) अनुषङ्ग-पूर्व वाक्यस्थितस्य अप्रवाक्ये स्थितत्वेन कल्पनम्.—"The principle of extension (anusaṅga) which denotes that it is often necessary in the case of mantras to supply with several sets of words, a clause which follows the last of those sets only, and which might thus be deemed to belong to it alone".

The rule of proximity applies to anusaṅga and not to atideśa which means transference of Vedic texts.

(62) ऊह-अग्नये इति पदस्थाने, "सूर्याय" इति परान्तरप्रक्षेपः The substitution of the word sūryāya in place of agnaye is ūha. "By ūha is meant an alteration wrought upon a text to enable it to convey a modified but kindred meaning"—Peter Petersen in his "Hand-book to the study of the Rigveda". In the ninth adhyāya of Jaimini sūtras this topic of ūha is discussed.

वाध-प्राकृतानां अवधातायोगानां कृण्वन् चक्षुष्यादिरूपं विद्वत्तोबाधउक्तः.

The rule regarding the pounding of paddy which occurs in the archetype cannot be transferred to the ectype where the çaru with kṛṣṇala (golden grains) is enjoined on one who performs what is known as kundaleṣṭi. There are three cases in which transference is inadmissible:—(i) प्रयोजनं लोपात्, (ii) प्रत्यान्नानात्, (iii) प्रतिषेधात्।

(63) ब्रीह्येनवदन्ति—should be interpreted in the vikṛti as ब्रीहिसाधनकः अवधातः अर्हदर्थं कर्तव्यः where emphasis should be laid on अवधात. What is to be done is, to bring a few grains of paddy and pound them so that the adṛṣṭa arising therefrom may help the kṛṣṇalayāga. In the prakṛti it is for havis that pounding is done but in vikṛti it is for adṛṣṭa so that there would be no bādha to "pounding" in vikṛti. So far pūrvapakṣa. But it is not the transference of mere vākya; it is its transference with all the implication it has in the prakṛti. We do not explain as you imagine i. e. as suits the context—यथा संभवम्.

Similarly as regards "nīvāra", it would come to this that "rice only should be pounded" (i. e. a few grains only for the sake of adṛṣṭa) so that no ūha enjoined in regard to Nivārayāga, will result.

It is not so stated by us. But (we say) that the angavākya which is in unity with the pradhāna vākya in the prakṛti is transferred (to the vikṛti), with all the import and structural appearance (it has in the prakṛti). In the prakṛti vṛhi is intended for havis and so the word vṛhi is used as being indicative of that (havis), and the object of avaghāta (pounding) in relation to them (vṛhi), viz. the removal of the husk is effected as one may directly perceive; so that the vidhi (enjoining avaghāta) gets into syntactical unity with the pradhāna vidhi through this means (i. e. husking). When so understood the prakṛti-vidhi takes this form — "With the rice unhusked by pounding, having prepared purodāśa, perform the sacrifice with that." Of this that part which denotes pradhāna, viz. "yejeta" being omitted, the part denoting the details of procedure (avaghāta etc.) is related to the vikṛti vākya. And even of that (prakṛti) the avaghāta is not directly the viśeṣaṇa. In the prakṛti what indeed constitutes the viśeṣaṇa of yāga is havis with the implication of unhusking in which again the pounding is presupposed. Hence that alone is attracted towards the vikṛti (i. e. is transferred just as it serves the prakṛti). And in kṛṣṇalāyāga since the word kṛṣṇala denoting havis has been expressly stated, the word purodāśa being incompatible with it turns back (i. e. we conclude, on account of incompatibility, that it is wrong to extend the application of this part of the prakṛti). With its non-application results the non-transference of rice also, because in kṛṣṇala the rice-grains cannot serve kṛṣṇala (which is the oblation in kṛṣṇalāyāga) as in the prakṛti (where purodāśa is the oblation). The word denoting unhusking which is declared as the means (for obtaining rice in prakṛti), also turns back being inapt in kṛṣṇala. And its (unhusking) viśeṣaṇa, viz. pounding, that also turns back. Hence the tenability of bādha. As regards the yāgas where nīvāras are mentioned the unhusking being appropriate, the pounding does not turn back so that the ūha also becomes tenable. The pūrvapakṣa by supposing that in the beginning of the tenth chapter the transference of all the anga-vākyas expressed (in prakṛti) is meant came to the conclusion that the transference of the vākyas which are in syntactical unity in the prakṛti is in the same manner in which they stand related in the prakṛti (and so pointed out the conflict with the chapters relating to bādha and ūha). No use in prolonging this topic.

74. Let the (incomplete) sentence be completed by supplying the meaning and where is the need for the words being understood? ⁶⁴

Prabhākara.

(64) नन्वर्थमेव—This objection emanates from Prabhākara who in all cases of ellipses supposes that it is the artha (the sense) and not the word or phrase that is to be supplied. Not only in atides'a but everywhere adhyāhāra means for him that of the idea and not of the word; e. g. Kumāṛila says 'योगेन अपूर्वं कृत्वा फले भावयेत्' but for Prabhākara apūrvajñāna is enough and there is no need for the word apūrvā to be understood.

The sentence-completion is not effected by merely supplying the sense. The meanings as connoted by the two

Bhāta.

words which are in syntactical unity alone yield (us) the sense of the sentence, and not otherwise. (To explain):— If the word “bring” is uttered by itself and the word “cow” is not uttered, though the cow is actually within the range of perception, “bringing” will not get into relation with “cow”. To sum up (i.e. since it is clear that the word should be transferred and not the sense), the mantra (agnaye juṣṭam nirvapāmi) that is to be transferred to the ectypal (saurayāga) will not fit in if the word “agnaye” is retained owing to its incompatibility in sauryayāga; hence we have to substitute “sūryāya” to remove the felt want. Hence ūha is tenable.

75. But for those who uphold the contention that transference is of the sense, ūha will have no place since the word nirvapāmi itself will give us the sense when sūrya-devatā is mentally understood.

arthādhyāhāra criticised,

Again when in an adhikāravākya (i.e. the sentence denoting phala) arthavāda alone is stated – e. g. “Those who perform the Rātrisatras (name of a yāga) attain celebrity” according to your doctrine the import of the mandatory verb alone has to be understood and not the word denoting mandate. (What follows) from this is that the upakāra and the elements generating upakāra belonging to prakṛti (when transferred) cannot become the operating cause of this apūrva (i. e. of the apūrva of the arthavāda). Even though there exist the feeling of incompleteness (akāṅkṣa), proximity (sannidhi), and compatibility (yogyatā) – (elements necessary) for (the production of) the meaning (to be understood), the significant combination will not take place without (the actual) word being expressed. And here (in the vikṛti vākya) the word denoting apūrva is absent, which (word) would have, had it been there, pointed out the relation of the apūrva (of the vikṛti) with the elements transferred from the prakṛti. It cannot be said that words from the prakṛti which could express the relation of their own import with the vikṛti-apūrva are transferred to vikṛti. (for there are no such words in the prakṛti). Nor are they (upakāra and upakārajanaka sāmāgrī) related to the elements connoted by the arthavāda vākya. Nor (in the absence of words) can they (upakāra etc.) get into relation with the utpatyapūrva. The net result is that a significant combination itself will not take place.

76. Similarly in the prakṛti (vākya) – “For (the attainment of) all desires Darśa and Pūrṇamāsa” – because the word denoting vidhi is not expressed and because it cannot be supplied (as per your doctrine), and since the import of the vidhi (which according to you has to be supplied) is different from the apūrva of svargakāmaḍhikāra and also of utpatyapūrva, the āṅgayāgas (“Samidho yajati etc.” – i. e. their apūrva) cannot establish their auxiliary character in relation to the vidhyartha (which you say has to be understood in “Sarvebhyaḥ kāmebhyaḥ darśapūrṇamāsau,” because there is no word with the liṅ suffix indicating vidhi). The words “yajati’s” (i. e. the vidhi denoted by

"yajati" found in "samidho yajati" etc.) cannot like avaghāta bring into combination their apūra with the apūra of adhikāravidhi, for then they lose their potency to express their own apūra (when there is no significant word in the adhikāravidhi). Hence in such adhikāra vidhis the potential word itself has to be substituted and not the sense. Because the meaning of the vidhi (i. e. apūra) cannot be brought within the sphere of cognition owing to its non-comprehension by the ordinary valid means of knowledge nor even by what is only illusory, how could your accepted substitution (adhyāhāra) which by its very nature imports the bringing in of something that is absent into one's consciousness manifest the apūra either in the adhikāravākya (viz. sarvebhyo etc.) in which the vidhiśabdha is not expressly stated or in the utpatti-vākya such as "yadagneyo aṣṭakapālaḥ amāvāsyaṃ" ? Therefore even by you reluctant as you are, the postulation of the word (śabda) has to be admitted. No need to further proceed with this topic.

Here ends the arthāpatti discussion.

77. "Negation or non-existence is the absence of (five) pramāṇas and it is the means to the assertion that a particular object which is not present to sense does not exist" (Sābara)⁶⁵

How could the absence of the means of knowledge become the means of knowledge since there is direct contradiction?

This word pramāṇa connotes the previously mentioned five pramāṇas such as perception etc. which give us a knowledge of positive entities (sadupalambhaka) and the absence of such pramāṇas is the lakṣaṇa or the mark of the sixth (pramāṇa) so that there is nothing incongruous.

Which is the object of this (cognition) ?

That it is "the non-existence of the object" has already been stated (in the definition above). Indeed every object can be viewed in two ways according as it is sat or asat. That object when it exists somewhere in its own form (sadrūpeṇa) say, pot, is then regarded through perception as existing. But if it is somewhere as non-existent then perception etc. which manifest objects of a positive character fail to function even though all the accessories for the manifestation (of such positive existences are present) and this non-manifestation which may be styled by the alternative names of dṛṣyādarsana (non-perceived) and yogyānupalambha (non-cognised though capable of being cognised) is termed pramāṇābhāva in the Bhāṣya (vide Sābara's definition above); and it is by this only (viz. pramāṇābhāva) which stands in the place of senses and verbal testimony (which give us a knowledge of positive entities) that we get the knowledge of the object of cognition 'nāsti' (non-existent is the prameya),

(65) This definition of abhāva as given by Sābara is translated thus: "Non-existence being an absence of any instrument of knowledge is also (as well as anumāna and arthāpatti) the thought of something not present to sense viz. of that thing (to which the pramāṇa would have applied) in the form 'it is not'". I, L. E. p. 328.

as for example "on the ground the pot is non-existent". To one (Prabhākara) who discards non-existence and says that there is no sixth pramāṇa because of the absence of prameya (the question to be put is) which is the locus (ālambana) of the cognition that arises after what can be cognised is not cognised, in the form of "here on the ground the pot is non-existent"?⁶⁶ It is not the ground. For then even though pot exists there would arise the cognition that pot is not.⁶⁷ Likewise which is the locus for the notions—"horse is not cow" and "taste is not colour"? It is not cow, for the cognition of cow does not require the counter-correlative (pratiyogin). But in the negation of horse the cognition does require the counter-correlative. If the locus (of the negative judgment the horse is not cow) is conceived as "cow" then the judgment, "this lion is not horse etc.," would be untenable because of the absence of cow-characteristics in it. But it may be urged that what is different (bheda) from horse (lit. being other than horse), a quality which is inseparable from cow etc., is really the locus (of this negative judgment). What (then we ask) is the meaning of bheda? If it means mutual non-existence then it comes to your having taken refuge in abhāva (which the Prabhākara rejects). If on the other hand it be said that bheda is a kind of quality named prthaktva (separateness or 'severality') then since it can only exist in a substance and not in an other quality the notion of mutual non-existence (which we have) in the qualities as is exemplified in "taste is not colour", "colour is not taste" will not arise.⁶⁸

78. He (meaning Prabhākara) who through sheer impudence asserts that apart from the cognition of the ground there is no such cognition as—the pot is non-existent, that person, would be negating the cognition of the ground also, there being no difference between the two (cognitions). What is the reason for the usage of the expression—the pot is non-existent here on the ground? If it be said that where there is the possibility of perceiving the pot we have the cognition relating to the ground only and that (cognition) is the reason (of the usage), then in the cognition—"the ground has cloth (i. e. the cloth is existent on the ground)" the usage—the pot is non-existent would not occur because of the absence of the cognition of mere ground (but such a negative cognition does arise even though it is not mere ground). If (again) it be said it is the cognition of the ground separated from pot that is the

(66) दृश्यादर्शन - A thing not cognised though it is capable of being cognised. "It is not sufficient that we do not perceive ghata, we must not perceive it in a place where from all surrounding circumstances we would naturally expect to find it but do not owing to its actual absence. The anupalabdhi must therefore be preceded by an ascertainment that no unfavourable circumstances like darkness exist which would prevent even a present pot form being perceived" A. p. 229.

(67) If you say that ground is the object of the cognition 'pot is not', then because ground is not absent even when we perceive the pot the cognition that on the ground the pot is non-existent would arise—a bare contradiction.

(68) "The conception of substance as the substratum of qualities and movements is the bed rock of the realism of Nyaya"—P. I. L. A quality cannot be the substratum of another quality—मुनेषुषान्गोकाराद, The Naiyāyika regards bheda as abhāva category. So also does the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka.

cause, the question is which is this ground-apart-from pot (ghata viveka)? If it is mere ground, even the ground with-the-pot would serve as the cause (of the apprehension-'the pot is non-existent' for the ground still retains its groundness). But if it be said that the reason of the negative judgment-the pot is non-existent, is the abhāva of pot-contact (ghatasamyoga) then abhāva is (per force) admitted.

79. Let then this view hold good - that which serves for the upholder of abhāva as the cause of the negative cognition, will itself be for us also the cause of the common usage.

You cannot say so. To me in reality the non-perception of the perceptible is the means of ascertaining the negative cognition. And non-perception is the abhāva of perception (of that which can be perceived -darśanābhāva). But this is not accepted by you for then you would be subscribing to (the postulation of) abhāva. But if you do admit pramāṇābhāva (i. e. anupalabdhī) where is the harm in admitting prameyābhāva (cognition of the non-existent)?

Now having first perceived the ground, abhāva is to be comprehended thereafter, so that the kind of cognition we have of the ground before the rise of the negative cognition, may (we say) serve as the means of the (negative) judgment.

This has been replied to already. To explain:-in the state when we have the apprehension of the ground itself without the knowledge of the pot and also of its absence, in that very state the cognition of the ground minus the knowledge of the pot and its absence is admitted by us and that alone is stated to be the apprehension of the mere ground (bhūṭalamātra).

"Svarūpamātram dr̥ṣṭvā ca" etc. (S. V. 483) here by the use of the word mātra is to be understood the abhāva of the cognition of pot and of its absence. It means the ground alone is cognised and not pot and its abhāva. If you should also admit the bhūṭalajñāna (the cognition of the ground) as conditioned by the absence of the cognition of pot etc. then by admitting the negative cognition it is but right that you should admit ghatābhāva also. Therefore do not be deluded (as you are when you try to explain the vārtika passage thus):-"Even by the upholder of abhāva because of the (Vārtika) statement-Svarūpamātram dr̥ṣṭvā ca paścāt kiñcit smarannapi,⁶⁹ the apprehension of the thing itself (the bare ground) bereft of the negative cognitions is admitted." And because that itself (cognition of bare ground) is the means of the negative judgment relating to the perceptible counter-correlative, it (bhūṭala) is (only another) name of nāsti (non-existent) ⁷⁰.

For him surely (for the upholder of abhāva the word mātra means jñānābhāva (i. e. of ghata and ghatābhāva). And since that (i. e.

(69) The Prābhākara thinks that भूतलमात्रम् is construed by the Bhāttas as having no connection with abhāvas and he argues that, that alone is his construction of मात्र. But in reality मात्र according to the Bhāttas means भूतल conjoined with abhāva.

(70) दृश्येप्रतियोगिनि, the pratiyogin is here the pot which is an object fit to be perceived if it were there.

abhāva) is discarded by you the word mātra has no significance for you; hence you have to assert that the ground alone is the means (of the negative cognition). What follows then is that even when the pot is on the ground the cognition of its non-existence would arise so that the charge remains (unanswered).

Well, my view (it may be urged) is that when the positive something (say, pot) is in some place the perception of another place is the means (of the cognition of the non-existent). Then 'cow-hood' which is in a brindled cow would give us the judgment—"it (cow-hood) is not in white cow"; similarly even when a cross-beam is resting on one pillar and is also in contact with another the judgment that it is not there would arise. Therefore here (in the case of a negative judgment) it is the abhāva alone that is the cause and not the fact of a thing being elsewhere.

The fact of the recollection of the pot coupled with the perception of the ground is the cause of the (negative) judgment.

No. Even when the pot is an object of perception its absence is perceived on the adjoining spot (so that there is no question of memory here). When the pot is just brought (to a place within sight) and is being perceived the negative judgment relating to the past time arises in the form "it was non-existent before"; (hence here is a case in which the perceived pot and not the remembered pot is the cause of the negative cognition).

80. How according to your view, would there arise the negative

Another query by cognition (i. e. the cognition of abhāva) having reference to the past, of the pot that is an object of present pramāṇa (viz. perception)? It is only the absence of positive pramāṇas (that is, of pramāṇas like perception etc. yielding positive judgments) that is the means of negative cognition; and in what is an object of present perception, the absence of pramāṇa cannot be presumed. It may be argued that though the pot is an object of present perception it is not apprehended as having been related to the past time, and that in consequence of the non-manifestation of a pramāṇa pointing to (the existence of the pot) in relation to past time, it is only right (that we have) the abhāvajnāna relating to the past. But this argument is not tenable (na); because of incompatibility.⁷¹ It is not a fit object of present apprehension—what is related to the past time. It is the non-apprehension of a thing capable of being apprehended (yogyānupalabdhi) that can establish a negative cognition and not merely non-apprehension. In the past no doubt there was the non-manifestation of pramāṇa (i. e. anupalabdhi) relating to an object capable of being apprehended but then even though there was the non-existence of pot it was not apprehended because of the non-recollection

(71) न, अयोप्यस्त्वन-Prabhākara contends that the Bhāṭṭa doctrine of abhāva as a separate pramāṇa fails in the case of a present non-apprehension establishing a past absence. For 'a present non-perception would not be 'non-perception of a thing capable of being perceived' (yogyānupalabdhi) for the scene of the absence is 'now remote' I. L. E. 334. Moreover two elements constitute anupalabdhi - non-existence and pratiyogijnāna.

of the counter-correlative pot, and the apprehension of the non-existent is dependent on it (pratiyogijnāna). Hence it is not right to regard that the non-existence of the pot as being an object of present recollection, for the recollection of a thing not experienced (before) is out of question. Further the past non-manifestation of *pramāṇa* (anupalabdhī) came to an end by the present manifestation of *pramāṇa* (for the pot is now an object of perception) and it is as impotent to give rise to a negative cognition as the plucked eye is (to give an idea) of colour. It may be argued (by the Bhāttas) that though *pramāṇābhāva* has come to an end its present recollection can produce the apprehension of the non-existent just as yesterday's smoke though it has ceased to exist by being now recollected gives rise to the cognition of yesterday's fire. This would be so if *pramāṇābhāva* while being actually cognised did give rise to *mevābhāva* (the non-apprehension of that which is to be cognised) as the probans does when it gives rise to the probandum. But that does not happen (here); for if it did it would lead to infinite regress. To know *prameyābhāva* *pramāṇābhāva* should be known and this (latter) also being an *abhāva* has to be known by the apprehension of another *abhāva* and this again by another and so on, with the result that the non-existence of pot cannot be determined even in a thousand births.⁷² You have therefore to admit that *pramāṇābhāva* by its actual existence only generates the apprehension of the non-existent like the sense of sight⁷³ etc. So that the question remains how there could be the past apprehension of the non-existence of the pot which is the object of present perception.

81. Here is the answer:—It has been well said that *jñānābhāva* (same as *pramāṇābhāva*) by its very existence gives rise to the apprehension of the absence of the thing to be cognised (*jneya*). The non-manifestation of the possible cognition of the past relation (between pot and ground) is apparent at present even when the pot is being perceived; and that (pot), though a fit object of recollection in its relation to the past time, is not recollected; and it is not essential that what gives rise to an apprehension of the non-existent should be *pramāṇābhāva* only; even the non-origination of recollection (*smaraṇajñāna*) when the object is capable of being recollected can certainly give rise to the apprehension of the non-existent.⁷⁴ Hence though the pot is at the present time being perceived, if it had been in the past also it would of

(72) अनवस्था प्रसंगात्—“The opponent's doctrine is that the non-perception cannot be brought to consciousness by any other of the instruments of apprehension—and if you suppose another 'non apprehension' to be the means of apprehending the first 'non apprehension' you land yourself in a regressus ad infinitum.

(73) सत्तामात्रेणैव—To avoid the regress non-apprehension must be thought of as giving rise to its object (viz. pot-absence) by the very fact of its existence like the organ of sight which is instrumental to perception without itself being known, as contrasted with the probans the cognition of which is essential to the cognition of the probandum. But (says Prabhākara) that condition also is absent in the present case for the pot is apprehended at the moment when memory is called to aid.

(74) The Bhāṭṭa says that non-recollection is as good as non-perception for the cognition of the non-existent. *Pramāṇābhāva* means *darsanābhāva*.

necessity have been apprehended by one present at the time and the apprehended (i. e. the pot) would now be fit for recollection; though it is so, it is not recollected and this present non-origination of the recollection of an object that could be recollected gives rise to the cognition which has for its object the past non-existent and is related to the present time. As such there is nothing incongruous. And in the Bhāṣya (Śābara) the word *pramāṇābhāva* (vide ante) is to be understood as implying *smaraṇābhāva* also. Similarly in the Vārtika. Or since recollection must perforce result from *pramāṇa* (i. e. what is grasped by *pramāṇa* will certainly give rise to its recollection) its non-existence also (*smaraṇābhāva*) may be said to be as a matter of fact *pramāṇābhāva* only.⁷⁵

82. Well, it is not right to hold that *yogyānupalabdhi* by its very

existence gives rise to negative cognition for
 Another objection. though it exists the negative cognition does not
 arise sometimes and even though it does not exist it does arise at
 times. To explain: a person who wishes to ascertain if his ring is to
 be found in a dark room searches with his hands all parts of the room
 and because he has searched the whole room, for him there certainly
 arises *yogyānupalabdhi*. But then the doubt comes whether all
 parts of the room have been searched or whether any part has been
 left unsearched, so that owing to the *yogyānupalabdhi* not being
 positively established in spite of its (indubitable) existence he does
 not conclude that the ring is non-existent. Sometimes however delud-
 ing himself that his search has been thorough even though it is not, he
 feels convinced that there is *yogyānupalabdhi* when it is actually not
 there, and mistakenly asserts the non-existence of the ring. Hence it
 has to be admitted (by you) that *yogyānupalabdhi*, only when its
 existence is apprehended, can establish a negative cognition. If so we
 cannot avoid being landed in infinite regress. Therefore the knowledge
 of the thing itself (the locus viz. ground) which one gets by oneself is
 the non-existence of the perceptible counter-correlative (viz. pot) and
 it (*abhāva*) is not a distinct category.

Well, if you do not recognise *abhāva* it would never be possible to

explain even the apprehension of the thing itself
 Bhātta answer. (the locus per se). The apprehension of the ground
 itself is not the apprehension of the thing only (*tanmātrādhiḥ*). The
tanmātrādhiḥ might arise even when the apprehension is of associated
 objects; for there also (say, *ghaṭavat bhūtaḥ*) we have the apprehension
 of the ground. Hence the apprehension of the ground which arises
 in the absence of the pot-apprehension, that is the *tanmātrādhiḥ* (the
 apprehension of the locus per se). It is evident therefore that it is futile

(75) यद्वा प्रमाणस्य &c.—The reason for the alternative explanation is that the Vārtika does not directly mention non-recollection (*Smaraṇābhāva*) and so it may be held not to be valid. It is from the '*pramāṇa*' (perception) mentioned in the Bhāṣya that recollection (*Smaraṇa*) arises and the latter's absence also may be regarded in effect as the instrument of the apprehension of the non-existent on the well recognised principle that cause and effect are non-different; (of course this principle applies only to the material cause.)

to discard abhāva when jñānābhāva is admitted (in construing mātra of tanmātradbhīh).

Query. Then how is this (abhāva) to be explained ?

(Yes) it will be explained. The non-existence of pot etc. is the

Answer. *object* of apprehension (prameya). The non-manifestation of a pramāṇa in relation to a Viśaya which

is capable of being perceived (yogya), by its mere presence reveals it (non-existence) like the eye etc. and not by the fact of its being known as, if that were so, it would lead to infinite regress. You have contended that in spite of the presence of yogyānupalabdhi non-existence is not comprehended and in spite of its absence it is comprehended; but that is due to your missing the sense of yogyatva. It is indeed yogyānupalabdhi that is the means (of comprehending the non-existent) and there, yogyatva becomes the means by the fact of its being *known* and not merely by its presence⁷⁶. Hence yogyatva even while present, not being apprehended sometimes, fails to establish the knowledge of the non-existent; and sometimes yogyatva even while not present establishes the knowledge of the non-existent being through illusion taken as actually existing. The absence of cognition however (i. e. anupalabdhi) becomes the instrument of knowledge by its mere being and not by the fact of its being known; so that it (our position) is not liable to the charge of infinite regress. Therefore there does exist a prameya named abhāva.

83. And that (abhāvaprāmēya) is not perceptive, since even when the sense-activity does not exist its cognition is seen to manifest itself. When one who has remained at home in the morning of a (particular) day is at mid-day questioned thus—well, did any person from Madhura clad in white, tall by far, and of ruddy complexion visit this house in the morning?—then only, from the fact of the failure of the memory even though capable of being revived, one makes a positive declaration of his (the man of Madhura) non-existence which has reference to the morning, and that, without any activity on the part of the senses. It cannot be said that the abhāva cognised in the morning is then (i. e. at mid-day) remembered (because) the counter-correlative, man of Madhura, could not then (in the morning) have been conceived by any means and when the positive counter-correlative is absent from the mind, the cognition of its non-existence is impossible. When this is so, where the cognition of the non-existence as related to proximate space and time arises, even when the senses are unceasingly active, since yogyānupalabdhi has been definitely ascertained to serve as the cause, this (alone) must be regarded there also as giving rise to the cognition of the non-existence (abhāva) and as such it is not possible to ascribe causality to the senses. Abhāva is not therefore perceptive; nor is it inferential, because of the improbability of relation between it which is unknown and any liṅga.

(76) सत्ता मात्रेण—The point is that yogyatva should be cognised in order that it (through anupalabdhi) may serve as the means of establishing the non-existent. Its mere presence is not sufficient to establish anupalabdhi. This is the distinction drawn by the Bhāttas. In a dark room however yogyatva cannot be apprehended. Hence the failure to establish the non-existent.

84. By some (the Bauddhas) this statement is made:—The existence of an object (the perceived) is pervaded by perception (darsana); hence owing to the absence of perception which is the pervader the negation of the object which is the pervaded is determined. This is untenable. One who tries to infer the absence of the pervaded (liṅga) from the absence of the pervader (sādhya) should necessarily apprehend the two non-existents in the example (i. e. darsana-nivṛtti and drśya-nivṛtti), then ascertain their invariable concomitance and finally apprehend by some pramāṇa (as by perception in the case of smoke) the darsana-nivṛtti which serves as the liṅga (sādhana) in the pakṣa (subject) having the property of sādhya; thereafter drśya-nivṛtti has to be inferred; but since nivṛtti (absence) is of a negative character it cannot be apprehended by perception; if it is to be inferred by another nivṛtti (i. e. another liṅga to establish this liṅga) that also being negative in character has to be inferred by another nivṛtti, that also similarly, so that infinite regress will result. Therefore it is inevitable that the non-existence should be cognised by anupalabdhi (non-cognition) which constitutes itself a distinct pramāṇa. When that cognition arises (i. e. when the non-existence is cognised through the instrumentality of non-cognition) then let there be scope for inference (said in derision). Hence abhāva is established as a distinct pramāṇa (lit. the status of a distinct means of knowledge is established in the case of abhāva); as such, doubts regarding the applicability here (i. e. in the cognition of the non-existence of śabda, upamāna and arthāpatti need not be entertained. The sixth pramāṇa is therefore proved to exist. These are the only pramāṇas.

That which is regarded by some as an additional pramāṇa viz. what is named 'sambhava'-Inclusion, as in the instance, the knowledge of the number hundred from the knowledge of thousand since it forms its part; the knowledge of kuḍava (a weight) from the knowledge of the weight of ādhaka of which it is a part, that is (a case of) inference only because of inseparable connection (i. e. it is conditioned by the knowledge that a hundred etc. are inseparably connected with a thousand etc.).

"Itiḥya"—tradition as in the instance, "in every vaṭa (fig tree) there is vaiśravaṇa-ghost" is not a pramāṇa at all because its trustworthiness cannot be ascertained; if valid it falls under āgama (śabda) and is not a distinct pramāṇa. Even the pramāṇa styled "pratibhā" prevision, accepted by some, as in the instance—"To-morrow your brother is coming" etc. arises from an illusory liṅga or mark and is not a valid means of knowledge since its truth cannot be ascertained. Hence the statement of the Kāśyapiyas (the Kānādas or Vaiśeṣikas) that dharma and adharma (what constitutes merit and what demerit) are apprehended through the prevision of the Rsis is valid.

Lokaprasiddhi (universal belief) also is no distinct pramāṇa since it can be included under perception etc.

Therefore six only are the valid instruments of knowledge and that it is so is corroborated in the revered Ramayana—"O Rama in the world there are six pramāṇas by which every thing is comprehended"⁷⁷.

Thus is the discussion of abhāvavāda concluded.

85. Having expounded the universally accepted Svataḥpramāṇya (self-evidence), of perception etc. and incidentally of the Sāstra (Veda) also, as coming under this (i. e. under the group of pramāṇas) what was asserted in the Sūtra "Çodanā lakṣaṇo artho dharmah" (vide Sūtra ii) was definitely established. Now on the strength of (the second half of the fourth Sūtra viz.) "animittam vidyāmānopalambhanatvāt" the validity (pramāṇya) of the injunction (çodanā or śabda) relating to Citrā etc. which are intended for securing a worldly reward is questioned because it (reward) is not present to perception etc. and (sometimes) is incongruous. (It is further argued that) the objection previously made in these words "nanvatathābhūtam" (S. Bh. p. 13) is in relation to the injunction applicable to the desire for svarga—a phala that is to accrue in the other world; as such (it is pointed out) that there is no fault of repetition, there being a difference in what is objected to.⁷⁸

Here is a rejoinder—Well, "çodanā might possibly make a statement that is the opposite of truth"—Since çodanā in general is understood in this (Vākya) the objection is not restricted (in scope). Similarly here also "when it is actually existing then it (yāga or iṣṭi) does not yield the reward; when the reward is generated then it is non-existent;—how can it when not existing yield the reward?" (S. Bh. p. 40). Since such an objection is equally applicable to çodanā relating to the desire for the attainment of svarga there is no distinction, and as such there is no viṣayabheda (i. e. what is objected to is identical).

(77) Vide Vālmiki Rāmāyaṇa, Āraṇyakāṇḍa-72-8. In commenting on this sloka Govindarāja interprets 'Yuktayaḥ' as Upāyaḥ and explains thus: सन्निविष्ट यानासन द्वैधीमाव समाश्रया. This interpretation suits the Rāmāyaṇa context better than that given by Tilaka who agreeing with the author of S'āstradiṭikā says that yuktayaḥ means the six pramāṇas.

(78) The Bhāṣyakāra (S'abara) having explained Sūtras 3, 4, and 5 gives the alternative and elaborate explanation of the same Sūtras as given by the Vrttikāra, reputed to be Upavaṛṣa. Now the Bhāṣyakāra's explanation of Sūtra 4 differs from that of the Vrttikāra. He maintains that perception cannot be the means (animittam) of establishing Dharma because by its very definition (Vidyāmānopalambhanatvāt) it is precluded from revealing anything that is super-sensuous. The Vrttikāra on the other hand splits up the 4th sūtra and makes the second half, "animittam Vidyāmānopalambhanatvāt" a separate sūtra by supplying the word "śabda". He considers it as lakṣaṇa sūtra and explains it thus—śabda is not a valid means of knowledge (animittam), because in certain cases such as citrā yāga it is unsupported by perception and in other cases as "Yejnāyudhi etc." it contradicts perception. This objection is met in that part of the 5th sūtra relating to this topic which is taken up subsequent to the examination of the six pramāṇas accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas. Hence the discussion regarding citrā yāga should be taken as closely following the second half of the 4th sūtra, the intervening exposition of the pramāṇas being only incidental (prāsāngika).

The rejoinder is met (as follows) – The previous objection however has in view the other world only. "There indeed Śabda which is dependent upon some other pramāṇa cannot by itself constitute a valid instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa) and as regards ṇodanā there is no other (corroborative) pramāṇa; hence ṇodanā is invalid," – this is the objection : this has in consequence applicability to the other world only. As regards injunctions relating to the desire to possess cattle, if immediately following the (yāga) karma cattle are obtained, then validity will be established in the case of ṇodanā because the corroborative pramāṇa (viz. perception) is evident; if not obtained, then from the very fact that the corroborative evidence annuls it (śabda), invalidity can easily be ascribed to it (ṇodanā). So why trouble about proving the similarity of objection ? Hence as regards the other objection (it is clear that) it relates to the heavenly reward only. This however relates to the worldly reward. The pramāṇya (of ṇodanā) pointing to the reward in the other world (paraloka) is not invalidated on the ground that the reward does not eventuate immediately (after the performance of the karma). It is not such as could come into being immediately (lit. without interval) for it can (only) manifest itself in a different birth.

"How can it when not existing yield the reward ?" (vide above): is not (the objection contained) in this part of the sentence similar (to the one you are now raising)?

We say no; because the reward comes through apūrva. Since it is evident that svrga by its very nature is fit to be enjoined in another body it is impossible of attainment immediately (after the karma) and this fact is understood even at the time of determining the sense of the Śāstra (viz. "let him who desires svarga periorṃ Jyotiṣṭoma"), so that apūrva is involved in the determination of the sense of the text. And that (apūrva) is of permanent existence (of course till phala results); as such the cause not perishing, svarga eventuates at a different time. As regards (the obtaining of) cattle however, since they can be obtained immediately after the karma the Śāstra which enjoins, as the means, sacrificial acts like citrā (cf. the text-citrāyā yajeta puṣukāmaḥ, does not in the least imply, when it is being interpreted, that the karaṇa is constituted through the channel of apūrva. Thus, the text is understood as meaning that the citreṣṭi is in itself (directly) the means (and not by the intervention of apūrva) of securing the reward. Hence the reward must accrue immediately and because the karma will have ceased to exist as such at a time different (from the one at which it is performed) it loses its capacity to serve as a means and by anupalabdhī the immediate-phala is negated so that the injunctions as set forth in the texts relating to citreṣṭ etc. are not valid.

86. It is not possible to regard apūrva as being implied in the interpretation of the Śāstra on the mere ground
 Objection answered. that the reward is not perceived soon after the performance of the karma. It is the ascertainment of the textual sense that must precede the ritual and not that the ritual (should precede the ascertainment of) the textual sense. Hence the objection here is with reference to (the injunctions pertaining to yāgas intended to yield)

rewards in this world. There is in consequence difference as regards the point of objection (*viṣayabheda*). Because there is *viṣayabheda* the reason (for the objections) also varies. In the case of mandatory passages promising rewards in the other world the reason for the objection is that they are dependent on another *pramāṇa* (for their validity and as such *śabda* is not an independent *pramāṇa*). Here however (*śabda*) is contradicted by another *pramāṇa* (*viz. anupalabdhi*.) Because of the different grounds (on which the objections are raised) there is no repetition.

Or (the present context may be understood thus): while commenting on the *Sūtras* in accordance with his own view, (Śabara) pointed out the objection previously referred to, though it is not to be found in the *Sūtra*; now however according to the view of *Vṛttikāra* (*Upavaṣa*) the objection arises from the *Sūtra* itself (i. e. IV; vide note 69). Let us investigate (the point). It has to be ascertained whether passages relating to *çitrā* etc. are valid means of knowledge or not. For this purpose (i. e. to know whether such a doubt exists) the question has to be asked whether they (*çitrādi*) are contradicted by other *pramāṇas* or not. Now (as regards *çitrā*) because the rewards are not apprehended immediately though they are fit to be apprehended (if present) it is concluded that the *çitrā* etc. are not the means (for obtaining the *phala*). And that the Vedic text (*viz. çitrayā yajeta* etc.) loses (its title to) validity because of the absence (of the reward) which if present perception cannot contradict, (i. e. must needs manifest). In some cases (the Vedic texts) are not valid because of the (direct) contravention of perception. (Take the passage) "That sacrificer who is armed with the sacrificial utensils goes straight to the region of *svarga*". Here 'armed with etc.' denotes the body because of the contact of the utensils, and the word *yajamāna* (sacrificer) also as it indicates a doer (*kartā*) is denotative of that only and not of *ātman*. Since the *ātman* is understood as all-pervading and devoid of action there could be no contact with the sacrificial vessel and because the word *yajñayudhi* which denotes the contact is used to praise the act of placing the vessels on the pyre, it is not to be understood as expressing the relation of property and proprietor; for that relation existed even before the placing of the vessels on the pyre (i. e. when the sacrificer was alive). The ascent of the body to *svarga* conflicts with perception and it cannot happen at an other time even, because of the use of the present tense "goes" (*yāti*) and because of the absurdity of such occurrence to the body that is reduced to ashes. And (the *Pūrvapakṣin* goes on to say) there is no such thing as *ātman* distinct from the body. Hence the invalidity (of Vedic texts). Similarly, when non-validity is established in the case of passages of non-human origin (like those relating to *çitreṣṭi*) no credibility could be attached to Vedic injunctions enjoined on those who desire *svarga*, (Vedic testimony is therefore bound to be invalid.⁷⁹)

(79) एवं अपौरुषेयस्यापि &c.—When it has been proved that what are regarded as texts of non-human origin like '*çitrayā yajeta* etc.' do not deserve to be credited with validity it is only right to extend this inference to texts like "*Svargakāmo yajeta*", so that the whole body of the Veda (maintains the opponent) is discredited as a valid means of right knowledge.—Vide *Candrikā*.

87. When the validity of Vedic testimony has been thus impugned on the ground that it contradicts perceptive anupalabdhi and also (direct) perception, the upholder of the Siddhānta ignoring altogether the necessity to reconcile these contradictions adduces in support of his position, Svataḥpramānya (self-validity) which has been urged before, by pointing out that there is no defect in the source, (as evidenced in Sūtra V) – “The relation between the word and the thing however, is eternal and corroborative of it (viz. that which is given by the Veda is valid knowledge).” The reason is that what was said before was only this—that since it is universally admitted that perception etc. are self-valid pramāṇas, śāstra also as coming under them is self-evident, but no refutation of the defects in the source was made. Here on the contrary what is stated is that Vedic testimony is free from defects and therefore is a valid pramāṇa: the relation between the word and the thing is eternal and as such there is no possibility of man’s interference herein (i. e. such relation is not dependent upon human convention) and defect in the word is of human origin.

(Here ends the controversy regarding the *ṣṭrayāga*.)

88. When thus on the ground of the eternity of relation (between śabda and artha) non-validity is discarded and self-validity is established, the other (opponent) returns to the charge: “Yes, it would be so (Svataḥpramānya would be feasible), but no relation exists between the word and the meaning; then why this question whether it is of human or of super-human origin?”—(Vide S. Bh. p. 43). To explain: there is no such thing as conjunction (*samyoga*, between the word and the meaning); for if it did exist the utterance of the word “knife” would eventuate in the splitting of the mouth. It cannot be that the relation is one of cause and effect because (according to you) both (śabda and artha) are eternal.

(Now it is possible to argue that) since Śabda may mean either *varṇa*, *sphota* or *jāti* and *artha* (may mean) either *vyakti*, *ākṛti*, or *sambandha* etc., and that as such it is difficult to determine what exactly śabda and artha connote if they are regarded as external (i. e. as being outside the mind), śabda like the form “ga” is nothing but *vijnāna* and the form “gau” which is its product is also *vijnāna* only, constituting the *artha* (meaning) so that the relation between śabda and artha is certainly one of cause and effect. (This is *Vijnāna-Vādin*’s plea). But this cannot stand; because no cognition arises without an objective ground; and no other relation (such as *samavāya*) need be thought of as being possible. If it be said that the relation is as between the denotator and the denotated (*pratyāyya* and *pratyāyaka*) we say, no. The relation itself being absent there can be no possibility of (the existence of) *pratyāyakatva*. We are investigating the very problem, viz. by which relation does the word denote the meaning? We would be committing the fallacy of *petitio principii* (*ātmāśraya*) if we hold that its denotative character results from its (śabda) being denotative only. Hence the

relation is non est. The relation not existing, it is not possible that one thing could denote another (totally distinct) thing; as such, the particular hetu (i. e. that which gives rise to śabdabodha viz. the relation) has to be left undefined with the result that the cognition of Śabdārtha (i. e. the thing denoted by śabda) like that of dreams can be assigned to no definite cause (yādṛcchika) and (therefore) śabda can have no claim to validity. The ordinary transactions of men however could somehow go on on the strength of other pramānas even in the absence of verbal testimony (i. e. without the need of verbal testimony being felt). But as regards acts prescribed in the Veda depending as they do upon śabda (they derive their sanction from the Vedic statements only) no attention need be paid to them since they are not supported by any valid pramāṇa.

89. It would be so if no relation existed between the word and its meaning; but the relation does exist, of the

Answer. nature of pratyāyā and pratyāyaka (i. e. of that which is denoted and that which denotes). Even without the other relations existing, the word by its very nature becomes denotative of the meaning (pratyāyaka) and the meaning, the denoted (pratyāyā) and this itself constitutes the relation. And because this (śabda) expresses the meaning without depending upon object-contact as does the sense, or upon invariable concomitance as does the hetu (probans), it is called abhidhāna (or the primary significative force) and that relation is what is known as Samjñā-Samjñitva. Hence the relation between the word and its meaning is defined as one of Samjñā-Samjñin (the relation between designation and thing designated).

What again is the proof (for the assumption) that śabda expresses the meaning?

The very fact that the knowledge of the meaning arises immediately after śabda (comes to one's knowledge).

Why not this (knowledge) be construed as inferential having been derived through (first getting at) the speaker's idea?

We say it is not so. For we get a knowledge of the meaning of words used by one who is ignorant of their sense or who being in a state of sleep has no control over his will. Similarly when a sentence composed by some person or a Vedic sentence which is of non-human origin is used even by the ignorant it does generate a knowledge of the meaning in cultivated minds. Hence śabda is denotative in character (i. e. indicative of meaning).

Then how is it that a word when first heard does not convey any sense?

Because of the absence of accessories; the knowledge that a symbol stands for something (samjñātvagrahaṇam) is an aid (aṅga) to the word that sets out to denote the sense like the light to the eye

(in the perception of objects).⁸⁰ Hence the word conveys the sense only to that person who learns from another that that word is the symbol of a particular meaning and not to another. Thus there is no incongruity.

90. Let us grant that such a relation (between the word and sense)

Objection regarding
the relation between
word and meaning.

exists, but that, from your statement only, should be regarded as of human origin (*pauruṣeya*). To explain : the relation of word with its sense is not *samyoga* (contact or conjunction), not *tādātmya* (identity compatible with difference) but it is *pratyāyakatva* (denotative in character). And that, it has been said, is dependent on man : hence as in the case of words like *Devadatta*, it is after we have determined the relation between a particular sense and the symbol (denoting it) that the *Śabda* (word) becomes indicative of the sense. So that *pauruṣeyatva* is inevitable.

91. Without first answering the objection raised regarding the eternal nature of relation (*Śabara* sets out with the question) "which is the *Śabda* in *gauḥ* ?" Now it may be pertinently questioned what connection there is and what the object in explaining *Śabdasvarūpa* (nature of word) here. (The answer is) that the connection is evidently one of *prasaṅga* (context).⁸¹ Because the relation is the subject of discussion, (naturally) the *relata* - *śabda* and *artha* (word and its sense) - suggest themselves so that their characteristics have to be explained. And the object (*prayojana*) itself is to establish the truth of "*ūha*" and the rest which are dependent upon its (*śabda*) component parts.⁸² If however the sentence or the word is not composed of parts the denotative parts being unreal all that is dependent upon them (like *ūha*) would become false. Moreover for the establishment of the (eternal) relation it must be admitted that *varṇas* are denotative of meaning. Otherwise since independently the *varṇas* have no *saṃgati* it would be inappropriate to consider them as denotative in

(80) Though it is maintained that the significative potency of words is natural and does not like perception etc. depend upon extraneous aids the conventional element in language is not ignored; but that is only accessory and not fundamental to establishing the eternal nature of the word and its meaning. Cf. O. I. P. p. 311. S. Bh. Vol. I G. O. S. P. 18.

(81) संगतिस्तद्वत् प्रसंगिकी - To the query as to the connection between the objection and the theme set out by *Śabara* the answer is that it is one of context. The term relation suggests *relata*, viz. *śabda* and its import so that *Śabara* pertinently takes up first the exposition of the nature of *śabda*. Cf. उपस्थितस्य उपेक्षाऽनर्हत्वम् - Something that suggests itself is not to be ignored, (but should be made explicit).

(82) ऊह-अन्यथाकरणारम्भकः ऊहः—by the term *Ūha* is meant the *chanḍi* effected in a sentence when it is transferred to a subsidiary *yāga*. In the *Darsapūrṇamāsa yāga* which is *prakṛti* or archetypal we have the text *अनयेजुष्टेनिर्वयामि* but in the *Saurayāga* which is its *vikṛti* or ectypal, for *अनये* we substitute *सुशाय* i. e. the case termination remains the same while the uninflected noun (*prātipadikā*) is altered. Such a transference becomes impossible and *Ūha* will lose its validity if the partless (*akḥanda*) *sphota* is accepted (vide note 47).

character.⁸³ Hence to such of those who think thus, the relation itself-namely, the one existing between what is denoted and what denotes will, having no basis to stand upon, disappear, and the "sphota" which (the grammarians maintain) being (unreal) like the horns of a hare cannot be admitted to possess any denotative character; ipso facto the eternity of relation has to be discarded. Hence for the proof of that (viz. eternity of relation) the nature of śabda is explained with a view to clearly establishing that the varṇas (letters occupying a certain order) are denotative (of meaning). In "gaṇḥ" is it that varṇas alone constitute the śabda or something (say sphota) different from them? This is the question that is primarily discussed, and incidentally (what is undertaken is) the refutation of (the doctrine) that the varṇas have parts, that 'ga' has a jāti or class, that gośabda is a composite of parts and that there is a jāti (viz. gośabdatva). The clause 'varṇas alone are śabda' is used for the sake of emphasis.⁸⁴

In this connection the arhats (jainas) express as their view that varṇas have as their constituent parts what is termed pudgala.⁸⁵ That is an untenable (doctrine) since we have no knowledge of these constituent parts. Perception does not give these constituents for there is no cognizance of the whole and parts in the varṇas. Nor are they cognised by inference, because of the absence of knowledge of the concomitance of any līṅga (hetu) with them (the constituent parts); nor by the sāmānyato dṛṣṭa⁸⁶ for we cannot argue thus; "whichever is a thing, that should have been perforce constituted by its own parts", because (of its straying away i.e. vyabhiçāra) in atoms (which are also things but in which) there are no parts. But if it be said that they (atoms) are also composed of parts, those parts would again be (composed of parts) and similarly thereafter, so that a single composite māṣa bean would be constituted of an infinite number of parts. Hence with a single māṣa or ṭila (sesamum) the whole world would be filled because things gross and composed of infinite parts not yielding room to one another

(83) The letters placed in a certain order are denotative and not separately -ānupūrvī is essential.

(84) वर्णा एव शब्दः—The word एव is used for emphasising the fact that varṇas following a particular order आनुपूर्वी विशिष्ट alone constitute śabda and not sphota.

(85) Pudgala—This is the name which the Jains (arhats) give to matter. Since the whole of the philosophical system of theirs is pervaded by the hylozoistic theory it is no wonder that they consider varṇas also as composed of pudgala atoms.

(86) सामान्यतो दृष्टम्—The sāmānyato dṛṣṭa is a variety of inference when the inferential mark is not directly experienced but experienced from likeness; Vide I.L.E. p. 159. "The third variety of Sāmānyato d-ṣṭa is that in which with the support of what is found in the sphere of sensuous objects, we reason about parallel cases in the sphere of the supersensuous." O. I. P. PP. 254-55. As Professor Hiriyanna observes this is merely analogical reasoning. That varṇas are composed of pudgala atoms may be inferred on the following analogy: यत्र यत्र वस्तुते तत्र सामान्यवस्तुम् यथा घटादिः i. e. conceding vastutva to varṇas we proceed from this sensuous sphere-घटादि to the non-sensuous-अवयव।

would (necessarily) occupy endless space. Therefore (we must conclude that) atoms have no parts, so also varṇas. Similarly "gatvajāti" and "autvajāti" (in gauḥ) can point to no pramāṇa to support them.

Here is an objection : How can jāti (i. e. the class-consciousness) that is recognised amidst utterances which are sharp, slow, and mid-dling; acute-accented, grave-accented and circumflexed (as in chanting the Veda); nasalised and non-nasalised; and short, long, and prolated, be said to be non-existent ?

It is true; recognition does exist; but that can be accounted for when the object is single only. The manifestation of different utterances like sharp and slow is due to the difference in the avasthā (pitch of the same varṇa, say ga) and it is not possible to attribute it to different individual objects (vyakti).

93. The manifestation of difference and non-difference occurs in two ways. In some cases difference relates to dharmin (the qualified), and non-difference relates to dharma (quality); for example, in (a number of) brindled cows, we get the notion of class since we distinguish the cows by saying this cow, this cow, and so on (here is the manifestation of difference in the individuals, hence the conception of jāti). In other cases the manifestation of difference is due to (the difference in) qualities and the manifestation of non-difference is due to the qualified. Of the same individual, Devadatta, we say - he is young, he is old, he is lean; here jāti is not accepted (because the individual dharmin is identical though the attributes are different). Hence in the present context as regards druta etc. (sharp utterance, low utterance etc.) non-difference is in relation to dharmin and difference is in relation to dharma (so that there is no gatva jāti). To explain :—The manifestation takes this form: this letter "a" (pronounced as in *around*) was uttered fast by this man, slow, by this man, and not this "a" is fast and this "a" is slow, since if it had been so we should have admitted both dharmibheda (difference in the qualified) and (as a consequence) jāti.

94. Here is an objection : The abiding together of thinness etc., in one and the same person, viz. Devadatta is feasible because they (the changes) succeed one after another (i. e. they occur at different times), but as regards qualities such as nasalisation etc. how can they all relate to a single Varṇa when that Varṇa is pronounced at the same time by a number of speakers? It is impossible for a dharmin having several contradictory dharmas to give asylum to (lit. to bear) them all together.

It is true. But in the real sense these (qualities - high and low etc.) are not the characteristics of Varṇa. Being the characteristics of dhvani (sound) they merely appear as if belonging to Varṇas as, for example, when standing at the same time, before a small and a big mirror smallness and bigness both appear in the face. Hence there is no contradiction (as pointed out by the objector) even though the varṇa is identically the same, with the result that the assertion that we have a universal, viz. "gatva" is supported by no pramāṇa. So too the

statement that the word "gauḥ" is avayav in (i. e. whole composed of parts) is (unsupported by any proof), since the letters "ga" etc. are not all (uttered) together and are also omnipresent (sarvagatatvāt) and as such incapable of forming a composite. It is perceived everywhere that the kārya (effect) is of greater magnitude than kāraṇa (cause) as in the case of threads and cloth (woven out of them); but greater magnitude than that of the (omnipresent) varṇas cannot be attributed to anything. Hence there exists no whole (avayavin).⁸⁷ When that (whole) does not exist (the idea of) gotva depending as it does on that (i. e. the existence of wholes) is banished altogether. Therefore (we must conclude) that varṇas alone (i. e. their aggregate) are śabda.

95. Let us admit so far: there is none such as parts, whole, and (the universal) gatva, But we do not admit that

Objection. varṇas only are śabda because of their inability to connote any meaning; to explain—"By the knowledge of a single letter no consciousness of any meaning does result and because the letters are progressively uttered we cannot postulate their togetherness (sāhitya)."

Just as sacrifices beginning with Āgneya though performed in succession produce a single result in co-operation, the varṇas also produce for us exactly alike (a single result) ⁸⁸.

Sāhitya (combination) is feasible in the case of sacrifices though performed in succession (since such combination takes place) through (the operation of) utpattyapūrva; ⁸⁹ but how in the case of varṇas?

In their case also (sāhitya) results from mental impressions. (samskāras).

Answer.

Question: Which is the pramāṇa for their existence (i. e. of samskāras) ?

(87) अतो नास्त्यवयवी—A varṇa is niravayava-integral, and sarvagata-omnipresent, and nitya-eternal. It is the dhvani—"tone" that manifests it. What suffers change therefore is the tone and not the varṇa. A word-śabda, is an aggregate of varṇas and not an avayavin.

(88) यथाग्नेयादि द्वाणि क्रमवर्तन्ति—The order of sacrifices in the Full-Moon Yāga-पूर्णिमास, is आग्नेय, उपाहु and अग्नीषोमीय; in the New-moon yāga- दर्श it is आग्नेय, ऐन्द्र दधि and पयोयाग ।

It is only when all these six yāgas are performed that a single reward, viz. svarga is attained.

(89) उत्पत्यपूर्व—utpattyapūrva is a technical term, meaning the apūrva which results from each of the six yāgas (see note above). Apūrva is a certain potency that is generated in the agent by the performance of the sacrifice. It resides in him till the object of the sacrifice is attained. The Utpattyapūrvas which arise from the performance of the six yāgas are replaced by the paramāpūrva or as it is termed Bhandapūrva by the Prābhākaras. It is the latter that abides till the wished for object is reached.

The same *pramāṇa* as in the case of *āgneya* sacrifice, &c.⁹⁰ For, just as in their case the Scripture makes it clear that

Answer.

the securing of the desired object is to be understood as the outcome of the combination and because in themselves they (the different sacrifices) cannot produce it (the object desired), *apūrvā* is postulated as the channel (through which the object viz. *Svarga* is to be attained); even so as regards the *varṇas* we get no idea of the sense from individual letters; and because the sense could be comprehended only by the utterance of all the letters and it is only the combination that could yield the desired result, the postulation of *samskāra* is appropriate. Alike a single agency and a specific order (in the utterance of *varṇas*) have to be admitted as no meaning is comprehended when they (single agency and specific succession) are upset.⁹¹

96. If so (i. e. when *samskāra* is postulated) having to presume

The doctrine of
Sphota. Objection.

samskāra for every *varṇa* there would be the postulation of several *samskāras*. Better than that is the presumption of a single *śabdatatva* (which

here is *sphota*).

Not so, because of its non-perception it is discarded.⁹² The word indeed (*śabda*) is admitted to be perceptively

Answer.

cognizant and in perception nothing other than *varṇa* is manifested. Hence we consider that it (*śabdatatva*) does not exist. By you also having presumed *śabdatatva*, *samskāra* has again to be necessarily presumed. As for sounds (*dhvani*) they do not severally suggest the *sphota* and combination of those that follow in succession could only be through the means of *samskāra* so that its postulation (*samskāra kalpanā*) is just the same (for both of us).

Now let this view hold good: The sounds manifest the *śabda* in

Objection.

their individual capacity only (and not as aggregates which then would need *samskāra*). And it cannot be argued from this that the latter sounds (of a word) are rendered purposeless. (Because) the first (uttered) sounds indistinctly manifest the *śabda* and the next and the further next ones manifest it distinctly and even more distinctly so that the latter sounds are not purposeless.

If so then those which constitute the latter sounds competent as they are to distinctly manifest (the *śabda*) are in

Answer.

themselves sufficient. No need therefore of the first occurring sounds.

(90) *अग्नेयादिषु*—The same *pramāṇa*, viz. *arthāpatti* by which we posit *apūrvā* which lasts till the *yāga* yields its fruit.

(91) *क्रम विशेषश्च*—Though the word is not considered as something whole-*avayavin*, we must admit that the letters composing it follow a particular order; for otherwise 'words like *'dina* (pitiful) and *'nadi* (river) which consist of the same *varṇas* but placed in a different order, would not differ in their connotation." I. P. p. 310.

(92) *हृदयदर्शनेन*—The *pramāṇa* for the rejection of *sphota* is *anupalabdhī*-non-cognition. Because of its non-perception it is concluded that *sphota* has no factual existence.

No sound (nāda) whatever, by itself (singly) does clearly manifest it (śabda i. e. sphota) but they all manifest it (each contributing individually). That (nāda) however does not all at once distinctly manifest it. For the sphota having been first indistinctly manifested becomes distinct by being repeatedly heard, on the following analogy:—A mango tree which is at a distance first presents itself in its general outline as an elephant, a hay rick etc.; when thought over again is seen as a tree and then again it is clearly perceived as a mango tree. Like that, is the other to be understood.

If it be so from those very sounds uttered in the initial stage such a distinct manifestation would result by their repetition (i. e. by repeating the first uttered sounds we should have a clear manifestation of sphota) or from the latter by the mere fact of repetition. Hence it serves no purpose to think that sphota is dependent upon a variety of sounds. Again if indeed the nādas are independently suggestive, from the latter (set of nādas) we might have indistinct manifestation and from the former distinct manifestation so that the utterance (of sounds) might be even in the reverse order. Therefore since the sphota is dependent upon a necessary specific order (of sounds) and an aggregation of a number of distinct sounds, it has inevitably to be admitted (by you) that sphota is revealed by the end nāda conjoined with the mental impressions (samskāra) left by the previous nādas, and as such the postulation of samskāra is common (to both of us). Or (another charge may be brought against you) to you alone is it necessary to postulate a novel kind of samskāra, but in my doctrine the knowledge of the meaning arises from the samskāras which are the causes of recollection so that there is no need to postulate a different samskāra.⁹³

To me also they alone will serve (i. e. for the revelation of sphota the mental impressions which occasion memory will do and there is no need for a distinct samskāra).

No, (it cannot be); elsewhere than in memory they (viz. samskāras which help recall) cannot function. According to me however the samskāras which help recall (of varṇas) only, give rise to the knowledge of the meaning. To explain:—A single recollection, that is, embracing all varṇas is originated by the combination of the samskāras which are generated by the "primary experience" (anubhava) of each varṇa. And the varṇas which are manifested all together in that (recollection) produce by combination the knowledge of the meaning without there being present a separate samskāra. According to your view however the procedure is unlike

(93) न संस्कारान्तरं कल्पयितव्यम्—The point is that in ordinary usage the mental impressions are reminders of past experience and here they bring to mind the previous varṇas which together with that heard last, manifest the sense, whereas according to the Grammarian philosophers the mental impressions manifest sphota—this function of theirs is novel,

this. To explain:—the *nādas* while being experienced (i. e. while the sounds are being actually heard) will not manifest *sphota* because they are not apprehended by the sense of hearing.⁹⁴ And because of their being outside the range of experience it cannot be said that they (sounds) signify *sphota* while being remembered, as it could be said of *varṇas* (that *samskāras* bring to one's recollection). (It may be said that) by their mere existence (i. e. though neither experienced nor remembered) the *nādas* by effecting some modification of the sense of hearing manifest the *śabda* (i. e. *sphota*); but there is no *conjoint* existence as they (sounds) succeed one another. Therefore it is through *samskāras* only that *sāhitya* or togetherness could be secured and as such the postulation of a distinct *samskāra* is unavoidable.

But this is our view. It is true that the manifestation of *sphota*

Objection.

is not caused by the *samskāras* which occasion recall; but those *samskāras* which are instrumental in the manifestation of the *varṇas*, which are generated by *nādas*, and which reside in the auditory sense-organ are themselves the means of manifesting *sphota* as in the case of *varṇas*. Where then is the need for the postulation of a distinct *samskāra*?⁹⁵

That is irrational; they (the *samskāras*) are momentary. The

Answer.

samskāra which is the means for the cognition of the first *varṇa* will have disappeared at the time the final *varṇa* is heard. If it should remain even at the time the aspirate (*visarjaniya* in *gauḥ*) is heard the "ga" sound would continue to be heard. Therefore they (the *samskāras* manifesting *varṇas*) are evanescent and in consequence the manifestation of *sphota* by their combination is impossible. And it has been already said that if they were supposed severally to manifest (*sphota*) the succeeding ones would go without value. Or (we may also point out) that the mere contact of *dhvani* (with the auditory sense) constitutes the modification of the auditory sense and none other, but of its momentariness, no doubt exists because the sounds are in a state of flux⁹⁶. It follows therefore that distinct, stable *samskāras* have to be postulated, alike *śabda* (*sphoṭātmaka*) which is other than *varṇa*-necessitating the presumption of several unsubstantiated existences. In my view however since the "constructive knowledge of the meaning of words" (*śābdabodha*) arises from the *varṇas* which are the object of indubitable recollection there is nothing to find fault with.

(94) अत्रावगन्तव्यम्—according to the Grammarians the *madhyamanāda* is the *vyāñjaka* of *sphota* but it is not the *viṣaya* of the sense of hearing. Sud. p. 374.

(95) किं संस्कारान्तरकल्पनया—where is the need for me to postulate a unique *samskāra*? This is what the Grammarian says to the *Mīmāṃsaka*. "According to you the impressions which arise from the sounds in the auditory organ are the manifestors of *varṇas* and to me they are the manifestors of *sphota*."

(96) From the impact of the sound on the ear, a certain *samskāra* takes place and that having generated its *sphota* disappears so that finally when *śabda*-*sphota* arises there is a combination of all the previous *samskāras*. But this, says the *Mīmāṃsaka*, is not possible since the *samskāras* are evanescent. For him however a separate *samskāra* need not be assumed for the revelation of *śabda* since each *samskāra* reveals a *varṇa* and then vanishes. The *varṇas* put together constitute *śabda*.

If as you say the import of a sentence is secured by the simultaneous recollection of varṇas then, varṇas even if uttered in a reverse order would become significant.

No; even the order (of varṇas) is a necessary adjunct.

Answer.

Which order, then, is the necessary adjunct (aṅga)? Aṅgatva cannot be attributed to varṇas in themselves because

Objection. they are omnipresent (vibhu) and eternal (nitya). Nor can it be so from the fact of their cognition (pratīti which you may say) follows a certain order because its (pratīti) recollection is a simultaneous single act.

Well, when it is so, (i. e. when there is no order either in the varṇas or in the act of their cognition) – we say, that the

Answer. specific order of the sounds constitutes the aṅga by its illicit transfer to varṇas, so that there is no fault (in our argument). Hence the sounds which are the means of manifesting the varṇas are, in a specific order, super-imposed upon the manifested varṇas so that it is evident that the recollected varṇas following this order are denotative (of the meaning) and that there is no other śabda (i. e. sphota).

Here ends the discussion of the sphota doctrine.

97. "Then – which is the meaning of the word gauḥ"? – thus (raising the question) on the plea of beginning to expound the meaning, he (Śabara p. 49 S. B.) proves the existence of ākṛti (jāti) for the purpose of establishing the eternity of relation (between Śabda and artha). If ākṛti were non-existent then the beginningless (apauruṣeya) relation between the word and the particulars (it denotes) would not result, because they (vyaktis) are fleeting⁹⁷. Again in the absence of ākṛti (we cannot say that there is such a thing as) eternal upalakṣaṇa⁹⁸. Hence the discussion as to the existence or non-existence of ākṛti. When the existence of that (ākṛti) is proved (here) it will be made clear in the section on ākṛti (Jai. 13–33) that, that itself (viz. ākṛti or universal) is what is denoted by the word.

(97) नव्यवृत्तिः शब्दस्यापौरुषेयः संबन्धः – If we assume that particulars (like pot) are all that are denoted by words then the relation between Śabda and artha will not be apauruṣeya, thus contradicting Jaimini's aphorism औपचितिकस्तु शब्दस्य अर्थेन संबन्धः where उत्पत्तिक means eternal.

(98) उल्लक्षणस्यापि – In the absence of ākṛti we have nothing by which the eternal nature of the relation between Śabda and artha could be established. And it cannot be maintained that from an eternal upalakṣaṇa the eternal nature of the denotative relation could be established. There is no common characteristic to manifest the individuals, i. e. there is no concept distinct from generality which while embracing a certain class of particulars excludes the rest.

98. Here (it has to be noted that) the Saugatas (Buddhists) do not admit the existence of the universal (ākṛti) since in their view the only realities are the non-predicable particulars (svalakṣaṇa)⁹⁹. To explain :—"if the universal is distinct from the individuals then it would be perceived apart (from the individuals); if not distinct it would be indistinguishable from the individual (lit. it would be individual merely); if it be said that it is both (distinct and non-distinct), it cannot be so owing to self-contradiction." It is indeed impossible that the same universal could be both distinct and non-distinct from it (vyakti), because of the incompatibility between difference and identity. If the universal is a distinct entity the question is whether it is omnipresent or confined to individuals only. Omnipresence anyhow cannot be attributed to it because of its non-residence in the intervening void; i. e. between two individual objects. If it be regarded as confined to individuals how could it, not being in a particular spot previously (i. e. before the origination, say of pot) be cognized in an individual that is coming into being there (i. e. in that spot)? And it cannot be said that it comes into being (afresh) there, because origination of what is eternal is an impossible occurrence; it cannot be that it comes from another vyakti (individual) because it is not gross (it is vibhu or omnipresent) and further jāti would cease to be cognized in that other object. Nor is it possible to say that some part which has not left resides there alone, for 'a universal is without parts. Also when the individual is destroyed it (the jāti) does not stay behind because it is not then apprehended. Nor is it destroyed for it is eternal. And it does not travel elsewhere for it is not gross. And because jāti is already resident in the other object it gets doubled if another should step in. This is what they (Bauddhas) say: "It does not come hither, it was not there (before), it is there afterwards and it does not contain parts; and it does not give up its former abode - O! What an array of troubles!" If the jāti residing in the individual were to be there in its entirety it could not be found in an individual different from that (individual). What is a single unit cannot simultaneously remain in its entirety in several places. And it cannot remain so in its parts because it is void of parts. How can its presence as parts be possible in individual objects which are varied in character, and which relate to the past, present and future? And as regards individuals that are (actually) present what is experienced is the notion "here" (i. e. we get the cognition in the form 'here is', say, 'a cow') and no one gets the cognition-"here exists gotva" (i. e. no class-consciousness arises on perceiving individuals that are present) but the form it takes is-"This is a cow". It may be argued that jāti is no other than the individual's self

(99) स्वलक्षण-स्वरूपमात्र, व्यक्तिमात्र is what the word denotes. The Bauddhas of the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika schools admit svalakṣaṇas or bare particulars only as given in perception while concepts like jāti etc. which are termed sāmānyalakṣaṇas are but mental fabrications super-imposed on svalakṣaṇas. Hence according to them the object of perception is that which is rid of all objective elaboration-kalpanāpodham.

(svarūpa) and not a distinct entity having the individual as its substratum. Such an argument is indefensible. How could jāti which is unique in character, eternal and inclusive by nature (it is a common factor of a number of individuals) be the svarūpa of individuals which are multiplex in character, non-eternal and which are different from one another (i. e. marked by prthaktva or severalty)?¹⁰⁰ The three worlds would then become mixed up. And there is no pramāṇa either, for the existence of ākr̥ti (same as jāti): it is by no means perception—since jāti is admitted to be eternal it does not give rise to its cognition (i. e. it is out of the question that the cognition of jāti could take place in time-kādaśitka). Those that are eternal are impotent to lead to any practical efficacy. That which is not productive (of jñāna) cannot become the viśaya (object), for what is a viśaya is characterised by that (i. e. it is only the potency to give rise to the knowledge of itself that constitutes viśaya – object). Hence sāmānya (which, you term jāti) is nothing but vikalpākāra (determination of thought which is untrue to reality), or false.¹

99. Now to account for variety in cognitions, just as the external svalakṣaṇas (the bare particulars) are admitted, why not (says the Siddhāntin) admit a variety of universals to account for the innumerable variety of thought – determinations (Vikalpas) like cow, horse, etc.?

No (there is no necessity); from the perception of Svalakṣaṇas only which are characterised by variety we can account for variety in vikalpas^a. Though devoid of objects (i. e. though Savikalpakajñāna does not in reality point to any object), thought-determinations (savikalpakas) arising as they do from svalakṣaṇas which are of infinite variety and so capable of

(100) व्यावृत्तस्वभावम् बौद्धमते घटश्च पटत्वादि अपोह शब्द प्रतिपाद्य अनुवृत्तमित्युच्यते, घट पटादि रूपव्यक्तिः स्वलक्षण शब्द प्रतिपाद्या व्यावृत्त मित्युच्यते; तत्र अनुवृत्तं कल्पितं, व्यावृत्तं सत्य इति तेषां मर्यादा—according to Buddhistic doctrine Jāti otherwise known as apoha is anuvṛtta, that is, it is seen as characterising several individuals, and ghata, pata etc. known as svalakṣaṇas are exclusive in character (Vyāvṛtta). What is anuvṛtta is subjectively determined and as such vyāvṛtta alone is real. "The doctrine of apoha is inseparable from the theory of svalakṣaṇa. Exclusion of what is other is the ground of the practical notion of sameness of character in things which are absolutely diverse in character. According to the Bauddhas "Sarvam prthak"—the atomistic principle which finds expression in the doctrine of Svalakṣaṇa or kṣaṇa—there cannot be any positive resemblance in reals. A cow is like a cow in virtue of what both are not" I. L. E. p. 125, N3.

(1) According to the Bauddhas all thought-determinations "savikalpakas", are illusory as not immediately given. For them it is only the svalakṣaṇas that have the stamp of reality. The sāmānya or jāti, which idea is a thought-determination is savikalpaka in essence—vikalpākāramātra, and so has no existence.

(2) विकल्पवैचित्र्योपपत्तेः—“वस्तुमात्रं परमार्थसत्, तच्च विचित्रं स्वभावं दृष्टमिति तदर्थनवशादेव गवाश्चादि विकल्प वैचित्र्योपपत्तेर्नैतद्वशात्सामान्य सिद्धिरित्यर्थः—Candrikā.

What the Bauddhas mean is that the variety of vikalpas or thought-determinations like 'cow', 'horse' etc., are apprehended by the perception of svalakṣaṇas which are real reals and as such it is not warranted to presume sāmānya or jāti because of the vikalpas.

inducing useful activity (like possessing or rejecting—hānopādāna) in one desirous of action indirectly (lit. successively) lead on to it; just as the apprehension of the lustre of a precious stone prompts one to get the gem; similarly these vikalpas will not frustrate empirical activity and in consequence there is nothing to baulk the course of ordinary human affairs, (cf. S. D. S. p. 18). Hence (it is concluded that) there is no (category like) jāti. By these very reasons (adduced to disprove universals) the reality of the substance, avayavin (the constituted whole as distinguished from the constituent parts) is denied, for neither alternative could stand (i. e. whether the whole is different from or the same as the parts). The manifestation of gross objects³ however is dependent upon the conglomeration of atoms of colour etc. Since it can be accounted for just as (we can), the appearance of dark objects dancing before the eye (keśondraka), the manifestation of Savikalpas is not a sufficient reason for the presumption of the avayavin. And when that (whole) is non-existent the universal like cow-hood stands discarded being devoid of its substrate—(jāti, it must be noted, is resident in avayavin.)

100. How in the absence of the identical (ekarūpa) universal, can the svalakṣaṇas which are wholly disparate (i. e. Mimāṃsaka. not related to one another) give rise to vikalpas (predicables or determinate ideas) which are identical in character? If it is urged that they do give rise (to such predicables), then why should some produce the determinate knowledge of cows, and some, the determinate knowledge of horses? Why not all (svalakṣaṇas) produce all 'determinations of thought'—(indifferently)?

For the upholder of the doctrine of universals also how is it reasonable to hold that individuals which are by nature disparate assume the character of the identical universal, become its ground or the means of revealing it (i. e. the universal; the Bhāttas admit that individuals possess these three characteristics). If it be said that they do discharge such functions why should some individuals get into relation only with some one kind of universal and not all (individuals) with all (universals indifferently)? If it be said that it is owing to the very constitution of things (svabhāvat) the answer is that the same (explanation) holds good for us also. Again if for the sake of securing the connection between the (distinct) individuals and universals which are uniform in character another common feature, a summum genus (param avilakṣaṇam) is admitted, then for securing the connection between that second common feature of individuals with that also, another universal has to be

(3) स्फुटव्यासस्तु &c.—We cannot posit a constituted substance because of the appearance of gross objects, for the latter are mere figments of the brain like keś'on-draka—an appearance like a mass of twisted hair. It is not a whole but a group-cognition; (Vide Candrikā).

admitted, then another, and so on resulting in infinite regress ⁴. Hence this sāmānya is an ideal (vikalpa) only and by no means is its existence a reality.

101. This will now be answered – “The universal which has the bed-rock of pratyakṣa for its support cannot be shaken by bad logic; that (viz. pratyakṣa-pramāṇa) triumphs over all (illogical notions).” In all things perception since it assumes such forms as – ‘this is also a cow,’ ‘this is also a cow,’ ‘this is also a tree’ and ‘this also,’ is both exclusive and inclusive in character, and it arises unaffected (abādhita) by differences in space (region), time, and states (such as sitting, moving, etc.) so that it overcomes all manner of specious reasoning and gives us a twofold idea of things, ⁵ and such (pratyakṣa) which other (pramāṇa) can vitiate? There is indeed no other pramāṇa more potent than that; it is the foundation of all other pramāṇas which in consequence cannot frustrate it. Further inferences also depending as they do on the universal only strengthen the (doctrine of) universals and not thwart it: for indeed that which depends on something cannot (also) harm the latter. If it did, itself would be non-est because of its dependence on that other. To explain:—He who condemns sāmānya by presupposing the alternatives-bheda and abheda, has per force to couch his argument thus: whatever is vastu, (that) will be either different or non-different. If sāmānya should be (regarded as) vastu, then that also will have to be either different or non-different (from the individuals). But it is neither (i. e. we cannot predicate either identity or difference of sāmānya). Hence it is avastu (i. e. not an entity). ⁶. From this it is evident that he who speaks of vastutva (thinghood) must admit sāmānya. Otherwise how could it be asserted that vastutva will not pertain to sāmānya (i. e. that the universal is not a separate category) on the reasoning that when there is invariable concomitance between vastutva and bheda-bheda there is non-apprehension of vyāpaka (pervador) ⁷?

(4) अथ व्यक्तीनामपि etc. The Bauddha reverts to another argument of the Mimāṃsaka and refutes it. To meet the objection that disparate individuals cannot be the ground of the universal the Mimāṃsaka urges that while he admits the primary universal (sattāsāmānya) the Buddhist does not. The rejoinder is that secondary universals being infinite any attempt to find a relation between these and the primary universal would land one in infinite regress: cf. अस्माभिस्तु सामान्य संबन्ध सिद्ध्यर्थं परं सामान्यं स्वीकीयते, भवतां तु तदभाव इति वैश्वस्यम् Candrikā.

(5) व्याकारं वस्तु &c. —In ‘this is a cow’ – इयं गौः, the ‘this,’—इयं is exclusive-व्यावृत्ताकार, as it separates the cow in one’s immediate presence from the one at a distance; ‘cow’—गौः denotes jāti and is inclusive अनुवृत्ताकार. Hence in every cognition we have both the elements—jāti and vyakti, the universal and the individual.

(6) भेदाभेद विकल्पेन etc. The Buddhist when condemning-sāmānya has to reason thus:—यत्र यत्र वस्तुत्वं (व्याप्य) तत्र तत्र भेदः अभेदो वा (व्यापक); भेदाभेदरूप व्यापकाभावात् वस्तु स्वरूप व्याख्याभावः In this line of argument he has unwittingly admitted the universal-vastutva.

(7) व्यापकानुबलनिष्ठं लिङ्गेन वस्तुत्वं अभावः अनुमीयते — The Bauddha admitting as he does only two pramāṇas (viz. pratyakṣa and anumāṇa) infers the negation of vastu by the hetu, vyāpakānupalabdhī which is one of eleven hetus to infer abhāva (Vide N.M. p.53.)

What if I maintain that the word *vastu* becomes significant by virtue of *upādhi*⁸ and not by virtue of *jāti*? Then where is room for the unwelcome *jāti*?

Be it *jāti* or *upādhi*, under any circumstance *sāmānya* (i. e. a common property) must be presupposed. Even as regards words which derive their significance from

upādhi, without a fundamental single property (*dharma* or *upalakṣaṇa*) their very existence (i. e. their significative power) is jeopardised. And to the Buddhist who adheres to the view that all things (*vastu*) mean only 'what a thing is not', there is nothing anywhere which gives rise to the thought of inclusion (*anuvṛtta* - one in the many), so that action as determined by *upādhi* would hardly take place. Hence it is impossible to dislodge *sāmānya* whose position is supported by all the *pramāṇas*.

How then is the objection based on the alternatives (viz. the universal is different from or identical with the individuals) to be met?

Even if there be no reconciliation they (*vikalpas*) cannot negate *sāmānya* because it has already been stated that they also should presuppose it (*sāmānya*). Still it (how the difficulty is to be solved) will be stated (below).

102. As regards the alternative i. e. whether *sāmānya* is distinct from or identical with the individual some (*Naiyāyikas* and *Prābhākaras*) say, '*Sāmānya* is certainly different from individuals; the question does not arise that it should (then) be cognized separately because it is related to individuals.

Which is that relation?

Samavāya.

What again is it?

"The relation which exists between things that are inseparably connected and which is the *hetu* of the notion 'here' (*īha*)."⁹ This is the view of some (*Vaiśeṣika*).

But that is not correct since the notion 'here' does not occur. The fact is that the cognition takes always and for all, the form -'this is a cow' and not 'here is cowhood'.

Which again is this inseparable relation (*ayutisiddhi*)? ⁹.

The opposite of *Yutasiddhi*.

Which then is *Yutasiddhi*?

(8) उपाधि-अनुगतो धर्मः - Viz. *vastutva* which is an inclusive characteristic, though it is not *jāti*.

(9) अयुतसिद्धि "The expression *ayutasiddhi* denotes things one of which is always dependent on the other, as the jar on its components or the quality on the substance. *Yutasiddhi* may be taken to mean either proved to be joined or proved to be separated". A. p. 96. The *samavāya* or inference relation according to the *Vaiśeṣikas* exists only between (i) whole and parts, (ii) quality and the qualified, (iii) movements and moving substances, (iv) class and individuals, (v) particularities and eternal substances.

Having distinct movements (functions) or having distinct loci. The opposite of that is *ayutasiddhi* ¹⁰. If it be so, then the relation between the parts and the whole will not be one of inherence (*sāmānya*) since it is observed that there is movement of parts even without the movement of the whole; and because both the whole and the parts have their own separate loci. Similarly *sāmānya* has its residence in individuals and the individuals have their own residence so that (for *sāmānya* and *Vyakti*) there exist different loci. Hence the doctrine of *samavāya* becomes untenable.

Therefore (i. e. since the non-distinction of movements and identity of locus on the basis of which *ayutasiddhi* was attempted to be established, are rebutted), we have to postulate (the doctrine) thus ¹¹ :—The relation by which the substrate produces a cognition similar to its own in the substratum—which means that it manifests its own form—that relation is *samavāya*.

If the individual is apprehended as of the nature of universal then on the strength of experience non-difference alone between the universal and the individual would result. How then (is it tenable) to admit difference (between the universal and individual)?

Well it is thus :—‘This Blots is a cow’. ‘This Spots is a cow’—in both (these statements), ‘Cowhood’ is seen to be common, but the particulars Blots and Spots (*Śābaleya* and *Bāhuleya*) appear distinct. If (as you imagine, referring to the objector) there should be absolute identity between them, viz. between Blots and Cow-hood, (then what follows is that) if one (*jāti*) is the inclusive element the other (*vyakti*) also becomes inclusive, or if (it is asserted) that (Blots) excludes (Spots) Cow-hood also would remain differentiated (i. e. would cease to be *anuvṛtta*—two contradictory characteristics would be found in one and the same thing). Moreover in the same individual cow we get the apprehension ‘This is a cow’ but though apprehended as a single notion—cow, there is no apprehension of synonymity between the notions ‘this’ and ‘cow’ as in the case of ‘cow’, ‘cow’. Hence no non-difference.

103. How then is it that the individual manifests the *tādrūpya* ? (i. e. the characteristics of the Universal, for if difference is admitted, identity is completely ruled out).

(10) *पुष्पगतिमत्त्वम्* & c. having relation with distinct acts; here *गति* means *व्यापार*, e. g. the potsherds and pot have different functions; or when asked to bring a cow that alone is brought and not a horse for their movements are not identical. *पुष्पाश्रयत्वम्*—when pot comes into being, cloth does not, for the locus of pot is *kapāla*, and of cloth *tantu*; but potness springs into being with pot. Hence the permanent relation of *sāmānya*. Now *Sāmānya* abides in individuals but the latter have their own loci: e. g. potness resides in pots but pot resides potsherds; clothness in cloths, but cloth in threads.

(11) *येन संबन्धेन* & c.—*आधेय* is *jāti* and *आधार* is *vyakti*; *स्वातन्त्र्यावुद्दिम्-जात्याकारणैव स्यक्ति बोधयति*—that relation is *samavāya*. This is the definition accepted by the *Mīmāṃsakas* in contradistinction to that of the *Vaiśeṣikas*.

The *tādrūpya* of the individual is no other than this, viz. the *samavāya* relation (between the *jāti* which is a variety of *sāmānya* and *Vyakti*); and its (*samavāya*) excellence consists in this that because of this relation the substrate (*jāti*) manifests the substratum (*vyakti*) as (possessing) its own characteristics (i. e. the *jāti* is apprehended in the *vyakti* owing to this intimate relation *samavāya*). Hence the doctrine is unexceptionable. Or, let identity be understood to exist on the basis of *tādātmya* experience and distinctness (*bheda*) on the basis of the reason already adduced, (viz. that *jāti* is inclusive and *Vyakti* distinctive). To conclude, it is *bhinnābhinnatva* (being both distinct and non-distinct) that should be admitted as correct on the strength of *pramāṇa* (here it is perceptive validity) ¹².

How could difference and non-difference which are opposed in character reside in the same locus?

Vaiśeṣika.

There is no conflict, since both are apprehended together. If as in the notions—'This is silver', 'This is not silver' difference and non-difference were apprehended, each cancelling the other, then there would be conflict, but there is no apprehension of such mutual negation. The double apprehension in 'This is a cow' without suggesting synonymy causes a single entity to appear in a two-fold character—the common substratum (viz. Cow-hood) indeed points to identity and non-synonymy (between *idam* and *cow-notion*), points to difference. Hence on the strength of *prātīti* (experience) there is no opposition. From the difference in view-points also (there is no opposition). ¹³. To explain:—The particular denoted by the term cow is understood as non-distinct from the Universal (*gotva*) as witness the usage—this cow is *Sābaleya*. When however the universal is viewed as referring to different individuals then one particular individual is understood as being distinct from another, as when we say "That cow *Bāhuleya* (spots) is not *S'ābaleya* (Blots)". Likewise when we take a substance having several qualities we find that in its nature as taste etc. it differs from shape (*rūpa*) etc. and as substance per se it is non-different. So also in the case of wholes, intrinsically they are non-different from their parts, but there is difference when the different parts are taken into account. Like this one has to construe the rest. Now on the evidence of general experience we perceive no inconsistency in one

(12) The *Mīmāṃsaka* repudiates the *samavāya* relation of the *Nyāyavaiśeṣika* and admits the identity relation—*tādātmya* in its place. The reason for his offering this alternative explanation is that the *samavāya* relation is felt to be not quite applicable to cases of wholes and parts; (*Chandrikā*).

(13) अपेक्षा भेदाच्च-जातिनिरूपितं अनेदम्—a reference to *jāti* gives one the notion of identity; व्यक्त्यन्तर निरूपितः भेदः, the notion of difference depends upon a reference to different particulars. So also of opposite qualities—Devadatta may be taller than Yajnadatta but shorter than Viṣṇudatta. Hence the compatibility of the existence of opposed qualities in the same person.

and the same thing possessing, when viewed from different stand-points, such opposite characteristics as 'long' and 'short' - similarly (such seeming inconsistency has to be reconciled) as regards difference and non-difference because the experience is not disparate.

104. Some one urges again:—The experience itself is wanting of a thing exhibiting both difference and identity—with the experience (of two things) as separate indeed there is the manifestation of difference, and with the experience (of things) as non-separate there is the manifestation of non-difference. Hence

Criticism of the view that identity and difference have the same locus.

when a person is apprehending the manifestation of difference, he is aware of both the universal and individual aspects, the same person, at the time of apprehending the manifestation of non-difference (identity) should perceive only one of the two (viz. *jāti* and *vyakti*) and that twice over and there cannot be the apprehension of identity of the one with the other. Therefore the manifestation of difference and identity in the same locus is non-est. ¹⁴.

This, your reasoning is vapid. It is not that the experience of difference is the result, only of the manifestation of a double object; because even when such

(manifestation) is present that (experience of difference) is absent. When first the individual is perceived there is indeed the manifestation of both *jāti* and *vyakti* and their difference is not then apprehended, but when a different individual object (of the same class) is perceived, because *jāti* is concomitant and the object of prior perception is not concomitant, the distinction between *jāti* and *vyakti* is rendered definite by reason of concomitance and non-concomitance. ¹⁵ And this is your doctrine also. Thus, having perceived Devadatta (once), then at some other time perceiving from a distance Yajnadatta resembling him, and recollecting Devadatta of former apprehension a person in reality apprehends two persons (one perceptive and the other recollective) who are mutually distinct, but still he does not get the cognition of difference and the doubt indeed arises thus: "Is that very person this Devadatta or another?" Hence the manifestation of a double object only, it cannot be said, is the ground of the apprehension of difference. Again though perceiving the same Devadatta from a distance at some other time the man doubts whether this one (of present perception) is the same as that (of former perception). Here though in reality there is the manifestation of a single object it is incompetent to establish non-difference. As such, it is unwarranted to urge that the manifestation of a double object ought to result in the apprehension of difference. Nor does the manifestation of a single object alone constitute the

(14) When identity is perceived it is enough if one of the two—*jāti* and *vyakti*, is perceived because according to the Bhāttas, they are identical and are cognised in the same percept. Hence, says Prabhākara, "you cannot assert that identity is manifested; one is seen, twice over."

(15) अन्वयव्यतिरेकसंभयम्—The universal is concomitant with the separate particular but the particular of past perception and the particular of present perception are mutually exclusive.

apprehension of identity. But the notion 'This is distinct' (anya) reveals difference and the notion 'this is not distinct' (ananya) reveals identity. To one who is perceiving Blots (Sābaleya) and Spots (Bāhuleya) there is the apprehension of identity (when he points to both and says), 'This is a cow' and 'this is a cow'; there is the apprehension of difference (when he says) 'different from Blots is Spots'. Therefore (the apprehension of) difference and non-difference (between jāti and vyakti) is quite consistent.

Is not jāti inclusive (anuvṛtta), eternal and characterised by non-origination and non-destruction and vyakti (on

Objection. the other hand) characterised by the opposite qualities? Then how could there be identity between the two? It cannot happen that a single object could be inclusive and exclusive, eternal and transient, and subject to origination and destruction, and not subject to them, as otherwise the three worlds would become (hopelessly) mixed up. And jāti itself would thus lose its characteristic of eternity and vyakti would come to possess the property of eternity.

There is no such blemish. The (empirical) object has different forms; and presenting eternity by means of some

Bhātta. one form and non-eternity etc. by another, it does not appear self-discrepant. Jāti also is, in its aspect as vyakti non-eternal and vyakti again is in its aspect as jāti eternal so that there is never room for what is undesired (i. e. what is destructive of our doctrine).

105. Your postulation of the alternatives—whether jāti is all-pervasive or present in individuals has been proved to be groundless by the statement that jāti is identical with vyakti (i. e. related to vyakti by tādātmya sambandha). This (jāti) being indeed the very essence of vyakti how could it be found elsewhere?¹⁶

Now how could jāti having been absent in the spot prior to the

Objection. appearance of vyakti there, come into being later?

The vyakti while coming into being determined by its causal conditions manifests itself associated only, with

Bhātta. the particular jāti¹⁷ (to which it belongs, say 'pot' with 'potness', 'cloth' with 'clothness') so that (the doctrine) is faultless.

Being non-existent there, how could jāti get into relation with vyakti? It is not that it comes into being at the

Objection. very time (that vyakti comes into being) because it is eternal, nor does it travel from somewhere else because it is imponderable.

(16) The purvapākṣin asks whether jāti is all-pervading like ether or conterminous with the particulars. The answer is that it is confined to particulars. This view is held by one school of Mīmāṃsakas; cf. —विण्णव्वचसामान्यं नांतरगृह्यते यतः, न ह्यक्काववदिच्छन्ति सामान्यं नामकिञ्चन—*chandrikā* quoted from S. V. Ākṛti Vāda St. 25.

(17) घटत्वपटत्वादिरूपेण संबद्धैव उत्पद्यते — The particular even in the act of its origination gets associated with the universal to which it belongs.

An object having found its way from some other place gets into conjunction with this spot (i. e. the one in our immediate presence); how could that (object) also having been absent only, in this spot acquire conjunctive relation with the spot? It is clear that it is owing to some (determinate) cause. Likewise *jāti* also acquires (i. e. gets into) relation with the *vyakti* due to a (particular) cause,¹⁸ but with this difference (between the origin of *tādātmya* or *samavāya*, and *samyoga*) – an object which before remains in conjunctive relation with some place, first gets into conjunctive relation with its immediate next spot, then with its immediate next spot and so on gradually till it becomes related by conjunction to some other place; the origination of *tādātmya* and *samavāya* however takes place from their own cause without the necessity of coming into relation with the immediate (and successive) spaces. What is natural for (the appearance of) the conjunctive relation, that alone need not be admitted in the case of *tādātmya* or *samavāya*,¹⁹ because of the absence of any valid reason and because positive entities (like *samyoga* and *samavāya*) are characterised by different properties (i. e. they possess distinct features).²⁰ Hence there is no defect (in our doctrine). Or else let the universal be understood to be all-pervasive; even then the question of its ubiquitous cognition does not arise because it is the individuals that reveal it.²¹ Though *sāmānya* is all-pervading it is related to *vyakti* either by *tādātmya sambandha* or by inherent relation. And the cognition of *sāmānya* is through the inherence-in-the-conjunct relation (with the visual organ).²² As such the relation (of *sāmānya*) occurs only in the space delimited by *vyakti* (i. e. in the *vyakti* itself) and not anywhere else so that its cognition is not ubiquitous. Even in the case of identity (between *sāmānya* and *vyakti*) because of the existence of difference between *jāti* and *vyakti* omnipresence and non-omnipresence like eternity and non-eternity etc. are not inconsistent.

(18) This reply may come under 'pratibandhi' or parity of reasoning. Turning to the objector the Bhāttas say: "Even you must admit that on account of some cause the effect, viz. conjunction has arisen. We also say that when the *vyakti* comes into being the cause of the *jāti-vyakti* relation springs up."

(19) The relation between *jāti* and *vyakti* is termed *samavāya* according to the *Prābhākaras* and *tādātmya* according to the Bhāttas. Hence the use of both the terms.

(20) विलक्षण स्वभावत्वाद्भावानाम् — Since things are diverse by their very nature—this is radical pluralism. *Tādātmya* and *samavāya* may be relations like *samyoga* but this does not compel us to admit that the process of their origination must be the same.

(21) So far the doctrine that *jāti* is conterminous with *vyakti*. Now is described what is known as *Sarvagata* or as it more usually termed *Sarvasarvagata* in *Vaiśeṣika* works. This view obviates the difficulty of accounting for the presence of *jāti* at a spot where previously it was not when a *vyakti* comes into being.

(22) संयुक्त समवाय संनिर्करणेन, Pot is related by conjunction (= *samyoga*) to the visual organ and potness (*ghatatva*) is in pot by inherence relation (*samavāya*). Hence the relation of potness (*jāti*) to the visual organ is *samyukta-samavāya*. The point is as the *Candrikā* puts it, that the universal though all-pervading is apprehended only where it is related by *Samavāya* but it does not mean that is absent elsewhere since it is ubiquitous.

106. The postulation of the alternatives—whether the universal resides (in *vyakti*) in its entirety or piecemeal is also baseless. Is not entirety dependent upon parts (i. e. on the fact of a thing possessing different parts?) And *sāmānya* is differentiated neither in itself nor in its parts, because it is one and devoid of parts.²³ It is because of the absence of parts there is no possibility of its existence in parts. Therefore all that can be said is that *jāti* resides in *vyaktis* because of its apprehension by *pramāṇa*, and there can be no division into entirety and parts, because of the absence of *pramāṇa* and of improbability. Likewise of the whole (*avayavin*) also entirety cannot be predicated in the parts (*avayava*) because of the absence of plurality (in the *avayavin*; the whole is one and not many) and on that (i. e. possession of parts) depends the attribution of entirety as vouched for by common usage. There cannot also be its existence in parts because of the absence of parts other (than those in which the whole resides, say the two halves of pot).

Now the question is whether the whole resides in the parts in exactly the same way as does the universal in the individual.

We say, no. The *sāmānya* resides severally (in the objects), but the whole, united (in the parts),²⁴—this is all the difference. Without at all desiderating

another individual object the *jāti* resides in some one individual object and creating a cognition akin to its own is said to reside separately (in each individual) but its existence is never (spoken of as one of) entirety. The whole (*avayavin*) however, residing in different parts which are mutually dependent for its existence in them, gives rise to a cognition similar to its own and is therefore said to reside in the constituent parts taken together (*vyāsajya*). To illustrate:—the cognition of cloth does not arise in a single thread as does the cognition of cow (i. e. of cowhood) in an individual cow.

107. Now the question is how conjunction resides in the conjuncts:—is it in the manner of '*jāti*' or is it in the manner of 'whole'? We say it is distinct from both. It resides in one conjunct requiring at the same time its relation with another conjunct and not dispensing with it so that it is unlike *jāti*. And it generates a cognition conformably to it in one (of the two conjuncts) only, as when we say: "This (referring to one conjunct) is conjoined with that and this (referring to the other) with that." Hence it is not entirely similar to the whole so that its dissimilarity with either (is established).

(23) भेदापेक्षं हि etc. The question whether the universal resides as a whole in the particular or not is itself not pertinent since wholeness is a relative term and is dependent upon parts which the universal has not.

(24) सामान्यं प्रत्येकं वर्तते अवयवीतु व्यासज्य वर्तते—The universal resides in each particular; e. g. cow-hood is apprehended in every cow. The whole on the contrary resides in all its parts; e. g. cloth is apprehended in the aggregate of threads and not in every thread.

The question next arises whether conjunction is one only associated with the two relata or double, one being in each (of the two related).

Nature of conjunction. The Kāśyāpiyas (Vaiśeṣikas) on the one hand hold that conjunction is one and inseparably connected with the two (relata); we on the other hand are impressed with the view that conjunction is distinct (and not one) on the analogy of similarity—'sādrśya'. When we say this is similar to that, and that is similar to this, the comprehension of similarity in the one as well as in the other is seen to be dependent upon the counter entity (pratiyogin) and as such it is distinct (because the counter-entity of the one is distinct from that of the other); and conjunction is apprehended in exactly the same manner.²⁵

108. Now let us pursue the topic on hand.²⁶ Therefore jāti cannot be negated on the presumption of the alternative modes of existence (i. e. whether it exists in the individual in its entirety or in parts). As for the contention that because jāti is eternal it is incompetent to give rise to a cognition of itself and as such it is not an object of apprehension—that is baseless. That even things eternal, possess causal action will be explained (later) when refuting the doctrine of momentariness. Again (it must be pointed out that) grahyatva—being apprehended, is not of the nature of the cause (of apprehension.) It has been explained in the section on the doctrine of nihilism that being apprehended (i. e. viṣaya or object, is not of the nature of hetu or the originating cause of the jñāna which apprehends it but it—grahyatva or karma) is of the nature of the ground in which the resultant of knowledge resides.²⁷ Therefore even this defect (that there would be perpetual apprehension of jāti) is absent.

The objection that because the thought-determinations like 'cow' etc. arise from Svalakṣaṇas (bare particular or "specific individuality") only, whose apprehension serves as the medium²⁸ (of such determinations), the postulation of jāti is not grounded in reason, is also meaningless. It is not that jāti is non-perceptive (to be put down as a mere fiction); for if it were so it (the conception of jāti) would be open to such objection. The cognition, however, which arises brings to light jāti which is its object, so that

(25) सादृश्यप्रतियोगिकम्—Similarity presupposes a counter-correlative; so does conjunction; e. g. pot is on the ground by the relation of conjunction, and the ground is related to pot by conjunction. Because the counter-correlatives, pot and ground are different it is argued that conjunction is also distinct.

(26) प्रकृतमनुसरामः—The subject under consideration is whether jāti is existent or not.

(27) ज्ञानजन्यफलभाषित्वम्—जतिः ज्ञानप्रतिकर्मत्वमेवप्राप्यत्वं ननुज्ञानप्रति हेतुत्वम्—A universal when apprehended serves only as the karma or the ground of the resultant of the act of apprehension but not as the cause of its apprehension.

(28) स्वानुभवद्वारेण—What one apprehends at the outset is the bare particular and the rest like jāti etc. are all mental constructs. The objects of perception are the svalakṣaṇas only. They alone are real and it is through their apprehension (anubhava) that one imposes other notions on them. This is the Buddhist doctrine of perception.

there is no occasion for such prattle. And (we might put you the question)—how do the extremely disparate svalakṣaṇas generate a homogenous cognition when you yourself assert that “objects of one kind and those which are not of that kind are the outcome of the causes which are of one kind and of the different kind”? ²⁹

Buddha. For you either how does it happen that disparate particulars get into relation with the homogenous universal?

Mīmāṃsaka. We say that it is due to the causes which give rise to them (i. e. the different particulars). Svalakṣaṇas (meaning particulars) of whatever kind when arising from their (respective) causes acquire the relation, either tādātmya or samavāya, with some one sāmānya. ³⁰

Buddha. Are not the causes disparate? How can they produce svalakṣaṇas possessing a single uniform potency?

Mīmāṃsaka. Yes, they would not have produced them if they had been disparate; but they also are of the same class (i. e. if the causes which produce, say, black pots and red pots were distinct from one another such a potency could not have arisen but they are not, e. g. all pots are made of the same stuff.)

Buddha. If so, in order that such a relation may be established a number of distinct jātis will have to be admitted leading to infinite regress. ³¹

Mīmāṃsaka. There is no such flaw. Just as the seed of the talipat palm belonging to a particular class through successive transformations begets a vyakti (the individual palm tree) associated with the talipat class (jāti) and just as that again (the vyakti) (begets) another seed which is of the same class as the seed which constituted its cause, so from the germ of a particular class does the creation of an individual belonging to the cow-class take place; and in that (individual) the germ peculiar to that class arises so that there is no absolute identity. ³² Therefore the conclusion is that there exists a single (category) which can be termed

(29) तत्तद्रूपिणः—ब्रह्मादिहृत्पदार्थाः परस्परैर्भिन्नाः; तद्वत्तद्रूपहेतुजाः—objects like pots of one kind are different from those of another, because the causes of their origin are different. What is implied in the quotation is that the concept of jāti is necessary to include different individuals of a particular class.

(30) स्वहेतुवशात्—The relation between the universal and the particulars arises from the very causes that generate them (i. e. the particulars).

(31) अनवस्था—If for establishing the relation between particulars and universals you admit a class— notion among the causes, then you have to admit another universal in their causes and so on leading to regressum ad infinitum.

(32) नाद्वयतन्तादात्म्यापत्तिः—The seed-sprout series is no doubt beginningless but there is no infinite regress because it is not necessary to complete it to determine the sense of the earlier terms (cf. I. L. E. p. 131). Since the individuals are different though jāti is one there is no identity. As such the postulation of jāti cannot be negated.

either ākṛti or jāti or sāmānya and which runs through (i. e. inclusive of) Blots etc.

Here ends the discussion on Ākṛti.

109. (The Buddhist) theory that similarity itself is sāmānya is wrong for there is no cognition of that: the common expression takes the form 'This is that only' and not 'similar to that'³³. And for one who contends that all kinds of sāmānya have to be discarded even similarity would cease to exist, for it implies resemblance of several parts (similarity means that there are several common features). It is not possible for him (the Bauddha) by whom the positive nature of sāmānya is not admitted to even know that sāmānya (which according to him) negates what is other than that (i. e. the present object). He who indeed wishes to comprehend the exclusion of non-cowness (in the cow) must first comprehend the cow (class). When the 'cowness' remains uncomprehended a negative description of cows is out of the question so that necessarily 'the cow' in its positive predication must first be comprehended. If instead of describing it as being other than the rest, we attempt to describe it by negating severally, horses etc. no comprehension arises (i. e. you can only say that what is other than 'cow' is not cow, and not that it is horse, elephant, sheep etc., etc.). Because they are multitudinous, thought cannot comprehend them and because they remain uncomprehended it is impossible to get the notion of 'cow' which is of the nature of their exclusion. As such when the universal is being comprehended by means of a positive predication as in '(this is) cow', '(this is) is cow' how is it possible to admit it (the universal) as being negative in character? Hence this doctrine (viz. that similarity constitutes sāmānya and that the universal is negative) is too feeble. Hence jāti (it must be admitted) does exist.

Here ends the discussion on the apoha doctrine.³⁴

110. By the aforesaid arguments (adduced to prove the existence of universals) the whole (as a separate entity) has been established (i. e. is as good as having been established). Regarding that (whole) also, in answer to the alternatives—whether it is different from the parts or not different, the Vaiśeṣikas declare that it is different, that it resides in the parts by samavāya (inherence) relation, and that special qualities (viśeṣaḥ) derived from the parts are generated therein. The special qualities, it is said, are those which being related by inherence delimit the single class of objects in which they reside.

(33) The Buddhist admits Sādrśya—resemblance, but not sāmānya or universal. Even this similarity is due according to him to subjective interference.

(34) अपोहवादः—i. e. exclusion of every thing else. cf. 'Exclusion of what is other is the ground of the practical notion of sameness of character in things which are absolutely diverse in character'. I. L. E. N3. p. 125.

(35) विशेषगुणाः—The special qualities referred to here are those which are apprehended by one external sense only viz. colour, taste, odour, touch, vicidity, and natural fluidity;—

Candrikā. A. p. 85-86 for the Naiyāyika definition of Viśeṣaḥ

We however maintain that it is difference-cum-non-difference. Neither cloth nor Devadatta is perceived to be distinct from their respective parts—threads, and head and hands. The parts themselves, viz. threads, hands etc. are perceived as of the nature of (i. e. as identical with) cloth etc. And in Devadatta (the whole), when we speak of his hand, his head etc. there is the manifestation of difference in some degree, so that its being of the nature of both (difference and non-difference) holds good. Therefore the aggregation of parts only in a particular manner constitutes the whole and it is not a distinct substance. They alone, due to a certain combination, assume the nature of a single substance and as such (i.e. as a single substance—say, cloth) revealing both dimension (*parimāṇa*) and *pañajāti* (clothness) are cognised as (a single piece of) cloth. Hence in their nature as cloth, unity, and in their nature as parts (threads), diversity, may both, with propriety be predicated of them. Your statement, again, that the qualities resident in the cause, such as colour etc., originate qualities (a new set of qualities akin to them) in the effect does not please us much since this double set of qualities is not within one's experience. If two sets of qualities had been experienced, viz. one in the threads and another in the cloth then the relation of cause and effect could have resulted (the cause being the property of the threads and the effect the property in the cloth), but two qualities are not perceived; the colour of the threads only, white, is perceived as the colour of the cloth, which form, the threads have assumed, but not a separate colour. Even where cloth is made from threads of a variety of colours as white, black, red and yellow, there also those very colours appear as belonging to the cloth but not different ones.

111. Is it not (a matter of common knowledge that we use the expression) "a cloth of variegated colour" and not "a cloth of white or yellow colour"? Hence Naiyāyika.
 a distinct colour termed *çitra* should be recognised as coming into being here (to account for the perceptibility of a cloth of variegated colours).³⁶

No, it is not so. *Citra* means many colours. In fact in the ordinary usage it is well known that the word *çitra* is a synonym of many. And it does not stand to reason to admit the existence of an independent colour named *çitra* seeing that experience is opposed to it. It is not inappropriate that several colours should inhere through the different constituent parts in one and the same piece of cloth. On this very ground it must be understood that *saṃyogajasamyoga* (i. e. conjunction produced by

(36) Among the seven kinds of colour recognised by the Naiyāyikas *çitra* is one. According to them the condition precedent for perceptibility is colour. Now if *çitra* is only a collection of colours each particular colour will only be partial in its scope (*avyāpyavṛtti*), while there will be none pervading the whole and as noted already a thing (here — the whole) will not be perceptible without a colour. Hence say the Naiyāyikas, we must admit an independent *çitra* (composite colour) — A. p. 153.

another conjunction,) is also negated.³⁷ Just as the conjunction (say with ground) of Devadatta itself, becomes the conjunction of the (same) person on his putting on the ear-ring (styled the man-with-the-ear-ring, kundalin) so also the conjunction between the thread and the shuttle alone becomes the conjunction between the cloth and the shuttle when the threads have assumed the form of cloth, and (it does) not (produce) another distinct conjunction because such is not warranted by experience. Hence let us not expand this topic needlessly.

Therefore (to return to the topic on hand) there does exist the whole (avayavin). It was pointed out that the whole resides in its parts (taken together - Vyāsajya, and not in each as is the case with universals). Hence it is concluded that there exist both the entity known as the whole and that known as sāmānya (universal) which is ubiquitous.

Here ends the discussion on avayavin.

112. Having explained that varṇas (articulate sounds) are denota

Relation between
word and meaning.

tive (abhidhātṛiva) and ākṛti (jāti) is what is denoted it is now proposed to give an account of sambandha (relation).³⁸ It has already been said that the relation (between the word and its sense) is one of recollector and recollected. Its eternity having been challenged the answer will now be furnished. What was formerly stated (by way of pūrva-pakṣa) was this:—Because on the first hearing the word does not convey the sense, therefore it is not possible for the word to convey the sense of its own accord as it is possible in the case of indriyas (organs of sense). It is only when a person says—the sense of this word is this, that the word reveals the sense; hence in reality the potency of a word to convey the sense is conferred on it by man so that the relation is human only (in its origin).

In answer this is to be said:—It is not man's making, this relation (which is observed when we say) 'of this it is the meaning' but it is only reiterating the well-known relation (existing between Śabda and artha).

How is this to be known?

If a meaning other (than the established one) were offered it would be met with opposition from many. If some one should tell some one else that the word 'cow' means a horse or a bison (gavaens), many will repudiate his explanation by saying,—'This is not its meaning; an animal with a dewlap—that is what it means.' If the view that the sambandha (relation) is of human creation is held then the

(37) For an account of the different kinds of conjunction vide A.p. 165. The conjunction produced by another conjunction in the case of cloth would be the conjunction of cloth with the shuttle produced by conjunction between the threads and the shuttle; but this is negated because the existence of cloth as an object distinct from the threads is ruled out.

(38) It has been shown that the denotative potency belongs to varṇas and not to Spṛṣṭa and that what is denoted is jāti or universal and not vyakti or individual. Now the eternity of the relation between the denotator and the denoted is undertaken to be proved. (cf. ओल्लि कस्तु etc. Sut. V).

particular relation with the sense brought about (by one) could not be set aside, as for instance in the case of words like Devadatta (where the relation of the word with the meaning it imports is purely artificial). Therefore, even though the later-day people should say (correctly)-of this word this is the meaning, they ought not to be imagined as the authors of the relation (*sambandhakāritva*). It may be argued as follows (in defence of the human agency):-in the beginning of creation the Lord Prajāpati having created all that is static and dynamic and also dharma and adharma, and having established the relation between words and meanings for (facilitating) mutual intercourse among men and having composed the Veda with the words as conjoined with their meanings in order to inculcate the nature of dharma and adharma taught the relation between words and their meanings, as also the Vedas to his offspring Marīci and others and that knowledge was transmitted by them to others, by them again to others and so on, so that from those that preceded to those that succeeded the knowledge of the relation of śabda and artha as well the correct usage of words (has been handed down)-even that view (we say) is not justified. Because there is no valid *pramāṇa* for taking such a view.³⁹

113. Non-apprehension on the first hearing is itself the *pramāṇa*;⁴⁰

Rejoinder.

because of the convention (i.e. man-made relation), those ignorant of it fail to apprehend (the meaning) but for those who are cognizant of it apprehension of the sense becomes possible as does the apprehension of words like Devadatta. But if the sense-relation were natural (i.e. non-conventional) then even on the first hearing clear apprehension (of the meaning of the word) would result.

It is not so. Though natural the relation between what signifies

Answer.

and what is signified, serves as the means in the understanding of the meaning, only when (that relation is) apprehended, and not when unapprehended. Hence it is only right viz. the non-cognisability (of the sense) on the first hearing. Further there exists no particular time when what is called the world-creation has had its beginning and it stands to reason to conceive of the world as always present (ever the same spectacle) on the analogy of what is perceived (now).⁴¹ There was never a time when all this was not existent; for there is no *pramāṇa* (in support of such a view).

(39) In the *Mīmāṃsaka* system cyclic creation is not admitted; the world as it is has been from eternity. cf. समीचीनं तु क्रियमानं तावत्कालं हि नैवेद्यतः.- Hence the relation between the word and the meaning is eternal - a view opposed to that of the *Naiyāyikas* who hold that *Is'vara* has settled that a particular word should convey a particular sense.

(40) The opponent's reason for affirming that the relation is of human origin is that a word when heard for the first time does not convey any meaning.

(41) न च सर्गादिर्नामकश्चिच्छब्दोऽस्ति-Neither creation nor dissolution of the universe is recognised by the *Mīmāṃsaka*; "there was never a time when the world was otherwise than now". No doubt things suffer change. They are destroyed and recreated with an endless renewal. We have to imagine what the world was from what we see it to be now, Vide S. V. p. 673, St. 113 and O. I. P. p. 323.

If it be said that Mantra, Arthavāda, Itihāsa, and Purāṇa are the pramāṇas we say, 'no'. The Vedas would cease to be valid pramāṇa in matters supersensuous very like the works of Buddha, since (it is conceded) that they are dependent upon the human origin of the relation (between words and their meanings) and themselves own (Īśvara's) authorship. When the Veda has lost its character as pramāṇa the validity of Dharmasūtra etc. which are based upon the Veda is completely ruled out. And when everything has disappeared (in the universal dissolution) even creation does not take place (for want of appliances - sāmāgrī). It is indeed with the aid of clay and thread that pot etc. are made and in the absence of everything with what materials could this entire world be created ?

114. Now then let the following doctrine be accepted :—The one

The view-point of
Advaita.

ātman only existed at the beginning of the world. Himself of his own will evolves into (manifests himself as) the world beginning with the ether etc. as the seed (transforms itself) into the form of the tree.⁴² If questioned as to how Brahman who is pure sentience is transmuted into insentient forms they answer—we do not say that the evolution (of Brahman) is ultimately real. But ātman without (actually) evolving appears as if evolving; being one only appears as many, like (one's) face in the mirror etc., all due to avidyā (primal nescience) and this ātman having given rise to appearances sees himself—the pure sentence, as if of the nature of non-sentience, and being secondless, as if associated with a second. And the creation of the world beginning with mahat⁴³ etc. like the dream-world has this very avidyā as its material cause, in support whereof witness the several advaitic texts:—"All this is Brahman", "All this is ātman only; there is absolutely no variety here". Similarly, "Indra appears as many with (the operations) of māyā." From these it is evident that the apprehension of bheda (variety) is dependent upon māyā. Again from texts like 'Him who perceives worlds as existing apart from Atman the worlds will forsake'-the belief in things other than Ātman is reprobated, and from the text, "From death to death he passes who here variety finds" the belief in variety is reprobated. Hence all this (dṛśyājātam—the world of perception) is the secondless Brahman alone—the ultimate Reality and the perception of duality has its roots in avidyā—such is the doctrine (which the pūrvapakṣin) declares.

115. What ! is it that this world does not exist at all now ? If you

Refutation.

say, yes, we say it is wrong because it is contrary to perception (i. e. the denial of the world is palpably wrong since it is given in perception). How perception

(42) परिणमति -It should be noted that Advaita does not admit the doctrine of evolution in the Sāṃkhya sense, so that the word pariṇāma means here 'appearance' or manifestation—Vivarta.

(43) Mahat should be taken here to mean Hiraṇyagarbha who is the first created being according to Advaita and not the Sāṃkhyan Mahat—the first evolute from Pradhāna or Prakṛti.

cognises the really existent world has been explained in the aphorism on perception (1-1-4). It cannot be that perception is nullified by āgama (Veda) because perception is quick in functioning and so more potent (as an instrument of knowledge) than all other (means of cognition). It cannot be argued that according to the "rule of priority and posteriority (paurvāparyanyāya)" perception which has begun to function is nullified subsequently by āgama, since (on the contrary) the cognising function of āgama is balked by pratyakṣa⁴⁴. Even at the time that āgama has begun to function (i. e. to enjoin that nothing exists besides the ātman) pratyakṣa revealing the world of duality opposes the teaching of the Veda. As indeed a pot which has just begun to come into being fails to come into being when destroyed by a club so also āgama (when it starts its teaching) is vanquished by pratyakṣa. Further the man who thinks that the world is non-existent has perforce to regard āgama also as of the nature of non-existence since it is included in the world-order. How is one to understand the negation of āgama by āgama itself? That which is taken as of the nature of non-existence cannot be the means of arriving at any knowledge about the world (artha)⁴⁵. But if its status as a pramāṇa is conceded then it (Veda) cannot be non-existent. (Hence the world also is existent since it is no other than what the Veda embraces.)

116. Some one (evidently the advaitin) however avers, "We do not ascribe non-existence to the world, for its existence is avouched by perception etc. nor do we ascribe existence to the world from an absolute stand-point for with the knowledge of ātman it is negated. Hence this world cannot be described either as existent or non-existent".

This (argument) is not sound. (Being) other than reality—that only, constitutes unreality and if the world is not real it is clear that it is unreal; or if unreality is negated, reality must perforce be ascribed to it, for of the two—reality and unreality, the negation of the one is inseparably connected with the positive assertion of the other. And apart from these two modes (i. e. reality and unreality) there is no separate mode (i. e. the two exhaust the world); there is no third alternative.

But this is our doctrine. What is apprehended at no time—that is unreal like the horns of a hare, when what is apprehended is not negated at any time—that is real like ātmatatva (selfhood). The world on the other hand, because

(44) पौर्वपरेन्याय—This is known also as अपच्छेदन्याय. The rule is that the expiatory ceremony to be performed when Udgātṛ has first erred in his observance of certain details in the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice, loses its importance and the expiatory ceremony to be performed when Pratihartā subsequently has gone wrong, takes precedence. Similarly it may be said that Vedic testimony overrides perception though operating subsequently to perception.

(45) कथंचिदर्थस्य &c.—How could the non-existent Veda make any valid statement about the world? Such a thing is a flat contradiction.

it is both perceived and is negated can be described neither as *bhāva* (positive entity) nor *abhāva* (negative entity.)

That does not stand to reason, being opposed to experience. That indeed, which having been given in perception is sublated, like the mirage and the "serpent-in-the-rope," is unreal only, and that it is so is well known to all. Between the horns of a hare and the mirage indeed no difference is recognised in the world, to exist. And if this world also is sublated it (should be regarded as) unreal only, so that indescribability has no place. If even then it should be said, discarding the general usage, that indescribability (*anirvācya* or *anirvacanīya*) is used in a technical sense like *Vṛddhi* etc.⁴⁶ that also is unreasonable, because sublation of the world, there is none. And it has been said that as long as the world-cycle lasts the world cannot be regarded as sublated by the (authority of the) Veda, (for it offends experience.) In the case of the *mukta* (the liberated) the sublating knowledge cannot be imagined even, devoid as he is of all the sense-organs and in the absence of the sense-organs knowledge (of any kind) is impossible. Of the unrecollected world negation cannot be thought of, and in that state (i. e. of *mukti*) recall does not take place since all mental impressions (upon which it depends) will have been effaced. Hence the world-sublation will never occur. As for the statement that this world is the fabrication of *avidyā* (we ask): well, which is this *avidyā*? Is it illusory knowledge or is it a separate entity serving as the cause of illusory knowledge? If it is illusion whose is it? (*Bh. G. XIII.*) Not of Brahman (surely); for his nature is pure consciousness—there is no room in the sun for darkness. Not of individual souls for of them no existence is predicable apart from Brahman. From the very fact that there is no (such thing as) illusion the postulation of a separate entity as being its cause is untenable. For those who admit, besides Brahman, illusory knowledge as well as its cause, the doctrine of Advaita falls to the ground. What was it that ushered into being this *avidyā* of Brahman? A separate originating cause (apart from Brahman) there does not exist. If it be urged that it is the result of the identity of nature, how, (we ask), could the one which is of the nature of *vidyā* (knowledge) be of the nature of *avidyā* (nescience)? If it (*māyā*) is there naturally (i. e. without owning its origin to anything else) by what can it be destroyed? If it is said that either meditation as enjoined in the Scriptures (*dhyāna*)—concentration on the truths propounded in the Veda or the knowledge of the self resulting from such meditation destroys the *avidyā* of Brahman (i. e. *avidyā* admitted by the Advaitin as existing alongside of Brahman), (we say), no; neither Scripture, nor meditation, nor its resultant *jñāna* exists apart from Brahman—the pure consciousness, for any of them to destroy *avidyā*. Better than this doctrine of *māyā*, is the doctrine of the Mahāyānika school of Buddhism wherein variety of colours like blue and yellow, the relation

(46) वृद्धि-विद्वत्—*Vṛddhi* is a technical term in Grammar relating to Samdhi. The point is that *anirvacanīya* cannot be used even as a technical term to denote non-existence (*asat*) since there never is any sublation of the world.

of cause and effect, the division (of men) into the bound and the liberated are established on the basis of distinction in the moment-series⁴⁷. For those who regard the Ātman as eternal, integral (homogeneous), and as the negation of the world (of names and forms), there would be utter annihilation of all activity – empirical and Vedic. This again is what they say:— “Error-born is the universe and with knowledge it disappears like the mirage and the world of dreams”. Even that is wrong. If the world that is created like pot by the operation of ajñāna which stands in the place of a potter’s activities &c. is destroyed by jñāna which stands in the place of a club, even then unreality cannot be ascribed to the world. Seeing that it is associated with origination and destruction, non-eternity alone but not absolute negation could be attributed to it. (Now the question may be put) by which knowledge is it sublated? You cannot say it is by the knowledge of the ātman, for there is no opposition (between ātmajñāna and the existence of the world). But if it be urged that it is by the knowledge of the ātman rid of the empirical realm we say, no; for there, no conflict is perceived between avidyā and one part of it viz. the knowledge of Atman (in niṣprapañcātmañāna there are two elements: niṣprapañcājñāna, and ātmajñāna); the knowledge then of the residue, viz. niṣprapañcājñāna, (knowledge of the negation of what constitutes the world) should be regarded as the sublating factor. (Now) it is the non-existence of the world that constitutes niṣprapañcatva but when the world is (actually) existing it is not possible for a knowledge of its non-existence to arise. It is with the knowledge of (niṣprapañca) that has arisen that the world has to be sublated and before (the rise of) that knowledge the world has certainly the character of reality (sadrūpa) and when that character of reality endures how could there arise the knowledge having as its object its non-existence? When the knowledge has arisen the sublation of the world (results), and when its sublation is accomplished (there occurs) the rise of the knowledge having as its object its (world’s) non-existence so that (this is a case of the fallacy known as) mutual dependence (itaretarāśraya).

By this (very reasoning) is refuted the statement that the (illusory) knowledge of the mirage is sublated by jñāna. It is not that the water (in the illusive appearance of a sheet of water in a desert) having been there is negated later; even prior (to its negation) the water was not

(47) महायानिकवादः—The doctrine of the Buddhist school known as Mahāyāna — “the great way of salvation” as contrasted with Hinayāna — “the little way”. The followers of the latter are called Sarvāstivāda-vādins since they believe in the reality of the external world though of a momentary character, while the former refuse to assign any reality to it. The Vijnānavādins and the Mādhyamika nihilists may be said to belong to the Mahāyānika school of thought. It is the Vijnānavādins who belong to the Mahāyāna school that maintain that there is no objective reality corresponding to Vijnānas which assume the infinite variety of forms and are momentary. The jñānasamtatis—streams of cognition, are distinct so that the existence of variety in colours and the cause and effect relation can all be accounted for. No doubt this idealistic doctrine does not recognise any distinction between jñāna and artha but each, say, pot-cognition, cloth-cognition, forms a distinct series.

there; a barren waterless tract heated up by the sun's rays is by illusion apprehended as (identical with a sheet of) water, and thereafter by the negating knowledge is apprehended in its real nature. Well, let us not pursue this childish prattle.

Here ends the refutation of the Advaita doctrine.

117. Some followers of the upaniṣadic doctrine hold that Atman, in reality transforms himself, guided by his own will, into the world-form, and in support of that view they quote: "O genial youth, this Reality only, existed at first, one alone, secondless" (Chand Up. VI. ii-i). "That saw: many may I be, may I be born." So it is (in the quoted texts) pointed out that the Atman which before creation remained alone as mere existence became transformed into the world-diversity composed of ether etc., just like the transformation of the seed into the form of a tree. (In corroboration thereof they adduce) several upaniṣadic passages such as: "From that, verily, from this ātman is ether born", and (urge that in this sense) there are hundreds of purāṇic passages. The texts however: "All this is puruṣa only", "Here there is no variety", etc. are (it is explained) intended to signify the absence of dharmi-bheda (i. e. to show that the dharmin the property-possessor, viz. Ātman is one and not many). For instance a single tree just above a small height having a number of branches is taken to be a group of trees by those standing at a distance but others who know it (to be a single tree) tell them thus: "Those are not several trees, but a single tree stands there with many branches". Similarly texts of the kind (quoted above) are intended to inculcate the truth (the nature of reality) to those who perceive this diversified universe of names and forms and who are ignorant of the fact that names and forms are but the evolution of the single root-cause viz. the Atman. Every thing is an elaboration of the one only; here is no such entity as many. Again texts attributing unreality to the universe, texts postulating avidyā, illusion-texts, māyā-texts—all these are intended by way of figure to point to the non-eternality of the universe. Just as the mirage, the rope-serpent, the dream-world etc. make their appearance for a time and then disappear, so also the diversified world-spectacle which is evolved from Brahman appears and disappears so that it is on this analogy of emergence and subsidence that the world is figuratively spoken of as unreal and because the world is assigned (in this manner) the status of unreality, the illusoriness of its cognition also is (to be understood) evidently in a figurative sense. That the world is error-ridden as evidenced in texts like 'Indra with the aid of māyic activities appears as many', can be rightly explained (only) in a figurative sense. And the text "The one Atman alone is real" is pertinent because of his eternal nature. Very similar to (the text) "Cows and horses only are cattle, the rest however are no cattle" (in the sense that they are inferior in nature) is this (the above quoted text) to be understood. He who takes passages such as these in a literal sense would have to maintain that other cattle are no cattle and (maintain also) the literal sense of the text "The sun is the sacrificial post". If it be said

that there, it is contradicted by another *pramāṇa* (so that the literal interpretation of the passage—"The sun is the sacrificial post", has to be abandoned) that (reasoning) applies equally here. If it be said that the literal interpretation is unjustified on the ground that the passage ("The sun is the sacrificial post") is a eulogistic (*arthavāda*) statement even that is on a par with it here. The (ascription of) unreality to the world is for creating (an attitude of) detachment and the ascription of ultimate reality to *Ātman* is to create enthusiasm in the seekers of freedom. And this (Brahman-evolution) is evident from the fact that the lump of clay with its changes is adduced in illustration. (Everywhere i. e. in all inferential reasoning) the object of giving the example is to clearly elucidate the sentence containing the *prabandum* (*sādhya*). Hence "Just as with the apprehension of the clay-lump which constitutes the cause, everything that is but a transformation of clay becomes apprehended, the changed forms like the platter etc. being a creation of speech, a (mere) name, and the clay alone real, so also with the apprehension of the Reality, the world (which is evolved from it) becomes apprehended, the particular form indeed being a creation of speech, a mere name; what is called *sat*, that alone is real" (Chand, Up. VI-4)-when such a statement is made this is what is understood: just as the *vikāra* (changing form) is characterised by (the traits of) emergence and subsidence and is of considerable variety as evidenced in platter etc. constituting the world,-and just as the clay which everywhere (i. e. in all its changing forms) endures is their (*vikāras*) cause; and because as between cause and effect there is difference only in the *avasthā* (i. e. in the state in which a thing appears first as cause and then as effect), and no difference in regard to their real nature, so that from a knowledge of the cause all (that constitutes) the effect though not apprehended in its altered state is apprehended in its real nature, even so the world also which is characterised by emergence and subsidence, is ephemeral, and its cause, the *Ātman* is of the essence of reality, all-pervasive (i. e. accompanies all changes), and not liable to destruction; and when that (*Ātman*) is known, everything being identical with it (in the sense that it is evolved from it) though not apprehended in its particularised form becomes apprehended in the aggregate-This is what (the passage adduced in illustration) in substance means. Therefore this world of variety is an evolute of the sole entity-*Ātman* but not absolutely unreal. If it were wholly unreal like the horns of a hare how could it be (said to be) apprehended by the apprehension of Reality (*Ātman*)? When the clay-lump is apprehended the hare-horn is not apprehended (because it is unreal; it is only what is existent that can be the object of cognition and not what is non-existent); similar (i. e. as unreal as the horns of a hare) would be the world. Hence the very object intended would be frustrated⁴⁸. (What the *Sruti* means therefore is that)

(48) प्रलुप्तहानिरवस्थान-What is intended to be proved is that when the material cause is known the effect also is known since cause and effect are in essence identical. This would be frustrated if the knowledge of *Ātman* fails to convey the knowledge of the world-reality.

the Ātman though a single entity is designated as the separate self (jīva) due to the difference in the upādhis (delimitations) of the internal sense (antahkaraṇa), and because of the divergent character of the jīva the division of jīvas into those that are bound and those that are freed is justified.

118. This does not stand to reason. The evolution of Ātman who is of the nature of consciousness into the insentient world is improbable. If Ātman were one only there would be the experience (of each other's pain and pleasure etc.) in all bodies; (the same person would say) – I am Devadatta, myself I am Yeṇadatta—similarly in Devadatta's body I feel pleasure, and in Yeṇadatta's body I feel pain; just as one would say "in my feet there is the feeling of ease, in my head there is the feeling of pain" one would experience the pleasure and pain of all. If it be said that there is a well-regulated order since the (experiencing) minds are different we say 'no', because of its insentience: truly the mind does not experience pleasure and pain for it is insentient. Ātman on the other hand is the enjoyer and he being the same everywhere (i. e. in all jīvas) who could brush aside experience (i. e. one person experiencing pains and pleasures of others)? Hence this also is not a very appealing doctrine.

Thus ends the refutation of Ātma-evolution doctrine.

119. The Sāṃkhyas hold that Ātman is not single (i. e. they admit plurality of souls) and that the universe is evolved from Prakṛti. Sāṃkhya is twofold-atheistic and theistic. (This is what) the advocates of the atheistic doctrine say: Prakṛti which is insentient, is constituted of three guṇas and is otherwise termed Pradhāna and it changes into the world-form beginning with mahat and ending with particulars (i. e. gross objects like pot, cloth etc.) (all) for the enjoyment of the selves (jīvas). The advocates of the theistic doctrine also support this view; this alone is the difference: Prakṛti evolves into the world deriving support from Īśvara having the name of Puruṣa, who is untrammelled (lit. unconnected) by kleśa, karma, vipāka and āśaya.⁴⁹ Just as the seed having come in contact with a cultivated bit of land evolves owing to its contact with it into a mighty tree passing through the stages of sprout etc., even so the all-pervading Prakṛti having secured the support of the all-pervading Īśvara starts by its contact with Him the world-creation evolving gradually through mahat (intellect), ahaṃkāra (egotism), tanmātras (the elemental rudimentals) and so on ending in

(49) क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयैरपरा मृष्टः पुनश्च विशेषईश्वरः – Pātaṇjala-yogasūtra 1-24. क्लेश-अविद्या, अहिंसा, राग, द्वेष, अभिनिवेश-इतिषष्टेः; ignorance, egotism, desire, hate, attachment—these are the five kleśas—P. Sūt. II-3.

कर्म-पुण्यपापादिरूपम् धर्माधर्माः तेषांचकर्मजत्वात् उपचारात्कर्मत्वम्—merit and demerit are occasioned by Karma.

विपाक-कर्मफलभोगः enjoyment of the fruit of Karma.

आशय-पूर्वकृतकर्मणां वासना impressions left by the performance of karma in the past.

viśeṣas (particulars). In Itihāsas (such as the Mahābhārata) and Purāṇas the same doctrine is generally found. (These more or less adhere to the Sāṃkhya conception of creation). And this creation has prakṛti for its material cause; Īśvara however is only the instrumental cause; as for kṣetrajñas or individual selves⁵⁰ they are the experients (bhoktārah), and because Prakṛti is the cause of all effects it is the sole object of enjoyment. And that (Prakṛti) is a single principle pervading all (creation); it is the difference between the experients that is determinative of the classification of men into those who are bound and those who are liberated; to this effect is the scriptural text: "There is a single she-goat flecked with red, white and dark which gives birth to a manifold progeny of the self-same hue and her a he-goat follows with great love; but another (goat) discards the spotted one that revels in (worldly) pleasures."⁵¹ From this it is clear that Prakṛti which is composed of passion (red), goodness (white) and delusion (dark) and which is the object of enjoyment is a single (principle) and it has been already pointed out that the division into the bound and the liberated is due to the difference between the experients.

120. But what about the propriety of the Upaniṣadic texts declaring the singleness of the self? ⁵²

We say (they are justified) on the ground that they (the selves) are not dissimilar: the term bheda (difference) is well recognised in common usage as equivalent to dissimilarity. Now as regards things which are very like each other men in ordinary conversation say—"between this and this there exists no distinction of any kind". In the same manner no distinction is perceived to exist between the selves which occupy diverse bodies such as those of man, beast and bird when their association with the (gross) bodies is ignored and when they are apprehended in their true nature—very like the absence of distinction between the pollen grains of a lotus or between two atoms. It is in this sense only that texts bearing on unity and those discarding plurality (are set forth in the Scriptures). And the Lord Vāsudeva's saying conveys the same import:—"In a Brāhmaṇa of learning and culture, in a cow, in an elephant, also in a dog and in a dog-eater the wise perceive the same".⁵³ Again: "Indra (Īśvara) with his māyic powers manifests himself in many a shape." Here, what the passage means is that though in himself he is undifferentiated, Atman (self) through contact with the bodies of men, cattle etc. appears as if differentiated owing to bhrānti (illusion)⁵⁴. Those texts also which declare identity of the liberated jivas with Īśvara are justified on the ground that there is similarity in the highest degree (between jīva and Īśvara) and absence of distinction : in proof of

(50) For the use of the word kṣetrajña in the sense of individual selves vide Bh. G. XIII-2.

(51) Svet. Up. IV-5. cont.-S'amkara's commentary thereon.

(52) Texts like— "एकतया सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा", "एकोवशी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा".

(53) Bh. G. V-18.

(54) The point is that the selves are plural and similar in their intrinsic nature.

which we have another scriptural passage :— “When the enlightened man perceives the luminous Lord, the Creator, the Puruṣa, the matrix of Brahma (apara), then that man of wisdom having cast aside both merit and sin and getting rid of all impurities (i. e. all contact with prakṛti) shall attain absolute similarity (with Īśvara)”⁵⁵ Here, the liberated person is shown to attain *similarity* only, with Īśvara. Even the Lord Vāsudeva has said :— “They who having resorted to this knowledge have attained equality in attributes with me are not born at the Creation and not destroyed at the Dissolution”.⁵⁶ The Lord’s utterance : “The eternal Jīva in this world of jīvas is a portion of myself only”,⁵⁷ has to be interpreted as pointing to the relation between the master and the servant. As indeed the ministers are spoken of as the limbs (amśa-part) of the sovereign so the jīva is spoken of as the amśa of Īśvara. Otherwise (i. e. if identity of jīva and Īśvara is admitted) since jīva-hood comes to an end (as is the case in the doctrine of identity) eternity (attributed to jīva) becomes inexplicable; (without the separate existence of jīva, its eternity cannot be maintained). Other statements found in the Purāṇas such as “on the total destruction of nescience which generates notions of distinction who can presume distinction between atman (Jīva) and Brahman when there is none”? also have the same sense. It is nescience that is the source of the belief in the total distinction between the self and Īśvara when such distinction is non-existent, so that on the disappearance of nescience it vanishes naturally (i. e. the notion of absolute distinction). That there is distinction between the Supreme Person and the individual self is made clear in the Gīta :— “But distinct is the Supreme Person and spoken of as Paramātmā”;⁵⁸ “The witness, approver, supporter, enjoyer, the Supreme Lord, and spoken of also as Paramātmā is He—the Supreme Person in this body”.⁵⁹

Let us close this discussion which has been much prolonged.

Therefore this creation of the world has Prakṛti as its material cause so that the objection (that Prakṛti) is not the material cause is refuted.⁶⁰

121. Now this is to be said : How can Prakṛti being singular in form (ekarūpa) transform itself into the diversified world of men, beasts and birds? The cause which is not marked by diversity is incompetent to produce an effect which is marked by diversity. If it be argued that diversity (results from) the diversity of dharma and adharma which belong to

(55) Mund. Upd. III, 1-13.

(56) Bh. G. XIV-2.

(57) Bh. G. XV-7.

(58) Bh. G. XV. 17

(59) Bh. G. XIII-22 मर्ता is the correct reading for कर्ता

(60) The Sāṃkhya conclude by saying that their doctrine is not open to the objection raised against the Brahmadāins viz. that Brahma who is of the essence of consciousness-*citśvarūpa*, cannot be the cause of the insentient world; because according to them it is the insentient prakṛti that at the time of the world-creation serves as the material cause.

the jīva (ksetrajña) and which aid in the act of creation, (we say) no. Because dharma and adharma (merit and demerit) are the functions of the mind (vṛtti of antaḥkaraṇa), and antaḥkaraṇa belongs to the class of effects; ⁶¹ because everything of the nature of effect beginning with mahat suffers dissolution in Prakṛti at the time of the universal Dissolution, dharma and adharma also cease to exist in that state (of dissolution) so that diversity cannot be accounted for from their competency, (i. e. on the strength of merit and demerit the world-complexity cannot be explained). What is the cause of Prakṛti evolving into mahat etc.? If it be said that it is its very nature it would follow that evolution would be taking place always; then dissolution would be meaningless. If it be said that transformation takes place at the desire of Īśvara (we say) this cannot be. Desire is incompatible with Īśvara who is free from all kleśas and in whom all wants have been eradicated (because He is satysamkalpa— all his wants have found fulfilment) and desire also being a quality of antaḥkaraṇa does not exist at that time (antaḥkaraṇa is absent at the time of creation and as such, desire which is its quality cannot exist). Moreover when the dissolution in Prakṛti takes place Prakṛti alone and the jīvas in their pristine condition (kevalam) remain; and jīvas are all unassociated with any of the qualities because all of them are of the nature of sentence. And change though wrought by merit and demerit does not affect the selves for they (merit and demerit) cannot constitute the characteristics of selves, (but) are the functions of the mind which as has already been stated is non-existent at the time (of creation). If then it should be urged that Prakṛti at the time of creation binds the selves by originating the bodies (for them) when (by their very nature) they (selves) are devoid of virtue and vice, and devoid also of specific attributes, then it might indiscriminately bind those who in the former creation were the liberated and alike those who were the unliberated. For instance, those who in a former creation having performed aśvamedha had not yet reaped the reward and those who had perpetrated the (the crime of) killing a Brāhman—all would be classed together owing (according to your view) to the fact that merit and demerit acquired in the past had become extinct.

122. When it is said that merit and demerit have become extinct

Sāṃkhya.

it does not mean total destruction but it is only the obscuration of effect in the cause that is vināśa (extinction). And creation is nothing more than the manifestation of the effects which are lying (concealed) within the cause. Origination of things which are totally absent can never happen as otherwise the origination of a hare's horn would become feasible. And if what is non-existent should come into being there would be indiscriminate happenings (lit. all things might occur in all places); order (of any kind), there would be none, as is observed when cloth is produced from threads and pot from clay and so on. Thus they (Sāṃkhyas) say: "Because non-existents cannot come into being, because the material is requisite

(61) अन्तःकरणस्य.....प्राप्तिवत् according to the Sāṃkhya categories antaḥkaraṇa is a distant evolute of Prakṛti.

(so that the effect must be in the cause), because things do not occur indiscriminately, because what is potent (i. e. having the śakti) can produce the product (say, clay which alone has the potency to produce pot), and because there is such a thing as kāraṇa (i. e. that a particular thing is the cause of a particular thing) kārya (effect) is sat ⁶² (i. e. the effect is not non-existent but is there in the cause). In support thereof (is quoted the following):—"Of the non-existent there is no being, of the existent there is no non-being". ⁶³ This is Lord Vāsudeva's statement. Hence variety in the world-creation is reasonable, dependent as it is on the potency (śakti) of dharma etc. in which state they (dharma etc.) remain during Pralaya.

123. It is not so—Pot is not perceived either when it is in the state of clay-lump or in the state of kapāla (the two halves) for (otherwise) it would contradict anupalabdhī (pramāṇa). ⁶⁴ The (Gītā) text however, "of the unreal there is no being etc." is intended to describe the nature of Atman; what was begun before (Gītā, II-12, with the words), "never did I cease to exist, nor these rulers of men; and no one of us will ever hereafter cease to exist", viz. the establishment of the eternity of Atman—that alone is here stated. There is no origination of the Atman that is non-existent, and there is no destruction of the Atman that is existent; all selves are eternal being subject neither to (the accident of) origination nor of destruction. But it is not with the object of establishing the eternity of the whole assemblage of the effects (i. e. the world-variety), for as already stated the world (effect) is not omnipresent (Vibhu) and (the view that kārya is in kāraṇa) militates against anupalabdhī. As regards the statement, that the pot existed first in the form of clay, made on the ground that upādāna (material) and upādeya (the thing made out of the material) are identical, (it has to be pointed out that) from that fact alone the existence of the kārya (pot) cannot be adduced. The pot which is in the state of clay cannot fetch water. Even so dharma and adharma existing not in their real nature but as identical with prakṛti (kāraṇarūpeṇa) are incapable of producing their kārya (i. e. the creation of the world) so that (it is evident that) the variegated world does not result from them.

(62) सत्कार्यम्—The Sāṃkhyas advocate satkārya as opposed to the asatkārya vāda of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. In the sphere of causation it is urged that the effect is already in the cause, only in a latent condition. This pre-existence of the effect in its cause must be understood to refer only to the material cause. The pot is already in the clay before it is fashioned by the potter. The Naiyāyikas on the other hand hold a view which is the very opposite of this. The pot to them is an entirely new product.

(63) Bh. G. XI-16.

(64) दृश्यादक्षेत्रविरोधात्—anupalabdhī or non-cognition is an independent means of valid knowledge by which all the four kinds of abhāvas are cognised. When what is fit to be perceived is not perceived (dṛśyādars'anavirodhāt) here is room for anupalabdhī.

Hence in the case under consideration when the pot is not actually seen either in its state as clay or kapāla, if we presume it is there, we will be going counter to anupalabdhī.

Further there is no *pramāṇa* to prove that *prakṛti* undergoes evolution in the order of *mahat* (intellect) etc., for validity cannot be ascribed to human statements in regard to objects whose existence cannot be substantiated by other *pramāṇas* (like perception or inference). And the Vedas also being the work of *Puruṣa* (*Īśvara*) are not valid, like the utterance of other *puruṣas*, (the theistic *Sāṃkhya*s hold that *Īśvara* is the author of the Veda).

The validity (of Vedic testimony) may be admitted by accepting the beginninglessness of the creation and dissolution series and on the strength of the eternity of words which are permanently related to the objects (they signify) and of the Vedas, which eternity is vouched for, on the analogy of the rotation of seasons, by the origination of objects having similar names, potency, and function as evidenced by such statements as, that in each creation, "He (*Prajāpati*) created in the beginning each distinct from the other, with the words of the Veda only, all names, actions, as also distinct spheres (to which their operations are confined)"; even then the question would remain that, because a single individual, viz. *Prajāpati* has followed the traditional procedure, the Veda is the work of a person (not *apauruṣeya*).

If again, in conformity with the statement "Eighty eight thousand are those who carry on the tradition," it is held that several *maharṣis* having recollected the Veda which they had studied in a different creation, just like men who when awake recollect things they have experienced before sleep, carry on the tradition and as such, (it may be argued) the doubt of human agency (in relation to the Veda) is dispelled⁶⁵ and its eternity is assured, even then it is impossible to admit the creation of a world without the material (required). And (the doctrine) that *Prakṛti* is the material cause has already been refuted. As to the *Upaniṣadic* declarations regarding creation and dissolution, as well as the *Purāṇic*, they have to be interpreted as *arthavādas* (i. e. laudatory statements; figurative, and not literal).

Well, let it be so (i. e. we will concede the opponent's contention); even then our position remains unassailed "because (our fundamental doctrines)—the eternity of the relation (between the word and its import) and the validity of the Veda are not annulled.

Here ends the refutation of the *Sāṃkhya* doctrine.

124. The *Vaiśeṣika*s on the other hand accepting only human agency in regard to the word-import relation, and also in regard to the Vedas and so desiring to establish by inference, creation and dissolution, as well as *Īśvara*, formulate thus:—Of three kinds is the assemblage of objects: those admitted to be of sentient origin like pot etc., those admitted to be not of that origin as ether (which is eternal), and those of doubtful sentient origin as mountain, grass-sprouts etc. Taking the last they

(65) कृतकालीन, कृतकत्वार्थक— The question would arise that the Veda was the fresh work of *Prajāpati* though it might be similar to its counterpart in the previous creation.

argue thus:—The world etc. are the work of one possessing intelligence, because they are *kārya* (product or effect) like pot etc. and *kāryatva* of the world etc. results, on the analogy of pot etc. from their possessing parts (*sāvayavatva*). Which then is the *samavāyikāraṇa* (constitutive or intimate cause) of the world etc.? ⁶⁶ Well, (this is the answer): the aggregate of the atoms of earth, water, fire, and air constitutes the *samavāyikāraṇa*, (each aggregate) of its own product viz. earth, water, fire and air: for us there is no destruction of atoms in *pralaya* as for the *Sāmkhyas*. The (first) products having constituent parts (*kārya-dravyāṇi*) however, beginning with the binaries (*dvyanuka*) perish, all their parts suffering disintegration at the will of *Īśvara*. As for atoms, they remain mutually disjointed; and ether etc., as also individual selves with their several *dharma*s and *adharma*s remain (unaffected). Again at the time of creation, (the process of origination is as follows): depending upon *Īśvara*'s will and the *adr̥ṣṭa* (i. e. *dharma* and *adharma*) of the *jīvas*, movements set in, in the atoms. Due to such (movements) the atoms of the four kinds combine,—two of each kind coming together in the order of binaries, and start creating, each its own kind, the four elements such as earth etc. Because of the infinite variety in the *adr̥ṣṭa* of the *jīvas*, constituting as it does the instrumental cause, the atoms start originating, when at the bidding of *Īśvara* particular combinations (of atoms) are produced, different bodies, as those born from the womb (*viviparous*) those born of eggs (as birds), those sprouting (from the ground as plants) and those generated by sweat (as insects).

125. This also is groundless:—movement cannot take place in the atoms at the mere will (of the Lord) without (conscious) effort. Even now it is perceived that
 Refutation of the Vais'eṣika view. bodily movement is dependent upon effort prompted by will. If it be said that *Īśvara* also does make an effort, (we say) it cannot be; effort is impossible in the case of one who is incorporeal. Though all-pervading the selves put forth effort only in the region of the body (i. e. as embodied souls) and not outside. Hence effort presumes corporeality. And because at the time of dissolution all products perish, *Īśvara*'s body also having perished, how could the bodiless *Īśvara* make any effort? Further as in the case of the liberated (selves) even will is impossible to one who is disembodied. Nor is even *jñāna* possible owing to the absence of the sense-organs, (for it is the sense-organs that are the gateways of knowledge). If it be said that his (*Īśvara*'s) *jñāna* is eternal, will is eternal, and effort is eternal, (we say) no, because non-eternity is invariably concomitant with all *jñāna*, will, and effort. The logical form of the inference can be stated thus :—The world (so also the rest) is not the product of a disembodied being nor is it produced by one whose effort is eternal, whose will is eternal and whose knowledge is eternal, because it (world) belongs to the category of *kārya* (product), like pot.

(66) समवायिकारण —the constitutive or the material cause e. g. the parts—the two halves of the pot are related to the whole (the pot) by *samavāyikāraṇa*. If the earth is a product, the question naturally arises as to the relation by which its parts constitute the whole.

126. Is it not a fact that even in the origination of pot there is
 Vais'eṣika. Īśvara's agency so that (your) example is devoid
 of probandum? (i. e. the inference is impossible
 owing to the absence of the Sādhya viz. asārirakartṛkatva in the
 example, viz. pot, for Īśvara, the disembodied Being is the maker of
 all).

Yes, even then, (in the origination) of pot, since there is also the
 Mimāṃsaka. agency of the potter it is not merely Īśvara's
 agency. Hence the syllogism should be stated
 thus:—The world (so also the rest) is not entirely the product of a
 disembodied being, because it belongs to the category of kārya, like
 pot; and because it is a substance like ether,⁶⁷ so that both the hetu
 (middle term) and the example are absolutely faultless. (Again a
 direct counter syllogistic argument has to be advanced, (viz.) the world
 has no sentient being (Īśvara) as its maker, because of the absence of
 an embodied being's agency as in the case of ether. If by admitting
 Īśvara's corporeality as eternal, it be understood that Īśvara remains
 embodied even at the time of dissolution, then sāyayavatva (the state
 of possessing parts, because Īśvara is admitted to be śarīrin) in Īśvara's
 body being anāikāntika cannot establish kāryatva of the world.⁶⁸
 And agency of an embodied being does not hold good in the case of
 grass sprouts etc. because it offends anupalabdhi, (inference by non-
 perception). Further, each effect is the outcome of a distinct effort:
 there is one effort for the movement of feet and another for the lifting
 of arms; as such though effort in Īśvara be eternal, because it is one
 only, it cannot be the means of the origination of the variegated kārya
 (viz. the world of infinite variety), so that the effort (on the part of
 Īśvara) is indeed fruitless, (i. e. powerless to create such a world). If
 however endless efforts to fit in with endless effects should always
 exist in Īśvara, then effort which brings about dissolution and which
 causes the diremption of atoms being present even at the time of
 creation and (effort) which brings together (the atoms) and which is
 the cause of creation, being present even at the time of dissolution,
 there could be no creation and no dissolution because they are
 mutually destructive. The assertion that the variety in effects can be
 accounted for from the variety in the adṛṣṭa of the jīvas— even that does
 not stand to reason. The infinite variety of effects cannot be established

(67) वस्तुत्वादेव्योमवत्—Because ether though a substance is not a product and as
 such it may be regarded as not having been created by a disembodied Being. It is
 also made clear that in the origination of the pot the agency of the potter is not
 excluded. Hence in both these examples the probandum, viz. the absence of
 asārirakartṛkatva is evident, whereas the Vais'eṣika contention is that there is
 asārirakartṛkatva (i. e. Īśvara's agency) in every act of creation.

(68) नक्षित्यादेः सार्यत्वेनापद्येत्—The Vais'eṣika contention was that the world being
 composed of parts must be a product—kārya. Now the Mimāṃsaka points out that this
 reasoning is defective—vyabhiçārin; for instance Īśvara is not a product though it
 may be supposed that he is eternally embodied—avayavin. Hence there is no invariable
 concomitance between 'possessing parts' and 'product'. When the world's being a
 product is disproved the contention that it is created by an intelligent being falls to
 the ground.

merely on the basis of variety in adṛṣṭa (unperceived causes, viz. dharmā and adharma) without the variety of perceived causes. Even with a hundred adṛṣṭas the palm-tree will not come into being without the palm-seed. If it be said that even without the seed everything becomes possible by Īśvara's prowess, (we say), no, for there is no pramāṇa (to substantiate it). If the eternity of the Vedas is once assured then on the strength of their authority even Īśvara's will and prowess, as also creation and desolution might be established, on the analogy of the return of seasons, or they might not ⁶⁷. On the other hand to those who pay no regard to the Vedas and who proceed to apply to things wholly supersensuous (like Īśvara, Dharma etc.) inferential reasoning as (they do) in the case of perceivable objects like (fire) in the hill, an attitude of indifference is the only answer. Hence the discussion is closed. The conclusion is that even at the time of creation (it cannot be accepted that Īśvara) brings about the relation (between the words and the objects they signify).

127. And impossible too, the fixing of the relation of all words (with their meanings). When any word remains unconnected with any sense whatever, then how is it possible to fix a relation (between the word and the object)? He who wishes to fix a relation has to do so by means of some sentence—for example by some such sentence as "the cow is one possessing a dew-lap". And because the word (possessing dew-lap) is not connected with any object its significance is unknown so that the person intending to establish the relation cannot utter the word sāsnaḍimatva (possessing dewlap) to denote the object (in view). Similarly the significative potency of the gestures of hand etc. cannot be established.

128. If it be so (the objector may say) the unestablished (not understood) relation cannot be brought home to another (i. e. no description of such a relation to make one understand it is possible). No doubt so far as the speaker is concerned the utterance of the sentence with the object of describing the relation is appropriate since the relation is well known to him but still how could children (bālāḥ used to denote men ignorant of the sense of words) who are listeners and to whom the significance of no word is known understand the relation on hearing the sentence? Hence like the fixing of relation (karaṇa), kathana (description) also is impossible.

There is no such defect. One who attempts to make the relation (understood by the listener) is not succorless like the man who attempts to fix (relations between words and objects)—because means are available; it is against (all) experience to say that learners cannot be made to understand for want of means and it is perceived that children who are absolutely ignorant of the meanings of any of the words learn the (significant) relation from grown-up men. Further there certainly is an expedient for children:—

(69) नृत्वा—It may be that the mention of Īśvara, his prowess and his glory, is mere arthavāda and so there would be neither creation nor dissolution. The Mimāṃsaka might even tolerate the acceptance of Īśvara provided the eternity of the Veda remains unassailed.

it is not that they come to know (the relation between the word, and its sense) necessarily from the use by adults of an explanatory sentence, but when elderly persons who are cognizant of the relations carry on conversation for transacting their own business children who are listening close by grasp the relation. When a person having been asked by some one to 'bring a cow' fetches an animal with a dew-lap then the child near at hand comprehends the sense in this manner—"because this person after hearing these words (vākya) was engaged in this act (viz. 'bringing the cow') therefore from that vākya this (particular) meaning ('bringing the cow') is revealed. Now (in the first instance) the significance (of the sentence) was understood in a general hazy manner; therefore, when the same vākya is used several times, (by removing certain words and introducing new ones), with the help of positive and negative concomitants (the significance) of the words forming parts of the sentence and of the stem and suffix forming parts of words will be grasped by the child, construing analytically the import of the sentence and of the words. Hence the relation is not due to human agency, so that the necessity of human interference is ruled out and in consequence the validity of the Vedas (as pramāṇa) is established independently of all other pramāṇas. Thus ends the refutation of the objection against the eternity of relation.

129. It was urged that since the reward does not follow immediately

after the performance of the yāga, the Vedic
 Discussion on declaration that reward in the shape of cows etc.
 çitrāyāga. would result from çitrāyāga ⁷⁰ is to be dis-
 counted. Yes, this would be so if there were only five pramāṇas
 beginning with perception (i. e. omitting śabda). Then by the immediate
 perception only of the fulfilment of the (promise of) reward it (çitrāyāga)
 would become the means (of securing the reward, viz. cows etc.) and
 not otherwise. But because śabda also generates knowledge it must be
 (elevated to the rank of) a pramāṇa and as such we have to grant that
 çitrāyāga is the means of bringing about the reward in the shape of
 cows so that even if (the reward is) not perceived immediately its being
 the means becomes tenable.

130. Was it not pointed out that it (Veda) loses its title to validity
 since it offends another pramāṇa (viz. non-perception or anupalabdhi)?
 (We say), no, because it (i. e. opposition to anupalabdhi) does not exist.
 Śabda (Vedic statement, "perform Çitrā etc.") does not say that çitrā
 is the means of immediate reward. If it did so there would be contradic-
 tion. What is understood is that it is merely the means (of paśuphala)
 since the words import only so much and since through the inter-
 position of apūrvā its (śabda) being the means of securing the reward,
 though at some other time, like the taking of oil, (which produces its
 beneficent result some time after it is taken) could be maintained.
 Again it was said that prior to the actual performance (of the

(70) चित्रादीनाम्—Çitrā is the name of a yāga; it is so called because of the
 variety of ingredients used therein—curds, honey, clarified butter, milk, fried yava
 grains (dhāna), water, rice. The presiding deity is prajāpati. The text runs thus—
 चित्रयायजेतपशुकामः.

çitrâyāga) while determining the sense of the śāstrāic text the question of apūrva was not involved. It is so in a sense. But still, later he (i.e. the agent in the yāga) conceives thus:—When the Veda (sābda) merely declared (by means of the text bearing on çitrā yāga) it to be the means it was erroneously understood by me to be the direct means and now I understand it otherwise (i.e. that it is not the immediate means of securing the promised reward); therefore it is certain that (it) will eventuate at some other time through some channel. Further even before (the performance of yāga) it is possible to anticipate apūrva. Unity (i. e. joint action) of the several auxiliary karmas and the principal karmā which are all of momentary existence is impossible without necessitating apūrva, and as there is need for a visible cause (such as the actual gifting of a cow and not merely the invisible apūrva) to bring it about, it (the reward) cannot come into being instantaneously, so that apūrva must of necessity be admitted even at the time of discussing the Vedic text. And the phala does not consist merely in the (coming into) possession of the cows; the benefit to be enjoyed lasts for a long time and that must be rendered possible by some agency which lasts as long (and this is no other than apūrva which endures the whole period of enjoyment). And because kārya (yāga) does not endure till the reward accrues and till (the period of enjoyment is over) apūrva has to be admitted and through its agency the distant fruition of karma becomes feasible so that the testimony of the śāstra is not vitiated (merely) because the reward is not immediately perceived.

Here then is the refutation of the objection against çitrā.

131. The Vedic text, "This sacrificer who (has maintained the sacrificial fire) immediately (after death) goes to Heaven armed with the sacrificial utensils" (yajñayudha), has been interpreted as contradicting perception, since the word 'etat'—(the demonstrative 'this') points to the actually perceived body armed with the sacrificial appliances.⁷¹ It is answered thus:—Because this is a laudatory text (arthavāda) and subserves another, there is no flaw if it should offend a different pramāṇa when taken in its literal sense. And there is no contradiction either. Journey to svarga is not ascribed to the body by this text. To whom then? To the ātman whose body this is; and that ātman is spoken of, by figuratively assuming identity between the body and the embodied, as possessed of yajñayudha which in reality is found on the body, and (spoken of too) as being actually perceived; or (it may be that) the passage of ātman to svarga is attributed figuratively to the body. Hence there is no contradiction. The term yajamāna (agent) signifies him only (i. e. ātman) since ātman is both the over-lord and the performer (agent or karta). And it is not possible to assert like the follower of Kapila that the soul (ātman) is

(71) स एष यज्ञायुधी—Here the demonstrative pronoun points to the actually perceived body as going to heaven with the sacrificial utensils; but since the body is consumed in the fire, the opponent impugns the authority of the Vedic text. The point is urged that the Veda contradicts perception.

not the agent⁷², because it (such a statement) offends the s'ruti, and it is invariably perceived that the words kartṛtva and bhokṛtva (agency and enjoyment) relate to the same substrate, (i. e. the same person who is the agent of an action is also the enjoyer of its fruit). Just as here (we have the statement), 'The agent goes to the world of svarga' (here the word 'yajamāna' signifies agent, and 'svargalokam yāti' signifies enjoyment), so (elsewhere): "He who knowing (all about s'yenayāga) performs (Garudaçayana) surely attains plenty"; "He who thus performs Dvirātra yāga attains surely svargaloka". In the upanishads also (it is stated) "By his merely wishing, (his) pitṛs appear before him"⁷³ so that by using the genetive case (asya) kartṛtva (agency) in relation to samkalpa (wish) is attributed to ātman (and he is the bhokta because he has the satisfaction of seeing the manes of his ancestors). And though ātman is omnipresent (sarvagata and so vibhu) his direct agency in yāga, jñāna, prayatna, samkalpa and the rest is evident; and we certainly do not, like the Vais'eṣikas admit that movement (which is of the body) itself (spanda) is kriyā, for if we did so, then ascription of agency to ātman would be inappropriate; what constitutes kriyā is dhātvartha (meaning of the verbal root) in general. Even in regard to movement kartṛtva belongs to him (ātma) only by his being an indirect agent.⁷⁴ It is indeed by his effort that ātman sets the body in motion; directly it cannot happen, for movement in one who is omnipresent is non est—with this in view (viz. that direct agency is impossible) both in the purāṇas and upanishads non-agency of ātman is advocated.

132. Now, which is the pramāṇa for establishing the existence of ātman as distinct from the body? The lūṅga or

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mark (from which ātman could be inferred) is respiration as well as (the feeling of) pleasure etc.—the word prāṇana (breathing) is used to indicate the effort (prayatna) which serves as the cause of the specific function, viz. the upward and downward movement of breath of the chest termed prāṇana. That (i. e. prāṇana), and pleasure etc. do not constitute the characteristic attributes of the body since they do not last as long as the body does (in the case of a dead man the body is there but not prāṇana etc.). These special qualities (viśeṣaṅga)⁷⁵ which

(72) अकर्तृत्वमुक्तम्—In the doctrine of the Sāṃkhyas Puruṣa corresponding to the Self or Ātman is passive, all activity being assigned to Prakṛti or Pradhāna. While the Puruṣa is the enjoyer he is not the doer.

(73) Chand. Up. VIII - ii - 1.

(74) प्रयोजकत्वेन—Agency is of two kinds: direct (svatantra) and indirect (prayojaka). It is indirect here, seeing that for the movement of the body effort of the self is necessary; the body itself is the direct agent.

(75) कार्ये दृश्यवतिनो विशेष गुणाः—The viśeṣaṅgas or specific qualities are: intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, colour, taste, smell, touch, vicidity, natural fluidity, fate (dharma and adharma), impressions and sound. Colour etc. are bodily qualities and they disappear either when the substance in which they inhere perishes or when opposite qualities take their place as when the dark colour of the pot is replaced by red with overheating. But breathing and pleasure etc. cease even when the body exists as when a man is dead. Hence they are not bodily qualities. As contrasted with the effect-substances the eternal substances (nityadravya) are ether, space, time, soul, mind.

inhere in effect-substances (like pot), such as colour etc. perish either by an opposite quality (taking their place) or by the destruction of the substance (in which they inhere); prāṇana etc. however even without it (i. e. even when the draya, viz. body is not destroyed) perish (as evidenced) in the dead state, so that they are not the attributes of the body. Even so jñāna (consciousness) since it does not last as long as the body does is not the property of the body. Again the qualities of the body like colour etc. which are objects of perception are, apprehended by means of perception as well by others as by himself. As for pleasure etc. though they are cognisable by (one's own) perception ⁷⁶ are not fit objects of perception by others. Hence they are not bodily qualities. And these two (reasons, viz. not being co-extensive with the body and not being cognised by the perception of others) dispelling the idea that pleasure etc. are bodily properties indicate that they are the qualities of something else. That something else is the ātman. Moreover all the special qualities being indeed resident in the cause become (themselves) the qualities of the effect-substances (such as pot etc.). ⁷⁷ And sentience (gaitānya) does not exist in the earth-atoms which constitute the cause of śarīra so that how could it happen that sentience is the property of the body? Hence Çetana (the sentient self) is distinct (from the body).

133. But some one says thus:—In all cognitions whatsoever, the self (ātman) stands revealed. Otherwise (i. e. if such revelation is not admitted) there would be no distinction between one's own knowledge and that of another. ⁷⁸ The body however which is an aggregate of hands, feet etc. is not so revealed (i. e. unlike the self which is revealed in every cognition). ⁷⁹ Therefore the self is distinct from the body.

(76) "Cognitions, pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, and volition are apprehended (svapratyakṣa) as the result of a conjunction (samyoga) of two factors, internal organ and soul" — I. L. E. pp. 111-12.

(77) सर्वे एव विशेष गुणाः &c:—The qualities of pot must be resident in its constituents viz. kapālas. Hence what is perceived in the effect must be found in the cause. If sentience is the quality of the body it must be found in the earth-atoms which constitute the body; but it is not. Hence sentience is not a quality of the body, and ātman whose quality is sentience is necessarily distinct from the body.

(78) कश्चिदिति—The reference here is to the Prābhākara school according to which perception is defined as Sākṣātprattiḥ, direct apprehension, pertaining to the apprehended object, to the apprehending person, and to the apprehension itself. This distinctive view is known as tripitipratyakṣavāda. Into every cognition therefore there enters the apprehending self as apart from the cognition and the cognised object. It is thus, says Prābhākara that we prove the existence of the ātman (i. e. the apprehending self) and not from the fact of pleasure and pain etc. which are qualities of the internal sense and as such cannot establish the existence of the self. cf. P. P. p. 148.

(79) The cognition does not take the form—'the body which is an aggregate of limbs, knows'.

That does not stand to reason.⁸⁰ Though there is no cognition of the aggregation (*sanniveśa*) the bodily manifestation is possible. It is not that the aggregate only is the *Sarira*; *sanniveśa* is (only) the property (*dharma*) of the body and it happens that even where there is no manifestation of the *dharma* there is the manifestation of the *dharmin* (i. e. the object possessing the property). Otherwise the revelation of the self even, would not result, since in the cognitions of objects (*arthavṛttiṣu*) there is no revelation of omnipresence etc. which are its (self) characteristics. And it is not inevitable that in the cognitions of objects there should be the manifestation of the cogniser. It is the object only that is revealed there (i. e. in all situations of knowledge) and not the cogniser. Nor is there no distinction between one's own cognition and that of another. Still this distinction is not occasioned by the cogniser being revealed (in the act of cognition), but (it must be understood that) something manifests itself to some one and not to another and this (fact) alone constitutes the distinction and none else. Hence *ātman*'s existence as an entity distinct from the body is established not on the ground of the revelation of *ātman* (in cognitions) but only from the proof already mentioned—that since knowledge, pleasure, etc. cannot be the characteristics of the body their substratum (*āśraya*) is different and that itself is *ātman*.

134. The *Saugatas*⁸¹ observe (as follows):—"If *prāṇa*, pleasure etc.

The Buddhistic doctrine of Self. belonged to the category of quality then it would be right to postulate a *guṇin* (i. e. a substratum of the qualities; here it is the *ātman*); for us that is not an approved fact because with that (*jñāna*) alone everything could be accounted for." Mere *jñāna* without an *āśraya* (i. e. a locus) is not an impossibility and why not admit *jñāna* as an entirely independent entity? Pleasure etc. which are the objects of *jñāna* (in reality they are not different from *jñāna* but only its aspects) are independent only, because of the non-perception of a separate *āśraya* (of them). In the cognition, "I cognize the blue," it is *jñāna* (knowledge) only that is determined as *jñātā* (knower) through 'fictitious diversifications', and there is nothing other (than that) because of the absence of any *pramāṇa*.

135. Since knowledge is momentary how could recollection, desire and recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) arise, on the next day in regard to an object perceived the previous day? When not experienced by oneself they (i. e. recollection, desire and recognition) cannot take place:—of an object perceived by *Devadatta*, *Yajnadata*'s recollection etc. cannot take place

(80) The *Bhāṭṭa* contention is that in the cognition 'I know' it is not only the apprehending self that is manifest but also the body which delimits it (*avaścchedaka*) so that we would be obliged to attribute *ātmavā* to the body also.

(81) The term "*saugata*" must here be restricted to the *Yogačāra*, the upholder of the doctrine of subjectivism according to which the existence of external objects is denied. The whole furniture of the world is a mental construct the only reality admitted being *vijñāna*. "In the case of each *vijñāna* we must assume the fictitious diversification of knower, knowledge and known so that the subject and the object are only aspects of *vijñāna* or knowledge itself" - O. I. P., p. 219.

Answer:—Yes, it is true, they (recollection etc.) cannot take place if there is difference in the thought-series (ātmasantānabhedha), but it is seen that in the same thought-series what is cognized by one jñāna (in the series) can be the object of recollection etc. to a subsequent jñāna (of that series). Indeed it is nowhere seen that the perceptor and the recollector are one, for nowhere has an enduring personality been observed. Hence knowledge itself is the knower and there is no distinct knower.

Bhāṭṭa:—Here is the refutation:—"Between the agent (draṣṭā) who recognises his own self as relating to the past and the subsequent times, who (as such) is an enduring personality, and vijñāna which perishes the next moment there is unmistakable distinction". In case (singleness) of knower is postulated (by us) in order to avoid the difficulty of explaining the recognition of the object then perhaps your answer, based on the cognition-series would be sufficient. But when the knower is the one person recognised as connected both with the past and the present as is evident in the statement, "I who perceived (some object) in the past, am the same person perceiving (it now)," then because the identity of the knower is apprehended by this recognition itself, and because vijñāna is momentary, therefore a distinct jñātā (knower) must be accepted as existing.

136. Is it (your view) that the notion 'aham' (ego-consciousness) has the knower as its object? If so, the body itself

Objection. is the object of the notion 'aham' because it is the common substrate to which the notion of leanness etc. is referred as when we say—"I know, I am lean, I am fat, I go." And leanness etc. cannot be attributed to ātman who is vibhu (all-embracing).

Answer:—It is undisputed that ego-cognition has the knower as its object. He who cognises (parāmrśati), cognises himself as 'aham' and others as 'idam' (this). As such it is beyond doubt that it (aham-notion) has jñātā as its object. And cognisability by the body has already been refuted. It is because of the most intimate connection (between the self and the body) that the fictitious knowledge of a common substrate arises just like the notion of 'hot water' and the notion of the 'glowing iron-ball'. (when in reality heat is the property of fire and not of water or iron-ball).

Likewise there is the apprehension of distinctness (between ātman and body) as in (the statement) 'This my body is lean' for the genitive case (of 'aham' viz. mama) shows that the meaning of 'aham' is distinct from the body; as for the body, it relates to something external and is indicated by (the demonstrative) 'this' (and not by the personal pronoun 'I'). Hence, because of this manifestation of distinctness and because of the fact that the body for the reasons already given is devoid of consciousness, the apprehension of non-distinctness is to be explained as due to illusion caused by the defect of intimate relation. The manifestation of the feelings of pleasure, fear and pain in an infant as commonly observed becomes inexplicable unless on the supposition that such feelings have reference to the memory of past experiences. Some who

have developed the power of seeing into their past births (jātimarāḥ) even in these days are seen to exist, who can narrate an obscure (secret) event of a past birth so that the distinction between the body and the self is (also) demonstrated by pratyakṣa.

137. Even then these reasons cannot clearly demonstrate the distinction between the body and the self.
Objection.

Answer:—But still even non-distinction is not clear, because of the apprehension of distinction as in (the statement) 'my body'. When what exactly is real (i. e. whether distinction or non-distinction) remains in doubt it has to be decided either by śrutarthāpatti⁸² or by direct śruti. The texts 'Let him sacrifice who wishes svarga' etc. are inexplicable unless there is one who is other than the body, who is fit to enjoy the things of the other world, and who is the agent (in the sacrifice) and therefore they (the texts) presume such a person (i. e. one who endures after the death of the body). The Upaniṣads directly uphold what by implication has been established by those texts:— "Lo ! ātman is unperishing", and the rest. Hence it is evident that there exists a knower who is separate from the body, who is of such a nature as can be apprehended by mental perception, and cognised in the ego-notion.

138. How then is it possible that knowability could be attributed to the knower?⁸³ It cannot happen that Prābhākara objection. one and the same entity could be both subject and object because the action cannot have its subject as its object (i. e. cannot revert to itself). Hence what is meant by the 'I-notion' (ahamvṛtti) is nothing other than the 'pot-notion'. In the cognition of pot only, the self manifests itself resembling the object (but is not really the object, it is knower only). This is what is stated (by the Prābhākaras).

Bhāṭṭa:—What is it that is meant by "incompatibility of action in ātman — (kriyāvirodha)?"

Prābhākara:—The meaning is that when one is agent in a particular act, that act does not produce its result in oneself only (in other words, the subject and the object cannot be identical in any act).

(82) Arthāpatti or presumption is of two kinds : drṣṭārthāpatti and śrutarthāpatti. (1) "You have information that Čaitra is alive; but you do not find him in his house. Ergo, he is out". (2) "You are told of one Devadatta who is fat and does not eat by day. You draw out of this statement the implication that he eats by night." (I. L. E. p. 319). The former is an illustration of drṣṭārthāpatti and the latter śrutarthāpatti — vide A. p. 355. Here in the text the examples adduced are both from the Scriptures and the Čandrikā pertinently raises the question how they can convince one who is no believer in the Veda. The answer given is that even apart from the Scriptural authority the existence of a distinct ātman can be established by the reasons given above.

(83) कथं, 'कथं' raises an objection. To silence the materialist Čarvāka it was pointed out that in the 'I notion' the knower is the object and not the insentient body. Now Prābhākara's contention is that in case the ātman is the object of 'I notion' ātman will become both the knower and the known and it is untenable that the self could be both subject and object at the same time. cf O. I. P. p. 306.

Bhāṭṭa:—Which then is the phala (resultant) of the action of knowing (samvit)?

Prābhākara:—Revelation (bhāsana or prakāśana - being revealed).

Bhāṭṭa:—Does not this (bhāsana which is the phala resulting from jñāna) relate to the agent (subject)? If you say 'om' (i. e. that phala is not revealed in the agent), then (tell us) how is (ātman) revealed (i. e. if in the I-notion ātman is not manifest, where else is he manifest?). When there is no revelation it is not possible to say that ātman is manifest. Hence even if the manifestation of ātman is admitted in the object-notion (say pot), the objection, viz. that the agent cannot have its act directed towards itself holds good equally. ⁸⁴

Prābhākara:—The phala of the cognition is merely the revelation (of the same ātman) and none other. ⁸⁵

Bhāṭṭa:—Well, let it be so. There is phala to that extent and that phala, you have (by implication) admitted, as resulting from cognition in the ātman just as in the case of the viśaya (object). Hence the contradiction (of subject and object being the same in an act) is common. If by emphasizing the absolute opposition between the cogniser and the thing cognised (jñatṛtva and jñeyatva) it be said that though ātman is the participant in the phala (manifestation, bhāsana) produced by the kriyā (jñānakriyā-act of cognising) the symbol (name) karma and the objective termination are out of place (in using the word ātman) because it is stated that "what constitutes karma is, its participation of the phala of kriyā which is intimately related to something other than itself," (we say), that too does not stand to reason. For indeed, that a word is used correctly is to be known from usage. That ātman is the viśaya (i. e. the object) in the act (jñānakriyā-cognitive act) of which he himself is the agent, there is usage, both empirical and Scriptural. To this effect (we have this statement) in the Bhaṣya itself (S. Bh. p. 67)—'he becomes self-cognised' so that the use of 'kṛtyapratyaya' is indicative of the objective case. In the Scripture also several are the usages like, 'meditate the ātman', 'know the ātman', 'ātman is to be known'. And it cannot be urged (by the opponent) that objectness (karmatva) desiderated by the act of going has to be attributed to goer; because of the absence of usage: as regards the correctness of language we are dependent upon usage and are not ourselves competent (to adjudge it) ⁸⁶ For example though both alike import motion, (the verb) 'gaṇḍhati'

(84) When in the act of cognizing the pot ātman reveals itself, then its own cognizability must necessarily follow so that the charge of the incompatibility of the self serving both as subject and object is unavoidable for Prābhākara also.

(85) व्यवहार योग्यत्वम्-घटादिज्ञानैः आत्मव्यवहारस्त्विति, यथा अहं घटं जानामि, अहं गच्छामि &c. न च तावताज्ञेयत्वमपि स्थिति—In the cognition of pot ātman is revealed, i. e. we are enabled to use such expressions as, 'I know the pot', etc., but thereby ātman does not become the object of the cognition.

(86) "The view taken of language is that it is independent of the individual using it" - O. I. P. p. 298. The opponent's point is that if ātman is the viśaya in jñānakriyā as exemplified by the Bhāṭṭas, he should be regarded as viśaya when engaged in some act, say, moving (as he is when cognising). The objection is met by the statement that general usage is the sole arbiter in such matters.

is transitive but 'çalati' is intransitive because it is found so in usage. Such is the justification for objectness in the case of 'cogniser' and of intransitiveness in the case of 'goer'. Hence (i. e. being the object of cognition) ātman is cognisable in the 'I notion' by mental perception, as witness the śruti—"Ātman is cognized in the mental perception of men." As such though there is the manifestation of ātman at the time of cognizing the object (viṣaya), still ātman is not manifest as the agent of the object-cognition but is manifest as object in the mental perception of the 'I notion'; and not as the object of that cognition (either, i. e. of the viṣaya) because of the failure of vyāpti.⁸⁷

Now, let the I-consciousness in ātman be one of illusion as it is in the body (vide Para 136 ibid.)

No, for there is no negation (i. e. the ego-consciousness cannot be willed away – we cannot say, nāhamasmi).

Negation is possible for yogins (i. e. for those who are in possession of truth – tattvajñānīnam).

No, for there is no proof; also (we have the following texts) – "Those also who have attained the highest state of yoga – the lords among the yogins, who have reached perfection (yogēśvaras) – they also regard the I-consciousness as ātman (i. e. they meditate on the ego as ātman)", "I am, of the whole world, the source as also its destruction"; "All these (births) I know, you do not know, O tormentor of foes," "Because I transcend the perishable and am higher than even the imperishable" (Gītā XV 18); "Sustaining this whole world by one part (of me) I stand" (Gītā X-42); "My womb is the great Brahman; in that I place the seed" (Gītā XIV- 3). In these and the rest (of the passages) the word 'aham' indubitably denotes the supreme person. It cannot be said that the 'I-notion' which is an evolute of mahat (according to sāmkhya), is the source of the whole world, nor is it superior to kṣara and akṣara (the perishable and the imperishable), nor does it deposit the seed in pradhāna styled here Brahman for it is only through the contact of the soul (puraṣa) that prakṛti loses its equiposed state. The Upaniṣads point to the same fact:—"Brahman alone this was in the beginning"; "Then he learnt that in "I am Brahman;" Brahman means no other than ātman". Again, the mantras (point to the same fact):—"I was Manu, and also Sūrya". Hence those who reject the view that the ātman is cognisable (as object) in the 'I notion' are to be ignored altogether since they go counter to the Scriptures. As for the sentence

(87) न विषयं विंति &c.—The meaning of this sentence will become clear if the reading is altered as suggested by Sud. viz. "न विषयं विंति कर्तुं तथा, नवाविषयं विंति कर्म तथाऽवभासोभवति, अव्याप्तिः, किंतुमानसाहंश्रययकर्मतयावभासः, अव्याप्तिः—सकलेषु विषयं ज्ञानेषु अस्मावभासाभावात् p. 482. An alternative explanation is evident from the Candrikā and it amounts to this that ātman is revealed not as the agent (as against Prābhākara) but only as the object in the mental ego-consciousness, for all that is manifest is manifest as the object of cognition—"तस्य भास मानस्य विंति कर्म तस्यैव अवभासः इति व्याप्तिः"—notice that the negative particle न and the 's' denoting the elision of अ should be deleted to suit this explanation.

declaring the absence of 'I notion' and 'my notion' in the self, even that when the sense is carefully sifted does not mean the negation of the ego-nature of the self. That sentence indeed runs thus:—"Of him none is (begot) and He of none (is begot), ātman is certainly rid of the 'I notion' and the 'my notion'; and this is its meaning:—Because none of Him (is begot) therefore He is one that is rid of mamakāra ('my-notion'), and because He is (begot) of none, therefore He is one that is rid of ahamkāra. If (on the contrary) it is supposed that its very nature as ahamkāra (i. e. ātman's nature) is negated, then there would be no connection (syntactically) with the previous (statement): "Because this (ātman) is (begotten) of none therefore the 'I-notion' in it (ātman) is illusory". Here the question would be 'between which and which is there this relation?' (expressed positively it means that the cause and effect relation would not be pertinent here). Hence there is no negation of the 'I-notion' nature (of ātman).

Question:—What then? (i. e. what is the significance of this sentence?)

Answer:—Owing to relationship by birth the 'I-notion' in ātman (as in the example) "I am his father, I am his son" and so on (arises) and that illusion will become cogent (if understood) in this way only. This ātman is unrelated as in the manner of a son to some one, for what constitutes the relation of progenitor and progeny belongs to the body; it is the body that is born of the body and not ātman from another ātman. Hence the 'I consciousness' in ātman (e. g. 'I am his son') as being related to something else (viz. to father etc.) is, like the ascription of leanness etc. to ātman, a mere illusion of those who cannot discriminate (ātman) from the body. Hence this (Scriptural text) is intended to produce detachment by negating its (ātman's) relation with anything else (say, father, son etc.) and by the annulment of its affection towards sons and so on. This negation is not in regard to its nature as ahamkāra for no purpose will be served thereby, there will be no pertinency, it will offend other pramāṇas, and (finally) it will offend the text "I am Brahman". Therefore (the conclusion is) that the knower (jñātā) who is cognised from ahampratyaya (I-consciousness) is distinct from the body and also distinct from the senses.

139. How (is ātman distinct) from the senses? Because even in the absence of a sense (say of sight) there is the recognition of one and the same cogniser (yoham soham) as when one says: "I who perceived the colour, (in an object) that very person, viz. myself now touch (that object); "I who experienced (i. e. perceived or enjoyed something in the past when the sense-organs were whole, that very person, viz.) myself now remember." As regards the mind it must be admitted to be a karaṇa (instrument of knowledge) in so far as the cogniser's knowledge of pleasure etc. is concerned since as regards the knowledge of colour etc. the cogniser, of whose presence we become directly aware (in the 'I-notion'), is dependent upon instruments other than himself (viz. the eye etc. and the latter cannot serve as such in regard to internal feelings like pleasure and pain). And because the mind has thus to be postulated jñātrtva (power to cognise) should not be thought of it.

For those however (referring to the Prābhākaras) who hold that ātman is apprehended only as subject (kartā) and not as object (karma) recollection and recognition of ātman would be impossible. Even there⁸⁸ in recollection etc.) ātman's manifestation must be admitted as related to the past time; and in the present recollection the agency (kartṛtā) of that which relates to the past time does not arise so that how could the kartṛtā (of ātman) be established? Therefore the ascertainment of ātman is only as the object in the 'I-notion', and this (doctrine) appears satisfactory.

140. Well, why should not the self-luminousness of ātman as well of pleasure be accepted (and why should

Objection from the Vedāntin. mind be premised to point to ātman?)

Answer.—Because of the non-perception of any object that is self-luminous and because of the rule that all objects are illumined by something other than themselves. If ātman were self-luminous he would be manifest even in sleep (suṣupti). But he does not manifest himself (then)—as it is said—"He is in sound sleep, who is void of consciousness".

Objection.—Well, we say that ātman associated with the bliss supreme that is natural to him does indeed manifest himself in sleep also, as otherwise how could there be the remembrance of happiness as when one says on waking 'I slept happily'? And as regards other objects such as body, senses or anything else, there is no manifestation of anyone of these, so that to this extent only there is difference between dream and waking (on the one hand) and sleep (on the other).⁸⁹

Answer.—That is not so, because it is against (all) experience. Nor does ātman of the sleepers in reality bring happiness to light. And it is not possible, on the mere (strength of) empirical usage, to admit what is not revealed as being revealed. Further, "Libidinous persons after waking from deep slumbers give vent to their regret thus—this night has passed in vain without my lady-love though in her embrace I slept like one that is dead, not being aware of her." When one has enjoyed the highest happiness and remembered it (after waking), this feeling of regret in him because of the deprivation of an insignificant pleasure, is most inappropriate. And if it be said that that happiness is forgotten, the vyavahāra (the expression) viz. 'I slept happily' would be absurd. This expression of happiness however, refers to the absence of the experience of pain. Hence it is evident that the expression (I slept happily) has to be explained in a secondary sense. Those who wake up from sleep not recollecting any pain experienced in sleep

(88) "एतत्कालसंबन्धिनिसमये पूर्वकालसंबन्धिनः कर्तृत्वं न संभवति, अतः कर्मतयैव सिद्धिः"—*Çandrikā*. To whichever time a cognitive act is related to that identical time the cogniser also should be related. A cogniser related to the past is not competent to be the cogniser of an act related to the present. But in the case of a recollective act the subject of the past can become the object of the present.

(89) जाग्रदवस्थायां अर्थांतरं प्रकाशः, सुषुप्त्यवस्थायां तु अस्मिन् एवैकेवलस्य प्रकाशः—*Candrikā*. That while things other than ātman manifest themselves in the waking state, ātman alone is manifest in sleep.

infer owing to the absence of such recollection thus—'there was no pain to me' and in describing that only (viz. absence of pain) they use, by way of figure (gaunivrtti) language importing happiness and their expression takes this form:—So long I slept unconscious of even my own self.⁹⁰ Hence we cannot predicate self-luminosity to ātman seeing that in sleep ātman is not manifest. It is evident therefore that ātman is cognisable by mental perception only.

141. Again it has to be considered whether this ātman is *anu* (i. e. of atomic size), or of the dimension of the body, or *vibhu* (i. e. all-pervasive). Now if (ātman were) of the size of an atom simultaneous feeling (of pain or pleasure) in the head and foot would be impossible. It may be said that though (as a matter of fact) it is not simultaneous, owing to extreme rapidity (i. e. shortness of interval between the two feelings, one in the head and the other in the foot) there arises simultaneous feeling. Yes, it would be so if the atomic nature (of ātman) were established by some one (pramāṇa). When that is not established it is only right in conformity with experience (viz. one's simultaneous feeling) to regard ātman as non-atomic. If of the size of the body then the ātman would be an (entity) endowed with parts. Partless substances are of two kinds only:—*anu* or *vibhu*.⁹¹ The self (if conceived) to be of the proportions of the body would become invested with parts; and it would be necessary to presume a multiplicity of parts and also presume that in the bodies of an insect and an elephant the whole of these parts which are neither more nor less (than are adequate to constitute the respective bodies) would undergo extreme shrinkage and expansion—such a postulation is not very pleasing to the mind. Hence it stands to reason to attribute all-pervasiveness (to ātman). Even so runs the śruti—“He who is endless and limitless”. In the Bhagavad Gītā (II-24) also there is the statement—“He is everlasting, all-pervading, stable, firm, and eternal”. Those statements in the Upaniṣads which point to the atomicity of the self and also those in the purāṇas like ‘Him the Lord who is of the size of the thumb’ etc. mean that the ātman could be understood only by a subtle intellect.

Question:—When (as you say), the ātman is all-pervading let there be a single ātman in all the bodies; why admit plurality of ātman?

Answer:—Not so. If the ātman were single then, just as one remembers with the (aid of the) mind and recognises with the tactile sense, an object perceived with the eye even though the senses are different, because of the oneness of the agent, as witness the statement—what I perceived that I touch, even so the object perceived by the ātman resident in Devadatta's body, Yagnadatta would comprehend, because though the body is distinct ātman who recognises is one.

(90) It is asserted that sleep is a blank, there being consciousness of neither pleasure nor pain. The absence of pain in sleep is by way of figure expressed as “I slept happily”.

(91) अणु, विणु—mind and the ultimate components of earth etc. are atomic while ether, time, space and ātman are infinite.

Objection:—Though the agent is one there is a definite order (viz. that one who perceived only should recognise and none other) owing to the fact that minds are separate.

Answer:—It cannot be, since the mind is a sense (like sight, touch etc.) and it has been said that the senses like the eye merely because they are different cannot posit different selves.

Objection:—Though the senses of sight etc. fail to establish such distinction the mind can do so.

Answer:—No, because it is but a sense (i. e. it belongs to the category of senses). This presumption that the mind is competent to determine such distinctions would perhaps be possible if there were an indubitable *pramāṇa* proving the existence of a single self. But there is none such. Those passages occurring in *śrūti*s, *smṛti*s and *purāṇa*s importing singleness of *ātman* since they conflict with passages importing plural *ātman* as “(The yogin) freed from all desires attains the highest resemblance (with me)”, “(They) have attained to equality in attributes with me” (Bh. G. XIX-2). “But distinct is the Highest *Puruṣa*” (Bh. G. XV-17), and also with perception etc. are not perforce competent to decide *ātman*’s singleness. Where there is mutual conflict between Scriptural passages, alternatives (e. g. singleness or plurality of *ātman*) are impossible, in the case of a thing that is self-established (and is not a product) so that the determination of the true sense can be (only) by a distinct *pramāṇa* and that distinct *pramāṇa* (viz. perception or inference) establishes plurality only. Hence passages advocating singleness of *ātman* have to be understood, in the light of the reasons already adduced, as indicating that they (selves) are not dissimilar. And this is clear from the analogy of the air—“of the air which is devoid of dissimilarity and all-pervading, distinctions technically styled *ṣaḍja* (the fourth among the seven primary notes of the Indian gamut) etc. arise owing to its passage through the different holes of the flute; even so it is in the case of the great *ātman*”. It is not that the air-substance (*Vāyudravya*) is one everywhere since difference between particular modulations of air is evident; of the air which naturally is not dissimilar (it has been shown that) dissimilarity like *ṣaḍja* is caused by the perforation in the flute. Even so differentiation of *ātman*, as cattle, men, etc. is due to his contact with the body and is not his characteristic—this alone is the (correct) sense. The use of the singular number—*Vāyoḥ* and *tasya*, (in the line quoted above) is intended to denote *sāmānya* (i. e. they stand for the class (denoting absence of dissimilarity). Hence the selves are different in different bodies, all-pervading, and eternal, with the result that the classification of selves into those that are bound and those that are liberated becomes more rational.

Here ends the disquisition on *ātman*.

142. What is it that is meant by *mokṣa*?

Nature of Liberation.

Some (*Vijnānavādins*) say—The knowledge-series which is ever-flowing in the form of variegated colours like blue and yellow, all due to the variegated past impressions assumes the absolute state of

when the phantasmagoria of blue, yellow, etc. is extinguished by the (prior) total destruction of impressions (Vāsanas) and that is mokṣa.

Others (Mādhyaṃikas) however, say that like the quiescence of the flame-series, the quiescence of the knowledge-series (is mokṣa).

Both those doctrines based as they are upon the negation of the external world stand condemned since the reality of the external world has been proved (Vide para 116 *ibid*).

Others (Advaitins) again say that the cessation of the world (i.e. of *smasāra*) is liberation. The world which is the creation of nescience will cease of itself when with the knowledge of the Brahman, *avidyā* (nescience) is destroyed as the dream-world is with waking. The *śruti* (quoted) in support (of this view is):— "When indeed (i.e. during *samsāra*) duality is perceived as it were then one sees another (i. e. notions of *meum* and *tuum* will persist), but when to him (to the liberated person) the whole universe appears as *ātman* only, then who could see whom?" (*Brh. Up. II. 4-14*). This doctrine of the *advaitins* also stands condemned since we have proved the ultimate reality of the world, having discarded the view that it is created by *avidyā*. The statement "all this is *ātman* only" means that the *ātman* is the enjoyer of all. Just as in the passage, "who desires thus—Let me become a kingdom", ('to become a kingdom') means the enjoyer of a kingdom; and just as in the passage, "who desires thus—Let me become all this", ('to become all this') means the enjoyer of all this; similarly the phrase '*ātman* is all' means that *ātman* is the enjoyer of all. Again in the text "when duality as it were is perceived", the description of duality as illusion is figurative (and not to be understood literally). For indeed as the dream-world, *legerdemain*, mirage, etc. having come for a short time within the perceptive range, then disappear and cease to be objects of enjoyment, so also this world constituted by body, sense and object having entertained the self for some time suffers destruction and ceases to be an object of enjoyment. It is on this analogy that the world is metaphorically spoken of as illusory in order to create a desire in men for liberation by weaning them away from their hankering after sense-enjoyments. As for the text "When however all became *ātman* to him" purporting non-duality of *ātman* in the state of liberation, even that is not (intended to) negate the world as such, but intended only for negating the relation of *ātman* to the world which is indeed real because of the (use of the) word '*asya*' (his)⁹². Here the text will not go so far as to say "Then all became *ātman*". What else then? It says this "Then (in *mukti*) however, to him all is *ātman* only." Hence its interpretation is as follows:— *Yatra*—in which state, i. e. in *mukti*, *asya*—to the liberated individual, there will be nothing related either as fit for cognition, or as the means of cognition or as the locus of cognition; on the contrary all is *ātman*

(92) अस्य—The genitive case shows that when the self's relation with the world ceases in *mokṣa* *ātman* alone is the object of enjoyment and not the world. It is clear therefore that the world is not negated.

only for him and none other; then by which could (he) perceive which? As among men (loke) when one has neither a single relation nor any property one says thus—"I have nothing left, I alone am all",—there all that is intended is that nothing else exists as related (to the person). Similarly in the state of liberation the self is self's all so that what is meant is merely the absence of outside relation (ātman is related to ātman only and there is no relation ab extra), and not the absence of the world as such. Hence it is not the dissolution of the world that is mokṣa but the dissolution of the world-contact. In three ways does the world bind the man; (by means of) the body which is the abode of enjoyment, the senses which are the means of enjoyment, and things which are fit to be enjoyed, namely, objects like sound. And enjoyment (bhoga) is with reference to (i. e. has for its object) pleasure and pain and is spoken of as immediate experience. Hence the permanent destruction of these three kinds of bonds is mokṣa. What does this permanent destruction mean? It is the destruction of the body, the senses and objects which had come into existence before (mokṣa), and the non-origination of those which have not originated (i. e. what is to befall in the future). How does this permanent non-origination (come about)? It is because of the total extinction of dharma and adharma which are the originators (of bondage). (Hence) this world-contact is bondage and its disruption is liberation.

143. When (as here stated) the whole of dharma becomes extinct

Does Ānanda constitute Liberation.

there would be no happiness to the person who has obtained liberation, and as such mokṣa ceases to be the highest human end (puruṣārtha).

Answer—There is nothing wrong here—The bliss of mokṣa is not generated by dharma. If it were so it would, being a thing born, be liable to destruction—a result which would be in conflict with the śruti text 'They do not return to mundane life.'⁹³ Ātmānanda which is there by its very nature (i. e. uncaused) having been shrouded in saṃsāra manifests itself to one who is rid of saṃsāra and becomes fit for his enjoyment. (To substantiate) that ānanda (bliss) is such by its very nature there are śrutis such as 'Ānandam is Brahman' in thousands.

Objection—Well, there is a Scriptural text declaring also the absence of bliss in mokṣa, viz.—"Him who is disembodied pleasure and pain (the agreeable and the non-agreeable) do not touch."

Answer—It is true, but such texts have reference to sense-pleasures. (If construed) otherwise it would be going counter to the śrutis declaring ānanda. It may however be questioned why, on the strength of the text declaring absence of bliss we should not construe the text declaring ānanda itself as meaning absence of pain. The answer is that because of the extreme paucity of texts declaring absence of bliss it stands to reason to give them only, a different interpretation and not

(93) The bliss of the emancipated is not generated by dharma as otherwise it would be liable to destruction and rebirth would result, thus conflicting with the text—Chand. up. VIII 15-1. "नच पुनरवर्तते".

to ānanda-texts which are in abundance. Moreover if the word, 'ānanda' is interpreted as absence of pain it would be entirely depriving it of its real sense; as for the word, 'sukha' (happiness) it is a general term so that even if interpreted in a special sense it would not be very far from its real sense.⁹⁴ Hence that alone is reasonable.

Objection:—Now, even if ānanda should exist it serves no purpose if unenjoyed; and there can be no enjoyment of bliss by the mukta who is devoid of all the senses. It cannot be that ānanda is self-luminous (not requiring any karaṇa for its manifestation) since in the state of saṃsāra it is not self-revealed.

Vedāntin's Answer:—Well, even there (i. e. in saṃsāra) the Puruṣa (ātman) being of the nature of bliss does indeed manifest himself because there arises the love of ātman (i. e. of one's self and such love would not arise if ātman were not of the nature of bliss). No love arises in what is not of the nature of bliss nor in bliss that is not experienced.

Mīmāṃsaka rejoinder:—Is it (seriously maintained) that now (in saṃsāra) ātman who is of the nature of the bliss is experienced by us (i. e. are we aware of a blissful self)? If one should say that it is a fact that one who is so audacious deserves no answer. If even he who is in the cycle of existence should experience the supreme bliss then there is nothing to distinguish a mukta, so that it comes to this that mokṣa ceases to be the highest human end (since pleasure here is not distinct from pleasure hereafter). Hence it is only unavoidably that we have to admit that the ātman, who is of the nature of non-bliss, is the object of love — because it is so experienced.⁹⁵

Upholder of ānanda:—But ānanda though self-revealing does not manifest itself in saṃsāra having been obscured.

Query:—What then does this obscuration of the luminous mean?

Upholder of ānanda:—It is indeed the dispelling of light that is the obscuration.

Query:—The obscuration of a thing that is by nature luminous does not take place. If in the state saṃsāra there is no manifestation, a cause has to be assigned for the origination, in mukti, of the manifestation which was absent in that state (i. e. of saṃsāra). Vijnāna (cognition) itself (we must say) is the cause of the result otherwise named prakāśa (manifestation); and that (cognition) is dependent upon the senses and the senses in the case of a mukta are absent. How then could there be the enjoyment of bliss?

Upholder of ānanda:—It is thus answered: The external senses only, of the mukta disappear; that the mind however endures in that

(94) The import of the word sukha may be either eternal happiness or ephemeral happiness so that when interpreted in the latter sense there will not be any wresting of the sense.

(95) In itself the body is not of the nature of bliss and yet we love it (through illusion), even so is our love of the ātman who in reality is not blissful either in saṃsāra or in mukti.

state is determined on the strength of 'ānanda-śruti'.⁹⁶ Similarly as regards jñāna:—"There is no extinction of the cognition of the cogniser (i. e. ātman)". From this śruti as well as from the 'Vijnānaghana' śruti (it is evident that jñāna is the inalienable nature of the self. Hence in the state of mukti ātman remains enjoying the supreme bliss with the aid of mental perception. So it is said - "Consciousness and bliss which are accepted by us as naturally belonging to ātman as also eternity, all-pervadingness etc. - from these ātman is never dissociated". The Vārtika no doubt says 'Hence it is only by the extinction of karma one is freed, since the cause (of future births) has disappeared. There is indeed no hetu for (inferring) the eternity of mokṣa if we ignore this hetu of a negative character';⁹⁷ but it is the doctrine of a different school (and not of Kumārila - the Vārtikakāra). Such is the view of the upholder of the doctrine that bliss is mokṣa.

Others say :—The statement embodying negation (absence of pain) only is his (Kumārila's) doctrine, because of the reason assigned (in its support). As for the ānanda-passage it refers to the doctrine of others since it is a mere statement (without any reason in its support). There cannot be the enjoyment of bliss to one who is freed, since the senses are non-existent (in mukti). If it be said that the mind exists (then), we say, no, because of the śruti declaring the absence of mind :—"Without mind, without speech".

144. The text viz. "There is no cessation of the cognition of the cogniser" is intended to point out (that there is no cessation of) *jñāna-śakti* (i.e. potency to cognise and not cognition itself). Otherwise, it will amount to saying that knowledge endures even in sleep. And it has been said that it is against experience (i. e. the apprehension of jñānābhāva in sleep). That the import of the text is potency is very clear as evidenced by the śrutis—"When it is said that ātman does not see, it means that though seeing he does not see; there is no cessation of the seeing of the seer because of its non-extinction; apart from it (self) there is no second-which it could have seen had it been something other and distinct from it".¹ (Brh. Up. IV. 3-23). Similarly there are other passages: 'actually smelling it does not smell, there is no cessation of the smelling of the smeller'; 'There is no cessation of the hearing of the hearer'; 'There is no cessation of the touch of one that touches'; 'There is no cessation of the knowing of the knower'. Thus the words occurring in the several śrutis, viz. seeing, smelling, hearing, touching are denotative of particular

(96) आनन्दश्रुति viz. आनन्दब्रह्म. For the enjoyment of bliss we must assume the existence of mind in mukti-this is what the Mīmāṃsaka thinks is the Vedāntin's answer. Perhaps a particular school of Mīmāṃsa (ānandavādins) regarded mokṣa as a state of bliss; cf. O. I. P. p. 334 and Čandrikā p. 327.

(97) अभावात्मकमुक्ता—Cessation of both pleasure and pain constitutes mokṣa there being nothing positive about it. This is the negative conception of salvation. Mokṣa is eternal since it is abhāva (negation) in character. Absolute negation (atyantābhāva) and consequent negation (dhvamsa) are eternal. Mokṣa being cessation of pain etc. is of the nature of dhvamsa.

cognitions relating to colour, smell, sound, and touch which are apprehended (lit. generated by) by the senses of sight, smell, hearing, and touch (respectively); and not (denotative of) anything else nor also of *viñāna* (knowledge) in general. And these particular cognitions do not by any means remain either in sleep or *mukti* without ceasing. At that time there exist not the senses nor are odour etc. experienced and in the absence of both there is no room for the particular cognitions denoted by the words hearing etc. 98 .

Now the illuminating power of the sun is constant even though the object to be illumined is not in its vicinity; similarly, it may be urged that the seeing is constant in spite of the absence of the senses. This would be so if knowledge as such were the denotation of words like sight etc. But it is not so, not being warranted by usage; the determination of the meaning of words must be in conformity with common usage and not be left to one's own will (cf. para 138, note 86 *ibid*). In common parlance the expression "the sense of smell (*ghrāṇam*) grasps odour" is not applied to anything other than odour. Even when one gets the knowledge of odour with the instrumentality of something other than the sense of smell, say, inference etc. the expression 'he smells' is not used. Hence the words 'smelling' etc. denote the particular cognitions of odour etc. arising from the senses of smell and the rest. And in deep sleep and *mukti* they cease to exist (lit. there can be no negation of their non-existence). As such it must be understood that merely to extol the (ever-abiding) potency in *ātman* to cognise smell etc. the words '*ghrāṇa*' etc. are used in a figurative sense. Now in the sentence 'with that indeed is rice prepared' because the potency is present the verb '*kriyate*' is used figuratively in the present tense for the sake of extolling (the winnowing fan) 99 . Hence even the text "there is no cessation of the cognition of the cogniser" is meant to denote potency only.

145. As regards the contention that (the illumination-power of) *ātman* is like the illuminating nature of the sun (we would ask), "what is your conception of his light?" If it is the dispelling of darkness, that exists always; he always destroys the darkness in regions not separated by anything intervening. But *ātman* does not, in this manner, always hear for we know that hearing is absent in sleep. But if it be said that the illuminating nature means the sun's power to give rise to *jñāna*, that is not constant (for in a dark room no *jñāna* is possible). Hence even there (i.e. as regards the sun) constancy can be predicated only of his potency. Hence this expression constancy (*nityatva*) must be understood to mean knowledge-producing potency (and not that knowledge is the very essence of the self). The way in

(98) What is meant is that cognitive potency persists in the state of liberation though specific cognitions are absent because of the absence of the instruments of knowledge as well as of the sense-objects.

(99) तेन ह्यन्नं &c. The full text is शेषेण ब्रूते तेन ह्यन्नं क्रियते - Because winnowing is necessary to prepare rice though indirectly (दूरसाधन) the present tense is used to indicate its capacity. This is laudatory and the mantra is uttered at the time of offering the *sūra* (winnowing fan) as an oblation.

which the text has to be interpreted is this:—What we understand when it is said that the self does not see either in sleep or in mukti is that, while seeing only or in other words, having really the potency to see he does not see. At no time is there any cessation of that which constitutes the perceptive potency of the perceiver. That potency is really indestructible. In that state (i. e. of mokṣa or sleep) other than the seer there is no second to serve as the means of seeing, like the eye etc. or any cognisable object which (had it existed) could have rendered seeing possible. It is however a fact that in that state the visible world such as colour etc. does exist in its own right, but still in that state it loses its comprehensibility (lit. *dr̥ṣyā* means fitness to be perceived) so that what we have to understand is that it (*dr̥ṣyā*) does not exist as being fit to be seen. Hence, because of the privation of a distinct instrument (like sight), the *ātman* does not perceive in that state and not because of the privation of potency. As for potency, at no time is it absent. The other texts have to be construed similarly. Even so the non-privation of *jñānaśakti* (i. e. the potency to give rise to knowledge) itself is spoken of as *jñānāparilopa* (i. e. the non-privation of knowledge, because the potency is there the text says that the self is *jñānaśvarūpa*). The word *jñāti* here relates to inferential knowledge etc. since knowledge given in perception etc. is denoted by their own specific terms. As here, (the texts) ‘Brahman is consciousness’, ‘mass of sentience (is Brahman)’ and the rest (of a similar character) have to be understood as referring to *śakti*. The *śruti* itself has expounded its *śakti* aspect (thus): “The *ātman* who is one entire sentience, having left these elements (lit. standing away from them) perishes in their wake only”; (Brh. Up. IV, 5–13 and II, 4–13):—That is, owing to the extinction of the elements and the senses the *ātman* also now unrevealed by any of the *pramāṇas* becomes *as if extinct*. Hence the statement—“Of him that is dead, and separated from the elements (it cannot be said that he) has *jñāna*.” Thus instructed by Yājñavalkya Maitreyi (his wife) put this question:—“Your worship has, in this only (i. e. in the elucidation of the nature of the self) deluded me because of the mutually opposed characterisation of the self viz. ‘mass of sentience’ and ‘sentience is absent in Him’.” In the sixth chapter (or the fourth) however the question arises as to his (*ātman*’s) extinction or non-extinction (here in II. 4–13 whether he is sentient or not). This is the difference. Thus questioned Yājñavalkya shows how the two statements can be reconciled:—“Lo, I do not tell you that which by mutual contradiction causes delusion, lo, for *viijnāna* (understanding), this is competent” (Brh. Up. II. 4–13). Here the meaning is that *ātmatatva* (i. e. the *ātman* – nature) is competent in all states to cognise (i. e. that the self has the potency to give rise to knowledge). Hence it comes to this that the description of *ātman* as *viijnānaghana* is intended to point out potency. And it really happens that even though he may have the capacity, a person is (often) bereft of *jñāna*, so that what is intended (to be inculcated) is that there is no contradiction (in the two *upaniṣadic* passages). From this *śruti*, it should be understood that all *śrutis* ascribing *viijnāna* to the self as having been construed in the sense of its possessing the potency (to generate *jñāna*).

146. If the potency exists in that state what is the reason, that jñāna does not arise from it ?

It is because of the non-existence of the senses which are the instruments of knowledge and of the objects of knowledge. Thus says the śruti:—when there is duality as it were then one sees another, but when all becomes one's self by what (means) could one see which (object)? This text has already been explained. Anticipating the query why not—when the knowledge of objects other than the self is ruled out because of the non-existence of the means—one admit that in the state of mukti the self sees itself? the śruti says, “Lo, by what could one cognise the cogniser”? Even the self cannot know itself without the means. It is well known that in the state of saṃsāra (existence-cycle) this (self) cognises through the mind, and the mind-relation does not exist in the case of one who is freed. Hence by which (means) could the self know itself? Hence the absence of self-knowledge is evident in one who is free (mukta) and it has been pointed out by the śruti that only the potency to cognise does reside (in the self). Therefore mokṣa is accompanied neither by jñāna nor by ānanda.

147. Well, apart from the self there is neither *vijnāna* nor *ānanda*.

Vedāntin's query.

Vedāntin's query. but the self itself is (of the nature of) consciousness and bliss; the śruti texts (vouch for this view): 'Brahman is consciousness', 'Brahman is bliss'. And the self persists both in sleep and *turiya* (*mokṣa*) states so that how could consciousness and bliss be denied?

It is not so. The thing whose nature is to manifest some other object (i. e. something out there) and which when present does indeed manifest some object—this is termed *vijnāna* in ordinary parlance. But there is no object whatever that is manifest though the self persists (as in *mukti*). Since no object is perceived in sleep even though existing then, *ātman* is not consciousness.

Answer.

Is it not that the self though illuminating in character does not do
Query. so because of the absence of auxiliaries ?

True, it does not produce (i. e. cause the illumination or revelation of objects). But then that 'auxiliary is no other than what is termed jñāna which invariably illumines a distinct object when it is present or something else consequent upon it is present.¹⁰⁰ Similarly the words ānanda and sukha denote

Answer.

(100) यस्मिन्सु सहस्रसि सन्नियाने—The point is that both schools—Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā admit the continuance of ātman in the states of sleep and mukti (turiya) and the scriptural texts—Vijñānam Brahma etc., declare that the self is of the nature of consciousness and so asks the Vedāntin—how could there be the absence of consciousness then? What the Mīmāṃsaka in his rejoinder means is that the ātman is not of the nature of consciousness even on the admission of the Vedāntin for it is dependent upon some auxiliary and that auxiliary itself is jñāna (consciousness) which in mukti and sleep is absent. What is termed jñāna is that which inevitably illumines an object in the presence of an auxiliary or something consequent upon it. Anyway it is the function of jñāna to illumine and not of ātman : cf.

यस्मिंस्तु सतिप्रकाशत एव अर्थान्तरं तत्तज्ज्ञानशब्दवाच्यं, ज्ञायते अनेनेत्यर्थकरणतः ; नचआत्मनिसति किंचिदन्यत्प्राशते, अतः नज्ञानरूपत्वं आत्मनः—*Candrikā*.

the pleasure such as is derived, from hearing songs, love-embrace, sight of the moon, tasting sweets, scenting fragrance etc. Such a characteristic ātman has not. Nor again do we recognise the joy in ātman as we certainly do in other joys, (i. e. we recognise similarity in joy, but not in ātman) and ātman might have been described by the term ānanda if it had been possible to recognise ātma-sukha. Further your assertion, that jñāna as well as ānanda is the name of what is known as ātman itself, is untenable since that nomenclature has neither empirical nor Vedic sanction. If it (name) be (used in the technical sense) like the term vṛddhi (in grammar) let it be so as you please (but it serves no purpose). The reference to the common substrate as made out from the statements, "Brahman is consciousness", "Brahman is bliss" is explicable on the ground that qualities alone are denoted and that usage permits non-difference between the quality and the qualified as in the phrase 'blue-lotus'.

Well, (says the Vedāntin) words like ānanda are confined in their usage to qualities only and are not like blue etc. found (in usage) in the qualified.

Yes, it is true (to some extent) but not in many (instances) are they so found. Sometimes words expressing only quality are used to denote the things qualified, e. g. "cool and sweet is rasa (taste) as also oily and heavy"—here the word rasa is used in the sense of substance (i. e. something having taste) for otherwise the words cool etc. would not be used with rasa to denote the same substrate (the adjectives, cool, sweet etc. can qualify only a substance and so rasa though a quality must be understood to denote the qualified i. e. a dravya). And because in the śruti, "Flavour indeed; having obtained this one he becomes blest", (Tait. Up. Brahnavalli VII.) the meaning of the termination — matup, (which termination is used only in the sense of 'having') is indicated (in ānandī having 'ini' termination) the distinction is cognised between ātman and ānanda. Likewise in 'He who knows the bliss of Brahman' (Ibid IX Brahnavalli), 'That is one bliss of Brahman' (Ibid VIII-4. Brahnavalli), by the use of the genitive case (viz. Brahmanāḥ) it is manifest that Brahman is distinct from ānanda. Again (when one says). "There is no happiness whatsoever to me at present, but sorrow alone to me in all respects" the self, it is evident, is cognised as experiencing absence of pleasure and presence of pain; how could such ātman be described as of the nature of bliss? Furthermore in so far as (the view that) liberation is similar to sleep (is concerned) there is no dispute between those who admit that ātman is self-illuminating and of the nature of bliss and ourselves. The difference between the two (i. e. sleep and mukti) lies only in this that we rise to the world in the one case (viz. sleep) and do not rise in the other case (mukti); all else is similar. To this effect is the Śruti also :—"These (deluded) people go to the world of Brahman every day and they come back every day". (cf. Chand. Up. VIII. iii-2). Describing thus, the state of deep slumber as Brahma-loka the Śruti points out the similarity between them. As for suṣupti, we also experience it but it is plain that in that state there is

no experience of ānanda. Hence mokṣa is joyless. The highest human end is (in consequence derived) from the disappearance of pain. If it be rejoined that because there is no (positive) pleasure mukti amounts to apuruṣārtha (not the highest human end, not a thing that one would covet), we say, 'not so; meagre is the happiness in the world (saṃsāra) and wise men count that even, as pain because it requires much fatiguing labour to achieve it. Birth, death, old age, disease, and pain daily assail men in a thousand ways—all of their own accord and unsought. By the constant neglect of enjoined duties and by embracing forbidden ones what great sorrow is in store for them, is not comprehended (by them). Even the joy so-called, slight as it is, is hemmed in by countless ills and it is to be avoided by discreet men like the joy of an intoxicating drink. Those who avid for pleasure hanker after such worldly life have no manner of right to the pursuit of the science of salvation. Those who shrink from saṃsāra having observed the best and the worst it has to offer, they alone for sure get release and not the worldly man. To them, the great souls, the highest human end termed Svarga (is possible); to them only, the wise men, belongs the right (to pursue) mukti-sāstra. Though thus liberation is negative in itself it is not that it does not connote the highest human end. That is termed saṃsāra which consists in the experience of pleasure and pain. The non-experience of these two is (said to be) mokṣa by those who understand what mokṣa is (in reality). The Scripture also describes alike the difference between saṃsāra and mokṣa:—"Freedom from pleasure and pain is indeed impossible to one who bears the body; pleasure and pain do not touch one who is disembodied." Even according to the doctrine of those who aver that the self-illuminating ātman is of the essence of bliss, thus far only is the difference between bondage and liberation (i. e. in saṃsāra pleasure and pain are inseparable, and not so in mukti). This ātman who is (said to be) blissful in nature is manifest in saṃsāra as well; to that extent only (ought he to manifest himself) in mokṣa for nothing in addition has he then. Would it be urged that in the cycle of existence ānanda is not manifest? But non-manifestation is not in keeping with an object that is self-manifest. If it (ānanda) is not manifest what else is it then that is manifest? If it be said that it is ātma-svarūpa (only), (we ask), is not that bliss itself? And when ātmasvarūpa is revealed for sure ānanda also is revealed. Hence (and this is the right view) it is but the riddance of pleasure and pain produced by the objects of sense like sound etc. that is called escape from saṃsāra (i.e. mokṣa). From this it is evident that if for us mukti does not constitute the highest human end because of the absence of pleasure then for you also (referring to the vedāntin) it (the charge) is equally applicable (because it has been shown that in mukti there is no pleasure). Because mokṣa though characterised by the absence of pleasure is rid of all pain it does constitute the highest human end for both of us alike. Therefore the man who has attained freedom, rid of pleasure and pain abides in peace (lit. abides in self).

148. What is it that is understood by (the statement that the self when freed) abides in itself (i. e. is restored to its pristine condition)?

Nature of liberation.

Having abandoned those properties which are sometimes there and sometimes not, viz. "intellect or understanding, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort or volition, merit, demerit and faculty - impression or *samskāra*" - (these are the nine special qualities of the self - vide A. P. 81 ff.), the self abides in what is its own natural state, in which the capacity to cognise, existence, substantiveness etc. persists - that is the meaning (of abiding in itself). If it be said that *ānanda* (bliss) though absent in the state of *samsāra* comes into being in the state of *mokṣa*, then *mokṣa* (which is identical with *ānanda*) being subject to birth would be non-eternal. And by which (instrument) is this (*ānanda*) to be experienced? It has been stated that nothing is capable of self-manifestation. And the experience (of bliss) does not come through the mind because of the absence of mind in one who is liberated, as vouched for by the *śruti* pointing to its absence. Therefore the assertion that *ānanda* though eternal is not experienced in the state of *samsāra* since it is obscured and that in *mukti* when the obscuring element is removed it is experienced by the mind, stands condemned. Further the experience of the self as associated with pleasure (i. e. the experience in *mukti* must be in the form - I enjoy happiness) is the highest human end and not the experience of mere pleasure; and in *mukti* there occurs no consciousness of self because the *śruti*, 'Lo' who could cognise the cogniser and by what means?' explicitly contradicts (the rise of such consciousness). And the *śruti* 'This is competent to generate knowledge' explaining the word *vijñāna* as referring to competency has unmistakably declared that in the state of liberation there remains *śakti* (capacity) only and not consciousness. Hence it is impossible to admit that one who has attained liberation has consciousness, a thing opposed to the *śruti*. Setting aside what this *śruti* 'who can cognise the cogniser etc.' and the *śruti* declaring that pleasure and pain do not touch (the disembodied one) in reality denote viz. that the self is devoid of *jñāna* in *mukti*, one cannot say that they mean something different.¹⁰¹ As for *śrutis* like 'Brahman is consciousness' they figuratively denote consciousness in what has competency only, (all) for the sake of laudation and as such there is nothing incongruous. Similarly the *śrutis* bearing on *ānanda* also are intended to be laudatory in as much as they figuratively ascribe pleasure (to the self in *mukti*) since *puruṣārtha* is common (i. e. since both absence of pain and attainment of pleasure alike point to the highest human end). And it stands to reason that when there is conflict between two scriptural statements, the decision (as to which is to be accepted) must come from something else (viz. reasoning vide para 143 *ibid*). Here is conflict between the two *śrutis* - one declaring (that the self is) *ānanda* (in nature) and the other declaring absence of pleasure. It cannot be said that the statement of

(101) *अन्यतरत्वं*—i. e. that they denote something other than the cognition and pleasure arising from the objects of sense or in other words that they denote the *ātman* who is of the nature of consciousness and bliss. The vedāntic explanation of these texts is that in the state of liberation the self is untouched by empirical cognitions but attains its pristine condition of consciousness and bliss. This view, says the *Mīmāṃsaka* is far-fetched.

negation has reference to sense-objects and the other (the positive - Brahman is bliss) has reference to what is natural (i. e. pleasure as the nature of self), since the texts denote the ordinary sense (of pleasure and pain), and since both assertion and negation point to an absolutely identical object (viz. ānanda, and there is no specification of pleasure and pain). Hence on the strength of a different instrument of knowledge (say, inference) it is reasonable to interpret 'the bliss-statement' to mean absence of pain and the other (i. e. the negative statement) in its literal sense. To conclude, mokṣa consists in the riddance of all the special properties of the self, like pleasure, pain etc. The riddance of pleasure and pain results from the riddance of merit and demerit; the riddance of merit and demerit (results from) actually experiencing merit and demerit (i. e. their fruit-either pleasure or pain) which have begun to operate (in one's life); from the performance of obligatory and occasional karmas, and from the knowledge of the self - for these are hostile (to past karma); the future merits since they result from the performance of interested works will not eventuate if such works are not performed; demerits which result from the non-performance of prescribed duties and the performance of prohibited duties vanish if the prescribed duties are performed and the prohibited ones avoided. When the causes that help one's taking on the body are absent, and when the body already acquired falls, the man remaining disembodied attains mukti.

149. Well, does not the knowledge of the self subserve the performance of kratu (Vedic sacrifice)?

Question.

Yes, it is true; it subserves also puruṣārtha (i. e. mokṣa which is most dearly sought after by man), since there are distinct statements. The knowledge, of the existence of the self which in its real nature is distinct from the body and is eternal, is derived from texts like, "Lo"! this ātman is indestructible", and that knowledge, because it subserves the performance of karma which yields the fruit relating to the other world (viz. svarga) is associated by implication with Vedic sacrifice, just as the knowledge of (a particular) karma is.¹⁰² Hence it (knowledge of the self) subserves kratu. (To explain:—) since the study of texts bearing on jyotiṣtoma etc. directly produces the knowledge subserving the performance (of the ritual) the adhyayana injunction enjoins the study of jyotiṣtoma texts; even so the (same) adhyayanavidhi enjoins the study of (upaniṣadīe)

(102) The doubt is whether the knowledge of the self is for the attainment of liberation since it destroys both dharma and adharma or for the performance of Vedic ritual since it brings home the eternal nature of the self. It is met by the declaration that such knowledge subserves both ends. Because there are two texts which respectively state that the knowledge of the self is an aid to ritual and to liberation we must attribute both functions to it. From the text—अविनाशीय etc. ātman as distinct from the body and as the enjoyer of the fruit of karma is established, and from the text नस्युन्नाशयते, it is evident that ātmajñāna is an aid to liberation; cf. Jai. Nyāya-mālavistara of Mādhava-IV, 3-5. कर्मज्ञानदेव— a knowledge of the particular karma one engaged in is essential for its right performance, संयोग-samyoga is a sentence denoting relation with a phala.

texts like 'Lo ! indestructible, is this ātman,' for obtaining ātmanjñāna which also subverts the performance of karma.¹⁰³ If from other pramāṇas (such as perception and inference) ātman's distinction from the body is not invariably proved then clearly do the upaniṣadic texts which emphatically declare the absolute distinction yield that knowledge. Thus it is stated: (by Kumārila-S. V. ātmavāda-section):- "The Bhāṣyakāra (Śabara) with the object of refuting Nihilism has here said so regarding the existence of ātman by adducing reasons. By the faithful study of vedānta this knowledge of the self becomes firmly rooted". If one should urge that by other means (such as inference) also this (ātmajñāna) can be had (the reply is that) as in the case of kratujñāna which may also be had by other means, those men only are fit to enter upon the performance of karma who have understood from a study of the Veda the nature of karma as revealed in the scriptural texts, even so only those who by Vedic study have grasped the true nature of the self as revealed in the upaniṣadic statements have the right (to undertake kratu); and we arrive at this conclusion on the strength of Adhyayanavidhi (viz. 'one should study one's Vedic branch') only. The upaniṣad statement, 'Lo !. Atman is to be seen etc.' (Brh. Up. II iv-5) which resembles a vidhi (i. e. a mandatory sentence) and which is found in the beginning of the topic expounding the existence of ātman—that statement, because the subject dealt with in the sequel (of Brh. Up.) is so profound and of such supreme consequence, has no other purpose than that of enabling the person to anyhow abandon his indolence and grasp with effort the teaching (regarding ātman's nature) that follows.¹⁰⁴ Hence this jñāna (acquired by learning the Upaniṣads) does subvert karma since it is of direct utility, (in yāga and not through apūrva). Again those (jñānas) which are of the nature of meditation (viz. Daharopāśana etc.) and which are enjoined together with their auxiliaries (like the cultivation of self-control etc.) yield only unseen fruit, seeing that they do not directly serve any purpose in the performance of kratu. And the unseen fruit is, as evidenced from the sequential passages (specially those in which the phala is described) of two kinds: of the nature of worldly success and of the nature of liberation. 'He obtains all that he desires', 'he enjoys all that he desires',

(103) इष्टेनैव—directly without the interposition of apūrva. We understand straight, everything connected with the ritual by getting up the principal and the auxiliary texts. This karmajñāna is helpful in ritualistic performances—कर्मविज्ञान. The study of the upaniṣadic texts like—अविनाशीना etc. is also enjoined by the text स्वाध्यायोऽष्टैतन्मयः; and ātmajñāna—that the self is distinct from the body and is indestructible prompts one to undertake the ritual. Hence both karmajñāna and ātmajñāna subvert karma. From the text Jyotiṣṭomena etc. we learn the nature of karma and from the avināśi text, ātmajñāna. We must know both karma and kartā.

(104) It has been maintained that the injunction regarding adhyayana itself declares that ātmajñāna as resulting from texts like 'Lo ! ātman is indestructible' is essential for kratu. Then why again should there be another text of the same status (vidhi), viz. 'Lo ! ātman is to be seen etc.'? The answer is that the repetition is to rouse the indolent to their sense of duty, and create interest in ātmajñāna. Hence the justification of Vidhi.

-these point to phala relating to wordly success; 'He does not return (to mundane life)' such texts point to phala of the nature of mokṣa-thus is the distinction between the two.

150. 'Ātman who is one entire consciousness after severing his connection from the elements is extinguished in their wake; when death occurs there is no consciousness thereafter' (Brh. Up. II 4-12; IV. 5-14). The doubt is entertained that from this Brāhmaṇa (texts) what is declared is that the elements themselves constitute consciousness. The śruti itself by means of a Brāhmaṇa having stated that doubt in the form of a question serving as an objection, viz. "Here indeed your worship has plunged me in confusion because of the description of the self first as ageless and deathless and now as perishable", has given the right solution. (First) describing the ātman in these words,—"Lo! this ātman is imperishable, and is indestructible in nature, then raising the question how in that case there could be the statement that the ātman is perishable the śruti has answered:—"He becomes free from the sense-contacts". By the term "mātra", the elements, senses, merit and demerit termed vikāras (products) are denoted. This in substance has been said:—By the term vijñānaghana (consciousness-entire) what is denoted is, that the capacity to cognise is ātman's nature. (The text) "He (ātman) having stood out from these elements, and attained freedom perishes in their wake only" means that owing to the destruction of the elements he too appears as though destroyed. Remaining within the elements he (the ātman) is cognised by oneself through perception and by others through inference having the movements of the body as its liṅga (hetu). The liberated man however having stepped aside the path of pramāṇa (i. e. not cognisable by any pramāṇa), appears as if he has perished, in the result it is said that 'he perishes'. In this way (i. e. as expounded here) what is stated is that the destruction refers only to the elements and not to the self and as such there is no conflict (between the two statements of Yājñavalkya). This, (the Vārtika) vouches: "The puruṣa is by nature imperishable; what is mentioned as perishable is (with reference to) the elements and dharma and adharma (denoted by the term adhikāra) and unconsciousness is asserted of the elements"—(S. V. Ātmavāda, P.147).

What need is there for the statement that the elements are not sentient? As regards the comment on "After death there is no consciousness", that does not stand to reason. The import of this statement, "After death there is no consciousness" is not that the elements have no sentience. What then? Its import is that the liberated self only, is void of sensibility; want of sensibility is attributed to it only, for want of the means (of acquiring knowledge), in passages beginning with: "By what could it cognise and which"; and ending with "Lo, by which could the cogniser be cognised?"

Yes, it is a fact that the comment ('unconsciousness is asserted of the elements') is not on this passage (viz. 'After death there is no consciousness'), but it is the

Answer.

concluding part of the section in the Śābarabhāṣya on the description of the nature of self. What is already established by reason, viz. that sentence does not belong to the elements, the same has been asserted by the Brāhmaṇas also. Hence non-sentence should be attributed to the elements and the senses; as for that which is distinct from them (viz. ātman) he is eternal and sentence; and since universal movement is possible for him the statement 'He goes to Svarga (vide ante)' does not contradict pratyakṣa. ¹⁰⁵.

(105) सत्यम्—The Vārtika portion भूतादीनामसंज्ञिता is not the comment on नप्रेत्यसंज्ञादित but it is intended to mark the conclusion of the topic under discussion; it is that insentience is the characteristic of the elements only and not of the ātman who has the capacity to cognise in the state of liberation. The objection that the text यद्वायुवी etc. offends perception is thus silenced.

CHAPTER VI

TOPIC—THE ETERNITY OF THE WORD (S'ABDA)

What was asserted (in the V th adhikaraṇa) viz. that the denotativeness of a word is natural (not depending upon human agency and so eternal) is objected to, because of the fact that S'abda (word) is not eternal.¹ It is not possible to accept how a word that is used afresh

(1) Of the 18 sūtras in this Adhikaraṇa, the first 6 state the objection against the view that the denotative character of S'abda owes its origin to no human agency; the second 6 state the refutation of these objections and the last 6 relate to the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of S'abda.

The purport of the Sūtras is noted below :—

Sūt. 6. कर्मैके तत्र दर्शनात्—Some (like the Naiyāyikas) hold the view that S'abda results from action (karma-effort), because it is only when there is effort we become aware of S'abda and not in its absence. The opponent relies on the anvaya-vyatireka argument—"the positive and negative concomitances" of the probans and probandum. Because it is produced by effort it must be non-eternal.

Sūt. 7. "अस्थानात्"—Because S'abda disappears soon after it is uttered it cannot be eternal.

Sūt. 8. करोति शब्दात्—कृत्वा तु च दितपदयोगेन कार्यत्वं अवसीयते—Because the words करोति, कृत्वा, etc. are used with S'abda, the latter being a product is non-eternal.

Sūt. 9. सत्त्वान्तरेच योगपद्यात्—Because S'abda is uttered simultaneously by different people (it must be many).

Sūt. 10. प्रकृतिविकृत्योश्च—in दध्यत्र the two elements are दधि and अन्न; the इकार is प्रकृति i. e. the radical unchanged form, the यकार is विकृति the changed form of इ. A thing that is eternal does not undergo these changes. दध्यत्र being a product is non-eternal; ergo all S'abdas are non-eternal.

Sūt. 11. वृद्धिश्च कर्तुमन्नास्य—A word acquires महत्त्वं i. e. sounds loud when several persons utter it (as in the group-chanting of the Veda). If the view is held that one's effort reveals the S'abda that is already there then there should be no difference in its volume whether it is uttered by one or many just as a pot does not change in bulk whether seen with one light or several. It is only when S'abda is admitted to be the result of human effort that its expansiveness can be explained. Hence S'abda is not eternal.

Pārthasarthi has not commented upon 10 and 11.

Sūt. 12. समनुत्तरदर्शनम्—S'abda that is perceived as the result of volitional effort may be either revealed or may be a product. It is then inevitable that it should be a product only.

Sūt. 13. सतः परमदर्शनं विषयानागमात्—शब्दस्य अनुपलब्धिरेव ननु अभावः; विषयानागमात्—शब्दव्यञ्जनानां अभावात्

What the Siddhānti means is that the conjunction and disjunction of the air in the mouth, by disrupting the still air causes the revelation of S'abda and when this revealer is absent S'abda remains unrevealed though it is eternal. Vide Candrikā p. 137.

has its significative force naturally, on the ground of its traditional usage by a succession of elders (i. e. a fresh word cannot have immemorial usage). If it be said that even when this significance remains uncognised the word by its very nature becomes significant like the eye etc. (just as the eye needs no help to reveal objects), then on the first hearing also it should signify (a thing). Hence S'abda being non-eternal we must admit that it acquires its denotative character through human

Sūt. 14. प्रयोगस्थयरम्—The opponent argues (8th Sūt.) that S'abda is a product because it is spoken of as the object of a verb. The Siddhāntin's reply is that the hetu is subject to the fallacy of svarūpāsiddha or unreal reason. The object is only the utterance of S'abda and not Sabda. It is not that S'abda is to be produced; it is only to be uttered.

Note that 13 and 14 are not commented on by Pārthasārathi.

Sūt. 15. आदित्यवयोगपचम्—The pūrvapakṣin reasons thus—S'abda is characterised by distinction because being non-eternal it is cognised in several places. The 'gakaras' are products because they are many. The Siddhāntin replies that the hetu is vitiated by the fallacy of vyabhiçāra—the sun though one is perceived by many in several places.

Sūt. 16. वर्णान्तरमविकारः—The hetu adduced in (10) is asiddha, i. e. is unreal or futile reason. In दध्यन्त्र the यकार is not the changed form (विकृति) of इ but it is शब्दान्तर, a different sound in place of इ.

Sūt. 17. नादवृद्धिपरा—The hetu adduced in (11) is svarūpāsiddha, non-existent reason. The S'abda being void of parts neither gains nor loses volume. It is only the sound that acquires volume and it is by illicit transference that S'abda (as well as pada) is regarded as being high or low.

Sūt. 18. नित्यस्तुत्यादर्शनस्थपराधेखात्—तु शब्दः पक्षव्यावर्तयति—नित्यः शब्दोऽविनश्यति; कुतः, दर्शनस्थपराधेखात्—दृश्यते शब्दः अनेनेति दर्शन—उच्चारणं, तत्पराधेखात्—Candrikā p.141

S'abda is eternal because its utterance is for generating the knowledge of the meaning. If with the mere utterance of S'abda it should perish then it ceases to convey the sense.

Sūt. 19. सर्वत्रयौगपथात्—शब्दः, नित्यः, जातिरूपेण नित्येन अर्थेन नित्यसंबन्धात्—S'abda is eternal because it is eternally related to the eternal jāti which is its import.

Sūt. 20. संख्याभावात्—What is meant is that when a word is uttered a number of times we have recognition of the same word and recognition implies unity. The repetition is of utterance and not of S'abda—S'abda is not many, but the utterances are.

Sūt. 21. अनेपेक्षत्वात्—शब्दः विनाशरहितः, अवयवसंयोगादि कारणानेपेक्षत्वात्—S'abda is not liable to destruction because there is no destruction of a karapa. In the case of cloth it is seen that with the destruction of its cause, viz. the threads, it,—cloth—which is a conjunct of threads, is destroyed. But S'abda having no cause is indestructible and what is indestructible must be eternal.

Sūt. 22. प्रक्षयाभावाच्च योगस्य—शब्दः वायव्यवकारणकोनभवति; वायव्यवयवसंबन्धप्रत्यक्षा विषयत्वात्; व्यतिरेकेण तत्त्ववयवयोऽपि पठ्यत्—In cloth we have the perception of threads, but in S'abda we have no perception of the parts of Vāyu; if otherwise we could infer that S'abda was composed of the parts of Vāyu.

Sūt. 23. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च—Because of liṅga also S'abda is eternal. The s'ruti वाचाविरूपनित्यया though relating to the praise of Agni presumes the eternity of S'abda—नित्ययावाचा; and this would not be pertinent if the eternity of the word had not been established by some other pramāṇa. This is a case of proof based on liṅga. The sentence वाचाविरूप etc. relates to some other context but incidentally makes mention of S'abda—nityatva.

agency as in the case of words like Devadatta.² How then is the non-eternality of the word (proved)? When an effort is made it is not that the word (which is already there) is revealed but since its cognition follows it (the effort) as in the case of pot etc., it must be concluded that it (the word) is its product. Otherwise why should it be known after that (effort) and not before? And since what is cognised is soon obscured its evanescence is evident. It cannot be said that the *hetu*—not being revealed, is not established because (says the opponent) the fact of revealing is not necessitated by effort (i. e. there is no relation of cause and consequence between effort and revealing). The revelation indeed means either the removal of an obstacle or the addition of an extra feature (lit. cleansing or purifying) to *Sabda*. It is not however the removal of an obstacle since no such obstacle is perceived. (One may say) that the motionless winds (air) remain veiling the ear and prevent the perception of the *Sabda*; and then when the winds are scattered by the breaths raised by one's effort from within the chest, the *Sabda* is experienced (is heard). If that be so then being omnipresent all the words would have come into contact with the ear and remained there and they would be heard by all at once the moment the obstacles were removed.

Now as regards the addition of an extra feature (lit. effecting purification or modification); even there we find three ways—the breaths proceeding from the chest might effect the purification of either the *Sabda* or the sense of hearing or both. If the purification is admitted to be of *Sabda*, because it is one, because it is omnipresent, and because the purification of parts is impossible since it has no parts the *Sabda* purified by the breaths emitted by the citizens of *Srughna* would be heard in *Pāṭaliputra* also; thus it is said (in the *S. V.*)—“It will be understood by all there”. The same defect (will be found) even as regards the purification of the sense of hearing. If according to the doctrine of each of these—*Kaṇāda*, *Kapila* and *Mīmāṃsaka* (*Vaidika*) the sense of hearing is constituted (respectively) by ether, *ahamkāra*, or *dik*, (space), because it (ether or *ahamkāra* or space) is one, because all-pervading, and because devoid of parts, there would be only one sense of hearing (*śrotrendriya*) for all men and that (sense) becomes purified by the *dhvanis* (the air proceeding from the chest) though they are confined to one particular region, so that who could prevent the cognition of that sound by all? And this has been pointed out in (the *Vārtikas*)—“According to the view that the sense of hearing is constituted by ether”, “If the sense of hearing (is regarded as being purified) the same fate (overtakes that view also)”. Again in this view since the sense of hearing is common for (the cognition) all the words, though purified for the purpose of cognising a single word the sense of hearing would manifest incidentally all the words just as the eye that is opened for beholding a pot would reveal cloth etc. found in the

(2) Just as proper names are purely conventional all others are. अणुदीतमपि—
a thing may serve as a cause either by mere existence (सत्त्वा) or by its existence
being known (ज्ञातत्वा).

same place. This has been shown in (the Vārtika):—"when once the sense of hearing is purified (it will manifest all śabdas)". And this defect (viz. the contingency of cognising all the words) though already pointed out (when refuting word-obstruction) must be shown to exist even as regards word-purification—all words indeed reside near the sense of hearing so that when one of them is purified, perforce the other words would undergo purification. And when words occupy the same region and have a common indriya (sense) as their locus no demarcation will be found between those that are purified and others not purified, for such a demarcation is not found in the case of pot etc. This has been pointed out in the Vārtika:—"The same defect ought to be attributed to etc". If however the view is held that both are purified then the aggregated defects of both will have to be pressed home. Hence śabda is not *revealed* by effort and being *produced* by it, it is of limited range (and as such it is not all-pervading) and the sense of hearing is only the orifice of the ear. When this is admitted it will stand to reason to say that some word is heard by some people only. Otherwise there would be no demarcation as to the scope of hearing and of words. Further a word which is uttered by speakers in different regions is cognised simultaneously in different regions 'and that' (cognition) says the Bhāṣya 'is impossible (in regard to) śabda which is eternal and therefore one.' Here in the Bhāṣya passage "of the eternal (the ubiquitous cognition in different places) is impossible" is the proposition, and "of that (śabda) which is one," is the hetu (vākya). This (śabda), because it is eternal, is one and of a thing that is single, cognition in different regions is an impossibility³.

2. Well, it does not necessarily follow that what is eternal must

Objection.

be single; the "gakāras" though in reality many are eternal. To meet such a contention the Bhāṣya says—"In the absence of the knowledge of distinctions (viśeṣa) plurality cannot be ascribed to a thing that is eternal." (S. Bh. p. 74). This, (says the opponent) is the substance of the Bhāṣya:—Since it is on the strength of the special cognition termed recognition⁴ that the gakāra of yesterday and the gakāra of to-day are regarded as one (i. e. identical), eternity (of śabda) is admitted; and in the gakāra also uttered by several speakers all simultaneously there is this knowledge of non-differentiation and no 'special cognition' (can be said to exist) there also (i. e. even without pratyabhijñā we have the notion of identity). And when the cognition of several is absent

(3) The eternity of Ś'abda establishes its oneness and oneness, the impossibility of ubiquitous cognition. सत्त्वात्तरे योग पचात् is the fourth pūrvapakṣa Sūtra in support of which the Bhāṣya passage (though somewhat altered) "नाना देशेष्ववकुम्भिः" is quoted (S. Bh. p. 74).

(4) प्रत्यभिज्ञादय विशेष प्रत्यय बलेन—on the strength of this specific jñāna viz. recognition. "अविशेष प्रत्यय बलेन" appears to be a better reading; then the meaning may be expressed thus:—यत्र भेद प्रत्यया भावेसति प्रत्यभिज्ञावर्तते तत्र एकत्वं अभ्युपगम्यतव्यम्.

what is eternal cannot be many.⁵ If however 'manyness' is admitted, recognition ceases to be *pramāṇa* to you even as it is to us. And when that ceases to be *pramāṇa* eternity (of *śabda*) cannot stand to reason. Hence singleness must be admitted in case it is eternal but singleness is not compatible with cognition in different regions. In the *Vārtika* also (this is said):—"Or because of simultaneous cognition (we must admit) distinctness (*śabdabheda*) and because of distinctness (we must admit) *kāryatā* (i. e. that it is a product);" thus having first set down these two (distinctness and 'being a product') it has been pointed out how distinctness arises from simultaneous cognition, in the *Vārtikas* commencing from "it is only when non-pervading that simultaneous cognition (of a *śabda* in several places is possible)" up to "when distinctness is evident, (recognition) is admitted only from similarity (and not from the identity of *śabda*)."⁶ And how on account of distinctness there results *kāryatā* and how it cannot be conceived that distinctness results from what is not a product and is eternal, that is shown in (S. V. *śabdānityatvādhikaraṇa* p. 732-St. 14):—"When a thing is eternal cognition of identity (singleness) follows &c." The illusoriness of cognition is certainly not welcomed by the advocate of the eternity (of *Śabda*, viz. the *Mīmāṃsaka*). So it is said thus:—"When unity is established the difference of regions (in which the same word is uttered) may entitle us if we please to infer different regions but not distinctness of *śabda*" (S. B. 15th sūtra. p. 82). Eternity cannot be established in case it (viz. recognition) is non-valid for there is no other *pramāṇa* (by which to prove the eternity of words). Hence if you admit eternity you must admit unity but that is contradicted by the fact that the same *śabda* is heard in several regions. Therefore (we must conclude) that owing to simultaneous cognition there is distinctness; distinctness means non-validity of recognition; and when that ceases to be a valid means of knowledge eternity vanishes, with the result that *Śabda* becomes a product—and this sorites is established automatically. Non-eternity being confirmed recognition (it must be conceded) takes place on the basis of *similarity* like (the recognition in a succession of) flames. Therefore *śabda* is non-eternal. When the *pūrvapakṣa* is thus urged (the answer follows in the next section).

3. The reply is stated thus:—"A *śabda* (*dhvani*) that comes to light after the effort is made, need not be an effect exclusively; that it comes to light after the effort fits in with the view that *śabda* is *revealed* (*abhivyangya*)." As regards the question how

Refutation of the doctrine that *śabda* is non-eternal.

this revealing (takes place) we say it is through the purification

(5) असतिच विशेषे नित्यस्य नशनेकत्वं संभवति—Since the identity of the *gākāra* of yesterday and of to-day is admitted on the strength of recognition why not admit the identity (*ekatva*) of *gākāra* when uttered by several men since there is also recognition. It is a single notion.

(6) अभिव्यक्तेरिदुपपन्नैको नानाऽवगम्यते—S. V. *śabdānityatvādhikaraṇa*, St. 10. तेनैकबुद्धिः सादृश्यात्पुनरेकव्यक्तेऽव कल्पते *ibid.* St. 13. When the notion of distinctions is there what is imagined as recognition is only similarity. The conclusion, so thinks the opponent, is inevitable that recognition is not a valid *pramāṇa*. What happens then? The eternity of the word based on recognition stands repudiated.

of the sense of hearing. As to the statement that when ether or egoity⁷ is admitted to constitute the sense of hearing men would have the knowledge (of śabda) in all regions by its purification (i. e. ākāṣa and antaḥkaraṇa-egoity, with either of which hearing is identified, being single would when they are rendered fit convey the knowledge of śabda to all men in all places) we say that in case the sense of hearing is identified with these two it would be liable to that defect. Let us grant that the ear-orifice is the sense of hearing and that being different for different persons there would be no warrant for extending the sense of the term (atiprasaṅga). No doubt it is the ether that constitutes the sense of hearing;⁸ that however is not directly purified but through its locus (viz. the orifice of the ear); hence though the sense of hearing is one for all men, as the loci are different, hearing will be delimited with the delimitation of purification.

4. Well, when the sense of hearing is admitted to be single, even though the loci are distinct the purification of any one locus must result in the purification of the sense and as such the hearing-sense of all men will become purified so that there would certainly be the cognition (of śabda simultaneously) by all men. The Vārtika has it thus:—"Well, one that advocates the singleness of the sense of hearing must admit that the sense which has had its purification in one locus would generate cognition in all men"—in other words, in all living human beings. Here is the answer to this (contention):—"It is perceived that men's cognition arises in the bodily regions; hence the purification (saṃskāra) not occurring in the same place as pradhāna (i. e. phala, viz. cognition of śabda) loses its auxiliary character."⁹ This is what it means—in one's own body only which is the seat of enjoyment (i. e. experience of pleasure and pain) jñāna arises for all men and not elsewhere; the auxiliary of the cognition of Śabda is this purification of the locus, and identity of place with pradhāna is auxiliary to the auxiliaries^{9a}; hence if the cognition (of śabda) is to manifest itself in a person having a particular body the purification effected in that body only is the originator of that (cognition) and not that which pertains to another body. And that (saṃskāra pertaining to the other body) occupying a region different from that of the cognition of pradhāna (śabda-jñāna) ceases to be the auxiliary.

(7) The antaḥkaraṇa of the Sāṃkhyas which embraces ahamkāra is cosmic—not individual, as such it is partless.

(8) According to the Mimāṃsakas it is the space that constitutes the sense of hearing and what is pointed out here is that even if ether is supposed to be identical with the sense of hearing there will be no room for the defect as urged by the opponent.

(9) The cognition of Ś'abda which is the effect (pradhāna) has saṃskāra as its cause (aṅga). This saṃskāra must take place in the very person who gets the cognition of the word as otherwise owing to the absence of the identity of the locus the cognition will not arise.

(9 a) Just as pradhāna, viz. the cognition of ś'abda is qualified by the purification of the locus, so the aṅga also, viz. purification is qualified by the identity of locus-pradhānasamānades atva.

5. Well, since the thing that is purified (or qualified) is one (viz. *indriya*) and since *samskāra* becomes an auxiliary through its medium the regional distinction (i. e. *śabdajnāna* arising in one place and the sense-qualification in another) is immaterial; for example, since the *kuśa* grass is one (i. e. not changed) the *samskāras* (done to it) do not cease to be auxiliary to 'upasad' and 'agniṣomiya' (sacrifice) even though such *samskāras* are effected for 'ātithyā' (sacrifice)¹⁰; the same holds good here also.

(We say) no, because it militates against experience.¹¹ The cognition (*śabdajnāna*) of all men is not any way experienced in one locus. Hence though the *indriya* is one it generates cognition only in close association with the *samskāra* of the same region (as that in which the particular cognition arises) and not in any other way so that this view of ours is established on the strength of (universal) experience. Therefore there is no room for any overextension (i. e. contingency of all men hearing). Again it is not that the sense of hearing must needs be one; no doubt ether is homogenous and impartible; still it gets into relation with objects of limited dimensions like pots etc; as such these (conjunctions with pots etc.) become circumscribed; hence the sense of hearing constituted by ether which is delimited by the orifice of the ear is different for different persons, and as the delimited ether is the auditory sense its distinctions in its delimited phase become clearly established though in its real nature it is one. Similarly it must be understood that cognition arises only in that region of *ahamkāra* or of *dik* which has undergone the necessary modification (if *ahamkāra* or *dik* be supposed to constitute the sense of hearing for they also are like ether all-pervading).

It was further said that the sense of hearing if once purified would manifest all the words; as to that here is the answer:—The tones (*dhvani*) coming into contact with the palate and other parts of the speech-apparatus emerge transformed and endowed with unique properties with the result that a particular *dhvani* effects only such modifications (in the ear-orifice) as would render a particular *śabda* alone audible and not (*śabdas*) in general; thus is the demarcation of cognitions of hearing accounted for. Even if it be held that the *Śabda* undergoes the (requisite) modification it is only a particular *dhvani* that effects the modification of a particular *śabda* and not all *dhvanis* will (modify) all (*śabdas*), so that the demarcation between cognitions (of hearing) is even more clear. And it is a matter of

(10) This is known as *आतिथ्या बर्हि न्यय*. The *kuśa* grass which has been purified for the second day of the *yāga* is kept on for the third and fourth days as well, without further purification. On the fourth day the *agniṣomiya pasu* is sacrificed and on the fifth known as *Stutyāha* the oblation consists of the *Soma* juice. On this analogy the opponent urges that when one Sense-organ (which is in the place of *Kuśa*) is purified the purification of other Sense-organs is unnecessary so that the cognition of *śabda* by one person ought to give rise to a similar cognition in all persons—cf. *Jai. Sat.* IV. ii-13.

(11) It is pointed out that the illustration of *kuśa* is inapplicable since in the *yāga* the *phala* is unseen whereas here it is perceptive.

experience that even in the apprehension of objects by one and the same sense (as the eye) there is the demarcation as regards its revealing capacity:—the light from the sun is the revealer of pot etc. only and not of stars; the rind of the nimba (a tree bearing bitter fruit) reveals only the sandal scent and not other scents; hence there is no blemish. Nor is it incumbent that when a śabda is purified its cognition should take place in all men, because the dhvanis occupy a limited space and the śabda is rendered fit only in that particular space and not everywhere. Hence whosoever sense of hearing is in the vicinity of the śabda that is purified he alone hears and not another; as such it (our doctrine) is justified.

6. "As in the case of the sun there would be simultaneous cognition in several places, of a thing though it is one." (cf. Sūt. 15). Those who dwell on the Vindhyas, those in the country of Kāmarūpa (part of Assam) —by all of them the rising sun is seen in

Further proof that s'abda though one is apprehended in different places.
the region lying to their east; even so the setting sun in the western direction and also as remaining above in the mid-day. For them (i. e. for people inhabiting the Vindhyas and Kāmarūpa) the eastern direction varies, so also the west, so also the zenith. It is clear that the sun who is seen in these countries has (simultaneous) existence in several regions". (To explain)—just as the sun is perceived by the people dwelling in a country at a particular distance, others also perceive it (sun-rise) beyond their dwelling place at the same distance. Hence also there does exist (the cognition of the same object in) several places. Multiplicity of suns (therefore) cannot be assumed nor (is it to be supposed that) some people perceive a different sun.

7. What then is the cause of the perception of the sun in several places when in reality he resides in one place only? This is the reason:—not knowing the exact place which the sun who is at a tremendous distance occupies they illusorily assign to him a spot within their ken and consider him (as shining in) separate regions. And this is an indubitable fact. For instance he who sees the sun in the afternoon in a particular region at a particular distance says, "there is the sun in that place and on that mountain", and the very person having reached that place, all the while keeping the sun within sight, perceives the sun beyond him in the same manner as before (because the horizon recedes as he approaches it); hence it becomes evident to all that the sun occupying a region (in the heavens) in front of the places (from which he is perceived) appears as though he were in their vicinity. Those objects even which compared to the sun are of insignificant size, such as mountains, appear alike to persons whether they are at a distance of two yojanas or three. Hence the cognition of a thing in several places is possible even when it is single. Similarly a single face is seen simultaneously in different mirrors.

8. Well, as for reflection (pratibimba), is not what is seen there a separate object (i. e. different from the image:—bimba)?

No, because it is not existent and is not apprehended (as a separate and independent object). There is no possibility of one gross object being within another gross object (viz. mirror and reflection). Again when a person lifting up a basin of water above the ground and holding it to the height of his navel adjusts his face above it at the height of an ell, he beholds the reflection of his face below the water exactly at the depth (distance) of an ell; but the men standing by his side in that very place perceive nothing. (They should have perceived it if it were different from the image). Hence its existence being negated by the *anupalabdhi* (non-apprehension) it is not possible to admit the existence of an entity called reflection. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that the ray proceeding from the eye is repulsed by the ray proceeding from the mirror or water and in consequence turns back and compasses (the image itself). Hence the cognition in several places being inconstant in its pervasion does not establish the multiplicity of *śabda*.¹²

Well, the perception of the sun in several places can be accounted for on the ground of the mistaken transference of vicinity but how about *Śabda*?

Because of its omnipresence (*sarvagatatva*). The omnipresent *śabda* rendered manifest, each in its place by the *dhvani*s arising in different places appears (as if associated) with distinct places; the *dhvani*s indeed though revealing the *śabda*, only after reaching the region of hearing manifest the *śabda* as if the *śabda* were related to the place of their (*dhvani*) origin; and (that) this (is the process) is admitted on the strength of experience.

Is not the organ of hearing one which must come into contact with its object (*prāpyakāri*)? And since the place of the origin of *dhvani* is not reached by the organ of hearing how could that (place) be grasped by the sense of hearing and when that is not grasped how could there be the apprehension of *śabda* as associated with that place? (cf. A. p. 171).

This is said in explanation :—It is not from the sense of hearing that the cognition of the *śabda* as associated with that region arises, but *Śrotra* (the organ of hearing) though manifesting the *śabda* resident in its own place does not manifest it as associated with the place (of the origin of *dhvani*) but (manifests it) only as such (i. e. *śabda* pure and simple). The *dhvani*s however from whatever quarter they come manifest *śabda* as associated with that (quarter). That *dik* (quarter) indeed being in contact with the *Śrotra* (for *dik* is all-pervading) is fit to be apprehended by the *Śrotra*. It is however to be noted that *dik* is not independently apprehended by the *Śrotra* and yet while *śabda* is apprehended *dik* also is apprehended by the *Śrotra* as its (*śabda*) qualifying adjunct; such being the common experience, (*dik*) is admitted (as an object of

(12) अनैकान्तिकः—Subject to the fallacy of *anaikāntika* or *vyabhiçāra*. *Śabda* though one is cognised in several places as in the case of the sun. The *hetu*, apprehension in different places, does not necessarily prove the manyness of the word.

sense-perception) like time.¹³ Just as time is not perceived independently by the senses but on the contrary is perceived by all the senses as a qualifying adjunct of the objects apprehended by them (is dik perceived). Hence what is demonstrated is the apprehension of the qualified, which apprehension takes the form "Śabda in this quarter".

9. The dhvani gradually become feeble as they travel from a place which is proximate or distant or far distant and reveal the śabda as high, low and lower (respectively). Because of this difference (in the apprehension of śabda as high etc.) the place where the dhvani originates is comprehended by the intellect through inference as being near and far. There (i. e. in this comprehension), as the abode of hearing which in fact is śabda-deśa (the place where śabda is manifested) is not apprehended, and as the dik-conjoined śabda (the real śabda associated with dik), as well as the place of the origin of dhvani is apprehended (by inference) cognition of this nature arises due to the ignorant commingling of the two (viz Srotradeśa and dhvanyutpattideśa): as when we say "In the eastern quarter at this intervening distance śabda is (heard)". Hence owing to the difference in the regions of the manifest (i. e. the dhvani that reveals śabda), cognition in several places of even an eternal object is quite intelligible, so that there is nothing wrong (in our explanation).

Is not this a defect that in the absence of negating cognition there should be illusoriness? (i. e. to regard a thing as illusory when it is not negated is itself fallacious). Or why should there be any partiality in regard to recognition which by this (partiality) is excluded from (the field of) illusoriness?¹⁴

This preference is (justifiable). It is not reasonable to accept illusoriness when indeed its (recognition) illusoriness is not (a matter of experience); as for the cognition (of śabda) in several places (the postulation) of illusoriness is unavoidable. Even according to the view that Śabda is non-eternal the apprehension is in reality only of that which resides in the śrotra (the ear-channel) since the sense of hearing must come into contact with the object (prāpyakāri) and it is not the apprehension of śabda resident in the speaker's mouth, and non-

(13) The Mīmāṃsakas admit that dik (Space or quarter) and kāla (time) as cognisable by all the senses, in their attributive capacity; e. g. the present pot, the pot here etc.

The Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas reject time and space as objects of ordinary perception. They explain 'the present pot' as composed of two elements- the 'one, 'pot' being the object of ordinary perception- लौकिक प्रत्यक्ष and the other, 'time element' as indicated by the word 'present' being the object of supernormal perception- अलौकिक प्रत्यक्ष.

(14) बाधकप्रत्ययविना भ्रान्तित्वे प्रत्यभिज्ञायावपि भ्रान्तिर्बन्ध्यात् — Candrika. If illusoriness is posited even though its negation does not occur, recognition also would become illusory knowledge. It is on the basis of pratyabhijñā (recognitive knowledge) that the eternality of Śabda is attempted to be proved by the Mīmāṃsakas. The opponent asks why elevate recognition to the status of a pramāṇa.

illusoriness would have resulted if the apprehension were of the śabda in that region (i. e. in the speaker's mouth).¹⁵

10. The Buddhist (Saugata) however, admitting only aprāpyakāritva (non-conjunction of sense-organ with the object) does not support illusoriness. That does not stand to reason. If aprāpyakāritva is accepted then śabda ought to be apprehended simultaneously by one standing near and another standing at a distance and it is impossible to account in any manner for their successive apprehension if aprāpyakāritva (were true). Again (the question is) whether śabda is momentary or enduring? If momentary then vanishing as it does immediately after being apprehended by those in its vicinity how could it be apprehended by those at a distance? Its enduring nature however is never admitted by the Saugatās. And if its enduring nature is admitted (advocating at the same time aprāpyakāritva), then those that are near would continue hearing the śabda for any length of time. Hence aprāpyakāritva being untenable the illusoriness of the apprehension of śabda in several places is unavoidable. In our view however since the dhvanis travel gradually to near and distant places and since they do not stay long in one auditory centre, being ever on the move, successive cognitions and non-continuance of hearing for long, are both feasible. Hence the non-eternity (of śabda) is not absolute.¹⁶ On the other hand the eternity of śabda alone, it is reasonable to hold, as otherwise the cognition of the meaning (for which a śabda stands) would not arise. If with every utterance fresh words are produced (according to the Naiyāyika words are produced and destroyed momentarily; the same word does not last more than two seconds) they cannot signify any meaning for there will be no apprehension of relation (i. e. sambandha—the primary significance or śakti-graha) and when there is no apprehension of śakti it ceases to be significative. It is not possible that from the apprehension of the primary meaning (śakti) of one śabda we could ascribe pratyāyakatva to another śabda (i. e. it is not right to say that the word uttered first enables us to understand its śakti and the same word uttered next yields us the meaning for they are not identical). On the ground that the primary significance (śakti) has been apprehended of the word 'go' (cow) the word 'aśva' (horse) cannot convey the meaning. (The point is that the word cow uttered once and the same word uttered next are as apart as cow and horse). (A third disputant)—It is true. No doubt

(15) With his wave-theory of sound-propagation the Naiyāyika has to admit the illusoriness of the knowledge which confounds the sound arising in the sense-organ with that in the speaker's mouth. The recognitive knowledge in सोयंगकारः is illusory to the Naiyāyika but valid to the Mīmāṃsaka.

(16) तत्समाज्ञैकान्ततत्तावदनित्यत्वम्, i. e. उग्रहितरूपेण अनित्यत्वं, स्वरूपतः नित्यत्वम्—Śabda in its real nature is eternal but is non-eternal when it is confounded with dhvani—such appears to be the sense of this phrase. An alternative explanation may be offered: there is no logical ground on which to base the non-eternity of Śabda.

when the word (uttered subsequently) is dissimilar it cannot be significant, but when a word though different is similar to the word whose primary sense has been apprehended and so has become significant, that word becomes denotative (of some object). To this we say 'no, because there is no such possibility (viz. its becoming significant). There is not even one principal word that becomes primarily significant because all words are similar and as such there is no apprehension of the significative relation (if the first uttered 'go' becomes significant the others by similarity may become so). It is impossible to apprehend the significance of a word unless it is heard twice or thrice for the reason that there is no anvayavyatireka.¹⁷

11. It may be urged that at the time śaktigraha (knowledge of the Non-eternity of significative potency) arises, if similar words are uttered by two or three persons, the word heard subsequently having had its śakti, acquires its significatory character and the words following it owing to their similarity with it signify the sense.¹⁸

This does not stand to reason.—It is stated (by you) that the word whose śakti has been understood by a person after hearing words similar to it, itself when heard subsequently becomes significant; but that very word being heard for the first time by those who have not heard words similar to it, becomes non-significant, leading thus to contradiction. This is said in the Vārtika—"For one who has not heard other similar words, the word at that time (i.e. when a different person hears the fifth word for the first time) is non-significant; but that very word (i. e. the fifth time uttered word) for those who have heard similar words (twice or thrice) becomes significant, and this is indeed surprising." (The contradiction lies in the fact that the same word is both significant and non-significant).

It may be stated that this śabda (which is uttered for the fifth time) is indeed significant; but that those who have not heard other (similar) words (i. e. those who hear it for the first time) do not apprehend its significative potency because of the absence of concomitant affirmation and negation (anvayavyatireka).

If that is so, words which come later also (i. e. uttered the sixth or seventh time) acquire their significative potency in this manner (i.e. by the method of concomitant affirmation and negation) so that why should similarity be juxtaposed to account for the significative potency?¹⁹

(17) अन्वयव्यतिरेकभावात्—In order that a word may become significant there must be positive and negative concomitance between the word and the apprehension of its meaning and the concomitance becomes apparent only after a repeated use of the same word in different settings.

(18) What the opponent urges is that words may be momentary but the same word when uttered, say thrice, becomes significant the fourth time that is uttered, and when heard subsequently becomes, on the strength of similarity, significant, its śakti having been apprehended.

(19) When once anvayavyatireka is admitted as essential for the apprehension of the meaning of a word, similarity may be dispensed with altogether.

This is stated (in the *vārtika*) thus:—"If in spite of the fact that the significance is in the word etc".²⁰ If it is admitted that in the case of those who have not apprehended its *śakti* the *śabda* heard subsequently (i.e. the sixth or the seventh time) is non-significant then that *śabda* which is admitted to be significant and on the basis of whose similarity subsequent words become significant also is non-significant for some (who have not apprehended its *śakti*), with the result that all words would become non-significant. (The *Vārtika*) says, "It would cease to be significant etc."²¹ Again for one who says that the word which has existence at the time its *śakti* arises, possesses significative potency, whereas the words used subsequently signify the sense through their similarity with it (i. e. the 'go' that has become meaningful for the first time) contradiction is inevitable. The *śabda* that for some persons exists at the time its *śakti* is apprehended, subserves for others the demands of practical life so that for one and the same word its significatory character will be both primary (*mukhya*) and secondary (*gauna*) through similarity—this is self-contradiction. (The *Vārtika*) says thus:—"The *śabda* by its similarity becomes significant etc."²² Hence the significatory power of a word is not established by similarity, so that unity (singleness of *śabda*) alone should be adhered to.

Well, (we say that) based on the unity of the universal (and not similarity) like 'gatva' the capacity to signify the sense could be established.

That is not (possible), because that (viz. universal 'gatva' itself) is absent; for it is only when the individuals are distinct that the universal gets its being (i. e. the very existence of the universal presupposes distinct individuals) and not otherwise.

12. Some one again says—Distinctions among particulars though existing, the universal (*sāmānya* or *jāti*) has no valid means of proof in its support. For it is only where the apprehension of identity exists along with the apprehension

(20) The *Vārtika* runs thus :—अथास्य विद्यमानोपिकैश्चिदर्थो न जायते, तत्तुल्यमुत्तरस्यैतिकिसाद-
येन वाचकः—S. V. VI. 251 If it be said that the word is really significant and yet is not apprehended by some, then the other word also, say the word uttered the fifth or the sixth time, is very like it (the fourth which is significant) and there is no need for introducing the new element—similarity. It is the absence of *anavayavyatireka* that obscures the sense in all cases.

(21) The full text of the *Vārtika* is as follows:—अनर्थकत्वमस्य स्यादथाऽनन्यश्रुतीनां प्रति,
पूर्वमिदमपि तत्सत्त्वात् सर्वानर्थकताभवेत्—S. V. VI. 252. If for one who has not heard the word uttered the 2nd or the 3rd time it is non-significant then non-significance being evident for some others in regard to the previous words all words would become non-significant.

(22) The full text is as follows:—अर्थवत्सदृशत्वेन योवाञ्छतवर्तमानतः मुख्योऽसावश्रुतीनां स्यात्
तदेकत्वेन युज्यते—S. V. VI. 253—For those who have apprehended the *śakti*, the fifth or the sixth word becomes significant through similarity (i.e. secondarily) but for others who have not apprehended the *śakti* but who actually apprehend it when the word is uttered the fourth time it becomes significant primarily. The same word cannot become significant both primarily and secondarily when its import is identical.

of distinction is there (room for) the universal. But here (as regards śabda) though distinction of particulars exists it is not apprehended. Hence the recognition here, being of the nature of an illusion as it arises from the non-apprehension of the distinction (among particulars and not from the singleness of the object) is incompetent to establish the universal.

That however does not stand to reason. If differences do exist among particulars how could recognition arise without (the conception of) the universal? If it

Answer.

be said that it is due to the non-apprehension of the discreteness what is that non-apprehension of discreteness (we ask)? It means (you will say) that the feature that differentiates to-day's 'ga' sound from yesterday's 'ga' sound is not apprehended. Then what is it that is apprehended? Even in the 'ga' sound that is uttered now some characteristic feature is apprehended, and if the differentiating characteristic is not apprehended, the apprehension of the inclusive element (i. e. the characteristic running through the particulars) is evident. And the common characteristic is spoken of as sāmānya (jāti). Hence is sāmānya established. It cannot be said that no purpose is served by sāmānya when recognition is rendered possible by similarity only, for similarity presumes the resemblance of (certain) common parts (in the objects recognised) and because the varṇas are partless (there could be no similarity).

Well, (we say) that similarity is no more than the common locus

Objection. which establishes the relatedness (between the varṇas) so that the palate etc. which serve as the

common ground (for the origination of varṇas) constitute themselves into similarity even though they (the varṇas) are partless.

No; because it is not perceived by the sense of hearing²³. Hence it must be admitted that recognition is dependent upon what is apprehended by the sense of hearing only (the same sense gives us both jāti and vyakti); and the common locus – the palate and others, is not what is perceived by the sense of hearing. Hence recognition as depending upon universals like 'gatva' etc. is established (when varṇas are distinct). Since this is so, it must be admitted that when the particulars are discrete the universal is certainly there, but when it (discreteness) is absent the universal itself vanishes. Therefore (because the varṇas are not distinct) the eternity of śabda is proved beyond doubt by means of recognition.

13. Well, what kind of pramāṇa is this which is styled 'recognition'?

We say it is pratyakṣa (i. e. perceptive knowledge arising from the sense of hearing). Since it is derived from the sense (of hearing) associated with impressions born of previous perception it is a unit cognition composed of both apprehension and recollection. There (in pratyabhijñā) it must be understood that what was experienced in the past is recalled but with that which is recalled, what is apprehended now, becomes one and is cognised by means of recognition.

(23) That varṇas, say two 'gākāras' have the same locus is not a matter of auditory cognition and recognition is based on sense-perception.

Hence śabda is eternal. But as regards a flame (which might be regarded as eternal seeing that by recognition the notion—"this is that flame", arises), how it lights up space all round cannot be accounted for except by (supposing that) the parts of the flame get detached from it and the whole (avayavin) that loses its parts must necessarily be destroyed so that when the previously existing flame is destroyed the one that manifests itself thereafter is of necessity a different flame. And (it is only) when the discreteness is assured that recognition will be imagined to be due to similarity. As regards śabda however there is no pramāṇa to substantiate its discreteness: this is the difference (between recognition in the case of light and of śabda).

14. Well, since all objects are momentary in character how is

The Buddhist eternity (to be ascribed) to śabda?
contention.

What then is the pramāṇa for the momentariness of all objects?

Bhāṭṭa.

'Perception' gives us what is present for the time being²⁴ and does not negate its existence at another time just as the perception of the blue does not negate the yellow. Rather a thing is known to be absent through anupalabdhi (non-perception) and a thing which (by its very nature) belongs to another moment cannot be said to be fit for perception (i.e. darśanayogyā) at the present time; and it is only then (i.e. darśanayogyā not being perceived) there might have been room for anupalabdhi²⁵. And we fail to see any other pramāṇa (in support of the doctrine of momentariness).

We say that we do find a pramāṇa which has svabhāva as its hetu

Bauddha.

because this pramāṇa has for its viśaya a sādhyā which is necessarily associated with Sattā in general²⁶.

(24) तावत्कालसत्ताबोधयति &c.—The function of perception is only to manifest what is present at a particular time; that it does not exist at another time which is what is involved in the doctrine of momentariness is not given in perception.

(25) Neither perception nor non-perception—anupalabdhi, is competent to validate momentariness.

(26) स्वभावहेतुकम्.—The Bauddha logicians maintained that a genuine inference was based upon the two real relations of causality and identity—tadutpatti and tādātmya. The inference of fire from smoke is an example of the former kind. It is indubitable that smoke is caused by fire and as such there is the invariable concomitance (Vyāpti) between the two. The inference of 'trees' from Sīms'apa is an example of the latter. There is identity between tree and Sīms'apa and so the concomitance is inevitable. In case 'treeness' is not admitted Sīms'apa would lose its very being (Sīms'apātva). The momentariness of all objects is sought to be proved here on the analogy of Sīms'apa. In the vyāpti यत् सत् तत् क्षणिकम् all that exists is momentary, there is identity between satta (existence) and kṣāpika (momentariness) —Vide O. I. P. p. 200 and S. D. S. Bauddha Darśana; also kalpataru V. S. 11, 2-28. स्वभावहेतुकम्—from identity as a determinant; concomitance based upon identity. It may be fully expressed as स्वभावहेतुकव्याप्तिरुक्तलिङ्गकम्. सत्तामात्रानुबन्धि—तादात्म्यनिबन्धनव्याप्तिश्च ले पक्षतावच्छेदकमेव व्याप्यमवति—Now in the example given above Sīms'apātva is pervaded by Vpksatva. Where the Vyāpti is based on identity the determining characteristic of pakṣa itself will be the pervaded. In यत् सत् तत् क्षणिकम् the Sādhyā (probandum) viz. momentariness is invariably associated with Sattā which is the determining factor of Sat; in other words every object that is characterised by existence is momentary.

How is the necessary association with Sattā in general proved in the case of what is momentary?

Bhāṭṭa.

If that is not so (i. e. if existents are not admitted to be momentary) there would be scope for a pramāṇa (inference) sublating (sattā):—In case momentariness is not admitted i. e. if non-momentariness (is admitted) sattā being sublated because of the non-apprehension of the pervader (viz. momentariness) necessarily becomes pervaded by momentariness and yields its (momentariness) inference (i. e. gives rise to the probandum-momentariness)²⁷

Which is the per-Vader of sattā? ²⁸

Bhāṭṭa.

We say, (it is based on) succession and simultaneousness. To explain:—sattā (existence) is "causal efficacy" only and no other. That thing will not attain to the status of existence which does not initiate some causal efficacy because all objects (do initiate causal efficacy) at least from the fact that they constitute the cause of their own apprehension (jñāna). Even though remaining unknown an object, if only its existence is held to be probable, becomes arthakriyākāri (initiating causal efficacy) since all that, is the viśaya of vijñāna²⁹. Hence it is arthakriyākāritva only that (constitutes) existence. Whatever is arthakriyākāri that alone is the real existent (pramārthasat). And that (arthakriyākāritva) is concomitant with (either) successiveness or simultaneity; and these two will not result if objects are regarded as non-momentary (akṣanika). An entity that is stable cannot effectuate simultaneously all the possible arthakriyas (practical or causal efficacies). If it did so there being nothing to be done the second moment it would cease to be an existent and being emptied of its causal efficacy would become momentary only. Nor does it produce (the effects) successively. Why should that entity when it is indeed potent to produce all effects, (it may be asked), produce some one effect to start with and not another, "postponement being out of the question in the case of what has the capacity"? ³⁰

(27) Existence, Sattā is the probans and when momentariness which is the probandum is not there, Sattā ceases to exist, i. e. becomes momentary.

(28) किं पुनः—The question raised is on what ground is the pervasiveness of kṣaṇikatva established. The answer is that without postulating momentariness it is impossible to apprehend existence (Sattā) whether its effects are produced successively or simultaneously. It is to be noted that sattā is identified with causal efficacy.

(29) संभाव्यतेतदपि—Even probability presumes knowledge (vijñāna) and as such constitutes causal efficacy. For as a matter of fact it is inconsistent to doubt knowledge when there is its probability. Another explanation is that the knowledge of the absence of knowledge is arthakriyākāri, 'अज्ञाते इत्याकारकज्ञानजननादेव तत्त्वसत्यत्वम्' (Sud. 572)

(30) This identical phrase समर्थस्यैवोपायोगात् is found in S. D. S. p. 8. Baṭṭha-darsana.

15. If it be argued that postponement is due to the need for the presence of auxiliaries, we say, no. The auxiliaries, if they render no help to the entity, are not needed. But if they do render any service (to the entity) then that which is produced by those auxiliaries, that alone (viz. additament) will be the means of bringing about the effect since the production of the effect follows it immediately.³¹ The bhāva (entity) however would become non-effectual (i. e. would cease to be the kāraṇa.³² For if the effect is produced when the adventitious additament (is present) the permanent entity will cease to be the cause since it is different from it (i. e. the additament).³³ If on the contrary it is held that it is non-different, then the entity also would become momentary since its origination is synchronous with that of the additament (because it is presumed that they are identical) and as for identity and difference (the third alternative) they are mutually contradictory. Hence existence (sattā) is impossible for what is not momentary; so that it is evident there is inseparable concomitance between momentariness and sattā in general.

Again in the case of objects which are products, destruction is inevitable; for that reason also momentariness (must be ascribed) to pots etc. To explain: if of certain things something is inevitable no extraneous cause is needed for (what must happen to) those objects; and of objects that are products (kṛtaka) what is inevitable is destruction so that there arises the knowledge of its inevitability (dhruva-bhāvīva) being pervaded by a hostile probandum.³⁴ (How such knowledge arises is explained):—Dhruvabhāvīva (i. e. destruction inherent in all objects) which is pervaded by the annulled necessity for an extraneous cause and which is perceived in the heat of fire etc. brings to mind its pervader, viz. the non-necessity (of an extraneous cause) and dispels what is its opposite, viz. the necessity (of an

(31) यत् तैः क्रियते; यत्— the additament (अतिशय); तैः—with the auxiliaries. The additament itself produces the effect for it is seen that when the additament is absent the effect is also absent and is present when the former is present. So that it is not the permanent entity भाव, that is the cause of the effect. This is Baudha rejoinder to Naiyāyika who introduces the notion of auxiliaries-

(32) भावस्तत्कारणमेव, following Sud. I read भावस्त्वकारणमेव; if the other reading, viz. भावस्तत्कारणमेव is retained then it should be interpreted as बीजसदृशयदि भावः and तत्कारणमेव as अतिशयकारणमेव. The entity and the auxiliaries can only produce the distinct additament and not the effect, say, sprout etc.

(33) भिन्नत्वात्—It cannot be said that when the auxiliary does effect something it is the permanent entity that has done it because the auxiliary and the entity are different.

(34) विरुद्धव्याप्तोपलब्धिः— The inevitability of its (say seed) destruction, because it is a product, is pervaded by the annulled extraneous probandum (i. e. contrary reason; Vide A. p. 306); in other words no extraneous cause is necessary to bring about destruction. When perishableness is the very nature of an object it must perforce be momentary. When the hetu is pervaded by a Sādhyā which is contrary to the one intended it is known as viruddha fallacy.

extraneous cause).³⁵ Or the colours in a cloth which require an extraneous cause are pervaded by *adhruvabhāvitā* (i. e. state of being non-inherent or non-inevitable) and so *dhruvabhāvitā* (inevitability) which is its opposite negates the necessity of an extraneous cause for (effecting) *vināśa* (destruction) because (in *vināśa*) the opposite of the pervader (the pervader being *adhruvabhāvitva*) is perceived.³⁶ And *vināśa* requiring no extraneous cause is so by its (object) very nature (*svābhāvika*) and operates the very moment after the object comes into being. Hence is established (the doctrine of) momentariness.

16. The blows etc. however, dealt with a stick (say to a pot) are causes only of a different series (as that of the potsherd) and not of destruction.³⁷ The (ordinary) observers however not noticing the distinctness of moments because of the origination of different yet similar (instants) fail, through ignorance of what is real, to perceive the extinction (of the object) which goes on every moment and when they actually perceive a distinct series after the (pot) is broken with the stick, imagine that the destruction was effected then only and imagine (too) that the cause of destruction is the stick etc. As a matter of fact however the causes of destruction are none. And destruction which owes its origin to a different cause cannot by any means be non-different from the object since there is difference in the cause.³⁸ But if the difference between destruction and object (be admitted) then though destruction should take place the object would be apprehended as before (i. e. intact) just as when 'cloth is' is produced 'pot' would be apprehended. Hence objects come into being as perishable in nature from causes which are inherent in themselves only; as such the momentary nature of objects stands vindicated. Again

(35) अग्न्युत्पत्तिरित्यु-Just as the heat of fire is natural and inevitable and is not caused by any extraneous agency so destructibility of objects depends upon no distinct cause. The example given here is one of *anvaya*.

(36) व्यतिरेका etc. Now is the same conclusion arrived at by the negative argument - *v्यतिरेka*, as the previous example is one of positive argument - *anvaya*. The absence of the pervader must result in the absence of the pervaded.

(37) विसदृशसंज्ञानहेतवः - For bringing about the destruction of a thing no extraneous causes are needed. The germs of destruction are inherent in all objects. What the apparent destruction means is the replacement of one series by another as does the sprout series when the seed series comes to an end.

(38) न तावद्भवाद्भिन्नः etc. The Bauddha here detects a dilemma; the destruction caused by the blow cannot be regarded as identical with the entity (pot) for each has its own cause of origination; nor can it be regarded as distinct from the entity, for then the pot though destroyed would remain intact there being no possible connection between the one and the other.

pots etc. though preserved with effort are seen to be destroyed even without blows from the stick owing to the dismemberment of the parts brought on by their wearing out with the lapse of time. And this (destruction) does not take place (all at once) without its (object) undergoing change little by little from the (instant of its) origination. And the change as between the new and the old states (of a pot which is under their observation for some days) is a matter of direct perception even by those men who are not aware of the time when the pot came into existence. Nor will a single pot possess several features because of the incompatibility between diversity and unity. Hence pot and the rest become different every moment, (the dharmin itself becomes new). And the formal process of inference may be stated thus:—Things under dispute (pakṣa) are destroyed the moment after they come into being (sādhya), because they are existents (hetu), like the lamp-flame (example); and recognition also is for us like the lamp-flame only (i. e. illusory, similarity being confounded with identity).

17. Here is our answer :—Practical efficiency does not constitute existence. Of an existent (it may be said) that it possesses practical efficiency but that alone is not existence. And it is not obligatory that every object should be identified with practical efficiency since we may have an existent which is not arthakriyākāri. Nor is it obligatory for every object that it should be the cause of (its own) apprehension. Even though an object is not apprehended it may exist in its own right. And not all objects of past or future existence can serve as the viśaya of knowledge (vijñāna) for those (things) that are absent cannot in reason serve as causes of jñāna. If it be said that they (even absent things) can be the cause of jñāna, since all objects are active in the production of all jñānas and since successive production is not admitted there can be no subsequent activity (why? because activity is once for all exhausted) and because existence is characterised by arthakriyākāritva it would result in the whole world becoming a mere blank immediately after all the objects are apprehended. Hence this (your argument) is worthless.

Practical efficiency of the permanent entities becomes manifest successively and delay can be accounted for by the fact of the necessity of auxiliaries; and the auxiliaries do really produce the adventitious additament whose relation to the entity is either one of identity-cum-difference (tādātmyasambandha) or of difference only; for instance in the case of a seed the additament is produced when there is contact with earth and water and in its (contact) absence the seed though permanent does not commence sprouting before (the rise of additament). If the contact is secured the commencement (is seen of the sprout) so that our position does at no time swerve from reason.

If so (says the Bauddha) let causal efficacy be ascribed to the contact only and not to the seed.

It is not so; by the mere contact its origination is not perceived—the contact of earth and water does not indeed generate the sprout.³⁹ When however that causal efficacy is seen in the contact as qualified by the seed, it must be admitted that the qualifying seed also possesses that causal efficacy. For him (Bauddha) however who does not admit the necessity of auxiliaries even the seed in the granary would sprout as there is no need for its contact with earth and water.

Well, an object which has reached the final instant is itself competent to give rise to the sprout and does not require any aid. Yet though requiring no aid this (object) cannot reach that (final) state without the auxiliaries so that it fails to produce the sprout without them; the seed which is in the granary is indeed different and different is this which is in contact with the earth and from which the sprout originates.⁴⁰

It is true (that the instants are different); but this has to be said here:—What has reached the ultimate instant is in contact with earth and water, and is the progenitor of the sprout; and if it should remain in the granary only there being no effort on the part of the farmer (we ask) does it generate the sprout? If you say, yes, then of what use is the careful husbandry on the part of the farmer? ⁴¹. And the assiduous exertion of the learned (among the Bauddhas) in the form of prayer at the sanctuary for the sake of svarga and apavarga (release from saṃsāra) and instruction thereto by the preceptors would all be to no purpose, because svarga and apavarga would result from vijñāna alone when it has reached the final instant and there would be no room for merit and demerit. Hence the need for the auxiliaries has to be admitted; and it follows therefore that competency for action takes place in succession even in the case of an enduring object in the order in which the auxiliaries come into its contact. Hence there being no pramāṇa invalidating the contrary of the sādhyā (vipakṣa, viz. non-momentariness) sattā, whose concomitance with momentariness is absent, is incompetent to yield that probandum

(39) The point is that samyoga which is a separate entity may itself be productive of the sprout without the necessity of the seed.

(40) निरपेक्षोऽप्यनौ &c. No doubt, says the Bauddha, the generation of the sprout does not need any auxiliary; but in order to reach the final instant the auxiliary is essential; cf. स्वरूपलभाथैवेव तस्य सहकार्यपेक्षा न कार्यजननाथम् Candrikā. An entity needs auxiliaries not for producing an effect but in order that it may acquire that state which gives rise to a new series.

(41) किमर्थतर्हि &c.—Perhaps the sprouting for the Mīmāṃsaka is the one that results from careful cultivation of the soil etc. and not such as takes place in a granary by the contact of earth and water. The Bauddha might retort by saying that for him also the final instant involves the farmer's ploughing operation etc. His doctrine of the kurvadrūpa, 'the immediate momentary antecedent of the effect' however is refuted by the Naiyāyika by pointing out that it necessitates the admission of an infinite number of instants — Vide Dinakariya on ātmavāda.

(viz. momentariness).⁴² Nor can it be maintained that owing to its inherent nature destruction does not require an extraneous cause; the potsherd series which is inherent in the pot-series does need (for its origination) an extraneous cause in the shape of blows from the stick and in consequence there occurs the fallacy-*anāikāntika* or straying away of reason.

Well, if by an extraneous cause destruction which is distinct from the object should arise let there be the apprehension of the object as before even when destruction has taken place, (which apprehension however is not seen to arise). Hence destruction arises from the very nature (of the object).

What do you understand by *svābhāvikatva* (i. e. being in the very nature of objects)?

Bhātta.

The meaning is that destruction takes place from the very nature of the objects and from no extraneous cause.

Bauddha.

Well, if destruction though arising from (the very nature of) the object should be (regarded as being) distinct from the object, it (the object) would be apprehended (intact) as before so that the blemish would be similar (in either case). But - this is only for the sake of argument - if destruction be considered as non-distinct from the object then because destruction (*vināśa*) being *abhāva* is non-perceptive the object also would become non-perceptive. And (really) to talk of identity between the positive and negative entities which are in their nature diametrically opposed to each other is nothing but temerity.

But the term destruction does not connote an entity which is either independent or identical (as compared with the object) since it is void (*tuc̥c̥ha*-empty of content).

Bauddha.

Then, since there is no destruction of an object that is produced (like pot etc.) its permanence alone would result so that your doctrine of momentariness is most successfully established! Hence with the (occurrence of) destruction though it be independent (of the object) the apprehension etc. of the object will (certainly come to an end)-that this is so has to be admitted even by one who does not desire (its disappearance).⁴³ Again it was

Bhātta.

(42) विश्लेषे etc. —The Bauddha had maintained (Vide para 14 *ibid*) that if momentariness is not accepted or in other words if the opposite (*vipakṣa*, viz. permanence) is accepted there would be neither successive nor simultaneous origination of an effect. Now the *Mīmāṃsaka* has shown that this negating *pramāṇa* (*anupalabdhi*) is inoperative since successive origination (on the part of an enduring object) can be accounted for by the association of auxiliaries. Hence the statement *यत् सत् तत् क्षणिकम्* stands disproved.

(43) The *Mīmāṃsaka* conclusion is that destruction must be regarded as bringing about the end of the object though it is distinct from the object. The Buddhist objection that if it be distinct its counter-correlative (*pratiyogin*) ought to continue to exist is waived on the ground of universal experience.

said that every moment there was change of state; let it be so; still on that score only the object that is liable to change (i.e. *dharmin*) cannot be said to be destroyed every moment since there is no *pramāṇa* (to support such a view). The different states if they do not mutually cancel each other can be found simultaneously in the object but if opposed to each other they can be there in succession. This being so, it is reasonable to expect an object to suffer annihilation through the dismemberment of the parts, even when guarded with effort, after it has passed through the stages of newness and reached the stage of decay. And momentariness of even pots etc. cannot be adduced from *sattā* (*hetu*) on the mere analogy of the lamp-flame. The *sattā* cannot be the right *hetu* since its non-existence "in things which do not resemble the subject (*vipakṣa*)" is inconclusive,⁴⁴ and as the proposition (viz. pots etc. are momentary) is contradicted by perception of the nature of recognition- (cf. This pot is the same as that seen before). Nor is it (recognition) to be explained away by similarity since no notion of commonness running through the parts arises. The conception of *sāmānya* necessarily implies 'inclusion' (*anuvṛtta*-one nature running through many individuals'). And no 'inclusion' is possible to one who advocates universal momentariness. If however it is (considered) possible then there can be no universal momentariness. Hence there is no warrant for the view that objects are all momentary; and by no means (could momentariness be ascribed) to *Śabda*; even at the final stage it is not subject to destruction; if it were so subject its minute (yet gradual) destruction could have been supposed, (if *Śabda* were destroyed in the end we could say that it underwent gradual extinction). *Śabda* is therefore eternal. There is the logical form also-*Śabda* is eternal because it is the *viśaya* of the auditory perception, like *śabdatva*, (which is a universal and so eternal).

18. One ought not to be deluded into thinking that there is no *śabdatva* (*śabdajāti*), because (we have) recognition (in proof of that):—Those going in a forest, hearing some peculiar sound not heard before entertain the doubt that it may be the (cry) of some animal. And without a knowledge of the universal (*sāmānya*), doubt as regards the particular does not arise. Even so there exists a certain intermediate (or subordinate) universal which gives rise to the notion of inclusion (*anuvṛtta*) as in the third letters of the (five) consonant-groups viz. *gākāra* ('g' sound) etc. and of exclusion from the first letters, viz. *kākāra* etc. Similarly there exist universals suggesting the notion of inclusion in the first, second, fourth and fifth letters, each (universal) relating to its own particulars.

How is it to be known? (i. e. by which *pramāṇa*). It is by recognition only. To explain:—for those who hear the 'd' sound uttered in a

(44) The three essential conditions of a proper *hetu* (*trairūpya*) are:—that it should be present in the subject-*pakṣa*, that it should be found only in things having the probandum—*साध्य*, that it should be absent in things in which the *sādhya* is not-*vipakṣa* cf. I, L. E. p. 181. Here the third condition—absence in *vipakṣa* is not guaranteed for we are not sure that *sattā* is absent in what is the opposite of momentariness, viz. in what is stable. Hence the reasoning is invalid.

somewhat distant place doubt arises whether it is the 'ga' sound etc. (i. e. any third varṇa of the consonant groups). And this doubt is not caused by 'datva' since it is absent in sounds like 'ga'. Hence there exists (a subordinate universal) which gives rise to the notion of inclusion as regards third letters etc. and of exclusion as regards others and by whose apprehension this doubt arises. Similarly when 'gha' sound is uttered doubt is with reference to 'bha' sound etc. and not with reference to others. As such, there is a sāmānya also in the fourth letters; alike in the first, second, and fifth letters, sāmānyas exist, each in its group. With these examples only (i. e. subordinate universals serving as examples) and with auditory perception as the hetu the eternity of s'abda is inferred.⁴⁵

19. Well, are not the sounds proceeding from conch etc. though non-eternal have śrāvaṇatva (i. e. being the object of auditory perception) as their hetu which in consequence is (to be regarded as) anaikāntika (fallacy)?⁴⁶

No, they too are eternal (as vouched for) by recognition. If however recognition fails in their case (i. e. if recognition cannot establish their jāti) then anaikāntika could be avoided by qualifying śrāvaṇatva with the adjunct "being other than dhvani"⁴⁷. And when dhvanis are admitted to be impermanent (they become kārya or product); and because a kārya without a substratum (āśraya) cannot be thought of there must be some substance (dravya) serving as its substratum. And because there is no valid ground to establish a multiplicity of it (viz. āśraya as we can, in the case of a pot, we must admit that it is one only); and if it is one, because dravya (say cloth which has as its āśraya not one but several threads) is not seen to have a single dravya as its āśraya (dhvani cannot be dravya); if it is other than dravya since there is lacking in it 'the direct and immediate cause of conjunction and disjunction (i. e. since it does not satisfy the definition of karma) it is not karma. If it is akarma then by the method of residues⁴⁸ the remaining alternative is that the sounds must come under quality (guṇa). Now if (dhvani) is the quality of earth like drum (which is an earth-product) or the quality of water like the waves etc. it cannot be apprehended by the ear since there is no contact between the ear (and the drum etc.). Hence it is not a quality of earth etc. It stands to reason to regard it as the quality of air. (To explain): The airs (i. e. the air in contact with the conch, the air in contact with the drum etc.) when arising

(45) The eternity of s'abda is established by the hetu श्रवणत्व and the examples given are valid since they contain both the hetu and the sādhya viz. nityatva; jāti as found in the third letters etc. of the consonant group is nitya.

(46) The probandum ('being eternal') is absent in the conch-sound though the probans ('being auditory') is present. Hence the fallacy anaikāntika 'co-existing with the sādhya, only partially'; or the hetu being discrepant with the sādhya.

(47) The syllogistic form would then be:—सद्बोमित्यः ध्वन्यन्यत्वेऽसि श्रवणत्वात्
Here the excluding adjunct is ध्वन्यन्यत्वेऽसि.

(48) परिशिष्टात् - The inference arrived at here viz. that sound is a quality and not either substance or action (movement) is known as paris'eṣānumāna - inference by elimination.

(i. e. set in motion) from the contact of the mouth with the conch (when the conch is blown) or from the contact of the drum with the stick or from any other, arise qualified by the respective sounds and circulating in all directions come into contact with the organ of hearing; and then the sound that reaches there (the *vāyu* in the ear) is apprehended by the auditory organ by means of *samyukta-samavāya* (inherence-in-the-conjunct)⁴⁹. Now that it has been proved that *śabda* (of the nature of *dhvani*) is the quality of *vāyu* (by this very reason) the statement made by some (referring to the *Naiyāyikas*) that 'ether has *śabda* as its *hetu*' (i. e. *śabda* being the quality of ether it is the means of proving its existence) stands refuted. As for *varṇas*—they are also *śabda*—which are eternal we must admit that they come under the category of *dravyas*. It may be urged that these also could be proved to come under the category of *guṇa* since, like sound, they are *śabda*. But it is not so because of the *pratisādhana* (or *satpratipakṣa* where the probandum is counterbalanced by another *hetu*) thus :—*Varṇas* are not *guṇas*; because being other than *dhvani*, they are apprehended by the organ of hearing, like *śabdātva*, like *dik*, and like *kāla*.

How *dik* (space) and *kāla* (time) are apprehended by the organ of hearing, has been stated already (vide para 8 *ibid*). As for the (*hetu*) which purports to establish *guṇatva* of *śabda* on the basis of the following syllogistic reasoning—*Śabda* (of the nature of *varṇa*) is *guṇa*; because it is apprehended by a single sense-organ except that of touch, like colour etc., that also is rebutted by the previously stated 'counter-balanced reason' (*Satpratipakṣa*). So let not the topic be pursued further.

Hence since there is recognition of *varṇas* of yesterday and to-day (as in '*soyam gakarḥ*') they do not suffer change with each utterance. In the result it is evident that utterance is not the cause of *śabda* but it merely reveals it. And there can possibly be no cause other than utterance (for the origin of *śabda* and utterance has been shown to be only its revealer and not originator) so that (*śabda*) is not a product;

(49) *Dhvani* is neither substance nor action. It is not substance because it inheres in one substance only while substance inheres in more than one as pot in its two halves and cloth in several threads. *Dhvani* is not *karma* (action or movement) because it is not the direct and immediate cause of conjunction and disjunction whereas action is such. Similarly *dhvani* does not fall under the other categories such as *jāti*, *visēṣa*, *samavāya* and *abhāva* (vide N. m. p. 210). Hence it must be *guṇa* or quality. It cannot be the quality of earth (*prthivi*) because it is apprehended by the auditory sense and there is no contact between the ear and the (say) drum where the sound is produced. Nor is it the quality of ether as admitted by the *Naiyāyika* since an infinity of sounds has to be accepted either on the wave analogy or *kadamba* analogy. The *Mīmāṃsaka* doctrine is that *dhvani* is the quality of the air and the manner in which it is conveyed to the ear is explained thus—when for instance a conch is blown there arises a specific (qualified) air and being by nature on the constant move (*sadāgati*) it proceeds in all directions and comes into contact with the ear.

Śabda and *vāyu* are related by *samavāya* relation, or *tādātmya* according to the *Bhāttas*.

therefore not being subject to destruction its eternity is assured. For indeed it is only a positive entity which has neither origin nor destruction that constitutes eternality.⁵⁰

(50) यत्स्वरूपसद्भावे, A positive entity (and not the blank of the Mādhyamika, admitted by him to be eternal) which has neither origin nor end that constitutes nityatva.

CHAPTER VII

Topic—Import of Propositions

Though eternal (i. e. the relation between the word and its sense is eternal and hence Sabda, artha and Sambandha are also eternal as pointed out in Sūtra V), the Vedic texts are no authority in determining the sense (viz. dharma) since there is no valid reason (to support the view that the Vedic texts) are explicative of dharma—(This is the pūrvapakṣa Sūtra).

The utterance of the words which are implied in the meanings, is with the object of an action (i. e. indicating that an action has to be performed) because the meanings of words (as in Jyotiṣṭomena Svargakāmo yejeta) are the pramāṇa for the vākyaṛtha (import of the proposition, viz. yāga which is the dharma serving as the means to svarga)—(This is the siddhanta Sūtra.)

In loke (in non-Vedic language) the order of words in oral or written composition is dependent upon man's will since it presupposes other means of proof while as regards the import of Vedic statements there is no room for human convention, for it is beyond the reach of other pramāṇas—(This is the auxiliary of Guṇa Sūtra).¹

1. It is true that because the relation between the word and its meaning is non-human (in its origin) the cognition of the meaning arises only through (observing) the usage of words among the elders; still dharma which is the purport of the (Vedic) sentence (vākya) not depending upon any human convention has no basis so that the Vedic injunctions are no valid means of proof in regard to dharma.² To explain:—the words either singly would convey the meaning of the sentence or the sentence constituted by their collocation or the meanings of words. Now nowhere is it perceived that the cognition of

(1) The Sūtra should be recast thus :—लोकं सन्निवर्त्तत् (प्रमाणान्तरं संबन्धात्) प्रयोग सन्निवर्त्तयः स्यात् (गुरुवाचीन प्रयोग व्यवस्थायुक्तत्वात्, नहिह प्रमाणान्तरागोचरार्थं विवक्ष्यत्वात्) Candrika.

(2) अप्रामाण्यं धर्मं चोदनायाः, We have no means of ascertaining that a particular sentence has a particular meaning; we know only the denotativeness of words—s'abdas'akti. Yāga which is the desired objective alone constitutes dharma and that is known through the sentence and not through words; hence the impossibility of ascertaining the denotativeness of vākya.

the import of a sentence arises from individual words. Nor do words possess the potency to denote the innumerable judgments (in which they may occur). And this (Sambandhagrahana) is impossible seeing that the meanings of sentences are endless. As for a Vedic sentence potency to denote it is absolutely impossible since it cannot be comprehended by any other pramāṇa. As the meanings of words are found to be common in an infinite number of judgments (vākyaṛthas) it is not reasonable to hold that they distinctly denote a particular vākyaṛtha. And because the potency (śakti) cannot be apprehended, neither the sentence which is a collocation of words nor the meanings of words can be denotative (of vākyaṛtha). A word whose śakti (i. e. its relation with the object which it signifies) is not comprehended does not denote the object (meaning) as evidenced in the case of children; (a child cannot make out the meaning of a word uttered for the first time). If it be said that they do comprehend the sense then all effort at understanding the denotation of words (śaktigraha) would be purposeless. If it be argued (says the opponent) that though a word whose śakti is unapprehended is not denotative, still either a collocation of words (pada-saṃghāta) or the final varṇa of the sentence associated with the impressions produced by the varṇas that have successively preceded it or the partless vākya-sphota will denote the meaning of the sentence without depending upon the apprehension of the relation (śakti-grahana), the answer is 'no'; it has already been said that in that case the import of a sentence would be comprehended even by those who have not had the required instruction and comprehension of denotation (śaktigraha) would be useless.

2. But the knowledge of the meanings of words is an auxiliary
 Siddhāntin. in the comprehension of the sentence and as
 such there is nothing wrong if those who are
 without it fail to comprehend it (i. e. the import of the proposition)
 and therefore the acquired instruction in the meanings of words is not
 purposeless.

What is said is untenable. If the sentence (as such) which is
 Opponent. quite different from the words should signify
 directly and with its own śakti (potency) the
 meaning of the sentence which is distinct from that of the words what
 is then the purpose of the knowledge of the meanings of the words?
 And when that serves no purpose (effort at acquiring) the knowledge
 of the meanings of words is useless for those who wish to get at the
 meaning of the sentence. "And it is not from the meanings of words
 that the cognition of the meaning of a sentence arises for there exists
 no relation between the two."³

(3) "नच पदार्था द्वावर्थार्थव्यतिः". S. Bh. p. 93. The cognition of the import of a sentence does not arise from the import of words for there is no logical connection between the two. It is the sentence that is denotative of its import (vākyaṛtha). Hence no purpose is served by knowing the meanings of words when our object is to get at the meaning of the sentence.

Well, the meaning of a word is general and the meaning of a sentence is particular and the relation is one of the nature of *sāmānya-vis'eṣa*.
Siddhāntin.

It is true; but one cannot be sure of the cognition of any definite particular because the general (*sāmānya*) is common to all the particulars. Hence in the sentence 'Bring the cow' what is understood from the word 'bring' (*ānaya*) which is general though desiderating a particular, does not necessarily point to the bringing of a *cow* only; so that the bringing of a cow only (and of none else) would not suggest itself (as the meaning of the sentence). Nor can it be said that definiteness (i. e. a well defined mutual relation between 'cow' and 'bring') could be secured by *ākāṅkṣā* (expectancy), *sanniddhi* (contiguity), and *yogyatva* (compatibility)⁴; for though they exist we do not perceive their links, (the relation is not apprehended). Apprehending a cow by means of *pratyakṣa* one who wishes to know to whom it belongs will not make out that the owner is Devadatta though he is contiguous to it (*Sannidhi*)⁵. Hence the import of a sentence being thus devoid of all authoritative basis must be understood to be due to convention. But there being none (no author, because the Veda is *apauruṣeya*) to fix up the convention in the case of the Veda it is not a valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). Or (as an alternative) postulating human agency to the scriptural texts their validity as a means of knowledge has to be admitted solely on the ground of human trustworthiness. And it is but proper to attribute human authorship to the Vedic utterance on the analogy of the common experience that all sentences owe their origin to man. But if as regards matters of this description (i. e. of the nature of *dharma* and *adharma*) no validity could be attached to (the utterance of) men, then let the Vedas be (understood to be) not valid testimony. Any way the doctrine that the Veda as a *pramāṇa* does not require any corroboration, falls to the ground;—this is the *pūrvapakṣa* (the opponent's contention.)

(4) According to the Nyāya theory of *S'ābdabodha* or verbal cognition three elements are required:—(a) verbal expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) which consists in a word requiring another word to convey a complete judgment; (b) *Yogyatva* or compatibility, i. e. the non-contradiction of the relation we have in mind in a combination of ideas. (c) Proximity (*āsatti*) consisting in the articulation of words without unnecessary delay. Proximity is temporal in conversation and spatial in written composition. A fourth element (*tātparyajñāna*) is often necessary. It is the knowledge of the idea of the speaker or the writer—(vide *Vedāntaparibhāṣa*, *Āgamaprakaraṇa*).

(5) देवदत्तस्यामिनम् &c.:—Is this not a shifting of the ground from the logical to the psychological, from the verbal to the perceptive? एतच्च सन्नधि मन्त्राभिप्रायेण दूषणं भवति; वाग्दत्तस्यैव तु नैत दूषणं भवती तिचित्यम्. Candrakā p. 152.

3. Here some say:—"The meaning of a sentence is indeed denoted directly by the sentence itself and its relation (with the meaning) is cognised by upalakṣaṇa.⁶ Prābhākara. The sentence which contains the word 'cow' gives the meaning (vākyārtha) viz. (some act) connected with an animal having the dewlap. This is how the sentence is to be straight away construed".

What you say is right.^{6a} It is how the denotativeness (Vyutpatti) of the sentence is acquired but still it is not directly from the sentence that the "cognition of the sentence arises" (i. e. it is not that the sense is denoted by the vākya as you imagine) for even when hidden (i. e. when forgotten) it (vākyārtha) is comprehended. In those who are competent to recollect the meanings of words, it is perceived that they have the knowledge of the sense of the passage even though the previous parts of the sentence have been forgotten. Just as the knowledge of the meaning of a word does not arise from the last letter only when the previous letters are forgotten, even so the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence does not arise when the previous words which are parts of the sentence are forgotten. But it is seen that in very long sentences we get at their meaning even though the earlier words are forgotten. (Hence no dependence on words), and it cannot be said that though the words as such (svarūpeṇa) have been forgotten we can with the help of the recollected meanings of words infer, (restore) the sentence, composed of words which denote those meanings and from that (sentence) obtain the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence. There is no proof for this process (channel) of construing the sense. When for sure with the recollected meanings of words the knowledge of the import of the sentence is directly possible which person would devise such a channel of apprehension? We will point out in the sequel that vākyārtha (import of a proposition) results from padārtha (import of words). Even for those who say that the words only which are denotative of their own meanings as related to

(6) The sentence which contains the word cow is denotative of all the judgments (vākyārthas) in which in any way, there is the relation of an animal having dewlap with a kārya and because the relation is general it seems to be regarded as upalakṣaṇa. The relation understood in this sense is inclusive in character and is not liable to the charge that anvitasakti leads to an infinity of judgments.

The doctrine here stated viz. that the sentence itself is directly denotative of its sense by upalakṣaṇa-sambandha and not through the meanings of words (padārthas) is advocated by the Prābhākara School. This very kārīkā, viz. वाक्ये नैव हि वक्तव्यः etc." is quoted in Laghuāndrikā, a standard commentary by Gauda Brahmānuāda on Advaita Siddhi of Madhusūdanasarasvatī, and explained as the view of anvītabhīdhāna vādīns. (Advaita Siddhi-N. S. p. 673).

(6 a) सत्यं, व्युत्पत्तिर्देव स्यात् etc.:—Now in the sentence गमान्त्र its denotativeness is understood through inference based on positive and negative concomitance-अन्वय व्यतिरेक, but when the same sentence is heard later, the S'ābdabodha is not, says the Bhāṭṭa Siddhāntin, got from the sentence direct but only from a recollection of the meanings of words comprising the sentence for, as it is pointed out, even when a few words are forgotten one is able to construct the sense, and there need be no verbal recollection.

some other words by satisfying the syntactical needs of ākāṅkṣa, san-nidhi and yogyatā are the ground for the cognition of the import of a proposition there would arise no knowledge of the vākyārtha when some of the words are forgotten so that they are equally liable to the same charge.⁷

Again for those who argue thus each word would become an independent sentence. Nowhere would it be possible for a unitary sentence (i. e. it would be impossible for a group of words to signify a connected sense). In the sentence "Bring the cow", (gāmānaya) the word 'cow' (go-padam) denotes the cow associated with the action of bringing (ānayana karmabhūtam); similarly 'bring', (ānayatiḥ) also denotes bringing associated with the object cow (gokarmakānayanam). And since they are distinct (in so far as the relation is altered) there would be no sentence-unity.

4. But-it may be argued-though the related complexes (synthesised words) are different since only one of them is the principal, sentence-unity is declared on the ground of the unity of purpose, (the construed meaning of the full sentence is one and it centres round 'ānayana', since according to Prabhākara the final meaning of the sentence is kārya). That does not stand to reason. For those who affirm that (in a sentence) there are several complexes there could be no sentence-unity merely because the purpose is one. If there be such, then sentence-unity would be possible for example even here:-"He shall sacrifice, Svarga is the reward, the goat is the oblation, Agni is the deity", because the purpose of all these statements taken together is the performance of yāga which includes the material (drvya), the deity (devata), and the reward (phala). Similarly (the sentence) "He shall sacrifice on new-moon and full-moon days" would get into syntactical relation with "He shall perform the yāga having samit (fire-sticks) as its deity" since both (the pradhāna and āṅga) serve a single purpose.

Well, syntactical unity is welcome (to us) as stated (in Jaiminiya Sūtra III, viii-4:-"That sentence which denotes the pradhāna (the principal) and that which denotes the āṅga (the subsidiary) constitute a unit-sentence, because they together serve a single purpose (tadarthat-vāt)". The Bhāṣyakāra also (states):-"The statements regarding the subsidiaries (dharmaṇām) constitute a single vākya along with the statements regarding the New-moon and Full-moon sacrifices". What you say is true; but there, it is from the context (prakaraṇa) that the unitary nature of the sentence is inferred and not directly, (the sentences are seen to be different but from the context syntactical unity has to be inferred). Otherwise (i. e. if unity is accepted as being direct and not inferential) it would amount to accepting vākya as the means

(7) This criticism it must be supposed is levelled against another variant of anvaita-bhīdāna doctrine. It is not the sentence as a whole or the group of words that is denotative of the propositional import but the words individually signifying their own meanings as related with others, help to denote the vākyārtha.

of ascertaining (the añga or the ancillary).⁸ Similarly in the sentence "gām ānaya" (bring the cow) there would arise directly no idea of a single sentence (according to anvitābhidhāna vāda); but that (it is directly a single sentence) is admitted (by all). Hence it must be held that in all cases of ekavākyatva such words only as are not fulfilling their function separately (as contrasted with anvita padas) attain their end by pointing to a single (synthetically connected) sense. And in your doctrine (referring to Prabhākara) the word 'ānaya' having signified the bringing-connected-with-cow comes to an end and the word 'cow' also comes to an end by indicating the cow-connected-with-bringing, so that it would certainly result in vākyabheda (syntactical split). It is not (i. e. you do not say) that the word "cow" has its function completed by indicating bringing-connected-with-cow (for we have seen that the "cow" denotes only 'cow-connected-with bringing') and ekavākyatā could have resulted if it had meant so (i. e. bringing-connected-with-cow).⁹ But if it be said that the word "cow" also denotes bringing-connected-with-cow (just as "bringing" does) then it would have to bear more than one sense (which is a blemish) since both 'cow' and 'bringing' are denoted by it (viz. "cow"). The denotativeness of "cow" is not otherwise determined (i. e. by a word found in 'gāmānaya' and is other than "go"); so that without signifying it (i. e. gorūpārtha) it might denote only bringing-connected-with-cow.¹⁰

(8) अन्यथा वाक्य विनियोग्यत्वापत्तेः—The general rule is that statements relating to the principal and auxiliary acts together constitute a single syntactically connected sentence. But the subsidiary nature of a thing (añga) is determined by six pramāṇas or 'modes of evidence': S'rutī-direct statement, liṅga-word-meaning, vākya-syntactical connection, prakaraṇa-context or interdependence, Sthāna-position, and Samākhyā-name. These pramāṇas are of successively decreasing force and there is no warrant for altering this order. Now in the two statements under consideration: (i) दूत-पुष्पमासाभ्यास्त्वनैकोऽन्येयजैत, (ii) समिधोयजति the syntactical unity is inferred by prakaraṇa, not by vākya, for these are two distinct sentences.

The Sūtra quoted here is truncated, the full sūtra being 'नतद्वान्वयं हितव्यत्वात्' which controverts a pūrva-pakṣa sūtra.

(9) In गामानय, according to the Prabhākara doctrine (i) 'go' means cow-connected-with-bringing and not bringing-connected-with-cow, and (ii) 'ānaya' means bringing-connected-with-cow and not cow-connected-with-bringing. If i and ii meant the same thing there would be sentence-unity but such is not anvitābhidhāna.

(10) To obviate the necessity of "gopada" bearing a double meaning we might suppose that the sense of "gopada" is indicated by some other word and that its function in the sentence is only to suggest the viśiṣṭārtha, viz. bringing-as-related-to-cow, but no such explanatory word exists. Hence the double significance of "gopada" cannot be avoided.

5. Moreover in the sentence "atisobhano rāja-puruṣaḥ"^{10a} (very handsome is the king's man), it is seen that between the quality "handsomeness" associated with "very" and "man" associated with "king" there is a second mutual connection. It is evident that when we have compound words the connection is between words which are already connected; hence here the connection is only between the meanings of words that have been connected. And this (i. e. the connection between the connected-anvitānvayaḥ) does not result from the denotative power of words. The word *puruṣa* (in 'rājapuruṣa') denotes the connection between *puruṣa* only with some other artha (and not of *puruṣa*-connected-with-rāja) for its significance is only in relation to it (i. e. it can connect its own sense "svārtha" with some other word-rāja or *sobhana* but it is not competent to connect *puruṣa*-connected-with-rāja with any other word). Hence it is incapable of denoting the connection between the already conjoined words.^{10b} Similarly the word 'Sobhana' (handsome) also states the connection of its own sense *Sobhanatva* (the quality of being handsome) with some other word and not its connection with a connected compound word. So it must be admitted that the connection between the connected words is necessarily determined by the meanings of words (and not by *padaśakti* as maintained in *anvitābhidhāna-vāda*).

Again it is indisputable that customary or conventional usage (*rūḍhi*) in reference to any word has precedence over its etymological sense (*yoga*), because it (*rūḍhi*) is comprehended (i. e. asserts itself) sooner than the other. But according to *anvitābhidhāna* strength and weakness (i. e. that *rūḍhi* is stronger than *yoga*) would be reversed. By the time the aggregate (the word taken as a whole) "aśvakarṇa" brings to mind the class notion of (a particular) tree (by that very time) the word 'aśva' also would certainly bring to mind (the notion of) 'horse' and the word 'karṇa' also, of a part of the body (viz. ear) so that there

(10 a.) अतिशोमनो राजपुरुषः etc. This illustration is given to show that the *Prābhākara* doctrine breaks down when construing compound sentences. In 'atisobhano rājapuruṣaḥ' we have to admit that the two compound words should first be separately interpreted and then the *vākyārtha* as a whole has to be understood. The first compound means 'very handsome' and the second 'king (s) man.' These two meanings are now to be connected in accordance with the syntactical requirements to arrive at the final meaning. It is obvious that what is done at this stage is the construing (*anvaya*) of the meanings—the very process which the *Bhāttas* adopt. The *Prābhākara* view of *anvitābhidhāna* has no place at this stage of the process of interpretation whatever may be the case when compound words are interpreted separately. For there is no word functioning to be put forward as *anvitābhidhāyaka*. In the present instance what is required is that 'rājapuruṣa', a related complex has to be related to 'atisobhana', also a related complex. The word *puruṣa* may conceivably denote its meaning but it can by no means be regarded as denoting *rājapuruṣa* related to some other meaning. The point is that at this stage we are concerned with *padārtha* alone and not with *padas*. This interpretative method, the *Bhāttas* maintain, is the one to be adopted not only here but in all verbal interpretation (*vākyārtha*) on the principle of 'lāghava' or economy.

(10.b.) अतोनाम्नितान्वयमलमभिधातुम्; another reading is अतोऽनन्वितान्वयमलमभिधातुम्— which means that *sobhana* is competent to denote connection with the uncompounded *puruṣa* and vice versa.

is no difference at the time of recollection (of these two notions—one arising from rūḍhi and the other from yoga); the revealing of the sense however in 'yogavṛtti' (i. e. significance by etymological relation) is accomplished by its own parts being at once mutually related without requiring any other word. The rūḍhi however (according to Prabhākara) desiderating the association of a complement requires another word and is consequently slow in revealing the sense (abhīdhāna here means conveying the import of the proposition)—as such (there occurs) the reversal (of the accepted view that rūḍhi is more potent than yoga).¹¹

6. If on the other hand the denotation of a word is confined to its meaning alone (not going beyond itself as in anvitābhīdhānavāda) the customary sense (as given in the dictionary — koṣa) would be secured on the mere hearing of the letters (composing the word), there being no need for another (complementary) word and it would (therefore) be more potent than the etymological sense which is obtained by implication (lakṣaṇa) from the meanings of the parts and which therefore is of the nature of the import of a proposition.¹²

Similarly in such sentences as—'very sweet is cow's milk', 'slender sweet is goat's milk', 'the serpent-scent is similar to ketaki-scent', (the incongruity) has to be shown.^{12a} Hence (this is the Bhāṭṭa doctrine) with the meanings of words obtained by means of the denotative power the import of a proposition (vākyārtha) is construed on the basis of lakṣaṇa or implication. Such being the siddhānta, in the sentence 'bring the cow' (gāmānaya) ānayaathiḥ (i. e. the root ni with añ preceding it) having denoted 'bringing' in general (ānayanatvajāti) expresses by implication a particularised act of bringing (which is the ground of jāti); the word 'cow' also through its own sense (gotva) indicates by implication

(11) According to anvitābhīdhāna the word as'vakarṇa in its customary sense of a tree would not in its isolation become significant but would require another suitable word as its complement (pratiyogi—one of the two relata) and hence would be more tardy in conveying the sense than in its etymological sense. This is opposed to the generally accepted view that rūḍhi has primacy over yoga. As'vakarṇa as a compound when the etymological sense is taken is self-complete and we get at the meaning of 'horse's ear' without reference to any other term. When however it means a tree, its meaning cannot be understood without reference to something else to constitute its anvita. Hence the former is s'ghrapravṛtta. In the stage of recollection the meanings may present themselves as isolated but not in the stage of signifying when words should necessarily be anvita.

(12) According to the Bhāṭṭa school the relation between the meanings of words and the import of the proposition composed of those words is cognised by means of lakṣaṇa (implication). In construing compound words such as 'as'vakarṇa' we have to fall back upon lakṣaṇa; hence the phrase 'Vākyārthasthānīyāt'—resembling Vākyārtha.

(12. a.) Two further instances are given to show the inadequacy of the anvitābhīdhāna doctrine—(i) atimadhuram goḥśṭram, śaṇmadhuram ajāḥśṭram; (ii) ketaktigandhasamāṇaḥ sarpagandhaḥ. In (i) the comparison is of degree and the anvitābhīdhāna fails because it is the tertiary stage. In (ii) it is similarity where also for want of words by which the analogy might be comprehended anvitābhīdhāna fails.

bringing only with which it (go) is related in its capacity as particularised (grammatical) object. (It is to be understood that 'bringing' is the sentence-import and hence both words-*ānayaṭiḥ* and 'go' imply bringing). Hence in whichever sentence whichever idea is regarded as central that very idea is expressed by implication based on the denotative significance of the word of which it is the meaning, the other words (in the sentence) also denoting their own *śakyārtha* express the same central idea by implication in their (*svārtha*) relational aspect.¹³ Where however the relation is between those already related (as in "*atisobhano rājapuruṣaḥ*") there also by a succession of implications of the implied meanings the full import of the sentence is established.^{13a} That is the way (to construe sentences).

7. Well, how can it be said that the word 'go' denoted as being accusative, though implying an action having it ('go') as its object, implies 'bringing' only (and not any other action as seeing or binding)? We say (in reply) it is because of the sentence-unity. The process of signifying a secondary sense no doubt starts in a general manner but is restricted (to a particular sense) by sentence-unity and that this is so is accepted on the strength of experience. Even by him who favours *anvitābhīdhānavāda* it must be admitted that words used in the secondary sense start vaguely (not specifically) and get into relation with such words as are determined by the sentence-unity. For instance (the Grammarians) desire the use of a *dvandva*-compound in cases where a single word denotes two or more meanings simultaneously. There, in the compound (say) "*dhavakhadirau*" (*dhava* and *khadira* are the names of trees) the uninflected substantive '*khadira*' though indicating by implication some other word (object) in order that the dual number (*Khadirau*) may be justified implies (*lakṣayati*) *dhava* only, and not any other word, just because of the juxtaposition of the word (*viz. dhava*). It should be so everywhere. And because this *Śābdabodha* (*anvaya-viśeṣaḥ*) arises in the manner described above it is (clear that it is) not the outcome of the inseparability of connection (between probans and probandum as urged by the *Vaiśeṣikas*) but results from syntactical unity only. Hence the validity of *Śabda* (*laukika* as well as *vaidika*) as a right means of apprehension as distinct from inference.

(13) It is the meaning of the leading word that determines the import of propositions in general. In the sentence 'bring the cow—*gāmānaya*, *ānaya* is the important idea and that constitutes the *vākyārtha*; the other words are adjectival. Now through its denotative potency the word *ānaya* means the class notion *ānayanatva* and by implication the individual act of bringing—*ānayanādirūpam vyaktim*. The word 'go' denotes by its *s'akti* 'gotva' and by implication based on its relation (*gosambandhini*), as object points to the same leading idea 'bringing'.

(13. a.) उचितलक्षणा परंपरया—The implication of the implied. We have this when *s'akyārtha* is indirectly related. In the sentence, '*atisobhano rājapuruṣaḥ*' we get by *s'akti*, *atis'aya* and *s'obhanatva*, and by *lakṣana*, *atis'ayitas'obhanatva* and this gets related to *rājapuruṣa* (which is again a compound) through *lakṣitalakṣana*. *Rājapuruṣa* has similarly to be construed when relating it to *atisobhana*.

8. Well, (rejoins the anvitābhīdhānavādin) even though the cow and Devadatta are perceived and there exist also the necessary conditions for the comprehension of the import of the proposition, viz. expectancy, juxtaposition, and compatibility, we get no idea of their mutual connection. (vide para 2 *ibid*). Hence the meanings of words fail to convey the meaning of the sentence so that it is but proper to attribute the combining potency to words only (and not to meanings of words as advocated by the Bhāttas).

This fault (says the abhihitānvayavādin) is common to anvitābhīdhāna also; at the very time the two objects (Devadatta and cow) are apprehended in perception, the words that are denotative of them are recollected but they do not convey the connection of their meanings even though expectancy etc. do exist. If it be said that the words indicate the identical relation which they were observed to indicate when, juxtaposed in a particular order, they were used by the elders, and none other, that (argument) applies equally to the meanings of words. And those meanings of words also (brought together consciously) in order that the meaning of one word may get into relation with that of another, yield the meaning of the sentence (as a whole) so that there is no blemish.¹⁴ Where however man's freedom is (perceived) in bringing about such aggregation (of the padārthas by using corresponding words) there, validity depends upon his will; but where there is no such freedom (validity or pramāṇya) does not depend on any one (but is independent as in the case of the Veda).

Therefore the view that words possess denotative potency to establish anvita (e. g. 'go' means 'go' associated with "bringing") is not supported by any valid proof. And the doctrine of anvitābhīdhānavāda is refuted in Nyāyaratnamāla (another work by the author); as such this topic need not be pursued further.

9. The sphota (said to be) revealed by the sentence (vākya-sphota)

Refutation of the doctrine that Vākya-rtha is conveyed by the partless vākya.

stands condemned by the very reasoning urged against the sphota revealed by the word (pada-sphota). And the doctrine viz. the partlessness of the meaning of the sentence (vākya-rtha), has to be discarded because of the common acceptance (of the view that the sentence is perceived to contain parts) and also because (the sections on) 'prasaṅga' etc. would be purposeless. To explain: 'How can, (for the grammarian) who maintains that vākya-rtha is partless, these viz. prasaṅga, tantra, bādha, ūha, atideśa, adhikriyā, krama, prayukti, śeṣa, and bheda, convey any sense? When, for example, we admit that the meaning of the mandate relating to the principal and auxiliary in the partless vākya 'agniṣomīyam paśumālābheta'—"He shall sacrifice with the goat in the yāga of which 'agniṣoma'

(14) The rejoinder consists in pointing out that the import of a proposition depends upon the manner in which the meanings are recalled to mind. If the objects are actually present it is perception—pratyakṣa that gives a knowledge of them and not the words that are recollected. It is only when there is auditory perception as when a sentence is heard, that the meanings of the component parts of the sentence get related and the import of the proposition comprehended.

is the deity"—is partless, and so has no *sādhya* (end or phala), no *sādhana* (the principal *yāga*), nor even the auxiliaries, then there would be no *paśu* (sacrificial goat), no *prayājas* (which are auxiliaries), no *puṛodāśa* (this is the *prasāṅgi*), and no *anūyājas*; so that the question arises which (objects) will become aids and where (i. e. in which *prasāṅgi*)? Similarly this (inappropriateness) has to be pointed out as regards "tantra" etc. (detailed in Chapter XI of the *Mīmāṃsā Sāstra*).¹⁵ Hence the *vākyārtha* is a composite of several *padārthas* (i. e. the meanings of a number of words constitute the import of a single sentence); and that (*vākyārtha*) has *padārtha* as its basis; it is not void of basis, nor is convention its basis.

Therefore it cannot be said that *codanā* (or mandatory statement of the Veda) is devoid of validity. We shall repudiate in the next *adbhikaraṇa* (section) the contention (of the opponent) that the Veda is of human origin because of the fact that it is composed of sentences (i. e. on the analogy of the *Mahābhārata* etc.).

(15) What the *Siddhāntin* says is that if *sphota* is accepted as the meaning of the sentence which is whole and devoid of parts the *Mīmāṃsā Sāstra* with its sub-divisions constituting a unit will become purposeless. Now *Jaimini's* aphoristic treatise contains twelve chapters as follows:—

- i *Pramāṇaviçāra*—inquiry into the nature of the valid means of knowledge.
- ii *Bhedābheda*—whether a particular *karma* is the same or different from another.
- iii *S'eṣas'eṣi*—which *karma* is *pradhāna* and which is *aṅga*.
- iv *Prayukti*—which is *prayojya* and which *prayojaka*; e. g. the *āmlkṣa* (the curd of milk when separated from whey) is *prayojaka* and the pouring in of sour milk on boiled milk is *prayojya*.
- v *Krama*—the order in which the *karma* has to be done.
- vi *Adhikāra*—the determining of the person's fitness for *karma*.
- vii *Sāmānyātides'a*—general transfer.
- viii *Viś'eṣātides'a*—special transfer.
- ix *Ūha*—change effected when transferring from *prakṛti* to *vikṛti*.
- x *Bādha*—cancellation, e. g. *pounding* is annulled in the case of golden grains (*kṛṣṇala*) to be offered.
- xi *Tantra*—performance of a single auxiliary *karma* to serve the needs of several main *karmas*.
- xii *prasaṅga*—performance of an auxiliary to serve another auxiliary; e. g. the *prayāja* performed for *paśu'yāga* generates *apūrva* which lasts till the *yaga* with rice-cakes (*Puṛodāśa*) which is also an auxiliary is performed and for which therefore no *prayāja* is required.

CHAPTER VIII

Topic—Eternity of the Veda

Sūtra 27:—Some make the assertion that the Vedas are of recent origin (or ascribe nearness of time to the Vedas) because of the presence therein of names.

Sūtra 28:—Because of the mention of transcendent personages (like Yājñavalkya etc.).

Sūtra 29:—The priority of Śabda has been declared (VI adhikaraṇa).

Sūtra 30:—The names (of Kaṭha etc.) are intended to refer to the teaching (and not to authorship).

Sūtra 31:—However there is similarity only (as regards words).

Sūtra 32:—Not so (va); these sentences are intimately connected with the yāga (sātra) because such connection is perceived to exist (elsewhere).^A

It has been said (V adhikaraṇa) that the meanings are expressed by words which need no convention whatever (to establish their relation with the meanings conveyed by them), and that from them (i. e. the meanings) again without the need of any convention vākyārtha (is expressed). And now what is inquired into is whether the Vedic texts are of human origin or of non-human origin. In case the human origin (of the Veda is proved), though the comprehension of vākyārtha should arise (through lakṣaṇa) and though (its) validity is self-established,

(A) Of the six Sūtras in the eighth section 27 and 28 are pūrvapakṣa Sūtras and the remaining are Siddhānta Sūtras. Pārthasārathi has commented on 27, 28, 29, and 30. The remaining two call for explanation:—

Sūtra 31. “Parantu S’rutisāmānyamātram” (परन्तु श्रुतिसामान्यमात्रम्). The pūrvapakṣin’s conclusion is that the Veda has a beginning on the ground that sentences like “Babaraḥ Prāvahaniḥ akāmayata” (बबरः प्रवाहनिः अकामयत) which occur therein refer to mortal beings like Babara, and to past time (akāmayata). This conclusion is not warranted. No doubt there is similarity in the words—Babaraḥ Prāvahaniḥ which ordinarily mean, Babara the son of Pravahana, but this yogārtha (etymological sense) is not the only one. Prāvāhaniḥ is one who carries rapidly (prakarṣeṇa vāhanakartā); ‘babara’ is onomatopoeic. Hence the meaning of the sentence is, the wind that makes this noise and carries things rapidly or as Candrikā puts it Babara etc. are names like Indra and are therefore eternal—pravāhatonitya.

Sūtra 32. Kṛte vā viniyogaḥ syāt karmaṇaḥ sambandhāt (कृते वा विनियोगः स्यात्कर्मणः संबन्धात्). Now the pūrvapakṣin relying on such meaningless expressions as “the trees performed the sacrifice” (वृक्षस्तपयः सन्नमासत), “the serpents performed the sacrifice” (सर्पाः सन्नमासत), concludes that the Veda is unauthoritative. In answer, it is stated these are only laudatory passages intended to extol the yāgas and thus induce persons to perform them. For a fuller exposition vide S. BH. pp. 103-104.

because there is no probability of there being an antecedent valid ground on which such meanings as are assigned by human agency could be based, that validity will be vitiated by (the inevitable conclusion) that it (i. e. the assignment of meanings) is due either to his (author's) desire to mislead or to his being self-deluded.¹ Here (i. e. pertaining to this topic whether the origin of the Veda is human or not the Naiyāyika opposes the *apauruṣeyatva* thus) – "The Vedas owe their origin to human agency because they are in the form of sentences like the Bhārata etc., (N.M. Part I. pp. 214 ff); the mention of names like Kāṭha also becomes significant (if it is admitted that) the Veda is the work (of some one)".

2. Well, the *vedārtha* (i. e. the content of the Veda) which is of the essence of *apūrva* and which is beyond the range of perception is by no means possible of being grasped by the intellect. How could men compose sentences therein (i. e. expressing vedic import which transcends human comprehension)?²

How again could your worship (said in derision) admit that the injunctive suffix is denotative of things such as this (viz. *apūrva* which is not cognizable by any other *pramāṇa*)? The apprehension of the denotativeness (of the injunctive suffix) arises (you will admit) when somehow the nature of *kārya* (or *apūrva* or *niyoga*) is brought to mind, namely, that it is fit to get into compatible relation with the agent to whom the vedic mandate is addressed and that it is potent as a means to *Svarga*. When thus the denotativeness of life is acquired the manner (*vidhiḥ*) of constructing (mandatory) sentences will become apparent.³ Hence because they are in the form of sentences the Vedas owe their origin to man. And on this view

(1) The point of the objection in VIII is the doubtful position whether the Veda is of human or non-human origin; if it is proved that it is of human origin then all the previous findings would be nought. If any personal authorship of the Veda is admitted then its content relating as it does to supersensuous matter will be above the comprehension of human intellect and there is no other means of determining the sense of vedic texts, with the result that the Veda ceases to be a valid *pramāṇa*.

(2) The construction of a sentence presupposes the comprehension of the subject which forms the content of the sentence; cf. अर्थबुद्धिश्चरन्तः. The *vedārtha* however is *apūrva* which is incomprehensible by any one of the ordinary means of knowledge. Hence how could man construct sentences relating to such transcendental matter?

(3) The *Mīmāṃsakas* point out the inadmissibility of the human origin of the Veda on the ground that prior to the comprehension of the sense, the formation of sentences is impossible and that such comprehension is ruled out in the case of the Veda since it speaks of supersensuous objects. The counterargument consists in reminding the *Mīmāṃsakas* (of the *Prābhākara* School in particular) that he is in no better position in construing the vedic mandatory sentences. The optative form (*liṅ*) he has to admit expresses action or *kārya* in general and it can be understood to denote *apūrva* only by what is known as inference by elimination-*paris'* *eṣānumāna*. When one has acquired the primary sense, viz. *apūrva* in this manner one could certainly write, says the *Naiyāyika*, passages denoting *apūrva*.

(that the Vedas are of human origin) the mention of names like Kāthaka etc. would be appropriate; the name (the derivative like Kāthaka) is not intended to point to the teaching. The specific mention of Kāthaka is inappropriate seeing that the teaching is possible of being undertaken by several people, while authorship pertains only to an individual; hence particularisation becomes appropriate.

What then is (the meaning of) 'human authorship' in the construction of sentences?

He is the author who exercises freedom in the choice of words for constructing sentences; and freedom belongs only to a single individual and as such particularisation stands to reason. He however who says to himself, "I shall repeat just in the manner in which it has been repeated by another" and repeats accordingly, - that person is not the author; such repetition, (it) is possible for several persons (to make) in regard to a single sentence, so that it does not stand to reason to particularise. Therefore we must conclude that this (name Kāthaka formed by the taddhita suffix) is used (here) to denote agency.

3. This is what is said (in answer to the first two pūrvapakṣa Sūtras)-"The priority (eternality) of Śabda has been declared (in VI); the names are intended to denote

the teaching.⁴ The argument that the Vedas are of human origin because they partake of the nature of sentence is frustrated by the non-perception of a thing that is capable of being perceived, and further the probans is contradicted by a counter-probans.⁵ Hence (the Vedas) are not the work of man." If the Vedas had some one as their author then necessarily he would have been remembered by successive generations of students just as Buddha is remembered. It cannot be that the (the author) is forgotten: since there is no apprehension of any distinct proof by which to establish that the Vedas are a means to the attainment of the desired result it is only by the faith in the existent author that observance of vedic duties would be regarded by people as imperative. Hence how could he be forgotten by the moderns? Because the author who must necessarily be remembered, is not remembered, therefore, being thus unapprehended though such apprehension in the shape of memory-recall is possible, that author, it is concluded, is of the nature of non-existence like the horns of a hare. (Now) even those who maintain human agency are unable to tell that there is uninterrupted recollection (of the author) as regards (the Vedas). Having inferred an author (lit. the maker) by (the process known as)

(4) Śābara regards "uktantu Śābdapūrvatvam" (उक्तंतु शब्दपूर्वत्वम्) and "ākhyā-pravaṇanāt", (अख्याप्रवचनात्) as two distinct Sūtras while Pārthasārathi regards them as one Siddhāntasūtra.

(5) Drs'yādars anubādhitam (दृश्यादर्शनबाधितम्) a thing capable of being perceived is not perceived (yogyānupalabdhi-योग्यानुपलब्धिः). Here if the composer of the Veda did actually exist he could have been known, say, by tradition but since he is not known the probans (vākyatvāt) is vitiated by the anupalabdhi pramāṇa. And it is vitiated also by the counter-reason (pratīhetu) which establishes a probandum that is quite the reverse of the one intended.

sāmānyatodrṣṭa⁶ they assign the authorship to one of their own choice—some to Īśvara, others to Hiraṇyagarbha and others to Prajāpati. And such a medley of views would not have been possible if there had been a successive recollection of the author as in the case of Manu etc. There is absolutely no dispute as to the specific authorship of Manusmṛti, Bhārata, or the works of Buddha. Hence since what can be remembered is not remembered, the Sāmānyatodrṣṭānumāna being contradicted by anupalabdhi of the character of dr̥ṣyādarsana is powerless to establish the existence of an author.

4. (Again) the hetu—"vākyatvāt" — because it is a composite of sentences, (advanced by the opponent to prove the artificiality of the Vedas) is tainted by neutralisation (satpratipakṣa, i. e. counterbalanced by another hetu which proves the opposite of the sādhyā; it may be stated) thus :—Vedic study which is the subject under dispute presumes vedic study by the teacher (he must have had some guru and so on), because it is of the nature of vedic study, like the present-day vedic study. This is what the Sūtrakāra (Jaimini) says—"The priority of Śabda has been declared". Here the word 'Śabda' means chanting the Veda (Śabdādhyayana). This is the substance:—The vedic study of all men presumes the previous vedic study: all wish to chant in the same manner as the preceptor himself has learnt to chant. And there is none whatsoever who has taught the Vedas for the first time independently; for if there had been one, he could have been their author. Hence the Vedas are of non-human origin.

5. Since human agency has been refuted on the strength of non-perception when such perception is possible (if the object were there) the name also (like Kaṭha) does not denote the Veda as the work of the person (bearing that name) so that what is rendered clear is that it is used to denote the person who is the preceptor. Unique distinction belongs to Kaṭha from the fact of his having come into large contact (with the disciples) so that particularisation (i. e. specific mention of his name) is not inexplicable. Or (to explain differently) the word 'kaṭha' is not the name of a particular person, but this symbol stands only for the eternal, specific Sākha (cārana, section of the Veda) and the Sākha which is studied by successive generations of its followers is termed Kaṭha. Hence the validity of the mandatory texts owning as they do their origin to no human source. The proposition set forth by the word 'Çodanā' (in the second Sūtra) has (thus) been proved by means of this pāda.

6. Now what was postulated in the 'Çodanā' sūtra (II) was that

Conclusion. as regards the nature of dharma with its attributes
bheda, śeṣa, prayukti, krama-niyama, adhikāra,
atideśa, bādha, ūha, tantra and prasaṅga (vide note 15-7th Chapter)

(6) This sāmānyatodrṣṭa is a variety of inference the distinguishing feature of which is 'that we are arguing from one sort of activity which we have experienced to another sort of activity of which we have no experience'; Vide I.L.E. p. 159 and A. p. 256. Here authorship of the Veda is inferred from the fact of known authorship as in the case of the Mahābhārata.

the Veda alone is the valid means of knowledge (Çodanaiva pramāṇam) and that the Veda is undubitably valid (pramāṇameva). There, by the exclusive emphasis on Çodanā (as indicated by the particle "eva" in Çodanaiva) the assertion was made of the invalidity of pratyakṣa etc. which do not desiculate the Veda but which (on the contrary) vie with it claiming equal validity; and that (assertion) was established by means of the Pratyakṣa sūtra (IV). And the (second) part, "indubitably valid" (pramāṇameva) was established in the fifth and the remainder sūtras of the (first) pāda, (i. e. from VI to VIII with their subdivisions-guṇa sūtras). Now when the two specific propositions set forth in the Çodanā sūtra (viz. the Veda alone is pramāṇa and valid certainly is the Veda) have been demonstrated the succeeding three pādas are not (it is clear) connected with the Çodanā sūtra as its complement (Seṣa); but in the first sūtra the object set out in "What is the pramāṇa of dharma? (kim lakṣaṇa dharmah)" was that the valid means of the knowledge of dharma should be investigated; and as regards that (question) the validity of the Veda (as the only source) having been demonstrated, the validity of arthavāda, smṛti and nāmyadheya will be established in the succeeding three pādas (of the first adhyāya).⁷ Hence similar to the Çodanā sūtra the three pādas are related to this very proposition set out in the first sūtra in (the words) "which is dharma?" The objection cannot be raised that the proposition, "The Veda alone" (is the right means of the knowledge of dharma) would be subversive of the validity of arthavāda (exhortative passages etc.) The object of the emphasis is to exclude those falling under the same category (viz. pramāṇa). For example, when it is said 'the cloth is white' the exclusion is with reference to 'black' etc. and not to substances (the class-notion of drvya). In the same way by the emphasis in 'çodanaiva' the exclusion is only of perception and the rest which claim independent validity like the Veda (in the ascertainment of dharma); but the validity of arthavāda etc., since they are in syntactical unity with the Veda (i.e.

(7) The first sūtra—"athātadharmañijnāsā," enunciates four propositions, viz., (i) What is the nature of dharma (को धर्मः), (ii) By which pramāṇa is dharma to be ascertained (किं लक्षणः), (iii) What are its aids (कानि अस्य साधनानि), (iv) What is its objective (किं परश्च धर्मः).

As regards (i) i. e. the nature of dharma, it is incidentally known, when what constitutes the pramāṇa of dharma is known. As regards (ii) it has been seen that the Veda alone is the pramāṇa by which to understand the nature of dharma.

Now the validity of mandatory statements (vidhivākyas) alone has been established in the first section of the first adhyāya. But authoritativeness has to be established not only of mandatory statements but also of arthavāda, smṛti and nāmadheya and this is done respectively in the second, third and fourth sections of the first adhyāya.

The arthavādas are laudatory passages extolling the yāga; the smṛtis are works composed by such eminent personages like Manu and Yājñavalkya and have their source in the Veda. The names such as Jyotiṣṭoma etc. are intended to create interest in the performance of yāga. Hence all these are assigned equal authority with the vidhis or mandatory texts.

(iii) and (iv) are detailed in the remaining adhyāyas i. e. from II to XII.


the mandatory texts) and since their authoritativeness is admitted on the ground that they have their source in the Veda (the *smṛtis* for example) is not vitiated by the emphasis on *ṣoḍanā*⁸ nor is their validity demonstrated (in the first *pāda*)⁹. This (their validity) will however be demonstrated in the succeeding three *pādas* as declared (in the *vārtika*):—

“Thus in this section having as aforesaid established the validity of the Veda in regard to *dharma*, thereafter however, dividing the Veda into three parts, what its import is will be revealed.”¹⁰

(8) *Pramāṇibhavatām* (प्रमाणोपपत्ताम्) perception etc. when employed to establish *dharma* are excluded and not *arthavāda* etc., which from their context are in close association with the mandatory texts and so are as authoritative as themselves.

(9) *Nāpisādhitam* (नापिसाधितम्). If the authoritativeness of *arthavāda* &c. is not demonstrated in the first *pāda* how could they, the question arises, attain to the status of *pramāṇa*? That they are as valid means as the *vidhivākyas* in the elucidation of *dharma* is maintained in the three succeeding *pādas* of the first *adhyāya*.

(10) The last stanza of the first *pāda* of Kumārila's *Vārtika*,



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*Reference is to S'āstradīpikā, Tarkapāda, Nirṇaya Sāgara Edn. 1915.
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
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
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